Counterterrorism Policy

Corri Zoli Interviewed by CNY Central About the New Zealand Mosque Shootings

(CNY Central | March 15, 2019) “We bring in a new perspective on an awful topic a woman we turn to often in times like this. Corri Zoli is an assistant professor at the Maxwell school at Syracuse University … why the recordings? why record what you’ve done?”

“I think this is a kind of classic terrorist tactic that we’ve been seeing since you know 2010 at the least where ISIS and al-Qaeda. I remember in the Toulouse attacks in France, for instance, where they recorded the attacks against a Jewish school with a GoPro video” …

A Brief Look at European Security & Defense: Franco-German Steps to Renew the EU?

By Kamil Szubart

On March 4, 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron published an opinion piece titled “For European Renewal” in the biggest newspapers across Europe. The article is, according to the French president, a roadmap for reviving an idea of the European integration that is threatened by the growth of nationalism and populist movements across Europe, the forthcoming “Brexit,” and the crisis of the European Union as a political project most of all.

A short passage of Macron’s article focuses on the future of European security and defense ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU. Brexit has been a hot topic, which European leaders have touched upon for two and a half years. In his piece, Macron explains that the EU, in the past two years, has reached substantial progress about European security and defense matters. He also encourages Europe to continue these successful efforts by setting “a clear course”, namely “a treaty on defense and security” that “should define our fundamental obligations in association with NATO and our European allies: increased defense spending, a truly operational defense clause, and the European Security Council with the United Kingdom on board to prepare our collective decisions”.

The Aachen Treaty as the First Footstep

Macron’s remarks are not something new. These ideas saw progress a couple of weeks ago (Jan. 22, 2019) when the French president and his German counterpart Chancellor Angela Merkel signed the Franco-German Treaty on Cooperation and Integration in a western German city of Aachen, commonly known as the Aachen Treaty. The declaration alludes to the Élysée Treaty signed by both countries 56 years ago (Jan. 22, 1963). The treaty’s preamble emphasizes the need to continue intensive bilateral cooperation between both countries as well as on forum of international organizations such as the EU and the United Nations. Much attention in the document has been devoted to the issue of security and defense, including Chapter II on “Peace, Security, and Development.” The Aachen Treaty confirms an absolute need for close cooperation between Berlin and Paris in the area of security and defense policies, internal affairs (e.g., combating terrorism and organized crime), and further integration of arms industries of both countries.

Germany and France declared mutual military assistance in case of aggression, resulting from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and article 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Berlin and Paris also committed themselves to work toward the cohesion and the credibility of European defense and the development of defense programs, as well as the reconstruction of cooperation within the framework of the German-French Defense and Security Council and—if possible—the presentation of a joint position at the EU and the UN.

Ambitions Versus Harsh Reality

Both Macron’s article and the Aachen Treaty embody a couple of somewhat strategic or operational limitations. Let us look closer at some of them.

First of all, the Aachen Treaty likely will not lead to the creation of a new paradigm in the field of European security and defense based on cooperation between France and Germany. Thus, there is no serious threat to NATO and its strategic planning process (NDPP) nor to initiatives developed under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Secondly, the document is only a political declaration that refers to those already being developed jointly through Berlin and Paris programs currently on various levels. It should be noted that both countries differ in the assessment of many of these projects. One of the best examples is Germany’s and France’s approaches to crisis management operations in the EU’s southern neighborhood, specifically North Africa. France permits itself to conduct combat operations against extremist groups in the Sahel region, while the Germans focus on advisory and training activities towards local security forces and providing humanitarian aid. For years, Germany and France have participated in two missions under the auspices of the UN (MINUSMA) and the EU’s training mission (EUTM Mali) in the Sahel region. The French Armed Forces, next to MINUSMA, also carry out a counterterrorism operation called Opération Barkhane.

Thirdly, The Aachen Treaty references the need to establish the “common strategic culture” of both countries despite Germany and France representing different strategic cultures regarding the use of military power and overseas deployments. Therefore, this demand should be interpreted only in terms of a political declaration.

For instance, the process of deploying the Armed Forces in France is much quicker than in Germany. This depends on the positions of the armed forces and political command and control over them in the constitutional systems of France and Germany. But differences between Paris and Berlin also occur at the operational level. France can deploy abroad in approximately 20,000 troops; Germany up to 5,000. Moreover, the German Bundeswehr faces a significant deficit in strategic airlift capabilities, depending on the assistance provided by the US or commercial transportation enterprises. On the other hand, France has at its disposal a well-developed chain of military bases worldwide, in South America, the Middle East, and Africa. France also remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power.

Fourthly, the Aachen Treaty calls for establishing common standards and rules for arms exports. However, it will be likely problematic to develop and set up a common position on arms goods. Despite the cooperation on the EU arms industry market, German and French arms companies compete for each other on non-European markets, above all in the Middle East and in southeastern Asia.

Fifthly, Despite the appeal in the Aachen Treaty to the need to continue efforts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU, its operationalization will not be possible in the short term. In the first place, there is a difference in its definition by both partners. For France, the EU strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense are mainly actions for strategic emancipation from the US, and its military presence in Europe, which is negatively received by some EU countries, especially NATO’s eastern flank. For the Germans, however, EU strategic autonomy is first and foremost an option for the EU in respect to its southern neighborhood. According to Germany, the EU’s southern neighborhood remains outside the primary interest of NATO and the US, while France treats that region as its sphere of influence.

Moreover, Berlin remains strongly skeptical about plans to give the EU the central role as a security provider for the EU countries in the face of threats posed by Russia. Despite disputes between Germany and the Trump Administration on burden-sharing, the US and NATO remain vital pillars of Germany’s security policy and guarantors of peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. In Germany’s view, security and defense policy activities taken by the EU will strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

Sixthly, Berlin and Paris realize what London’s security and defense capabilities mean for their security, especially counterterrorism. France has payed particular attention to its European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2) launched in June 2018 and composed currently of 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK). Paris needs both Berlin’s and London’s buy-in for the development of EII/EI2. In the case of Germany, France expects political support; in the case of the British, their military capabilities.

The Aachen Treaty’s declarations on strengthening cooperation between Germany and France concerning counterterrorism and combating organized crime should be considered appropriate. Although there are EU mechanisms in this realm—including the Schengen Information System or Europol—there is still less effectiveness than there should be. For instance, EU member countries still selectively provide intelligence data for their everyday use. Cooperation in this field should not, however, have an exclusive character, limiting itself to German-French cooperation. It should be extended to other EU member countries.

INSCT Research and Practice Associate Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at INSCT, via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He works as an analyst for the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznan, Poland, where he is responsible for German foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic threats in German-native-speaking countries and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and the UN. Currently, he is working on a doctoral dissertation examining US-German relations in the field of international security since 9/11.

 

Searching for Justice: The Courier Speaks to Corri Zoli on the 30th Anniversary of the Lockerbie Disaster

Staring into the ‘bowels of hell’: Lockerbie disaster 30 years on and the ongoing transatlantic search for justice

In an exclusive interview marking the 30th anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, Michael Alexander speaks to an American terrorism expert whose university is marking the loss of 35 of its students in the attack – and hears the ‘hellish’ memories of several journalists who covered the aftermath.

(The Courier | Dec. 21, 2018) Cruising at a height of 31,000 feet and packed with students embarking on the long journey home to America for Christmas, passengers on board New York-bound Pan Am flight 103 were just 38 minutes into their flight from London Heathrow when at 7.03pm on December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on board as the Boeing 747 flew over the Scottish borders.

“I had a briefing fairly recently from the FBI and the Scottish prosecutors on this. They talked about the various leads that they were pursuing in this long process.”

As well as killing all 259 people on the aircraft, the falling debris which hit the town of Lockerbie two minutes later, also wiped out 11 people on the ground.

As bodies, luggage and debris tumbled six miles through the sky, the most devastating carnage in the town came as the wings containing thousands of gallons of aviation fuel exploded on impact – gouging out a huge crater in Sherwood Crescent and obliterating two houses and their inhabitants with it …

… It’s a chapter which is of particular interest to terrorism expert Dr Corri Zoli – Syracuse University’s director of research at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, and a teaching professor of law.

In an exclusive interview with The Courier, she revealed she was recently briefed by the FBI and Scottish prosecutors on the ongoing criminal and civil cases against alleged co-conspirators.

While she knows there was controversy around al-Megrahi’s prosecution, she thinks there was “good strong evidence” for him being involved – particularly as the late Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi admitted his country’s involvement in 2003.

She’s confident that, despite the complications of a trans-national investigation and liaising with “unstable” countries like Libya, further prosecutions will take place.

“I had a briefing fairly recently from the FBI and the Scottish prosecutors on this,” she said.

“They talked about the various leads that they were pursuing in this long process.

“They actually were closer to finding information in part because there has been destabilisation in Libya.

“They were getting access to records they hadn’t been able to gain access to before. So I do think there will be that level of justice in terms of prosecuting people beyond those who have already been prosecuted.”

Dr Zoli, who has worked at Syracuse since 2009, said the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was “shocking” in all the ways that terrorist attacks are shocking.

It was atypical in that hijackings were the most prevalent form of terrorism at the time and, some 13 years before 9/11, it was unusual in that it targeted Americans. It was also relatively rare for bombs to eliminate aircraft in flight.

However, the fact there were 35 American students on board from a single university was in itself “quite unprecedented” …

Staring into the ‘bowels of hell’: Lockerbie disaster 30 years on and the ongoing transatlantic search for justice

Corri Zoli to Attend UNSC Counterterrorism Special Meeting on the “Madrid Principles”

Zoli_UN_MeetingINSCT Director of Research Corri Zoli has been invited to attend a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee on Dec. 13, 2018, in the Economic and Social Council Chamber, UN Headquarters, New York City. The meeting will discuss “Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017): A Review of the Madrid Principles,” a document that provides guidance to member states on stemming the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) across national borders, while staying compliant with human rights laws and norms.  

In particular, explains UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Chair Gustavo Meza-Cuadra in his letter of invitation, the special meeting will tackle the issue of FTFs “in light of the evolving threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, particularly FTF returnees and relocators and their family members.” The review of the Madrid Principles also will examine gaps that may hinder states’ abilities to detect, interdict, prosecute, rehabilitate, and reintegrate FTF returnees and their families, as well as identify good practices.

Among the working sessions will be those on “border security and information-sharing”; “global research perspectives on cross-cutting trends”; “countering incitement, recruitment, and violent extremism”; and “judicial measures, international cooperation, and prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies.” Invited discussants include Edmund Fitton-Brown of the Analytical and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee; Elisabeth Neugebauer, Deputy Special Representative, International Criminal Police Organization; and Tanya Mehra, International Centre for Counterterrorism, The Hague.

The Madrid Principles were developed from a July 2015 special meeting hosted by the Government of Spain and co-organized by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with which INSCT collaborates on counterterrorism prevention. This Madrid meeting was attended by member states from every region of the world, as well as representatives of international and regional organizations, universities, and civil society groups. Discussions and technical sessions identified 35 guiding principles that were subsequently adopted by the Security Council and offered as a practical tool for use by member states in their efforts to combat terrorism.

Corri Zoli Discusses Mail Bomb Attacks & Domestic Terrorism on Spectrum News

Are Recent Suspicious Packages an Act of Political Terrorism?

(Spectrum News | Oct. 25, 2018) One after the other, suspicious packages were delivered to the media and liberal leaders, many in New York City.

“This is a very painful time in our nation. It’s a time when people are feeling a lot of hate in the air,” said Bill de Blasio, (D) New York City Mayor.

Some are calling it domestic terrorism and others call it political terrorism.

“Someone one who might be trying to use scare tactics or trying to enhance political passions, make partisan divisions worse,” said Corri Zoli, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism Research Director.

It is a scary thought for a country largely functioning on a two-party system.

Zoli said, “It’s not accurate to characterize opposition groups as enemies in a two-party system that structures the United States.”

But, is that what we’re seeing?

In 2017, the target appeared to be on the other side of the aisle, members of Republican Congressional baseball team.

“Is this a retaliatory attack for those attacks? This is the problem with polarization. You get these kind of escalating dynamics…clearly this is an expression of partisanship gone awry,” said Zoli …

Watch the whole segment.

 

“A Worrisome Case”: William C. Banks Examines Election Season Attempted Mail Bombs with Bloomberg Law

Law Enforcement Probes Attempted Mail Bombs

(Bloomberg Law | 10.25.18) William Banks, a professor at Syracuse Law School, discusses law enforcement efforts after several high-profile democrats, public figures, and the CNN newsroom in New York received apparent explosive devices over the course of several days …

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2018-10-25/law-enforcement-probes-attempted-mail-bombs-radio

2018-2019 National Security Law/Counterterrorism Law Supplement Published

National Security Law/Counterterrorism LawEdited by Professor Emeritus William C. Banks—along with Stephen Dycus, Peter Raven-Hansen, and Steve Vladeck—the 2018-2019 National Security Law/Counterterrorism Law Supplement (Woulters Kluwer/Aspen Casebook Series, 2018) addresses topics covered in the sixth edition of National Security Law and the third edition of Counterterrorism Law, both leading casebooks in their respective fields.

Among the new materials presented in the Supplement are those concerning national security incidents and actions taken during the first year of the President Donald J. Trump Administration. Teachers and students will find documents and legal notes addressing Washington v. Trump, Zaidan v. Trump, Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA, Carpenter v. United States, and Hernandez v. Mesa. There are also policy notes on topics such as targeted killings, military action in Syria, military activities in cyberspace, transparency in the intelligence community, access to FISC records, and national security letters. Many chapters investigate “ripped from the headlines” topics that have dominated the news from 2016 to 2018: the Trump Administration “travel bans,” the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka the Iran Nuclear Deal), Russian hacks of the US power grid, the Hawaii Missile Alert, the McCain-Feinstein Amendment, and undocumented immigrants.

As the authors write in their preface, “In a field of law as dynamic as ours, we expect many important developments each year. But even we were surprised by the torrent of notable changes during the first year and a half of the Trump Administration.

“Federal courts caught up with the Trump travel bans in fast-progressing litigation that came to a head when a divided Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii. Almost 40 years after the supreme court expounded the third-party doctrine to give the government access to dialed phone numbers without a warrant or even probable cause, the court refused to apply that doctrine to allow access to historical cell tower locational data in Carpenter v. United States.

“Earlier this year Congress approved a five-year extension of programmatic national security surveillance without significantly changing the scheme approved in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. In the meantime, the continuing chaos of the Guantánamo military commissions continued to generate new case law and new issues, even as the Administration persisted in relying on them to prosecute some accused terrorists. In addition, evidence of Russian efforts to interfere in US elections, and to intrude on critical US infrastructure, presented new challenges in the evolving field of cyber security law.

“Other developments arose from continuity between administrations. Arguably building on the Obama Administration’s precedent of using armed force in Libya for the protection of local civilians, the Trump Administration used armed force in Syria for the same purpose. In rejecting the nuclear deal with Iran—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the Trump Administration ironically invoked the same authority that its predecessor used to approve the plan: the putative authority of the president unilaterally to decide on non-binding political commitments to and with foreign states.

“Unabated screening and profiling at the borders continued to generate litigation and a broad range of new case law on immigration. Administration efforts to control leaks and prevent disclosure of national security information also continued. We have tried to keep up with these and many other developments without overly complicating the use of the core casebooks …”

 

“Machine-Driven Mistakes”: William C. Banks Speaks to Fifth Domain About the IG Report on NSA Surveillance

NSA criticized for ‘increased risk’ of jeopardizing civil liberties

(Fifth Domain | July 25, 2018) The National Security Agency is at an “increased risk” of jeopardizing civil liberties and the privacy of American citizens, according to an inspector general report that comes just months after a controversial program that collects emails and phone calls was extended.

“A fair amount of it was apparently mechanical or machine-driven mistakes.”

The NSA watchdog said that agency analysts performed “noncompliant” searches using the organization’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Authority, which were caused by “human error, incomplete understanding of the rules, and gaps in guidance.”

According to the report, which covered the period from October 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018 the unauthorized searches were related to the FISA’s counterterrorism authority.

“This has been going on for some time,” said William Banks, a law professor at Syracuse University. He said that noncompliance was a heated topic when the section 702 of the FISA act was reauthorized earlier this year. “A fair amount of it was apparently mechanical or machine-driven mistakes … you would expect it might take the better part of a year for improvement in implementation to show results.”

Previously, privacy groups have raised issue with the noncompliance searches of digital and electronic records …

Read the whole article.

 

The Stain of Torture

By David M. Crane

(Re-published from The Jurist | June 26, 2018) June 26th is the United Nations’ International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. Its purpose — to denounce the crime of torture and proclaim solidarity with its survivors — is in stark opposition to the policy of my government.

As a former Chief Prosecutor of an international war crimes tribunal in West Africa, I walked the countryside, interviewing hundreds of victims — often people who had been tortured by their own government. The atrocities scarred them physically, emotionally, and psychologically for life.

But they shared their stories enthusiastically with our team, willing to relay the horror in order to receive human empathy, long after giving up hope of finding anything resembling justice.

Having prosecuted the officials of other governments for torture, I now find myself in a United States increasingly identified with torture and cruelty. Intensifying torture was presidential campaign rhetoric. A person who oversaw waterboarding in black site prisons is promoted to lead the CIA. Children are removed from their families as they flee gang violence. The U.S. reportedly now plans to leave the UN Human Rights Council, although a member has never before departed that body voluntarily.

How Did We Get Here?

A leader in building the post-World War II consensus against torture and for the rule of law, the United States chose a path of lawless brutality after the horrendous crime of 9/11. Lashing out broadly at Muslims, it threw aside its own rules and embarked on the rendition, detention and interrogation program (RDI).

Our government embraced torture, long known by interrogation professionals to be counter-productive. It did so as an attempt at payback, out of anger. Weak justifications defied logic, morality, and international legal norms that had stood for decades.

Two Libyan victims of the RDI program, Abdul-Hakim Belhaj and his wife Fatima Boudchar, exemplify how far the U.S. moved to the dark side. They were on their way to the U.K. to seek asylum as opponents of the Gaddafi regime. With intelligence from the U.K., the CIA detained them in Thailand and tortured them: painful stress positions, drugs, and vicious beatings. Boudchar was several months pregnant.

From Thailand they were rendered to Libya, to the hands of their enemies, where they suffered further torture. Ms. Boudchar was released from prison just three weeks before she gave birth.

Fourteen years later, the British Prime Minister finally issued an apology for the U.K.’s role in the couple’s rendition and torture, a crime led by the United States. Stating that her country had contributed to the couple’s capture, Teresa May admitted “neither of you should have been treated this way,” and apologized unreservedly.

Less than a month later, the European Court of Human Rights also repudiated torture. It delivered judgments against Romania and Lithuania, which both hosted secret CIA torture prisons, finding this supporting role a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In stark contrast, at the same time such moral progress was occurring across the Atlantic, the U.S. confirmed a key figure in the RDI program to lead the CIA. Gina Haspel oversaw detention and torture at a black site occupied by Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, the detainee whom the European Court said was subject to “an extremely harsh interrogation regime.”

What Are Citizens to Do When Their Government Doubles Down on its Torture Record?

I am part of one attempt to answer that question and give the survivors a safe space to tell their stories. I am a Commissioner of the North Carolina Commission of Inquiry on Torture (NCCIT). As part of the RDI program, the CIA used contractors and public facilities in North Carolina to move victims around the world to be tortured. Now local citizens are demanding to know how and why this was allowed to occur …

Read the whole article.