New Battlefields

David M. Crane, Syrian Accountability Project Profiled in Der Spiegel

Unimaginable Horrors: The War-Crimes Lawyer Hunting Bashar Assad

(Der Spiegel | June 6, 2016) Is it allowable to kill Bashar al-Assad? “It is,” says university professor David Crane, “under certain circumstances.” He asks the question to one of his students during a lecture, then answers it immediately himself, without any discernable emotion.

At such times, the friendly professor turns into a fierce lawyer, unafraid of travelling to the world’s more uncomfortable places.

Crane was once a chief prosecutor for the United Nations, but these days, he is a professor at Syracuse University’s College of Law in the state of New York. As a lawyer, when he sees Assad, he doesn’t see a monster, he sees a case. And it’s a case that he wants to bring before a court.

Syracuse is a city of 145,000 inhabitants in the so-called Rust Belt, an industrial region approximately four hours by car from New York City. The University of Syracuse has a good reputation, especially when it comes to law.

It is here where Crane, shortly after the beginning of the Syrian civil war, established a kind of student public prosecutor’s office. Together with their professors, students are preparing for the day when Assad’s war crimes will hopefully be tried before an international court. They call it the Syrian Accountability Project.

Crane’s appearance is unremarkable, with a light-colored shirt, gray wool trousers and dark glasses. But he comes alive when he talks about what drives him: the opportunity to use legal powers to confront unimaginable horrors.

At such times, the friendly professor turns into a fierce lawyer, unafraid of travelling to the world’s more uncomfortable places. It was Crane who, in 2003, indicted one of Africa’s most powerful dictators, Charles Taylor, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. In 2012, Taylor was sentenced to 50 years in jail. Liberia’s former president is being held responsible for the death of over 100,000 people and is currently being kept in an English prison, which he will likely never leave.

Detailed Tally

Crane and his students hope that either the United Nations or post-war Syria decide one day to establish a special tribunal to prosecute the conflict’s war criminals. Indeed, they are collecting evidence as if such a court already existed, comparing sources from around the world, checking eyewitness reports and communicating with human rights organizations. They comb through government reports and media articles as completely and thoroughly as possible. They are keeping precise records of this war, documenting every day, thus creating the world’s most complete matrix of war crimes in Syria. It is an index of horrors, up-to-date versions of which Crane regularly sends to the UN and the International Criminal Court.

The young people staying up all night to do this are doctoral candidates, like Molly White, 24, from Michigan. Even as a child, she was fascinated by serial killers and the fragility of civilization. With the Syrian Accountability Project, she is motivated by the idea of working on something that “will change the world,” instead of ending up in the trash can …

To read the complete profile, click here.

Global Media Coverage

ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism

By Courtney Schuster (L ’13), David Sterman, & Peter Bergen

“An unprecedented number of the militant recruits are female, young (with an average age of 24), and active in online jihadist circles.”

Who exactly are the estimated 4,500 Westerners drawn to join ISIS and other militant groups in Syria, and how great of a threat do they pose?

In the wake of Friday’s harrowing terrorist attacks in Paris, New America’s Peter Bergen, INSCT alumna Courtney Schuster (L ’13), and David Sterman have published “ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism,” a new report reviewing what is known about the Westerners drawn to Jihadist groups.

New America has collected information about 475 individuals from 25 Western countries who have been reported by credible news sources as having left their home countries to join ISIS or other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq.

The report finds:

  • Western fighters in Syria and Iraq represent a new demographic profile. An unprecedented number of the militant recruits are female, young (with an average age of 24), and active in online jihadist circles. This is quite different from Western militants who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s or Bosnia in the 1990s.
  • Many have familial ties to jihadism. One-third of Western fighters have a familial connection to jihad, whether through relatives currently fighting in Syria or Iraq, marriage, or some other link to jihadists from prior conflicts or terrorist attacks.
  • The likeliest threat to the US comes from ISIS-inspired violence. Returning fighters from Syria pose a limited threat to the US, while the threat from returning fighters to other Western countries is greater.
  • Few of the Western fighters who have traveled to Syria or Iraq are in government custody. Only one-sixth of Western fighters in New America’s dataset are in custody and more than two-fifths of the individuals are still at large.
  • The wars in Syria and Iraq have proven deadly for Western militants. Almost two-fifths of Western fighters in New America’s dataset have been reported as dead in Syria or Iraq. Almost half of the male foreign fighters and six percent of female militants have been killed.
  • The majority of Western fighters have joined ISIS. Only one-tenth have joined Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, and only six percent have joined other smaller groups.
  • The most popular route to Syria is through Turkey. Forty-two percent of the Western foreign fighters made their way to Syria or Iraq via Turkey.

To read the full report from New America, click here.

INSCT alumna Courtney Schuster (L ’13) is a program associate for the International Security Program at New America. David Sterman is a senior program associate at New America and holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. Peter Bergen is Vice President; Director of Studies; and Director of the International Security, Future of War, and Fellows programs at New America and a frequent contributor to CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and elsewhere.

US Cyber Command Moves Towards “Lethal Cyber Weapons”

By Christoper Folk (J.D./M.A. in Forensic Science Candidate, ’17)

US Cyber Command $460 million Cyber Project

In a follow-up to a recent cyber round-up, according to NextGov an upcoming $460 million project at US Cyber Command will outsource a number of offensive cyber capabilities to the private sector.  NextGov reports that these new weapons that will be developed will give the US military the ability to launch logic bombs which would be capable of causing critical infrastructure to essentially self-destruct.  The article quotes the head of Raytheon’s Government Cyber Solutions Division, Ret. Adm. Bill Leigher “When I use ‘cyberwar’, I’m thinking of it, in a sense of war …  [s]o yes, war is violence.”

In June, the DoD released the “Law of War Manual.” NextGov reports that the chapter entitled “Cyber Operations” provides three potential actions that the Pentagon deems to be legal in cyberspace:

  1. Triggering a nuclear plant meltdown
  2. Opening a dam upstream from a population center
  3. Disabling air traffic control services

“[T]hese new weapons that will be developed will give the US military the ability to launch logic bombs which would be capable of causing critical infrastructure to essentially self-destruct.”
Furthermore, NextGov indicates that the stated role of the Pentagon in the context of Cyberspace is: (1) Prevent or block foreign hackers from targeting domestic systems, (2) providing assistance to U.S. combat operations overseas, and (3) the defense of military networks.  Accomplishing those mission objectives is no different from standard military operations in a conventional warfare setting, according to Ret. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, the executive director of Duke University’s Center of Law, Ethics, and National Security.  

In the article, Dunlap goes on to say that this essentially comes down to a balancing test with reasonable collateral damage on one side and the military objectives on the other; so long as the collateral damage isn’t disproportionately greater than the probability of military success, lethal impacts to civilians are acceptable in a cyber strike situation.

Analyzing the Uncertainty of the Scope and Duration of Cyber Weapons

CYBERCOM spokeswoman Kara Soules indicated to NextGov that it is vitally important to understand the success rate of any cyber weapons.  The concept of cyber joint munitions effectiveness indicates that a cyber weapon has been carefully evaluated such that there is an understanding of the rate of effectiveness against a given target, according to the article.  NextGov reports that Tim Maurer, a cyber policy researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated that outside the U.S., governments are also hiring private organizations to develop cyber munitions which include zero-day exploits.  

One issue which then arises is the fact that malware is not designed to self-neutralize and consequently the impacts can be far-reaching and of an unknown duration, reports NextGov.  For instance, in the case of the Stuxnet virus, which was first revealed back in 2010,  Microsoft was still dealing with the after-effects of this virus and issued yet another patch, (latest patch released March 2015), according to NextGov.  Consequently, statements that NextGov attributes to Cedric Leighton, a retired Air Force Intelligence and National Security Agency Director, are particularly vexing when Leighton states that the use of cyber munitions is like the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, where we really didn’t fully understand the consequences of using nuclear weapons.

My Opinion

As our ability to wage war has continued to expand and our use of technology becomes pervasive we seem to be removing some of the human elements from the battlefield.  With weapons such as smart bombs and drones, we have enabled military actors to engage targets from locations far removed from the actual theater of operations.  While this likely has resulted in saving countless U.S. lives, the psychological impacts are vastly different from those engaged in direct line-of-sight hostilities with enemy combatants …

To read the full article, click here.

New Battlefields/Old Laws Workshop, Simulation to Address Foreign Terrorist Fighters

One of INSCT’s signature projects, New Battlefields/Old Laws (NBOL) began with a 2007 symposium to commemorate the 100th anniversary of The Hague Convention of 1907 (“Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land”). It has since grown into a series of interdisciplinary workshops and associated publications that reexamine the application of centuries-old laws and customs of armed conflict in the age of non-conventional, asymmetric warfare.

The 2015 edition of New Battlefields/Old Laws will convene at the headquarters of project partner the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel during ICT’s World Summit on Counter-Terrorism on Sept. 10, 2015. Titled “The Threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and UN Security Council Resolution 2178,” the workshop (and a related simulation) will explore what nations can do to prosecute, prevent, and/or de-radicalize nationals who wish to fight for insurgent and terrorist organizations in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions.

Calling foreign terrorist fighting a “scourge on a global level,” the United Nations passed Resolution 2178 in September 2014. It called for all signatories to ensure that their legal systems can prosecute travel for terrorism or related training and the financing or facilitation of such activities. It also called for nations to take measures to curb radicalization within their own borders and to better monitor the travel of would-be insurgents and mercenaries “in order to avoid ‘feeding the monster’ of terrorism.”

Taking part in the morning workshop will be project lead William C. Banks, Dean of SU College of Law and Director of INSCT, and SU Law Associate Professor Nathan Sales. They will be joined by Peter Neumann, Director, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College, London; David Scharia, Senior Legal Officer, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UN Security Council; Gregory Rose, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia; and Daphné Richemond-Barak, Senior Researcher and Head of the Terrorism and International Law Desk, ICT.

During the afternoon of Sept. 10, a simulation will further explore the issues raised during the workshop. “The Threat of Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters to Europe” takes as its backdrop the continuing asymmetric war between Islamic State and world coalition-backed forces in Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. In this simulation, a group of European foreign fighters is reportedly planning a large-scale attack in their state of origin, and senior security officials of the home state must act to prevent the attack and bring the would-be perpetrators and their associates to justice.

Distinguished counterterrorism experts who will be playing roles in the simulation are Brian M. Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation (Prime Minister); Dimitar  Mihaylov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to the State of Israel (Minister of Defense); Daphné Richemond-Barak, ICT (Minister of Justice); Michèle Coninsx, President, EUROJUST (Minister of Interior); LTC Bryan Price, Director, Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy at West Point (National Security Adviser); LTC Edward Brady, US Army War College Fellow, ICT (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces); David Scharia, UN Security Council (Chief Prosecutor); Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Orit Adato, Associate, ICT, and Former Commissioner, Israeli Prison Service (Head of the Prison Service); and Rohan Gunaratna, Director, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (Head of De-Radicalization Programs).

More information about the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, NBOL, and other workshops can be found here.

William C. Banks Discusses “How Do Drone Strikes Go Wrong?” With the BBC

How do drone strikes go wrong?

… Mistakes happen, says William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University’s Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, largely for one reason: “People are involved.”

In most cases the people are good at their jobs. Over the years the drone programme has been extraordinarily effective in the fight against al-Qaeda. Dozens of al-Qaeda commanders have been “taken off the battlefield,” as Mr Obama puts it, through the strikes.

Mr Obama recognised the dangers of the programme and had a policy that stated no strikes would be carried out unless there was “near certainty” that civilians would not be killed.

The process for carrying out a drone strike is complex, though, and critics of the programme say it was only a matter of time until they backfired.

People in Pakistan—officials as well as individuals who are hired locally—help US analysts put together information about the hiding places of militants.

In addition, individuals who work on the drone programme, whether they are CIA analysts or done pilots, sift through intelligence from satellite imagery, audio recordings and other sources in order to distinguish “bad guys from good guys”, Mr Banks explains.

“Even if you’re up close and personal, it can be difficult,” he says, “much less if you’re at a distance, using technical means” …

To read the story in full, click here.

The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context

USS_TrumanAn interview with Robert Martinage, former Deputy Under Secretary of the US Navy and former US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities.

(Re-published from Small Wars Journal, Jan. 29, 2015) Octavian Manea: Historically, what is the role of offset strategies in broader US grand strategies?

Robert Martinage: Since the end of the Cold War, there have been at least two occasions when the United States pursued an offset strategy. The first was President Eisenhower’s “New Look” in the 1950s and the second was the “Offset strategy” promoted by the Secretary Harold Brown in the 1970s. In both cases the fundamental challenge was the same: to offset the numerical advantage of Warsaw Pact forces by using a US technology advantage.

OM: What is the role of the offset strategy in deterring a competitor? How crucial was the second offset strategy in deterring and changing the calculation of the Soviet mass superiority vis-à-vis NATO? What was the effect of the second offset strategy for the Soviet perceptions?

RM: The second offset strategy clearly influenced Soviet perceptions about deterrence. By demonstrating the capability to “look deep and shoot deep” into Warsaw Pact territory in the 1970s and 1980s, NATO called into question the underlying Soviet operational concept at the time for combined arms ground maneuver. Our growing ability to see deep into the Warsaw Pact territory and hold Soviet second echelon forces at risk caused a great deal of angst. The Soviets not only wrote about the problem in military journals, they also made focused investments and conducted field exercises to mitigate the impact of NATO “reconnaissance-strike” networks. It is very clear from the historical record that the Soviets were very concerned about these developments and actively took steps to counter them.

OM: In his latest book, Harold Brown remembers the fact that when he became Secretary of Defense in 1977 he concluded that “America and its allies needed to be able to deny or at least reduce Soviet confidence that it could roll over Western Europe in thirty days. (…) The US considered how to change the Soviet calculation that its military could accomplish a blitzkrieg victory in Western Europe.” Was the offset strategy the crucial variable that changed the Soviet calculus and stabilized the balance of power?

RM: Based on historical documents that are now available, it did influence Soviet calculations about the balance of power and bolstered deterrence along the Central Front in Europe. It certainly sowed doubt in their minds about the feasibility of achieving the timelines underpinning their operational plans. Was the offset important in terms of stabilizing the situation in Europe? Yes, I think that is the case. The second offset strategy, however, was focused on a relatively narrow operational problem; specifically that NATO forces were outnumbered by roughly 3 to 1 along the Central Front in Europe. That said, it was a major strategic concern given the uncertain credibility of the US threat to escalate to the nuclear level in defense of Western Europe. In terms of addressing the underlying problem, the NATO conventional imbalance in Europe, the offset strategy was effective.

OM: Why is the traditional US power projection model in crisis? Why is the conventional US power projection challenged?

RM: In large part the monopoly that we had on the second offset strategy (the networking of the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems with precision strike capabilities) is slipping away. Prospective adversaries have watched how we project power over the last several decades, identified vulnerabilities and fielded reconnaissance-strike networks of their own to target US weaknesses. And this new environment has troubling implications for the way the US has preferred to project power since the end of the Cold War. We now have four core operational problems that we have to address: one is that close-in theater bases (airfields, ports, ground installations) are increasingly vulnerable to precision attack; second, surface combatants including aircraft carriers operating in littoral waters are easier to detect, track, and attack at range; third, networked integrated air defense systems (IADS) are becoming more lethal in terms of both of their reach and their ability to counteract our defense systems that we may try to use (as a result non-stealthy aircraft are increasingly vulnerable to attack); and lastly, space (used for ISR, precision navigation and timing, and communication) is increasingly vulnerable to both kinetic and non-kinetic attack, and thus, is no longer a sanctuary. These are the four core problems that we need to address and that is why, in my view, countering them should be the focus of the third offset strategy. We need to “offset” the fielding of disruptive technologies, and anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) systems in particular, by prospective adversaries to restore and sustain US conventional power projection capability …

To read the full article, click here.

Octavian Manea (MAIR ’13) was a Fulbright Junior Scholar at SU Maxwell School and a 2013 recipient of a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies through INSCT.

Rise of the Female Jihadists

Female_JihadistBy Peter Bergen & Emily Schneider (LAW ’14)

(Re-printed from CNN, Jan. 10, 2015) The hunt is on for Hayat Boumeddiene, the 26-year-old woman wanted over Thursday’s fatal shooting of a French policewoman. Early reports suggested she might have escaped Friday from a kosher grocery store in eastern Paris as French authorities mounted a rescue operation to free hostages being held there by Amedy Coulibaly, believed to be her boyfriend. However, CNN reports that no witness has publicly said the woman was actually at the scene of the siege, and now sources are saying she left France before the attack on the policewoman.

[pullquoteright]In many cases, these Western women are often going to Syria with the fantasy that there they will be able to marry the jihadist militant of their dreams.[/pullquoteright]Boumeddiene is believed to have left France for Turkey around January 2 with the final destination of Syria, according to French and Turkish sources.

Regardless, photographs of Boumeddiene published by Le Monde show her shooting what appears to be a crossbow in an all-enveloping black niqab. At first glance, this might appear puzzling. After all, jihadist militant organizations support Taliban-style rule, which allows women only a role at home.

However, we have seen a number of women from the West, including American citizens, taking an operational role in jihadist terrorist plots, including Colleen LaRose, a Caucasian-American 46-year-old from Pennsylvania, known as “Jihad Jane,” who traveled to Europe in 2009 to scope out an attack on Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist who had drawn a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed’s head on the body of a dog. 

European women have also played an operational role in jihadist terrorism. Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old Belgian woman, died when she committed a suicide bombing in Iraq in 2005. And on May 14, 2010, Roshonara Choudhry, a 21-year-old British woman, stabbed Stephen Timms, her local member of Parliament, for his vote in support of the Iraq War. Timms survived the attack.

And there is also 31-year-old British citizen Samantha Lewthwaite, who is, according to Interpol, “wanted by Kenya on charges of being in possession of explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony dating back to December 2011.” The Kenyans believe she was part of a terrorist cell that was planning to carry out an attack in Kenya. Lewthwaite is the widow of one of the suicide attackers who set off bombs on London’s transportation system on July 7, 2005, killing 52 commuters.

All this underscores that the phenomenon of females joining the jihad has become far more common in the past four years, fueled by the Syrian war, which is drawing an unprecedented number of foreign militants from around the globe, including from the West.

According to data collected by New America, based on media reports and court documents, of the 455 individuals who have been publicly identified from around the world who have traveled or were arrested while attempting to travel to Syria to fight with a terrorist organization, 36 were women from the West. That’s 8%. And their average age is, astonishingly, only 18 years.

They hail from countries from around the West: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Britain and the United States. And in many cases, these Western women are often going to Syria with the fantasy that there they will be able to marry the jihadist militant of their dreams …

For the complete article and video, click here

Peter Bergen is CNN’s National Security Analyst, Vice President at New America Foundation, and Professor of Practice at Arizona State University. He is the author ofManhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden—From 9/11 to Abbottabad. Emily Schneider (LAW ’13) is a Research Associate at New America and a 2013 INSCT graduate.

How the Kouachi Brothers Turned to Terrorism

Je_suis_CharlieBy Peter Bergen & Emily Schneider (LAW ’14)

(Re-printed from CNN, Jan. 9, 2015) Said and Cherif Kouachi, who are the leading suspects in Wednesday’s attack on the magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, grew up in a world of poor job prospects, life in the French equivalent of the projects and prison time that is not untypical for the French “underclass,” which is disproportionately Muslim.

On Friday, the two brothers were killed in a shootout with police, achieving their goal of a supposedly heroic “martyrdom.” Before they died, one of the brothers spoke on the phone to a journalist from the French news network BFM saying, “We are just telling you that we are the defenders of Prophet Mohammed. I was sent, me, Cherif Kouachi, by al Qaeda in Yemen. I went there and Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki financed my trip… before he was killed.”

Anwar al-Awlaki was a Yemeni American cleric born in New Mexico who spent much of his life in his native United States, but he left in 2002 when he became the subject of intense FBI scrutiny. He traveled first to the United Kingdom and then to Yemen, where he joined al Qaeda, eventually rising to become the head of its operations to target the West.

Al-Awlaki was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in September 2011.

Cherif Kouachi, the younger of the brothers had dreams of being a successful rapper that fizzled and later worked in a series of menial jobs, including as a pizza delivery guy. He fell under the spell of a militant cleric in the 19th arrondissement, a gritty immigrant-dominated suburb of northeastern Paris that has little in common with the glamorous French capital city that is known to tourists.

He was arrested by French authorities in 2005 when he was about to leave to fight in Iraq.

He planned to travel to Iraq via Syria. This appears to be quite significant as the pipeline of Western “foreign fighters” traveling to Syria and then to Iraq during this time period was dominated by “al Qaeda in Iraq,” which was a precursor both of the Nusra Front, which is al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, and also of ISIS, which broke away from al Qaeda early last year.

He was sentenced to three years in prison in 2008 for recruiting fighters to join in the Iraq War alongside the notorious leader of the al Qaeda affiliate there, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, but didn’t serve any time after the conviction; the judge ruled that his pretrial detention had been enough.

Nonetheless, Cherif’s time in prison awaiting trial seems to have not only solidified his radicalization, but also connected him to people who were important in French militant circles While in pretrial detention, Cherif met Djamel Beghal, who was in prison for his role in an attempted attack against the U.S. Embassy in Paris in 2001.

Cherif and Beghal became friends and in 2010, when Beghal was released, he and Cherif allegedly planned the jail break of another radical Islamist who was serving a life sentence for his involvement in the bombing of the Musee d’Orsay train station in Paris in October 1995 that wounded 29 people.

But prosecutors couldn’t prove the conspiracy, and Cherif was released.

While there is no particular economic profile of terrorists — some are from privileged backgrounds and others are not — it’s interesting to note some of the similarities between the Kouachi brothers and the Tsarnaev brothers, who are alleged to have carried out the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013.

The Tsarnaev brothers grew up in a working-class household in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The elder brother Tamerlan had dreams of becoming a world-class boxer but was unemployed when he carried out the Boston attacks.

He had traveled to Dagestan in Russia in 2011 in an attempt to meet up with militants there. He also felt alienated from American society, telling an interviewer, “I don’t have a single American friend.” The Tsarnaevs were influenced by the jihadist propaganda of Awlaki.

The Tsarnaevs, however, are not typical of American Muslims. For Muslims in the United States the “American Dream” has, on average, worked fairly well. They are as educated as most Americans and have similar incomes.

This is often not the case for the Muslims of France, who make up the largest Muslim population of any country in the West. Consider that around 12% of the French population is Muslim, but as much as an astonishing 70% of itsprison population is Muslim.

According to a researcher at Stanford University, Muslim immigrants in France are two-and-a-half times less likely to be called for a job interview than a similar Christian candidate and Muslim incomes are around 15% below their Christian counterparts …

For the complete story, click here.

Peter Bergen is CNN’s National Security Analyst, Vice President at New America Foundation, and Professor of Practice at Arizona State University. He is the author ofManhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden—From 9/11 to Abbottabad. Emily Schneider (LAW ’13) is a Research Associate at New America and a 2013 INSCT graduate.