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Professor Corri Zoli: US Intelligence Warns of Foreign Election Interference

With less than 100 days to go before the US election, US intelligence officials are warning of attempted election interference by Russia, China and Iran, according to an update from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Professor Corri Zoli’s research focuses on contemporary problems of warfare from an interdisciplinary social science, public policy, and law perspective, and one track of her research investigates the changing nature of the US military force structure and the challenges of asymmetric warfare for military personnel.

“Director Evanina’s message is also designed to educate Americans and all private and government entities to adopt an aware and ‘hardened’ posture.”

“Election interference from foreign actors is a common and persistent concern in the United States (as well as in other democracies),” says Zoli. “Open systems with free markets, free speech, and robust public spheres are always subject to influence operations by actors, state and non-state, with their own agendas. These influence agendas may be motivated by political and economic interests, an opportunity for peer competitors to gain an advantage or edge over the US, or they may be efforts to simply test the strength and resilience of US public democratic institutions and processes, to see how far they can exercise power and influence on an unsuspecting American public.

“The recent statement by William Evanina, at the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence Director of National Counterintelligence and Security Center, should be read as a positive, proactive posture on the part of the federal government. It indicates that US Intelligence professionals are ready and aware of these multifaceted election threats. Part of the purpose of Evanina’s message is to publicize the issue—to make ordinary Americans aware that bad actors will try to influence them through information campaigns, including on social media platforms.  

“The reach of those influence campaigns also includes cyber acts targeting election systems and infrastructure. The US is somewhat distinctive in the diversity of our election systems among municipalities and states, with multiple redundancies and post-election auditing procedures, all of which makes voter fraud less likely. There are recent cases of US based election interference by vote tampering, evident in recent prosecutions of individuals, including over 900 criminal convictions across the US of individuals attempting to change or remove votes (false registration, buying votes, misuse of absentee ballots, etc.)—but still the scope of that problem is relatively small.

“Director Evanina’s message is also designed to educate Americans and all private and government entities to adopt an aware and ‘hardened’ posture about foreign influence campaigns in social and traditional media designed to shape US voters’ perspectives and preferences by manipulating fears—about COVID-19 and the pandemic response, recent protests and riots across the nation, political division, etc.”

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Professor Corri Zoli Helps Empower Veterans at Virtual Academic Boot Camp

Professor Corri Zoli was among University faculty who, for the sixth year in a row, helped teach in the esteemed Warrior-Scholar Project (WSP), a no-cost academic boot camp for first-year student veterans. Normally held on campus to allow for a comprehensive campus experience, the program was moved online this year in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hosted at 18 select institutions nationwide, WSP empowers enlisted military veterans by providing them with a skill bridge to enable a successful transition from the battlefield to the classroom, maximizes their education opportunities by making them informed consumers of education, and increases the confidence they will need to successfully complete a rigorous four-year undergraduate program.

This year’s cohort of nine included four active duty incoming students, four veterans and a reservist, all members of the US Army, US Navy or the US Marine Corps. Participants attended virtually from Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Washington, Washington DC, Nevada, Ohio and Iowa.

The project at Syracuse University is a collaborative effort of the Office of Veteran and Military Affairs and the College of Arts and Sciences. Syracuse faculty who taught during this year’s program include, among others:

  • Corri Zoli, Associate Teaching Professor, College of Law and Maxwell School
  • Tessa Murphy, Assistant Professor, Maxwell School
  • David Bennett, Professor Emeritus, Maxwell School
  • Eileen Schell, Professor, College of Arts and Sciences
  • Genevieve García de Müeller, Assistant Professor, College of Arts and Sciences

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Chinese Hacking Indictments: Professor Corri Zoli Speaks to SCMP

US indicts Chinese hackers on charges of targeting coronavirus vaccine data and defence secrets

(South China Morning Post | July 22, 2020) The US government has indicted two Chinese nationals in connection with long-running cyber espionage operations that aimed to net information on Covid-19 vaccines, military weapons and human rights activists, in what is the second Justice Department indictment against individuals from China in recent days.

“You’re seeing more inter-agency cooperation to manage this threat.”

Li Xiaoyu, 34, and Dong Jiazhi, 33, were charged with 11 counts of conspiracy, identity theft and fraud related to operations carried out from China since 2009, some in conjunction with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), according to an indictment filed on July 7 with the US District Court for the Eastern District of Washington and unsealed on Tuesday …

…“This is information warfare so there’s a lot of evasion and distraction going on here,” said Corrinne Zoli, director of research at the Institute for Security Policy & Law at Syracuse University in New York. “I think the issue is not that the Chinese need more clinical data to sort out their own vaccine programmes.”

China is more likely to be “trying to probe the US response to what really is an economic and security threat that is the pandemic”, she added. “They’re trying to figure out if the response is leading to the US to be more stable or unstable, if their response is indicative of a government that resilient or a government that’s in crisis” …

… “What you’re seeing now is just an administration that’s got a more of a forward posture … you’re seeing more inter-governmental operability, you’re seeing more inter-agency cooperation to manage this threat,” said Zoli. “Any nation state that has capacity, and usually that’s any nation state with a developed military, is going to have some information warfare capacity,” including the US.

The difference, she added, is that while the US government limits cyber espionage to the countering of national security threats, China is more inclined to hack for economic and commercial secrets as well.
“That’s where I think they are in a league of their own,” she said …

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Professor Mark Nevitt: Secretary Pompeo’s Surprising Defense of International Law

Secretary Pompeo’s Surprising Defense of International Law, Allies, and the Law of the Sea Convention

By Mark P. Nevitt

(Just Security | July 15, 2020) On Monday, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a strongly worded, highly legalistic statement lambasting excessive Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea.

I welcome Pompeo’s statement as a substantive legal matter. It is long overdue. Nevertheless, it showcased the United States’ current schizophrenic approach to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its international allies in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere, and international law more generally. The United States should seek to reaffirm and reinforce its commitment to international law through UNCLOS Senate ratification. While doing so is by no means a magic bullet, it would serve as an important signal of the U.S. commitment to a rules-based order in the South China Sea and beyond.

To recap: for years, China has been making excessive claims in the region, pointing to a so-called historic “Nine-Dash Line” as the legal basis for these claims. This envelops an enormous swath of the South China Sea, encroaching on other nations’ maritime boundaries. And China is following through on its excessive claims: it has shown a willingness to employ aggressive tactics — including flexing military muscle — against other coastal states in Southeast Asia. It also has been building massive structures on contested “low tide elevations” and “rocks” in the area. These formerly uninhabited formations barely rise above sea level. They don’t qualify as “islands” under international law and, therefore, don’t create a critically important exclusive economic zone around them. But that has not stopped China from building and asserting one …

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Corri Zoli Discusses Arrest of Chinese Researcher with SCMP

US ties activities of arrested Chinese military officer to those by defendant in Boston case

(South China Morning Post | June 25, 2020) US federal prosecutors in Los Angeles have tied the activities of an arrested Chinese military officer conducting research at the University of California to that of a Chinese defendant charged in another high-profile case, in what Washington sees as a coordinated pattern of spying.

The indictments reflect the US government’s efforts to prevent advanced technologies developed in America from being transferred to China’s military, as lawmakers and government officials all the way up to President Donald Trump warn of Beijing’s attempts to undermine national security …

… Corri Zoli, director of research at the Institute for Security Policy & Law at Syracuse University in New York, went further: “I can’t imagine that the Chinese government would be sending active-duty military officers to academic tech programmes, who are on their payroll and engaging is some sort of transfer of research technology, and they’re not somehow involved” in an orchestrated tech transfer strategy, she said.

“These efforts are very much a kind of fourth-generation warfare or information-warfare-type strategy, and this is the way of our contemporary world,” Zoli added.

“It’s not just China doing this. It’s everybody. This is the way that we’re evolving into a new battlespace, but China happens to be very effective at it.”

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Corri Zoli Awarded US Intelligence Community Grant to Offer Geopolitical Simulation

Professor Corri Zoli, Syracuse University College of Law Director of Sponsored Research, has been awarded an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence (ICCAE) Program Office grant for a 2020 Virtual Summer Session Simulation project she is spearheading entitled “Strategic Triangulation in Central, South, and East Asia.” The award is made through the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which directs the national ICCAE program. 

The nationwide ODNI ICCAE Summer Session takes place across 26 July and 7 Aug., 2020. The simulation, which will be presented to ICCAE students twice, draws on the international security subject matter expertise of Zoli, a Co-Investigator for the Syracuse University ICCAE, and Robert B. Murrett, Professor of Practice in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and SU ICCAE Primary Investigator. Also helping to design the simulation are Professor James Edward Crill II, Forensic and National Security Sciences Institute (FNSSI), College of Arts and Sciences; Professor Margaret Hermann, Director of the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell School; Professor Michael Marciano, Associate Director of FNSSI Research; and Professor Robert A. Rubinstein, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Professor of International Relations, Maxwell School. 

“The ODNI ICCAE online simulation scenario reflects today’s highly dynamic strategic environment and the stressors currently faced by the 17 elements of the US Intelligence Community (IC) and our national security institutions,” explains Zoli. “This environment is characterized by complexity and unpredictability, asymmetric actors, transformative technology, and global economic and public health variables, to name just a few challenges.” To provide a realistic geopolitical theater, the simulation begins with a recent real-world event: on April 2, 2020, an Indian quadcopter was shot down by the Pakistan Army after it violated Pakistan’s airspace in the Sankh district and entered 600 metres into Pakistan’s territory to conduct surveillance. 

“As the simulation unfolds, ICCAE students will discover, through plot-twists and seemingly unrelated incidents in Afghanistan—including the release of a modified vaccinia virus and the recovery of fissile material from a dirty bomb—that China is influencing actors in the background,” explains Zoli. The students, adopting various roles in the IC community, must puzzle their way through this combustible mix of events, involving operationalized chemical and nuclear capabilities, illicit global economic collaboration, disrupted supply chains, and the role of transnational critical infrastructure, such the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. 

“ICCAE students will play US intelligence analysts from many of the 17 IC agencies and must make sense of the threats and opportunities that these kaleidoscopic challenges create,” says Zoli.

Zoli explains that in the interdisciplinary spirit of the SU ICCAE program, the simulation exercise is the result of a collaborative partnership that includes faculty from the College of Law, College of Arts and Sciences, and the Maxwell School. Zoli adds that several of her College of Law colleagues also will share their expertise with participating ICCAE students from across the nation. Furthermore, SU ICCAE graduate students have been invited to join with and mentor ICCAE summer session students during the simulations. 

About SU ICCAE

Recently renewed for year two, the Syracuse University Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence (SU ICCAE) is a Congressionally-mandated, $1.5 million federal award program designed to increase the recruitment of diverse candidates into US public service and the 17 agencies of the Intelligence Community. SU ICCAE—which includes minority-serving partner institutions CUNY Grove, CUNY John Jay, Norfolk State University, and Wells College—is open to all Syracuse University faculty and students. Embracing a broad understanding of diversity, SU ICCAE prioritizes the central role and contribution of diversity to public service, building next-generation knowledge professionals, and the ethics and rule of law tradition essential to US security policy and governance.

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Putting Arms Control at Risk: Trump’s Hasty Play with the Treaty on Open Skies

By Kamil Szubart*

The US decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) announced by President Donald J. Trump on May 22, 2020, and then followed by a notice submitted by the US Department of State to the depositaries and all other state-parties to the Treaty, seems to be a next step of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle an arms control architecture[1].

“A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.”

This time, President Trump has decided to demolish a framework for conventional arms control.

The pull-out of the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019, and the current resolution toward the OST, has simply led to the decrease of confidence between NATO allies, and it harms both US and European security interests undermining the sense of keeping and developing the arms control systems (both conventional and nuclear) at all. So far, 10 foreign ministers of the European state parties of the treaty have expressed regret over the US announcement[2].

By this step, the Trump Administration will give Russia a useful tool to deepen divisions within the NATO alliance and booster anti-American narrative throughout Europe, especially in Germany and France.

The decision will benefit the Kremlin much more than preventing Russian inspectors from making observation flights over the US territory and gleaning intelligence data on the US critical infrastructure reportedly. Finally, the sudden step of President Trump would likely have an impact on possible bilateral negotiations with Russia to extend the New START Treaty signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010, which expires in February 2021[3].

Understanding the Meaning of Conventional Arms Control

The OST has remained a crucial pillar of the conventional arms control system founded at the end of the Cold War era.

Alongside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document (V.D.), politically binding agreement with its last updated in 2011, the OST has belonged to stand-alone confidence, and security-building measures (CSBMs) developed in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE[4].

Signed on March 24, 1992, and in force since Jan. 1, 2002, the accord permits each of state-parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others’ territories to collect data on military forces, facilities and activities, especially drills and troops’ movements[5].

Each aircraft be equipped with sensors that enable them to observe and identify significant pieces of military equipment, such as main battle tanks, pieces of artillery, jet fighters, combat helicopters or armored fighting vehicles. Through the 1990s and in early 2000s, 34 countries from the OSCE (the Treaty’s initial 27 signatories) have joined and ratified the OST while Kyrgyzstan (a 35th) has signed but not ratified it so far[6].

According to the Treaty, observation flights can be carried out over the others’ entire territories, and no area can be declared off-limits by the state-party[7]. In practice, tensions between the OST state-parties have led to a partial suspension of the Treaty’s provisions.

“The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.”

Since 2010, the Russian Federation has excluded the provision of the OST alongside its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to having recognized both separatist republics as independent states. In response, Georgia has, since 2012, formally suspended Russia’s right to observe its territory. In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit on the OST flights over Russia’s heavily armed Baltic exclave Kaliningrad. The Russians have justified the decision referring to a paragraph of the OST that allows for the legitimate refusal of access to an area bordering a non-signatory state. In 2017, the Trump Administration suddenly declared Russia’s violation of the OST, and it restricted Russian access to Hawaii and Alaska in retaliation[8].

All scheduled observation flights are based on passive and active quotas agreed by the all state-parties annually. A passive quota refers to a certain number of overflights and the geographic size of host-state determines it[9]. Larger state-parties such as the US, Russia sharing its quotas with Belarus—42 quotas a year for the US and Russia each—or Ukraine (12 quotas) hold a higher number of quotas than Portugal or Denmark (Portugal have two and Denmark, six 6).

An active quota is the number of flights it may conduct over other OST countries. The OST does not require state-parties to use all quotas every year. However, the allocation of flights cannot be transferred for the next year. The first flights within the OST regime were carried out in August 2002, and since that time, more than 1,500 air observations have been conducted (including 77 US flights over Russia’s territory).[10]

The Treaty regulates all aspects related to the observation flights, including the time of each flight (which must be completed within 96 hours after arrival at the point of entry), the necessity to submit advance notices (72 hours before the scheduled flight), specific points of entry and exit and refueling airfields, flight plans, information on inspectors, and more.

The OST indicates if each observing party may use its observation aircraft or if it must use planes supplied by the host country. Some state-parties to reduce costs have not owned observation aircraft and exploited aircraft of allies, such as the NATO member countries conducting joined observation flights over Russia and other non-NATO countries[11].  

The Treaty Is not a Primary Intel Asset

Using the Treaty as an intelligence-gathering could have been useful during the Cold War era, but not now.

Although Russia has decided to place within its both aircraft (Tu-214 and Tu-154) used in the OST missions, new digital systems possess a more excellent range and an advanced processing capability, and the imagery could be similar to that available on the commercial market of satellite imagery.

However, under the provision of the Treaty, all new sensors and aircraft must be certified and approved by all states-parties gathered in a decision-making body of the OST: the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). Subsequently, a copy of all data gleaned during each OST flight must be supplied to the overflown state party. Moreover, all state parties receive a mission report from each single observation mission and have the right to purchase the data gleaned by the observing state party.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the information the OST countries, including Russia, collected under the provision of the Treaty is only a value in addition to other means of intelligence gathering, especially satellite imagery. States, including some state-parties, with capabilities in imagery intelligence, can typically obtain better imagery and collect it without informing or passing to review collected data to the other party.

The Priceless Values of Détente

A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.

The Treaty undoubtedly helps to increase transparency and communication between its members. It symbolizes cooperation between distrustful countries or politico-military alliances, and in that respect, is a model for behavior. The OST is also a risk-reduction mechanism to ease tensions between the state-parties. Finally, inspectors on both sides get to know one another during the field implementation of the Treaty, leading to more interaction and more exceptional communication at the inspection level.

Although the Treaty has been in force for 18 years, the idea to set up a framework for each other’s reconnaissance flights over the territories of the US and the Soviet Union sparked in the peak of the Cold War. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed an agreement between both countries to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.

Unfortunately, the US proposal was rejected by the Kremlin, claiming the initiative would be used for espionage. The idea was not abandoned definitely, and President George H.W. Bush resurrected it in 1989. The negotiations between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were launched in 1990, parallel to simultaneous talks on the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990[12].

Both conventional and nuclear arms control systems were born at the end of the Cold War and mirror that era. However, significant progress has not been achieved since that time. Although the 2010 New START Treaty should be considered a small step forward, in the meantime, the systems have been demolished by technology, such as satellite imagery, as well as Russia’s pivot in its foreign and security policy (and that seems to be heading for a confrontation with the West under Putin).

In 2007, Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. Subsequently, in March 2015, Russia abandoned its place in the Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a main decision-making body of the CFE Treaty[13]. The Trump Administration also has taken steps to disassemble of the architecture of arms control worldwide, first with the shutdown of the INF Treaty, and now tinkering with the OST.

Risks Over Benefits

The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.

First, Russia will use the abandonment as a diplomatic weapon to give saliency to the US as a country that has destroyed foundations of the international arms control systems and the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security. Moscow will feature Washington as an untrustworthy and unpredictable partner for cooperation, especially regarding politico-military dimensions. It is also sending a contradictory signal concerning the extension of the New START that expires in 2021, giving Russia a reliable card in this diplomatic play.

Secondly, the exit from the OST will leave the US at a disadvantage position among European allies from NATO, so the US should be prepared for heavy criticism coming from Berlin and Paris and a dozen of other European capitals. The US decision will be seen among European NATO partners as one more instance where the Trump Administration ignores the views and interests of its allies.

Thirdly, it is evident that Russia will use the US decision to put more substantial pressure on the US allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, by arousing insecurity concerning an American military engagement in Europe and its allied credibility.

The goal of Moscow would be to deepen divides within NATO, especially between allies on NATO’s eastern flank and the others. Concurrently, Russia would offer an alternative to the US exit from the OST by proposing Europeans its initiatives either to replace the OST or to renew conventional arms control and cooperative security in Europe without the US. Russian propositions in this matter would surely be taken into consideration by governments of a couple of European allies.

However, there is a positive sign of the Trump Administration’s decision. It will not be the necessary for the US taxpayer to invest in replacing the more than 50-years-old Boeing OC-135B aircraft that US observers and their allies use for combined OTS flights[14].

But in other aspects, the US will lose. There is still a chance to revoke the decision because it will come into force in six months. However, the clock is ticking.


*Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at the Institute for Security Policy and Law (formerly INSCT), via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He worked as a security and defense analyst for think tanks in Poland and abroad, where he was responsible for German security and defense policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic terrorism threats in German-native-speaking countries, and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and conventional arms control. He completed international courses on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document in the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s current workplace.


[1] https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-regret-us-plan-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/

[3] https://www.state.gov/new-start/

[4] https://www.osce.org/arms-control

[5] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/what-is-the-open-skies-treaty-intl/index.html

[6] The 34 state-parties (plus Kyrgyzstan) to the OST are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark (including Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[7] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[8] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/

[9] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[10] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/05/21/donald-trump-abandons-the-open-skies-treaty

[11] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[12] https://armscontrolcenter.org/treaty-open-skies/

[13] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/

[14] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/04/dod-wont-offer-contract-for-new-open-skies-plane-until-treaty-future-clear/

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The President, the Military, and Minneapolis—What You Need to Know

By Mark P. Nevitt

(Just Security | May 29, 2020) In the aftermath of the tragic killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer, riots and unrest have been spreading throughout the city of Minneapolis and the country. The Minnesota National Guard has been activated by Minnesota Governor Timothy Walz. These Minnesota National Guard members report to the governor and can actively take part in law enforcement functions, which they are doing.

But now, President Donald Trump is involved too.

The president tweeted Thursday night that he 

can’t stand back & watch this [the riots] happen to a great city, Minneapolis. A total lack of leadership. Either the Radical Left Mayor, Jacob Frey, get his act together and bring the city under control, or I will send in the National Guard and get the job done right.

Further, Trump stated that he “just spoke to Governor Walz and told him that the Military is with him all the way. Any difficult and we will assume control but, when the looting starts the shooting starts . . . ”

Beyond their deeply troubling moral messaging, there are two key legal issues associated with these remarkable tweets (outside of Trump’s showdown with Twitter, which placed a warning on the tweet, saying it glorified violence):

  • Under what conditions can the president order the military to respond to Minneapolis?
  • What are the military’s rules for the use of force—i.e. does looting justify shooting?

Can Trump Use the Military to Respond to Minneapolis? 

Yes, but this is subject to certain, critical legal restrictions under both the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act. The president is, of course, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, but he lacks the authority to use the military in any manner that he pleases. That authority is constrained by Congress and the courts.

Under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, Congress has limited the president’s ability to use the federal (title 10) military in domestic law enforcement operations such as searches, seizures, and arrests. A criminal statute, the Posse Comitatus Act makes it unlawful for the Army or Air Force to “execute the laws . . . except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” So, the president cannot simply call in federal military forces or nationalize the Minnesota National Guard to quell the civil disturbance in Minneapolis without pointing to a Posse Comitatus Act exception …

Read the full article.

Mark P. Nevitt is an Associate Professor of the College of Law and an SPL Afiliated Faculty member.

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China & US Must Cooperate to Lead World Out of Coronavirus Danger

By James B. Steinberg

(Nikkei Asian Review | May 9, 2020) The international response to the COVID pandemic is a watershed moment in the evolution of the international order. At time when the value of global interdependence and international cooperation is already under assault from politicians and popular movements around the world, national leaders and international institutions face a fundamental test: can they turn back the growing tide of inward-looking, zero-sum policies to meet this critical challenge?

It would seem self-evident that the transnational nature of the threat, both to health and to prosperity, should trigger actions emphasizing international cooperation. Yet to an alarming degree, the response has been the opposite. For too many countries, the instinct has been to pull up the drawbridges and point fingers, seeking national solutions at the expense of international collaboration.

From the earliest days, China turned down offers of help from international organizations and foreign experts; refused to freely share complete information; and petulantly blocked Taiwan from World Health Organization emergency meetings.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, similarly, proposed banning travel, halting immigration and cutting off funds for the WHO, more focused on deflecting political fallout than developing an effective response … MORE

James B. Steinberg is University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs, and Law and an SPL faculty affiliate.

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Hon. James E. Baker: A Marshall Plan for Public Health (ABA Podcast)

The DPA: A Marshall Plan for Public Health with Judge James Baker

ABA National Security Law Today | April 9, 2020

Judge James Baker is the the Director of the Syracuse University Institute for Security Policy and Law, former Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and former Chair of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security.

This episode references:

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