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UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES

Exploring the Role of the US Department of State's
Office of Global Partnership in Public-Private
Partnership (P3) Development of the
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves

TECHNICAL REPORT



Program for the Advancement of Research
on Conflict and Collaboration

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Exploring the Role of the US Department of State's Office of Global Partnership in Public-Private Partnership (P3) Development of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves

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RESEARCH PURPOSE: Through interdisciplinary, data-driven analysis, this inquiry explores how and why the S/GP partnership process resulted in a successful model of development innovation in the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves; whether the process may be replicated; and provides useful recommendations for future P3 design in the foreign policy domain.



THIS TECHNICAL REPORT represents the full 12-month evaluation study commissioned by the Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships, U.S. Department of State, for S/GP activities surrounding the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, 2009-2015, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), the Maxwell School of Public Affairs and SU College of Law. It was supported by U.S. Department of State Award S-LMAQM-14-CA-1196 to SU.

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ON THE COVER: A clean cookstove in use in India. (Source: Sustainable Energy for All, UN, Vienna Austria. Image available at www.se4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1-Cookstove-in-India.jpg.)

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CONTENTS

Executive Summary	5
Research Questions	6
Key Working Definitions	6
About the Contribution.....	6
1.0 Public-Private Partnerships at the U.S. State Department: New Paradigms	7
1.1 Before S/GP: Secretary Rice and the Global Partnerships Center (GPC).....	8
1.2 The Clinton State Department and the P3 as a Global Governance Tool	8
2.0 Research Methods: “Standing-Up” the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves as a Case Study in Evaluating the S/GP.....	14
2.1 Methodology Rationale and Case Justification	14
2.2 How to Measure Collaborative Processes and Platforms in Foreign Policy?	15
2.3 Theories of Collaboration: Defining the Object.....	16
2.4 Problem and Impact-Driven Research Priorities.....	17
2.5 Data Collection: Interview Protocol, Data Sources and Triangulation	18
2.5.1 Instrument Development, Sample Selection and Outreach, and Interview Process	18
2.6 Data Analysis: General Principles used from Case Study Evaluation Research	19
2.6.1 Pattern-Matching to the Empirical Domain	20
2.7 Results and Implications.....	21
3.0 Origin Stories: A Narrative Account of Bureaucratic Innovation in Operationalizing a P3	23
3.1 A Word about the Role of Leadership and Leadership Types in Bureaucratic Innovation	24
3.2 Historicizing the S/GP and the Clean Cookstoves Initiative in Phases	24
3.2.1 Phase I: PCIA and the Cookstove Global Partnership Concept Prior to GACC Launch in 2010	25
3.2.2 Phase 2: From CGI 2010 to Creating the P3 Structure: “Launch It, then Build It. . .”	33
3.2.3 Phase 3: From Igniting Change to the 2014 Cookstoves Future Summit: P3 Graduation.....	35
3.2.4 Phase 4: Onward: Assessing Impact, Incorporating Lessons Learned, and Achieving Sustainability	37
3.2.5 Conclusion: Realizing Partnerships at the Intersection of Interests and Opportunity	37
3.3 Founding Partners: The Public Sector, Private Sector, and NGOs.....	38
3.3.1 The Public Sector.....	38
3.3.2 The Private Sector	38
3.3.3 The Nongovernmental Sector.....	40
4.0 Findings: Measures of Success	44
4.1 Facilitating Conditions: Identifying Indicators.....	45
4.2 Measures of Success: Deductive and Inductive Findings	48
4.3 Main Drivers of Collaboration in P3 Development at GACC and S/GP.....	49
4.3.1 Concept Framing: Problem/Solution Nexus in the Clean Cooking/Clean Fuels Sector	49
4.3.2 Epistemic Community and Scientific Evidence in P3 Progress.....	52
4.3.3 Available Partners Willing to Take Risks.....	53
4.3.4 People and Leadership	54

4.3.5 Organizational Culture of S/GP: “Disruptors” in Partnership Management Mechanisms	55
4.3.6 S/GP “Spectrum of Partnerships” Typology.	56
4.3.7 Positive P3 Interface with Pressing USG Foreign Policy Goals	58
4.3.8 S/GP Role in P3 Governance: Definitions, Managing Partners and Executive Direction	59
4.3.9 Collaboration and Partner Objectives	61
5.0 Key Recommendations and Challenges	63
5.1 Strengthen S/GP Office Policies for P3 Development, Outreach, and Incubation.....	63
5.2 Build Responsive Infrastructures at S/GP and Beyond.....	65
5.3 Confront Problems of Sustainability and Replicability	66
6.0 Appendices	68
6.1 Appendix A: Timeline: Institutional History S/GP and GACC	68
6.2 Appendix B: Works Cited and Bibliography by Research Area.....	75
6.3 Appendix C: Interview Protocol [Designed, Nov. 19, 2014]	87
6.4 Appendix D. Additional Climate P3s Discussed: Interviewees and Public Documents	90

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



STUDY OVERVIEW

Public-private partnerships (or P3s) are medium to long-term agreements between the public and private sectors (including nonprofits) whereby public service obligations are provided by the private sector, with clear agreement on shared objectives and risk for delivering public services.¹

The Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP), established in 2009, is tasked with leveraging U.S. government resources to establish a new generation of public-private partnerships in the service of U.S. foreign policy objectives, to maximize foreign aid impact, and to enhance collaboration among the public sector, private sector, and civil society to solve global challenges. Among the flagship initiatives of S/GP is the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (hereafter, GACC or the Alliance), which has proven to be an unusually innovative, globally-scaled, public-private partnership to support a global market for clean and efficient household cooking methods and technologies.

This report evaluates the success of S/GP, and its predecessor, the Secretary's Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), in nurturing, launching, and sustaining the GACC initiative from its inception as an informal working group in the early 2000s to its formal launch as a fully independent entity housed within the United Nations Foundation (UNF). The evaluation study will examine how S/GP helped to build the partnership base with private and other-country partners, how S/GP contributed to this specific collaborative partnership, and the ways that S/GP has identified and sought to

overcome barriers to this and other partnerships. In addition to providing a historical overview of key milestones in S/GP's efforts involving clean cookstoves, this report also provides insights into definitions of success in using P3s in the development and foreign policy domain, and the critical facilitating conditions that account for both positive and negative movement in S/GP partnership efforts in supporting the GACC. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for P3 development in the future. Ultimately this evaluation can serve as a 'road map' for what works and what doesn't with respect to P3 conceptualization, development, and sustainable collaboration and partnerships.

The study is based on four sources of information gleaned from a review of archival data, interviews with key stakeholders from multiple sectors, participation in a number of S/GP and GACC events, and a review of the research literature on P3s and collaboration. We structured our research as a rich, revelatory case study using GACC-specific insights to abstract P3 lessons and best practices for S/GP in the foreign policy and development domains. Our findings and recommendations focus on conditions that can be controlled to enable successful P3s in the foreign policy domain and conditions that are more difficult to control. Moreover, we have designed this document to be prac-

This report evaluates the success of S/GP, and its predecessor, the Secretary's Global Partnership Initiative ... in nurturing, launching, and sustaining the GACC initiative.

tical by providing a digest of relevant insights, findings, and recommendations. We also make available an Appendix at the document's end comprised of primary source materials and references.

In short, we have approached this evaluation study as an opportunity to provide S/GP with maximum analytical resources to understand—not only the success of the GACC—but the unique and ongoing opportunities to leverage public private partnerships (P3s) available to the S/GP, the State Department, and the U.S. Government (USG) and its agencies.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This report examines the U.S. State Department's Secretary's Office of Global Partnership's (S/GP) role in 'standing up' the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (hereafter GACC or the Alliance) as an exemplar of the State Department's public-private partnership strategy. To do this, this study is framed by three research questions:

- » What role did S/GP play in the establishment and success of the GACC? Is that process replicable and under what conditions?
- » What generalizable lessons does this "rich case" hold for the S/GP, its P3 model, and for future collaborative partnership development in the USG foreign policy domain?
- » Beyond "best practices" and "actionable insights," what other lessons and concerns—positive and negative—are critical for the S/GP Office to understand, given its own organizational trajectory and "disrupter" identity?

In keeping with our commitment to provide ample and applicable analytical resources for State and USG in P3 development going forward, we have tried where possible to provide readers with "take-aways," practical insights and recommendations in each section of the study. Such a "toolkit" approach provides readers with applied findings from our data-collection relevant to other P3s beyond GACC; specific thematic clusters relevant for "thinking through" P3 selection and development; and relevant flashpoints and key concepts gleaned from insightful comments by interviewees, the P3 interdisciplinary scholarly literature, pertinent policy documents, and examples to enhance the knowledge base of S/GP professionals and improve their ability to help establish effective P3s in the future.

KEY WORKING DEFINITIONS

We began with the definition of partnership established for the State Department by the S/GP Office. According to S/GP, partnerships are defined as:

a collaborative working relationship with non-governmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance as well as roles and responsibilities, are mutually determined and decision making is shared. Partnerships are characterized by: complementary equities; openness and transparency; mutual benefit; shared risks and rewards; and accountability.²

This definition of P3 emphasizes collaboration—our own key emphasis—and is consonant with discussions from the academic literature.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION

This report evaluates the S/GP as it was involved in incubating, launching, and sustaining the clean cookstoves initiative in its transformation from an EPA P3 to a fully independent, formal Alliance hosted by the United Nations Foundation (UNF).

The evaluation examines how S/GP helped to build the GACC's partnership base with attention to the private sector; how S/GP helped to advance this collaborative partnership structure given challenges to it; and the ways that S/GP has identified and sought to overcome barriers to the Alliance's success. In addition to providing a historical overview of key milestones in S/GP's efforts for clean cookstoves, this report also provides insights into definitions of success in using P3s in international diplomacy and development in the foreign policy domain and the critical facilitating conditions that account for both positive and negative movement in S/GP efforts to stand-up partnerships.

The report concludes with a set of recommendations for P3 development in the future. Ultimately, this evaluation may serve as a 'road map' for what works and what does not with respect to the conceptualization, development, and sustainable launch of P3s in the future.

- 1 See, International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank, Public-Private Partnerships, Version 2.0 (The World Bank Group, Washington, DC 20433, 2014): 17-18 for the definition of a P3; Roberto Ridolfi, European Commission, Directorate, General Regional Policy, Resource Book on PPP Case Studies (June 2004): http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppresourcebook.pdf
- 2 U.S. Department of State, State of Global Partnerships Report (March 28, 2014): 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224308.pdf>.

1.0 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AT THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: NEW PARADIGMS



In 2009, early in the term of the newly-appointed 67th Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton repurposed an existing resource management office, known as the Global Partnerships Center (GPC), located on the third floor of the State's Department's Washington, D.C. office. Clinton renamed the office the Secretary's Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), elevated it to a department within the Secretary's Office (an "S" office), and moved GPI to the 6th floor of the building, nearer to the Secretary's 7th floor office.

Understanding the success of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (hereafter GACC or the Alliance) involves this seemingly mundane bureaucratic act—standing up a new office, with a new mission and vision, albeit with a decidedly modest budget and staff.¹ At the heart of this administrative choice was the beginning of a new partnership process for conducting U.S. foreign policy, development, and diplomacy—a model that came to be housed and operationalized in the S/GP office. Its influence was also emergent across related U.S. government (USG) initiatives, including the restructuring of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Importantly, this model in international affairs required an equally innovative—and agile—method of delivery: the public-private partnership (P3). The use of P3s has been prevalent for some time, particularly in national and international infrastructure development projects. Social science research finds the partnership approach to be useful (under certain conditions) in recruiting, harnessing, organizing, and coordinating stakeholders and in empowering them to invest in a given en-

terprise. Rarely, however, had this mechanism been adapted for broad-scale foreign policy objectives, including creating entirely new aid infrastructures and self-sustaining markets for international development, diplomacy, and aid delivery. The innovative partnership model and the collaborative process developed in the course of standing up the S/GP Office is, thus, one critical and core element of the Alliance's success.

In this section we describe how the S/GP Office and its cornerstone use of the P3 mechanism both depended upon and enhanced this new foreign policy development model, itself a creative response to pressing global challenges and rapidly changing global conditions. In doing this, we pay particular attention to contextual policy pressures, USG bureaucratic and organizational processes that implicated both the Alliance and S/GP as young entities, and the role of innovation in leadership, partnership design, and resource mobilization in making the Alliance a reality. In many respects, the widely-acclaimed success of the cookstoves Alliance—the "rich case" in this evaluation study—stems in part from its role, not only as a flagship State Department P3, but as one of the first collaborative partnerships built and sustained during this generative period of change in both U.S. foreign policy and global affairs. The story of the Alliance's success—whose elements, challenges, strengths, and accomplishments we analyze in detail from first-hand reports—is inseparable from the emergence of the S/GP Office and its creative use of P3s as a timely and innovative delivery system for diplomacy and development challenges.

It would, however, be inaccurate to hypostasize the experimental and ad hoc process by which the Alliance partnership achieved its many ambitious goals.

The collaborative process that became the globally-scaled Alliance was in many respects a “dry run,” a pilot project, an iterative process of inventing both a new foreign policy model and a P3 delivery system, a process that often required unwinding previous practices as much as inventing new ways of doing business in international affairs.

In constructing an evidence-based evaluation, we have reviewed the broad interdisciplinary P3 literature in the social sci-

ences, including over 300 unique peer-reviewed essays, in addition to a variety of government reports; we have assessed much of the written record (i.e., reports, evaluations, strategic plans and business plans) associated with the Alliance and the S/GP Office itself; we

Having used partnerships for domestic issues in her role as a New York Senator, Clinton understood the potential of the P3 model as a responsive mechanism to solve highly interdependent global problems.

have conducted thorough individual interviews with 18 respondents directly involved in the S/GP Office and the Alliance; and we have attended partnership-focused events associated with the Alliance and at the State Department (State or DOS) and engaged with State administrative staff. Through the course of this document, we draw liberally on these sources, as well as insights offered by interviewees, to substantiate and strengthen our findings throughout. In our data-collection process we have anonymized all identities and organizations associated with respondents, as guaranteed in our interview protocol and as our scholarly norms dictate.

Likewise, our preference has been to attribute comments to generalized leaders in their functional roles (i.e. Operational Leader)—not to individuals or organizations. We do identify relevant public figures by name (i.e., publicly known USG officials, professional staff, and unit leaders) associated with the Alliance and S/GP in their disseminated public statements (in self-authored articles, press interviews, public reports, etc.). Lastly, we have included in the Appendices a bibliography of references by subject area, as well as other primary source materials to provide context for our work, including our interview protocol and consent form.

Ultimately, this study—and the research and data-collection that inform it—is designed to be more than a descriptive and summative evaluation of an interesting global partnership. It is also a case-study and ground-clearing exercise in exploring the possibilities and challenges of the P3 concept and mechanism for the foreign policy, development, and aid communities, with the attendant limits and challenges implied in that endeavor.

1.1 BEFORE S/GP: SECRETARY RICE AND THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS CENTER (GPC)

The State Department’s global partnership office did not appear on the scene as a fully-formed concept. The importance of partnerships and the need for an entity within State to facilitate and support them had a prior history. Established in December 2007 by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, the Global Partnerships Center (GPC) was designed to advance results-based P3s as a mainstream tool for U.S. diplomacy.² The Center’s managing director until 2009, Chris Scalzo, described the entity as a “matchmaker” office, which linked private organizations with government agencies to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives. The need for the office, Scalzo explained, reflects the fact that “[e]mbassies are no longer the U.S. presence overseas,” as diplomacy, aid, and development initiatives now include “the U.S. government, for-profit companies, non-governmental organizations, foundations and other partners.”³ The soda brand Coke, for instance—in its brand presence and philanthropic and development efforts to protect its supply chain—may project American national identity as much as traditional State Department bureaus and embassies.⁴ The advisory committee that helped Secretary Rice develop her Transformational Diplomacy strategy thus recommended the GPC Office as a means for “better doing [State Department] business” given “21st century technological and geopolitical realities” and as “non-traditional actors” (including thousands of NGOs) proliferate.⁵ Aside from toolkits to build partnerships, the GPC developed a “clearinghouse” database of all private-public partnerships across the federal government to identify best practices for federal partnerships and to align strategic priorities across executive agencies.

1.2 THE CLINTON STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE P3 AS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE TOOL

Despite the growing use of P3s in public sector infrastructure projects, especially in the developing world, Secretary Clinton’s approach in the foreign policy domain was different. Having used partnerships for domestic issues in her role as a New York Senator, Clinton understood the potential of the P3 model as a responsive mechanism to solve highly interdependent global problems (i.e., public health, sustainable energy, climate change, gender equality) which required a coalition of existing expert actors and where issue areas were entirely intertwined. One study participant recalled a key moment when Senator Clinton insisted there must be better ways to link Central New York farmers and their ample products to downstate demand for fresh “farm to table” products in urban New York City and its boroughs. “One of hundreds of [Clinton] partnership” initiatives, a study respondent recounted, Clinton was struck by the plight of struggling upstate farmers juxtaposed with the immense market for fresh farm items in New York City—a natural opportunity for “a mutually-beneficial” partnership. In effect, Clinton’s inclination to seek collaborative opportunities to public-sector problem solving—

prioritizing private sector and market involvement and linking up existing actors—was a well-established policy preference by the time she entered the Secretary's Office.

Within State—and the newly-elected Obama administration itself—such innovative collaborative thinking was also afoot.⁶ The lingering global financial crisis, which hit in 2008, made new, inventive strategies urgent. Expanding on Rice's P3 strategy and the existing GPC office, Clinton understood that the P3 model might be used as a functional foreign diplomacy and development “delivery system” in a period of global fiscal constraint and at a time when the private sector had vastly outmatched public actors in investing development and aid resources to global problems.⁷ As the newly-established Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR, 2010) noted, the cookstoves Alliance P3, led by the U.N. Foundation (UNF) “illustrates the culture of collaboration that we need to address 21st century challenges.” These partnerships were promising precisely when states faced both resource constraints and a crowded international field of willing actors—evident in the proliferation of tens of thousands of nontraditional actors, including NGOs, with specialized missions, resources, and capabilities.⁸ In light of these historical contingencies, a new concept of international, collaborative partnership was developed to play an increasingly active operational role in the domain of foreign affairs. This study explores in detail one instance of a successful operationalization.

It should be emphasized at the outset, however, that the P3 model—particularly in the international development and critical infrastructure domain—was not new. Models and contracts had been developed since the 1980s to facilitate both collaborative and partnership-based approaches to projects of scale in contexts of uneven governance and capacity.⁹ In this respect, we distinguish three separate concepts across this broad literature and applied field: the term collaboration, often used interchangeably with coordination and cooperation, is a form of working relationships between entities for the purpose of achieving an outcome. But we distinguish “collaboration” from these other forms of joint effort¹⁰ (coordination, cooperation) as the broad distribution among participating entities of authority, responsibility and accountability, resulting in a system that is deeply interdependent. Collaboration, the essential trait of a partnership, thus, brings together diverse entities that: 1) perceive the existence of a common problem (even if their connection to the problem stems from different needs); 2) recognize the inability to achieve a viable solution without the contributions of other participants;¹¹ and 3) are willing to commit resources and expertise to build a common vision and strategy for addressing the issue.¹² Collaborative relationships are based on the understanding that both benefits and risks are shared among partners, and partners are willing to operate in a framework that accords relative equity to all in decision-making, thus, requiring each to cede some independence and control—with the expectation that such commitment is dependable, constant, and relatively durable. This working relationship requires a foundation of trust, strong governance mechanisms for inclu-

sive and deliberative decision-making, highly integrative communication networks, and metrics for purposes of assessment and accountability.¹³ True collaboration creates a fertile environment for innovation at many levels (i.e., institutional, procedural, methodological, technical)¹⁴ and results in prioritizing shared over individual objectives by participating entities.¹⁵

Similarly, the phrase public-private partnership has come to signify a variety of working arrangements between the public and private sectors. The P3 is often equated to a contracting model in which the public entity plays the critical roles of defining the problem, exercising primary authority over decision-making, and shouldering the risk of failure. Utilizing the more general term partnership to encompass the diverse range of existent relationships between public and private entities, we define public-private partnerships specifically as cross-sectoral organizational structures that function according to the basic principles of collaboration. The institutional manifestation of the partnership must contain governance structures and procedures to ensure mutuality between partners (shared goals, risks, and accountability), equity in decision-making; processes for pooling and distributing resources (including information), and systems for accountability.

The case for the P3 model in the foreign policy domain was already being expressed by State's Policy Planning Office in the 2010 QDDR in these prioritized methods and approaches: (1.) collaboration—far beyond interagency cooperation; (2.) market driven mechanisms; (3.) bundling foreign policy objectives; (4.) using alliance and inter-sector models to grapple with global complexity and interdependencies shaping most problems; and (5.) using high risk, high reward start-up methods and a focus on the biggest, most interlinked problems.¹⁷

It is likely, moreover, that P3s are suited to certain sectors (i.e., critical infrastructure development, historically)—though this question is beyond the scope of this study. Likewise, in national security and defense, P3s have long been integrated into U.S. Defense Department (DoD) operations, from private sector involvement in military technology, to private military contractors (PMCs) outpacing military personnel on contemporary battlefields. Working relationships based on public-private partnerships—in a similar contract model structure to DoD—have also been long used at USAID and were facilitated by its own longstanding “global partnership” office, which provided much early insight for the P3 concept at S/GP. But, increasingly, P3s are being adapted to the broad foreign policy domain for development and aid delivery, the subject of this study; and perhaps less commonly so, for diplomacy. Our evaluation thus corresponds with this generative moment in which “the verdict is still out” on whether the P3 model is a “good fit” for State Department business and is invariably part of the early contemplation of the utility and sustainability of this tool—and under what condi-

tions—in the contemporary landscape of international affairs and foreign policy.¹⁶

Part of Clinton's innovation was in understanding this 'blue sky' moment and in building a bureaucratic structure to operationalize the opportunity that the P3 model itself represented in helping to facilitate the core foreign policy aims at the heart of the State Department: diplomacy, development, and defense, as described in QDDR 2010. In domestic politics, the partnership tool was useful at State for many reasons in the aftermath of the global financial crisis when even strong states struggled with fiscal policies to reorient their economies. It was also useful given the costs associated with the Post-9/11 wars—the longest wars in U.S. history—which, when combined with sequestration, reduced State's already limited resources for proactive foreign policy initiatives and cast a pall over the United States' traditional forward-leaning posture in the world. In an environment that Cindy Williams describes as one of austerity and fiscal restraint, a reserved approach to international affairs emerged, along with what some termed the "new isolationism," as slow and steady military drawdowns and cuts converged with the rising public desire to exit the global stage.¹⁸ No doubt, Clinton was well aware that this inward-looking attitude chafed against the increasing global need for international aid resources among the soon-to-explode Arab Spring states and elsewhere. Other systemic global problems—climate-based conflict, water deficits, food insecurity, rising energy needs—loomed large beyond obvious Mideast crises and other economic and political flashpoints, including increasing tests of international access to the global commons.¹⁹ Globally scaled, well-coordinated, transformative, and sustainable interventions that leveraged all relevant

resources and actors—in capacity, commitment, and expertise—were recognized as sorely needed.

One additional, contextual element—often missing from the partnership literature—is needed to make sense of why the foreign policy application of the P3 model proved so timely and potentially successful: preexisting, broad-based, and largely successful innovative development initiatives. Few sectors may boast of the recent global success that international development initiatives have achieved, especially in extreme global poverty reduction (cut in half since 1990). Such transformative results have initiated a thorough rethinking of post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG) paradigms, notably, the Post-2015 Development Agenda, now underway at USAID, the World Bank, and elsewhere.²⁰ Among other economic factors, such dramatic shifts were aided by the MDG's agenda setting, planning, and execution framework. One key vehicle for MDG implementation, the MDG Corporation, is itself a P3 initiated by the second Bush administration.²¹ Despite valid criticisms and limitations, the clear message in the aftermath of the MDG planning process is the need for coordinated global framework building, coalition formation, and policy execution to tackle "wicked" problems.²² These three strategies represent key attributes of State's conception of the P3 foreign policy model. What is unusual about this moment in the life cycle of international development, however, is the degree to which these models were actually effective while, at the same time, they remain little known or understood as drivers of global development success beyond narrow diplomatic and development circles. Thus, expanding the understanding of public-private partnership models has important implications for the utility and sustainability of P3s in the future.



From the perspective of seasoned practitioners of statecraft, such coalitionist, framework-based, planning and capacity-building initiatives for long-term and sustainable development in a partnership process that integrated all relevant actors, including the private sector, are timely and innovative tools of contemporary global governance. Clinton herself was well aware of the capacity of this tool given the cross-cutting nature and global scale of the most serious foreign policy challenges. All of these factors not only made public-private partnership mechanisms a notable 21st century tool for delivering development but a potentially politically powerful tool for conducting global statecraft and governance, particularly in the context of established globalization.²³ The themes of interagency collaboration and

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- » Today, it is impossible to separate development from diplomacy, demanding a new way of designing and meeting US foreign policy goals.
- » New models of diplomacy and development are ineffectual without enabling infrastructures—including offices like S/GP.
- » Given the 2008 global financial crisis and new resource constraints, the P3 model is a useful tool and new type of delivery system for redressing highly interdependent global problems and for meeting US foreign policy objectives, a position reinforced by State leadership and the Obama Administration's Executive Order on interagency collaboration, among others.
- » Clinton designed the S/GP as an entry point for global problem solving forms of collaboration between USG, the public and private sectors, and global civil society using State convening power and developing an incubator/disrupter model for P3s in the USG.
- » P3s facilitate USG participation in problem solving without becoming the dominant face of the effort; allow for the inclusion of nonstate actors and broader buy-in and ownership of mission/goals; provide for a wider resource base; and engage different types of expertise. All of this enables State to become a "joint services" organization rather than a merely contractual (contract granting) agency.
- » At the core of the S/GP P3 method was a fundamental reorientation of the problem-solution approach to foreign policy challenges—at many levels. At the largest level, global partnerships are a delivery mechanisms for diplomacy, aid, and development goals—to share the burden, risk and rewards of ambitious aims in poverty reduction, women's equity, sustainable climate and energy initiatives. At a more localized and bureaucratic level, the mechanics of such partnerships depend on empowering agencies, departments, leadership and staff to prioritize problems and develop an internal approach to addressing them. That entails new work processes, new kinds of people and leaders, new kinds of legal contracts and agreements, new partner networks and outreach efforts and more.
- » State also reconceptualized impactful diplomacy to preserve the U.S. global leadership role.
- » Prioritized institutional steps for effecting these shifts involve leveraging private sector partners and the very different approach the sector brought to advancing foreign policy goals "through their resources, their capacity to establish presence in places we cannot, through the technologies, networks, and contacts they can tap, and through their specialized expertise or knowledge." ²⁶

the expanded utilization of cooperative working arrangements with the private sector were also integral to the message conveyed in the inaugural U.S. State Department QDDR (2010).²⁴ The prioritized steps for effecting this shift to integrate the P3 model into mainstream foreign policy business, according to State's Policy Planning Office, included both inward- and outward-facing innovations.²⁵

Ultimately, to create a new P3 delivery system and to implement the partnership concept and approach within the institutional structure of the State Department, S/GP invariably had to standardize and modernize a number of highly bureaucratic work processes associated with P3s for diplomacy and development. Among the procedural challenges faced by S/GP were the need to:

- » Identify and formalize a P3 process via a uniform partnership template adapted to cases;
- » Create a central database of existing P3s and potential partners (ultimately vetted) so USG and other stakeholders have situational awareness and capacity to tap talent and opportunities;
- » Create methods to build and sustain P3 capacity at State by facilitating institutional knowledge about how to partner with State (an otherwise "opaque process");
- » Establish institutional networks and links with USAID around partnerships;
- » Break down institutional stovepipes;
- » Build human capacity and institutional expertise in the effective use of P3s at State by enhancing training and management, including specialized expertise;
- » Develop incentive structures that reward partnership creation, including in hiring;
- » Emphasize outreach by bringing to State a wide range of potential global partners;
- » Attract and focus resources on policy priorities;
- » Plug existing private partners into USG networks and vice versa;
- » Develop and publish data on P3 efforts and results;
- » Dundle foreign policy objectives;
- » Use interagency structures to grapple with global complexity in shaping most problems;
- » Define high risk, high reward start-up approach in the foreign policy domain by identifying the biggest, most interlinked problems in which one can make progress.

We turn to these next.

- 1 Kris Balderston, who served as Hillary Clinton's first Legislative Director in 2001, and subsequently as her Deputy Chief of Staff in New York from 2002 to 2009, was named the Managing Director of the GPI in 2009 and later (November 2010) became Secretary Clinton's Special Representative for Global Partnerships.
- 2 David Francis, "The State Department's Public-Private Matchmaker," 10 Mar. 2009, DevEx, <https://www.devex.com/news/the-state-department-s-public-private-matchmaker-59312>. The cornerstone of this effort was the Global Partnership Clearinghouse, the first-ever database of multi-sector partnerships created under Chief of Mission authority.

- 3 Francis, "The State Department's Public-Private Matchmaker," 10 Mar. 2009, DevEx.
- 4 See the Coca-Cola Company & World Wildlife Fund Global Freshwater Partnership 2013 Annual Review Report, Partnering to Protect our Freshwater Resources, <http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/708/files/original/2013-coca-cola-and-wwf-annual-partnership-review-basic.PDF?1405106064>
- 5 See, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary, State Department Publication 11484: A Call to Action: The Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (ACTD), Jan. 2008, p. 2, available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>. ACTD was chartered by DoS on 10 Feb. 2006 to provide the Secretary with private sector expertise on transformational diplomacy and other institutional challenges "as they concern the effective structuring, leadership and management of a global diplomacy enterprise," and to provide recommendations that "support her vision to transform the Department of State." Committee meetings were co-chaired by John B. Breaux & John Engle and findings agreed upon on 14 Sept. 2007. As the group noted, the proliferation of NGOs, private philanthropy, increased corporate, business and academic entities involved in diplomacy and development, means 21st century diplomacy "must adapt to the presence of these non-traditional actors in the foreign affairs domain." Thus, "to be relevant and effective, the [U.S. government] must strengthen its ability to engage these organizations and leverage their growing resources and capabilities." See, also, DoS & USAID, Transformational Diplomacy: Joint Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012 available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82819.pdf>.
- 6 See "Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy," available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy>.
- 7 Much of this moment is captured in Secretary Clinton's own doctrinal initiation in 2010 of the first Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review (QDDR), modeled on the longstanding Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), under the guidance of Anne-Marie Slaughter. Among its many claims, this strategy document announced an emergent State commitment to civilian diplomacy and development to play as significant a role in international affairs as arms and the military establishment. The QDDR also notes that the GACC P3 led by UNF illustrates "the culture of collaboration that we need to address 21st century challenges."
...Announced by Secretary Clinton in September 2010, [GACC] will help 100 million homes around the world adopt sanitary and energy-efficient stoves by 2020, saving lives while combating deforestation and climate change. By developing markets for stoves and fuel and supporting local supply chains, the Alliance will also promote sustainable, inclusive economic growth by creating new microbusiness opportunities for women and other entrepreneurs....State, US-AID, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency have all pledged resources to support the Alliance, and State has led diplomatic outreach to invite other nations to join the effort.
- 8 See USAID, Global Development Alliances, available at: <http://www.usaid.gov/gda>. The landscape includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), results-oriented private philanthropy on the scale associated with the Gates Foundation, increased corporate, business and academic entities engaged in aid, diplomacy, and development initiatives, the heightened role of religious organizations and charities, as well as conflict actors and spoilers and criminal organizations, many playing duplicitous roles in humanitarian concerns
- 9 See U.S. Government Accountability Office (herein after GAO), "Best Practices and Leading Practices in Collaboration," with attendant reports, available at: http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/leading_practices_collaboration/issue_summary#t=0
- 10 See R. Keast, K. Brown & M. Mandell (2007), "Getting the right mix: Unpacking Integration Meanings and Strategies," International Public Management Journal 10(1): 9-33; A.T. Himmelman (2002), "Collaboration for a Change: Definitions, Decision-making roles, and collaboration process guide," (Himmelman Consulting, Minneapolis); E. Konrad (1996), "A Multidimensional framework for Conceptualising Human Service Integration Initiatives," in J. Marquart & E. Konrad (eds). Evaluating Initiatives to Integrate Human Services (The American Evaluation Association, No. 69, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).
- 11 R. Keast and D. Chamberlain (2014), Collaboration-Decision Support Tool (Southern Cross University): 26.
- 12 S. Vangen and C. Huxham (2005), "The Tangled Web: Unraveling the Principle of Common Goals in Collaborations," Journal of Public Administration Research Theory, 22: 731-760.
- 13 Keast and Chamberlain, "Collaboration-Decision," p. 25.
- 14 R. Keast, M. Mandel, K. Brown, and G. Woolcock (2004), "Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations," Public Administration Review 64:3. May/June 2004: 363-371.
- 15 R. O'Leary and C. Gerard, "Collaboration across Boundaries: Insights and Tips from Federal Senior Executives," (IBM):11.
- 16 For concerns and criticisms about P3s and development, see also: Marian L. Lawson, Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R41880 (28 Oct. 2013): 13-15, especially "Potential Concerns About Partnerships," including management burdens, inadequate evidence of value added, distortion of development and aid priorities, disadvantages to Least-Developed Countries, preferential advantages to the private sector, threat to U.S. jobs, reputational costs to USG through 'bad' partners; and Afiya McLaughlin-Johnson, "Partnerships with Extractives Industries: Lessons learned," USAID Alliance Innovation Newsletter, Spring 2009.
- 17 See U.S. Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power (2010): 68-73. For other accounts of these developments, see Benjamin Leo, Todd Moss, and Beth Schwanke, "OPIC Unleashed: Strengthening US Tools to Promote Private-Sector Development Overseas," Center for Global Development; Feb. 28, 2013;
- 18 See Cindy Williams, "Accepting Austerity: The Right Way to Cut Defense," Foreign Affairs, November-December 2013, pp. 54-64; Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home (Routledge, 2010); B.R. Posen, "Pull Back: The Case of a Less Activist Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 92 (2013): 116; B.R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2014); S.G. Brooks, G.J. Ikenberry & W.C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," International Security, Winter 2012/13, 37(3): 7-51;
- 19 See President Obama's Cairo Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning, 4 June 2009, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/NewBeginning/transcripts>.
- 20 See United Nations (UN), A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development, The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (UN Publications, New York: 2013): http://www.un.org/sgf/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf; and the UN

- Development Groups (UNDP), *Delivering the Post 2015 Development Agenda Report* (2104), <https://www.worldwewant2015.org/dialogues2015>.
- 21 For 2008, the latest year with full global data available, about 1.29 billion — roughly 22% of the developing world’s population — lived below \$1.25 a day. In 1981, 1.94 billion people lived in extreme poverty. The bank’s latest figures are based on more than 850 household surveys in about 130 countries. The region with the highest extreme poverty rate was Sub-Saharan Africa, where about 47% lived below \$1.25 a day. The \$1.25 marker for extreme poverty is the average for the poorest 10 to 20 nations of the world. The median poverty line for developing countries — \$2 a day — showed less progress, the bank said. The number of people living below \$2 per day fell to 2.47 billion in 2008 from 2.59 billion in 1981, though it has fallen more sharply since 1999.
- 22 See H.W. Rittel & M.M. Webber (1973), “Dilemmas in a general theory of planning,” *Policy sciences*, 4(2), 155-169 and, for a lengthier discussion, notes 126 and 127, below.
- 23 Various USG efforts on interagency collaboration have developed in the last decade, some with the support of Congress on reducing duplication in services across federal agencies. See Frederick M. Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations* (Congressional Research Report No. R41803: May 31, 2011); GAO, *Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies*, GAO-06-15,
- 24 U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power* (2010): 68-73.
- 25 The QDDR 2010, p. 70, itemizes some of these changes that need to be made to mainstream P3s into the foreign policy and development spaces, including recognizing and leveraging shared values—and the added value—that private sector partners bring to advancing foreign policy goals “through their resources, their capacity to establish presence in places we cannot, through the technologies, networks, and contacts they can tap, and through their specialized expertise or knowledge.” It also describes the need to build out the GPI Office as the single POC for partnership at State; to standardize P3 process via a uniform partnership template adapted to cases; and create a central database of all existing partnerships so that U.S. government agencies and potential partners know what we are already doing, with whom, and where, among other items.
- 26 U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power* (2010): 68-73.

2.0 RESEARCH METHODS: “STANDING-UP” THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COOKSTOVES AS A CASE STUDY IN EVALUATING THE S/GP



The evaluation study is conducted by a team of social scientists at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) through a competitive grant (October 2014–October 2015) from the Secretary’s Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP), U.S. Department of State. The purpose of the evaluation is to study “how GACC may serve as a ‘rich case’ for identifying [S/GP] leading practices and lessons from its implementation, as well as for facilitating the development of a typology and model for other public-private partnerships tailored to achieve multifaceted international development goals” (Scope of Work: 1).

This research is complex, not only given the increasing use of P3s in international development today, but in that researchers were tasked with evaluating a process—the role of the S/GP in developing a successful P3 process which resulted in the GACC. We define that process as the S/GP approach and model (and its predecessor office, the GPI) in nurturing, launching, and sustaining the GACC initiative from its inception and formal launch, to helping to stand up the entity as a whole, to encouraging its ‘graduation’ into a fully independent P3 entity housed at the UNF. In effect, the whole process of establishing the GACC—among other partnership initiatives at S/GP—is an exemplar of the process under study that provides resonant information for S/GP in their institutional learning and capacity building partnership strategy.

The research effort includes a review of relevant scholarly literatures and archival data; developing a unique interview instrument for P3 participating leaders and professionals for use

in interviews with key stakeholder organizations from public, private, and nonprofit sectors; and researcher participation at a number of S/GP and GACC events. The research abides by the requirements of Syracuse University’s (SU) Institutional Review Board.¹

2.1 METHODOLOGY RATIONALE AND CASE JUSTIFICATION

The purpose of this evaluation is to generate learning for the S/GP Office in their recent experiences with GACC, in developing collaborative partnership leadership and capacity in going forward, all while creating a new alternative hub of global partnership action for the USG.

To render the evaluation, we selected a case-study approach—an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed.² Whereas scholarship on P3s in the context of larger national and international infrastructural projects is well developed in public management, international development, and the business-management literatures, little evidence and theory building exist on emergent, economically-oriented collaborations in the foreign policy domain that rely upon and leverage a market-based approach to solving “wicked” transnational problems.³ Case study research, specifically the study of unique and revelatory cases, is, thus, a fruitful approach for evaluating phenomena that are new and underspecified.⁴ Likewise, single-case studies are ideal and recommended for such cases where evaluators may have empirical access to phenomenon that were previously opaque or inaccessible.⁵ Case studies tend to be selec-

tive, and our evaluation is no different in that we focus on the influence of the S/GP in the process of helping to establish and develop the Alliance.

Importantly, in evaluating the process used by S/GP, the case approach is useful instrumentally, that is, to understand more than what is obvious to any individual or involved observer or participant, including founding members or S/GP and GACC leaders.⁶ In short, the methodological problem in unique case studies is to establish meaning in contextual factors (i.e., background or foreground elements). Rich, descriptive case studies, thus, pay attention to the role that context plays in influencing the meaning, variation, and relationships among concepts under evaluation. Rather than explaining the S/GP partnership process by a given institutional location or any one factor (i.e., institutional location at S/GP or UNF, or a given interagency meeting, the launch at CGI), we thus identify diverse variables which impact and constrain the process of establishing GACC and in developing P3 capacity at S/GP. We highlight the context as it pertains to interactions in settings, focusing specifically on the “roles” agents played, in addition to location and preconditions, noting that organizational cultures and temporal factors (sequencing and co-occurrence, for instance) matter in generating success and in defining evaluative propositions for the case, as suggested by case study scholarship.⁷

Ultimately, the unveiling of the GACC at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) represents an exposé of a new set of accelerating trends, factors, and arrangements that resulted in a new collaborative problem solving platform to address complex and interdependent international problems.

2.2 HOW TO MEASURE COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES AND PLATFORMS IN FOREIGN POLICY?

Evaluating the process of realizing the GACC and in developing partnership capacity at State can be conceptualized as a unique or extreme case because the phenomenon reflects a previously unobserved “system of action” including distinct variables (i.e., the combined ingredients of GACC leaders and the demands of context and stakeholders). We refer to this complex, context-dependent, and dynamic process as the “intervention.” The intervention occurs in the crucible of the international clean cooking and fuels movements as these endeavors move from epistemic community to a definitive market-based solution and bottom-of-the pyramid approach for global shared economic prosperity and foreign policy diffusion. This transition and the complex process-based phenomenon it represents is the “intervention” which our case study evaluates—albeit in only one of its manifestations, the collaborative partnership and institution-building processes associated with S/GP.

In general, the process of establishing the GACC through S/GP efforts is measurable by identifying implicit and explicit goals for the partnership as these interfaced with incremental policy innovation at State and across the USG. By establishing the

GACC, we include all those processes for purposes of evaluation that went into realizing the GACC, its incubation and the campaign-style approach to developing the P3 concept, and the formative stages that ultimately lead to the graduation of the P3 out of the S/GP.

To generate evaluative and actionable meaning around this transformative process, we organize our analysis into semi-discreet analytical phases: (1.) the historical and formative period which ends with the launch of the GACC at the CGI in 2010; (2.) the primary organizational and governance processes associated with standing up the GACC into an independently functioning partnership entity; and (3.) the process of graduating the P3 model in both the GACC exemplar and in the increasing elevation of the S/GP Office as a player in USG P3 design and development. Within this phased context, we organize the process of analyzing the P3 design and development process associated with the GACC into thematic clusters (see Table 2), so as to identify with more specificity the significant parts in the process of establishing the GACC as a system of action. For instance, though temporal boundaries can be debated, we specify the “campaign moment” as the array of interdependent actions between the time when EPA and S/GP interacted in interagency situations and structures, to the “campaign promises” of the “first one-hundred days of GACC.” We label as the “campaign” to launch the GACC these elements: the framing of the Alliance-building process; its reframing to a globalized PCIA with the help of EPA; opportunity structure (S/GP post Shanghai-US pavilion, early 2010); readiness; and interdependence.

That phased process with clusters of meaningful action can be further examined as it is influenced—through coordination and collaboration—by sets and subsets of actors, networks, and constraints. Those actions are equally embedded in contexts, situations, and decision moments which brought about the initial concept, value propositions, and goal achievements associated with GACC—rather than the uncoordinated activities of individuals and groups of individuals. Likewise, for the purpose of this case, the construct tying the system together is specified as the influence and type of control over events achieved, sustained, and made replicable by S/GP. This evaluative emphasis, thus, fits with S/GP’s own priority as a learning organization that defines “a central role for self-reflexive learning and innovation built-in-to project design to foster sustainability and reproducibility” (Scope of Work, p. 1).

Four aims, thus, define this study, consistent with social science case research:⁸

The process of establishing the GACC through S/GP efforts is measurable by identifying implicit and explicit goals for the partnership as these interfaced with incremental policy innovation at State and across the USG.

- » To describe and specify the intervention and its ultimate meaning in the agency-appropriate development domain itself, as described;
- » To describe the real-life facilitating conditions and context in which the GACC intervention occurred (see Table 1);
- » To dissect the semi-discreet elements for analytical purposes that organize and structure the collaborative process in which the intervention occurred in relation to the simultaneous development of S/GP (see Table 2);
- » To explore whether the intervention evaluated has clear outcomes, including unintended outcomes, along with resultant measures that indicate performance success (Table 3) and that provide lessons and recommendations in which results and future achievements are to be expected.

2.3 THEORIES OF COLLABORATION: DEFINING THE OBJECT

Though the international relations (IR) literature considers P3 cases with some similarities to the GACC process (i.e., 2002 World Summit of Sustainable Development P3s, World Commission on Dams P3, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme P3, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, to name a few), the IR P3 literature does not address life-cycle issues, U.S. government interagency mechanisms for developing P3s in foreign policy, and, most importantly, P3s that have their start as policy-formulation partnerships and even become policy implementations P3s.⁹ The challenge of this research in the IR P3 context is phasing, which could be reversed and scaled at different rates and at different levels of scale and scope. The situation and system of action aspects on which we focus are institutional design issues and the transitions and transformation that account for the development of GACC—an emphasis that fills a gap in the literature for exploring the transition and transformation links in the cycle between policy formation and policy implementations models and the types of P3s that emerge.

As mentioned, our first aim was to define and circumscribe the complex object of study for this evaluative case study, a process that requires identifying the nature of the collective action problem under study and, further, the conditions under which collective-action constraints exist, intensify, and vary in approach. As also mentioned, a second complexity of this case involves assessing a process rather than an entity. In evaluating a process, a related consideration is recognizing this process itself as multivariate and complex, as it includes multiple organizational entities, many in high flux: most notably, the newly-formed GPI Office and the evolving GACC, but also the UNF, the State Department under the influence of political transition, and the U.S. administration itself. A third complexity involves the dependent relationship between many of these USG entities, the fact that S/GP was engaged in the process of facilitating the development of the GACC organizational entity, the process under study, an entity which would ultimately become autonomous and independent. We solved these linked problems by structuring our evaluation around a process, as mentioned, and by using GACC as a revelatory case and exemplar of the process we wish to elucidate and assess.

For purposes of theorizing collaboration in this case with some attempt to capture broader implications, we describe this process (“the intervention,” itself resulting in a “system of action,” which is itself dynamic, interdependent, interacting with other systems) as it is undertaken by organizational and institutional

2.3.1 KEY DEFINITIONS: COLLABORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS

The term collaboration has a history of imprecise use by both theorists and practitioners, often equated with coordination and cooperation, all which denote a form of working relationship between entities for the purpose of achieving an outcome. Our definition of collaboration aligns with current research that posits it as a distinct concept distinguished by a number of characteristics different from other joint efforts.¹² Principle among these is the broad distribution across the participating entities of authority, responsibility and accountability, resulting in a system that is deeply interdependent. Collaboration brings together diverse entities that: 1) perceive the existence of a common problem (even if their connection to the problem stems from different needs); 2) recognize the inability to achieve a viable solution without the contributions of all participants;¹³ and 3) are willing to commit resources and expertise to build a common vision and strategy for addressing the issue.¹⁴ Collaborative relationships are based on the understanding that both benefits and risks are shared among the partners, and partners in a collaboration are willing to operate in a framework that accords relative equity to all in decision-making (thus each is required to cede some portion of independence and control) with the expectation that the commitment of each entity is dependable, constant, and enduring. Such a working relationship requires a foundation of trust, as well as strong governance mechanisms that allow for inclusive and deliberative decision-making, highly integrative communication networks, and the establishment of metrics for purposes of assessment and accountability.¹⁵ Collaboration may also create a fertile environment for innovation at many levels (i.e., institutional, procedural, methodological, or technical)¹⁶ and result in prioritized shared objectives over the individual objectives sought by the participating entities.¹⁷

Similarly, the term public-private partnership has come to signify a variety of working arrangements between public and private actors and sectors. Too often the P3 is equated to a contracting model, in which the public entity plays the critical leadership role of defining the problem, exercising primary authority over decision-making, and shouldering the risk of failure. Utilizing the more general term partnership to encompass the diverse range of existent relationships between public and private entities, we define public-private partnerships specifically as cross-sectoral organizational structures that function according to the basic principles of collaboration. The institutional manifestation of the partnership must contain governance structures and procedures to ensure mutuality between all partners (shared goals, risks, and accountability), equity between partners in decision-making; processes for pooling and distributing resources (including information), and systems for accountability.

actors and leaders.¹⁰ To theoretically specify the intervention, we use a situation-structuralist approach defined in international relations (IR) as a mode of examining the interdependencies of regimes and the strategic settings or “situation structures”¹¹ associated with them. Recent IR and public management comparative literature on P3s examines the way that P3s vary dramatically in their institutional forms and strength of arrangements. Specifically, compliance theory—a variant of the situation-structuralist approach—provides that issues of collective action in P3s vary and increase in complexity according to whether partners coordinate or collaborate, among other behaviors.

Thus, at the core of the collaboration literature is a series of distinctions made regarding increasing degrees of cooperation: coordination, collaboration, and partnership. In contrasting coordination with collaboration, for instance, Hasenclever (1997) notes of regimes, similar to P3 in organizational structures: “Coordination situations require only relatively lowly formalized and centralized regimes.”¹⁸ But, Hasenclever continues, once actors agree upon a course of action, for example, government regulation of the need for distributed radio frequencies, that decision (in this case, the regulation) becomes self-enforcing. Thus,

*Collaboration situations represent a more severe form of collective action problems, as actors face incentives for defection—a state may have incentives to subsidize its industry despite an international agreement that prohibits industry subsidies. Regimes that deal with collaboration problems are expected to be relatively formalized, containing mechanisms to prevent defection from regime rules.*¹⁹

Hence, collaboration is a more formal and motivated form of collective action—a tightly wound system in which incentives exist to keep partners inside the system.

Traditional rational models of foreign aid/development provisioning are often understood as service-delivery coordination and, thus, may be theorized as the least constrained networked approach to collective action problems for partners. Coordination networks where leaders contend with marginally different delivery mechanisms for partner goals, or invest in incremental innovations to effect common goals, may be both more constrained as networked arrangements with some planned goals in providing services. Finally, the most constrained and most advantage-bearing (implied in the “spirit of collaboration” notion of leadership)²⁰ systems of actions to resolve complex problems are encapsulated in the idea of partnerships.²¹ One element that made the GACC model unique was S/GP aspirations to achieve



high cooperation along the parameters of both benefit and risk—beyond traditional foreign policy coordinated service delivery systems. We would further venture that the private-public partnership model embodies an increased scale of cohesion.

Leadership is a central ingredient and plays a predictable role in this process. As we discuss in detail, what was not predictable was the variety of leadership and the networked nature of leadership agents involved in ways that pushed the delivery from coordination to cooperation to partnership.

2.4 PROBLEM AND IMPACT-DRIVEN RESEARCH PRIORITIES

Two general sets of problems drive the case: those related to evaluating the P3 model as it evolved in the case of the GACC and by the S/GP Office and its agents; and the resulting insights and scientifically determined processes deduced from the evaluation. In the first category, we addressed some of these research questions:

- » How to collect data—i.e., who do we interview—to understand the P3 design and development process in relation to S/GP and the Alliance?
- » How to develop an instrument to assess USG innovation in global partnerships in development and international affairs?
- » What key drivers facilitated the GACC?
- » To what extent is S/GP building a collaborative process across USG and other entities in the clean cookstoves sector and beyond?
- » What gains and outcomes occurred for S/GP in developing GACC as it sets models for P3 design and development in its domain?
- » How and under what conditions was S/GP successful in effecting its self-specified model of global partnerships?
- » What is the actionable legacy of the collaboration that become the GACC partnership?

In delineating units of analysis, we distinguish between two key, overlapping phenomenological subunits in these processes under evaluation:

- » The Secretary's office for Global Partnerships (initially the Global Partnership Initiative in 2009) serves as a placeholder for the nexus of processes in organizational innovation that helped to initiate the GACC P3. We thus evaluate S/GP in terms of broad process-based metrics (i.e. partnership goals and targets used by S/GP for cultivating, nurturing and developing P3s to further USG identified aims).
- » The GACC P3 is a relevant sub-unit of analysis divided into subparts: governance and organizational structure; personnel and leadership resources; stakeholders and partners (i.e., founding partners, donor partners, the incorporated Partnership for Clean Indoor Air or PCIA, UNF as the employer and "host" of GACC); institutional relationships (i.e., the continued institutional-champion-operational collaboration of EPA), among other elements. Though not an evaluation of the GACC P3, the demands of this revelatory case require that evaluators access a number of GACC processes—namely, output level achievements (e.g. chief core champions), the relationship ties between S/GP and GACC governance, the enactment and growth of founder members and new donor partner commitments, and the timing of partner acquisition.

The impact dimension of metrics refers to problem-solving: an institution has an impact if it helps solve the problem that inspired actors to create the institution."²² Rather than assessing the impact of GACC generally, we narrow-in on the coordination and collaboration actions to show the effects of new partnership platforms and institution on solving problems. For instance, S/GP made an intervention in the co-evolving nature of the GACC phenomena and in nongovernmental (private, civil society, NGO) stakeholder commitments, typified in the Shell Foundation and the UNF role in the GACC.

2.5 DATA COLLECTION: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL, DATA SOURCES AND TRIANGULATION

The study was designed to synthesize four sources of information: (1.) archival and program accounts associated with the S/GP Office and the evolving GACC; (2.) primary data in direct interviews conducted with S/GP and GACC principles, affiliates, and agents; (3.) secondary interdisciplinary social science scholarship pertaining to content (partnership, collaboration, and leadership research in international affairs) and methods (case studies, evaluation studies); and (4.) anecdotal information from researcher participation in a number of S/GP and GACC events.

Phase one research involved research preparation for methods selection and data collection, Institutional Review Board (IRB) application and approval for studying human subjects, and conducting interviews, which included sample selection, outreach, and other logistics.

2.5.1 INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT, SAMPLE SELECTION AND OUTREACH, AND INTERVIEW PROCESS

The instrument was developed after review and synthesis of sources (#1 and #3) were complete and reflects S/GP support in sample selection and outreach. As a qualitative instrument, the interview protocol was designed as a moderator's guide with specific prompts to illicit participants' responses, opinions, insights, narrative accounts, and perspectives. The instrument was

used systematically to conduct all interviews. A total of 18 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted, either face-to-face in a location of the respondent's choosing, or via online conferences calls.

Interviews ran 60-90 minutes and generated over 400 single-spaced pages of transcribed data. The majority of interviews were led by the co-principle-investigator (Co-PI), with at least two other research team members present and engaged; only on three occasions did one Co-PI and one team researcher conduct interviews. This collaborative approach was both critical and efficient in developing interpretive alignment among researchers/observers of the case (see Stake's recommendations regarding case and data collection selection maximization under time constraints.)²³

S/GP and GACC affiliated institutional leaders were selected, invited (via email) to participate in the research study and interview process, and engaged in interviews over the course of five months from December 2014 to May 2015. Initial recommendations for interview subjects were provided by S/GP administrative staff, and we followed with a snowball sampling procedure for other respondents in two ways: (a.) by asking each interviewed respondent to identify other key persons necessary to contact for purposes of comprehensive analysis and by focusing in on repeatedly mentioned persons deemed critical; and (b.) by drawing upon named individuals associated with S/GP and GACC partner organizations identified in organizational reports. The sample includes individuals from three relevant arenas: USG, nonprofit/civil society community, and the private sector.

We used an open-ended, semistructured interview model deployed in free-form fashion, ideal for the case under evaluation, as recommended by Yin,²⁴ to achieve depth of data gathering, increase the quality of information, and acquire information that might not have become available from other sources. The instrument was enhanced as interviews proceeded in an iterative process that also deepened our research questions. The interviews were conducted according to interviewees' schedule and availability, as suggested by Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg.²⁵ The researchers were well qualified to conduct this form of inquiry with combined experience in large scale instrument development, face-to-face interviewing, and mixed-methods data collecting methods and procedures. The protocol development process was informed by several disciplinary perspectives represented across research team expertise in qualitative methods, international relations, public management, organizational science, and non-profit studies. Interview protocol questions included both exploratory (inductive) and confirmatory (deductive) modes of inquiry. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed as available and stored confidentially at the Maxwell School.

The consistent use of the protocol across all respondents was needed to ensure accuracy, to evaluate and contrast emerging themes, help formulate alternative explanations, and to facilitate triangulation. By definition, triangulation is intended to ar-

rive at convergence on the discoveries of the case.²⁶ The forms of triangulation ascribed to the case were fourfold: (a.) we provided investigator triangulation, the idea that a great majority of investigators, and always at least dyads of investigators, were present at primary source data collections (interviews and in participant-observer sessions), which facilitates verification of trends emerging real-time in the data; (2.) we provided theoretical triangulation given the interdisciplinary choices made available to us in the range and depth of evaluators' research agendas, thus, highlighting the use of multiple theories in the same study for the purpose of supporting or refuting findings²⁷; (3.) we provided a level of 'within-method triangulation' in the single paradigm of our evaluation²⁸ in using a leadership content analysis scheme to check the validity of our inductive and deductive leadership roles for the internal consistency and credibility of our propositions; and (4.) we operated the most common and essential form of triangulation in single case studies, data triangulation, the use of multiple data sources in the same study for validation purposes. As mentioned, we used multiple sources of data (primary source data was gathered through interviews and through participant observation at S/GP conference and interactions) as well as secondary sources of evidence in report documentation and archival records.²⁹

Data and investigator convergence on findings was further enhanced at the midpoint of data collection (with 11 interviews transcribed) as we used research-team weekly meetings to brainstorm and identify emerging themes and devise a preliminary structure for the report. This reflective process facilitated the checks and balances needed in the process of construct and validity. The final structure of the report retains much of this initial triangulation of data and investigators interpretations of the evidence. The four types of triangulation helped investigators deal with possible bias and subjective interpretation of the case. We used weekly meetings and documented minutes to help establish our chain of evidence.

The conceptual scheme used to anonymize interview data involved removing all traces of personal and organizational identifiers when using data from interviews, field notes, or secondary sources (see the Interview Protocol in the Appendix which portrays how anonymity and consent for participation were solicited and granted). We endeavored to configure our findings from multiple sources to guard against the loss of context that can occur when identifying information is stripped from data. Following a number of methodological sources, we developed a conceptual scheme for leaders who participated in the study given the problem that identification of organizations and even institutional relationships cues observers on how to interpret finding and assess their validity. The contextual relevance of the details anonymized, both in regard to the study conducted and the situation that has been documented, can be problematic ethically, epistemologically and methodologically.³⁰

When faced with the possibility of losing key contextual information, we elected to both look to the relevant convergence points and choose evidence that conveyed the same message without

revealing sources. To retain options, given the contextual relevance of the source, we devised a set of pseudo identifiers³¹ and leadership labels: this helps us deal with attribution, rendering it largely functional rather than specific, actor-based, or organizational. Transcription of interviews was conducted in a rolling process that overlapped data gathering and analysis, an effort that was rewarded with a decreasing need to go to any given specific source to make a point or articulate a finding effectively.

To draw advantage of the evaluation and its findings, we sensibly continued with a within-case analysis and replication logic typical of singular case studies.³² This was done both to ensure adaptive replicability of the P3 model proposed in our findings and recommendations and for possible research replicability of this largely inductive evaluation case-oriented process

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2.6 DATA ANALYSIS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES USED FROM CASE STUDY EVALUATION RESEARCH

As Yin describes, "Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study."³³ Stake likewise recommends categorical aggregation (i.e., the brainstorming of S/GP "drivers of success") and a process of refining those categories and matching evidence from all data sources in an aggregate-pattern matching process as a means of analysis.³⁴ We continued with a within-case analysis and replication logic typical of singular case studies.³⁵ This was done to ensure the research replicability of this largely inductive evaluation case-oriented process.³⁶ To ensure clear insights, all analysis is grounded in the evidence, the key criteria for evaluating our type of case study evaluative research. Following Eisenhardt's recommendations, we looked for cross-case patterns using both convergent and divergent views from the data—a move that forced us to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence through the multiple lenses available to investigators on the case.³⁷

TABLE 1. INITIAL DISCUSSIONS FOR DETERMINING KEY THEMES

Key Processes & Enabling Conditions	<p>We know these partnerships are hard to start given fiscal, political, organizational constraints.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Can you describe the process by which the S/GP & Alliance were started & what processes sustained them? » Key enabling conditions? Key events or decisions critical for creating the Alliance & similar partnerships?
Leadership	<p>Was leadership a key element—who were the leaders in creating the S/GP, the Alliance, the partnership model?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Were there specific leadership skills, styles, decisions at critical moments that proved important? » Did leaders have certain qualities—or sources of power and persuasion? Vision? » Network or constellation of personalities?
State Department	<p>What about the State Dept. as an institution and the S/GP office itself—was it a leader agency, a change agent, a catalyst, collaborator, convener?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Has that leadership role of S/GP evolved as the Alliance & other partnerships have become more established? » Did prior experience and planning play a critical role? » What about politics—having a supporter in the Secretary, elsewhere? » Financial drivers? Regulatory environment? Networks? » What about the specificity of the project itself—why was cookstoves selected?
Obstacles/Challenges	<p>What were the most serious obstacles or challenges in the early period—and later?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What constraints limited its ability to scale up at EPA, but not at State? » How conscious were S/GP & Alliance actors in identifying obstacles—challenges or threats to the process, organizational learning (evaluation/adaptation through lessons learned)?
Partnership Model	<p>What about the nature of the partnership model itself and the influence of foreign policy/diplomatic objectives?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Is the Alliance a traditional P3? What are its principle characteristics? » How were original partners found and recruited? Were they critical? How did S/GP—give them a stake? » As the partnership has grown, who have been the most pivotal partners and why? » Superficially, it looks like the Alliance got off the ground through lots of help from media and energy sector industries? Is that true? Are those the “go-to” groups for this particular project or are they well-resourced, dependable friends? » Did this partnership initiative interface well with FP objectives—which objectives were prioritized, strategic?

2.6.1 PATTERN-MATCHING TO THE EMPIRICAL DOMAIN

Given that the existing theory is about slightly different phenomena, (i.e., not specifically focused on the use of P3s for foreign policy formulation, a process that we consider to present unique aspects), we used pattern-matching logics in a “grounded evaluative theory-building” approach. Looking at the system of action that encapsulates the process of establishing the GACC, we were careful to remain focused on the “context of use” as a mitigating factor in the study of S/GP P3 institutional design and delivery, following Danziger.³⁸ Yin (1994) also has suggested that every investigation should have a general analytic strategy to guide research object identification for analysis: since few relevant theoretical propositions existed specific to the universe of the case, we opted for developing a descriptive framework for organizing the case study.³⁹ We retained some extent of pattern-matching in our analysis, though this is not an explanation-building case. The analytical approach is still recommended in exploratory cases, as this one, and our recommendations do

contribute to a hypothesis-generating process that is part of the replicability of the P3 model.

In establishing that the case at hand demonstrates a specific system of action, the pattern of organizational process demonstrates influence through the capacity of the S/GP Office and its agents to transform a policy-formulating P3 into a global enabling (but not implementing) model for “clean cookstoves and fuels solutions.”⁴⁰ This empirical pattern was traced in the methodological steps, as described. The case traces not only the design, and development of GACC but the “bridging” function it served as a vehicle for S/GP to expand and transform a traditional P3 model into a vehicle to deliver on a complex policy agenda. The case also analyzes, using primary data analysis, how closely this new “bridging” function, which itself requires a central role for institutional “learning,” aligns with the partnership definition associated with the S/GP. We also frame our analysis of the case by specifying S/GP control—what it did, did not, could have, and could not have controlled—in helping to launch the GACC.

DEFINING SUCCESS—INITIAL EMERGENT THEMES

"Success"	<p>What accounts for S/GP's success with the Alliance? Does that carry over into other partnership initiatives?</p> <p>» How would you define "success"? What are its metrics/measures/indicators? Who created those standards or measures?</p> <p>» Have conditions at the start changed over the life of the partnership? Is the partnership sustainable and resilient? Are those part of the definition of success?</p> <p>» What role did resource acquisition & management play in S/GP's process of standing up the Alliance and helping to let it go?</p> <p>» Communication and information sharing play?</p> <p>» How much was the collaborative process (managerial, administrative, M&E, etc.) of establishing the Alliance responsible for its success? Would it have succeeded with a less labor intensive/sophisticated/networked process?</p> <p>» The literature on partnerships and collaborations often focuses on resources, management, communication, process and networks—which were essential to S/GP's success in building the Alliance?</p>
State Dept. FP goals	<p>How much does success depend upon achieving strategic foreign policy goals or implementing them? Did the Alliance do that? Do those goals shift with new administration/Secretaries? How does S/GP negotiate that?</p> <p>» Have conflicts regarding program goals or implementation ever arisen within the partnership and how are these managed?</p>
Partnership & Partners	<p>Did State/S/GP need to "sell" its partnership vision to other stakeholders—Congress, federal agencies, other states, private sectors, NGOs? Was that part of its success?</p> <p>» Has S/GP done well attracting partners—numbers, types—to the Alliance essential to its success?</p>
Leadership	<p>Is the S/GP satisfied with its leadership role? Was that preordained or did it make it up as you went along? Did S/GP monitor progress towards its goals as a mark of success?</p>
Resources	<p>A goal identified by the State Dept. has been pooling resources across public, private and civil society sectors to amplify U.S. foreign policy goals of development and democracy. Has the partnership model depended on attracting sufficient partners and resources? Describe the role S/GP played in the process?</p>

The following tables represent the data analysis process engaged in by the research team, including the identification of emergent themes across the data.

2.7 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

As mentioned, there exists a gap in the literature for exploring the transition and transformation links in the cycle between policy formation and policy implementations models and the types of P3 institutional arrangements that emerge. It is for this and other reasons that in evaluating this case, we pay particular attention to the interaction between the P3 policy formulation model and the P3 policy implementation model. Even in the IR literature, which reports findings closest to the models addressed here, offers few insights for understanding the organization, institutional, and market elements of the effective policy collaboration model.⁴¹ In this respect important findings associated with this evaluation remain understudied. For instance, one of our key findings was in "uncommon value creation" for some of the GACC partner agencies, including the CDC, which was able to utilize its own partner role in the Alliance to increase internal (CDC) support for related climate research resource. Without having a more rigorous sense of the relationship between the P3 role in policy formation and implementation, it is difficult to anticipate and maximize these surprising gains.

- 1 The Principle Investigators submitted and obtained approval for the research through the SU Institutional Review Board, 11/20/2014. Contact the Office of Research Integrity and Protections orip@syr.edu for more information.
- 2 Feagin, J. R., Orum, A. M., & Sjoberg, G. (1991). *A Case for the Case Study*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- 3 See Rittel & Webber (1973); and Schaferhoff, M, Campe, S, & Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational public-private partnerships in international relations: Making sense of concepts, research frameworks, and results, *International Studies Review*, 11, 451-474.
- 4 Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. SAGE; Stake, R. E. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- 5 Yin, 2003.
- 6 Stake, 1995.
- 7 Rousseau, D. M., & Fried, Y. (2001), "Location, Location, Location: Contextualizing Organizational Research," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 22(1), 1-13.
- 8 Yin, 2003.
- 9 Given the huge diversity of PPPs, it is useful for our purposes to classify PPPs under the two broad functions of policy formulation and implementation. Policy formulation refers to the development of norms and standards that are supposed to regulate government or business behavior. Policy implementation spans implementing rules and standards, and also the provision of services as a particularly widespread function of PPPs in the areas of development and humanitarian aid. See Borzel and Risse, 2005; and Schaferhoff et al., 2009.
- 10 Such examples of the activity, behaviors, and functions associated

with the “system of action” of standing up the GACC include, for example, include interagency meetings, stakeholder consultations, the commitment making of donors, the CIG platform choice for the launch, the effect of leader engagement on S/GP organizational purposes and interests, etc.

- 11 Snidal, D. (1985), “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” *International Organization*, 39(4), 579–614.
- 12 R. Keast, K. Brown, and M. Mandell (2007), “Getting the Right Mix: Unpacking Integration Meanings and Strategies,” *International Public Management Journal* 10(1): 9–33; A.T. Himmelman (2002), *Collaboration for a Change: Definitions, Decision-Making Roles, and Collaboration Process Guide* (Himmelman Consulting, Minneapolis); Konrad, E. (1996), “A Multidimensional Framework for Conceptualising Human Service Integration Initiatives,” in J. Marquart & E. Konrad (eds). *Evaluating Initiatives to Integrate Human Services: A Publication of the American Evaluation Association Number 69*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- 13 R. Keast, D. Chamberlain. 2014. *Collaboration-Decision Support Tool*. Southern Cross University. 26.
- 14 S. Vangen and C. Huxham (2005), “The Tangled Web: Unraveling the Principle of Common Goals in Collaborations,” *Journal of Public Administration Research Theory*, 22: 731–760.
- 15 Keast and Chamberlain, p. 25.
- 16 R. Keast, M. Mandel, K. Brown, and G. Woolcock. 2004. *Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations*. *Public Administration Review* 64:3. May/June 2004: 363–371.
- 17 R. O’Leary and C. Gerard, *Collaboration across Boundaries: insights and tips from Federal senior executives* (page 11).
- 18 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). *Theories of International Regimes Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.abebooks.com/book-search/isbn/0521598494/>
- 19 Hasenclever et al. 1997:44–82
- 20 For the normative trappings associated with “the Spirit of Collaboration” in the public management literature see Huxham and Vangen (2013).
- 21 Keast, Brown, and Mandell, 2009; Schaferhoff et al., 2009
- 22 Schaferhoff, et al., 2009, p.460
- 23 Stake, 1995.
- 24 Yin, 2003.
- 25 Feagin, et al., 1991.
- 26 Creswell & Miller (2000) define triangulation as a validity procedure where researchers and evaluators search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to evoke and specify themes or categories in a study. The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes we used.
- 27 Denzin, Norman K. (1984). *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. Prentice Hall.
- 28 Denzin, 1984
- 29 There are three types of data triangulation; namely, in time, space and person. The robustness of data can vary based on the time data were collected, the people involved in the data collection process, and the setting from which the data were collected (Hussein, 2009). We guard robustness of our data triangulation under those three conditions by using a key informant strategy in addition to always asking informants if there was someone else that it would be critical for us to interview to

ensure a breath of points of view on the same protocol questions. We proceeded patiently to reach and schedule key informants repeatedly until the respondent was comfortable with the timing of their interview. And in the end, in all respondent cases, investigators gave respondents ample options for where the interview were conducted. Participant observation at the Summit and during the 2015 Partnership Week first day launch also provided additional opportunity for data triangulation and, more importantly, a picture of internal congruence messages and statements in some respondents’ cases.

- 30 Mondada, L. (2013). *Ethics in Action: Anonymization as a Participant’s Concern and a Participant’s Practice*. *Human Studies*, 37(2), 179–209.
- 31 Mondada, 2013.
- 32 Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). *Building Theories from Case Study Research*. *The Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 532.
- 33 See Yin, 1994.
- 34 See Stake, 1995.
- 35 See Eisenhardt, 1989.
- 36 See Schaferhoff et al., 2009
- 37 See Eisenhardt, 1989.
- 38 Danziger, J. (1985), “Social science and the social impacts of computer technology,” *Social Science Quarterly*, 66(1).
- 39 As Trochim (1989) has argued, pattern-matching is one of the most desirable strategies for analysis: this technique compares an empirically-based pattern with a predicted one. If the patterns match, the internal reliability of the study is enhanced. The actual comparison between the predicted and actual pattern might not have any quantitative criteria so the discretion of the researcher is therefore required for interpretation.
- 40 Draft Business Plan for the Global Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, 2009 p. 8.
- 41 Schaferhoff et al., 2009

3.0 ORIGIN STORIES: A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF BUREAUCRATIC INNOVATION IN OPERATIONALIZING A P3



We draw on our collected data to tell the story—from multiple perspectives—of the history of the global Alliance and S/GP's role in its development. The historical process and conditions that brought key players and interests together provides the framework for this section's historical account and assessment. The following narrative offers the story of the Alliance told from the perspectives of individuals representing the experiences of public, private, and civil society participants involved in the Alliance-building process. Imposed upon this multifaceted story is a process framework organized into themes and phases, each emphasizing critical issues and pivotal junctures.

We also emphasize the forces that pushed both individual and organizational efforts into alignment. We describe these elements historically so that readers may understand, not only enabling contexts, but the often haphazard, opportunistic, and serendipitous convergence of events, people, and circumstances that informed the Alliance's formation.

The following discussion is organized into three subsections: 3.1. A Word about P3 Leadership in GACC & S/GP, which treats both leadership roles and types suited to the P3 development process; 3.2 Why Cookstoves: The Foundation for Collaboration, which addresses preexisting conditions for the GACC's distinctive development; and 3.3 S/GP & GACC: An Historical Account in Phases, which examines from primary data and documents the history of GACC's development and S/GP's role in it.

Taken together, these accounts relay a perhaps surprising outcome in bureaucratic politics: namely, innovation. Most re-

spondents in one way or another emphasized that the Alliance partnership required finding new approaches to deal with intractable global development issues; new institutions, new processes, new leadership models; and, most pivotally, a new vision of a global development response scaled to global needs and challenges. These processes consistently involved innovation: creating new habits, rules, procedures, even leaders for present global challenges. In addition to innovative, the process of establishing the Alliance was also understood as operationally complex: inventing a dispersed and wide-reaching process to coalesce a broad array of disparate resources into a unified structure.

The resulting Alliance harnessed existing influential players and social, political, and economic forces—most notably, markets—to expand existing initiatives in the clean cooking and energy space. The Alliance model promised a global mechanism capable of making concrete impacts in public health, environment and sustainability, gender and women's empowerment, economic growth and development capacity, among other arenas. At the core of the Alliance model was, thus, a commitment to enabling each “uncommon” partner to pursue their own interests while contributing to the global effort—a path that would encourage partners to achieve goals for their own organization and for the Alliance that were far greater than the “sum of the parts.”

3.1 A WORD ABOUT THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP TYPES IN BUREAUCRATIC INNOVATION

Leadership is a central analytical variable in this emphasis on history and bureaucratic innovation: the styles, types, traits, and attributes visible among leaders involved in these collaborative processes. Extrapolating from Minsberg (1973) and Kotter's (1999) managerial types in which leadership traits are used to define functional attributes, we both identify and translate common leadership traits across our sample into functional leadership types, described in the figure below.¹ This typology is helpful for organizing the historical narrative, in contemplating the myriad of leadership roles that advanced (or hindered) collaboration, and to help supplement the literature as P3 leadership and management functions are often only superficially treated in international affairs. In this respect, categorized lead-

ership types (below) take their inspiration from the broad public management literature but are contextualized for the specific foreign policy and development arenas.

In our embedded discussions of some of these leadership types throughout the narrative, we tend to highlight identified leaders—stripping non-public names from this analysis—and to provide text boxes for stand-out discussions of these leadership traits and roles in relation to this history.

3.2 HISTORICIZING THE S/GP AND THE CLEAN COOKSTOVES INITIATIVE IN PHASES

We demarcate the first phase in the creation of the GACC partnership from the launch of PCIA at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, in August,

3.1.1 TABLE 2. LEADERSHIP TYPES AT GACC AND S/GP

LEADERSHIP TYPE	DEFINITION/CHARACTERISTICS/CRITICAL FUNCTIONAL ROLES
Champion Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » lends the credibility, reputation and influence of a high level leadership position to the project through association. » contextualizes diverse interests into a larger vision, integrated into broader policy objectives » provides project with access to a larger platform » offers access to a larger resource base » utilizes power associated with position to advocate for project » employs influence to create policy/procedural/ institutional change necessary for the success of the endeavor, and is able to force ideas through moments of internal resistance
Boundary Spanner/Political Operational Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » recognizes moments of convergence between interest and opportunity through astute awareness of the agendas and motivations of actors across the stakeholder spectrum. » provides the essential nexus point between top-down and bottom-up momentum, connecting critical grassroots leaders with champion leaders able to further the cause. » understands and, when necessary, massages the processes necessary to implement effectively the objectives of the program. » maintains the “eyes on the prize” for the endeavor, facilitating the environment for successful working relationships, and creating the sense of urgency needed to take timely advantage of political opportunities that arise. » facilitates bureaucratic and political processes necessary to success of the project
P3 Operational Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » assumes responsibility for translation of the partnership vision into an achievable reality » serves as guardian of the “big picture” – ensuring integration of the individual interests of the many into a unified and cohesive approach. » oversees development and implementation of system-wide indicators and measures of success. » remains cognizant of the evolutionary needs of the partnership, facilitating learning and adaptation within the system » manages the internal process of diplomacy between stakeholders to ensure that their diverse needs and interests, as well as those of the sector as a whole, are best served.
Subject Matter Expert (SME) Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » generates and maintains the evidentiary knowledge base utilized by interested stakeholders to understand and promote the cause. » serves as critical evidence-based link in connecting programmatic vision and realistic expectations. » provides data that informs results-based program design, adaptation and other learning components of the project. » is source of long-term commitment and dedicated passion to objectives that are relatively unsusceptible to transient political shifts.

Institutional Change Agent Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » serves as institutional expert, holding extensive knowledge of internal bureaucratic processes relevant to the project » engages in groundwork to understand the integration of new programming into the institutional framework of their organization. » envisions and pursues adaptation of these institutional processes necessary to facilitate innovative approaches to problem-solving » provides dedicated energy, attention and focus required to move the project forward in a consistent manner » assumes responsibility for integrating learning into future programming » projects institutional resource needs and manage the acquisition process » holds institutional memory
Sector Strategic Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » serves as critical player in the development of strategic planning for the sector as a whole » provides critical knowledge of the functioning of the private sector to infuse partnership strategy with market-based approaches and businesslike thinking. » represents interests of important non-public sector stakeholders
Instrumental/Process Change Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » spearheads efforts to formalize/institutionalize procedural changes that result from the innovative process » disseminates innovation through the institution through various modes of communication: presentations, documentation, etc.
Network Management Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » manages critical day-to-day operations of partnership operations. » serves as essential node for connection/ interaction between potential partners from public, private and NGO sectors » organizes opportunities to encourage collaboration » facilitates the dissemination of learning exercises to external parties
Interagency Connector Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » provides agency-level expertise and experience to the collaborative effort » facilitates interaction between home agency and external institutional entities promulgating the collaborative effort » advocates for home agency interests and perspectives
Project Management Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » designs, implements and manages programs in alignment with mission and general approach defined by home institution. » applies best practices and lessons-learned from previous institutional experiences to new programs
Institutional Political Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » provides overall political leadership for the institution » defines/refines institutional program priorities in line with those of high-level leadership » serves as intermediary between mid-level institution and high-level leadership

2002, to the launch of the Alliance, announced September 21, at the 2010 Clinton Global Initiative. Over these eight years, while no organization acted in isolation, each of the most important players from the public, private, and NGO sectors came to see a global partnership in the clean cooking and energy sectors as an urgent and effective means to their organizational ends.

Phase one, thus, tells the story of the convergence of these fields: hospitable contexts, framed by steep and interdependent global challenges and an accommodating political landscape; shared interests on the part of wildly different organizations with different missions, mandates, and goals; and the timely manifestation of opportunity. If these factors cannot be entirely controlled, entrepreneurial leaders take advantage of which factors they may. Phase one processes, thus, saw seasoned stakeholders seize new opportunities, leverage existing conditions, and rearticulate their interests into an innovative global partnership.

3.2.1 PHASE I: PCIA AND THE COOKSTOVE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP CONCEPT PRIOR TO GACC LAUNCH IN 2010

The kernel of the Alliance idea—a collaborative, international partnership of multiple stakeholders using market forces to advance cooking-related global health, environment, and development goals—already existed at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Partnerships for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA). The EPA launched PCIA at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development: this P3 grew to over 590 partners, worked in 116 countries by 2012, and aided in reducing indoor air pollution and toxic exposure from household energy use.² By most measures, PCIA was a successful partnership,³ impacting about 2.5 million households and 15 million people. With the advent of this early cookstoves international partnership, the EPA had staked out a claim as an active player in the sector, committing funding, expertise, and personnel to the P3 and its operational management.

But this effort was by no means the only one.⁴ Clean cookstoves and related initiatives existed prior to the PCIA, in the private

and NGO sectors, notably by the efforts of the Shell Foundation, which had engaged in clean cooking initiatives in India since 2002,⁵ and within USAID, which had made a number of programmatic forays into the sector since the mid-1980s, including funding research and cookstove projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America—a commitment that had continued at a moderate level under the auspices of EPA's PCIA.⁶

There is no question that the genesis of GACC was enabled by the PCIA precursor and many of its material and nonmaterial assets, including: a strong and simple idea; a cohesive network of subject matter (SME) experts and international partners; an established research and scientific knowledge base on the problem and its solution; a persistent and organized cohort of individuals from which talented leaders could be drawn; and an early organizational structure with committed stakeholders and partners, among other elements. In fact, probably the most critical resource offered to the subsequent Alliance was one of PCIA's most important assets: the affiliated cohort of experts, that collection of compelling individual subject matter and scientific experts at EPA, PCIA, UNF, and USAID who achieved deep knowledge of the sector over time, understood the fundamental science and scale of the problem, and had appraised the challenges, including institutional and procedural ones, involved in making actual progress. In the academic literature this group is known as the epistemic community,⁷ defined according to Sebenius as “a special kind of de facto natural coalition of ‘believers’ whose main interest lies not in the material sphere but instead in fostering the adoption of the community’s policy project.”⁸ Others note that this special community of experts is made up of a network of specialists from a variety of disciplines, sectors, and positions who share a common world view and seek to translate their beliefs into public policies. From the scientific perspective of these SME members and leaders, a wholly new vision of a global institutional model was needed.

To understand why the issue of cookstoves became a candidate for scaling up to the full global partnership, it is necessary to note the sheer magnitude of the problem embodied in clean fuel cooking in the developing world and the spinoff effects of such deficits across critical arenas of public health, child mortality, human capital development, food security, environmental degradation, and economic progress. It is also important to emphasize the importance of SME leaders, scientists, and science—and a robust evidentiary basis—for the success of this P3 and, more specifically, in shifting from a smaller PCIA compact to the larger Alliance model.⁹ In fact, so important, persistent, and impactful was the role of this early cohort of scientists and experts that we define this group of individuals—universally refereed to by all our respondents—as “SME or scientist leaders.”¹⁰

In early 2002, Secretary Rice issued a call for proposals to build public-private partnerships for USG development priorities to be presented at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Jacob Moss, then senior advisor for high-priority domestic energy initiatives and coordinator of international air quality policy, was tasked with coordinating the contribution to this

SME/SCIENTIST LEADERS

SME/Scientist Leadership and the EPA-PCIA Partnership: In standing up the Alliance, SME leaders—and the epistemic community associated with this issue and sector—had in mind these findings: nearly half the world's population—about 3 billion people—prepare and cook food and heat their homes using rudimentary solid or biomass (wood, dung, sticks, straw, crop residue, coal and charcoal) cooking and heating implements (i.e., open fires or inefficient cookstoves). The health effects from the resulting household pollution are dramatic: unsafe exposure results in up to 2 million premature deaths annually and countless chronic disease and injuries (i.e. lung and heart disease, burns, disfigurement). Women and children are disproportionately impacted as they are often culturally, socially, and economically tasked with cooking and fuel collection. In gathering fuel, these groups also face increased exposure to violence, including gender-based violence, in remote, conflict-ridden, or unstable contexts. Aside from health, safety, and security issues—directly or indirectly related to fuel needs—the whole system depends upon squandering human capital in wasted time seeking fuel with equally dramatic secondary effects for development and economic opportunities, which require affordable and consistent energy resources.¹¹ The massive scale of the problem also effects another layer of implications: environmental degradation, itself linked to food security challenges.

effort on behalf of EPA's air office.¹² Recognizing the potential for the small clean cookstoves sector, Moss designed a concept and recruited partners. At the World Summit, the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA) was announced, with 14 founding partners.¹³ This number expanded to 33 by the inaugural meeting of the PCIA in May 2003, representing 13 countries, 5 international organizations, 14 NGOs and 1 private energy company.¹⁴ The direct precursor to the GACC, the PCIA focused on four core dimensions of indoor air pollution that would come to constitute core drivers in the sector's development: 1) social/behavioral barriers; 2) market development; 3) technology design; and 4) health effects research.¹⁵ The partnership was hosted and managed at EPA, where it grew to 590 partners, until 2012, when it was integrated into the GACC.¹⁶

From its foundation in 2002 until its official merger with the Alliance at UNF on June 1, 2012, PCIA worked to increase the use of affordable, reliable, clean, efficient, and safe home cooking and heating technologies and practices. At its early stages, the EPA, the lead organization for PCIA, identified these critical issues in gaining traction on a global problem as broad and complex as the international restructuring of baseline heating and cooking technologies and traditions to improve air quality. Evident in the PCIA Fact Sheet already in 2003, these insights would shape the GACC's grounding assumptions:

- » The global nature of the problem: “Over 2 billion people worldwide use traditional biomass fuels (e.g., wood, dung, crop residues) for cooking and heating. As a result, an estimated 2 million people - particularly women and children - die each year from breathing elevated levels of indoor smoke...”

- » The necessity to frame the cross-cutting nature of the problem: “The broad lesson is that to achieve sustainable progress, the Partnership must tackle this problem not just on technology front, but as a health, economic, and environmental issue as well.”
- » The importance of a market-based strategy: “Long-term sustainability through local market and business development will be prioritized.”
- » The need for strategic planning, metrics, and evaluation: “Performance will be evaluated, approaches (outreach modules, business models, and financing mechanisms) refined, and longer-term implementation plans identified.”
- » The need for a cross-sector global partnership approach to address complexity and magnitude: “While this issue is easy to solve in any individual case, its dispersed nature makes it enormously complicated to solve on the broader scale....The Partners are contributing their resources and expertise to implement the (global) goals of the initiative....”¹⁷



Within this framework, the cookstoves solution offered a compelling response to a global need, integrating a cross-cutting and market-based approach.

During its tenure, the PCIA adopted activities in four areas: 1) capacity-building at all participant levels, including researchers, entrepreneurs, program implementers, communities and individual beneficiaries; 2) technical assistance in the design, testing, and manufacturing of clean technologies; 3) program implementation including outreach/education programs, market development, and monitoring and evaluation components; and 4) knowledge management for the sector. Through these diverse efforts, PCIA key partners reported assisting an estimated 2.5 million households in adopting clean cooking and heating practices, which translated to an impact of reducing harmful exposures for more than 15 million people.¹⁸

Despite PCIA success in summative outcomes and its capacity in developing SME talent and defining the sector’s priorities and agenda, PCIA faced structural challenges.¹⁹ In September 2006, Moss persuaded EPA leadership to allow him to explore the concept of a targeted cookstoves business strategy for the USG to pursue through the PCIA infrastructure, with a critical issue identified: relocating PCIA to a new host, as EPA regulatory limitations were restricting its efforts. PCIA-affiliated leaders interviewed more than 100 stakeholders from across the cookstoves and fuel sectors to assess sector priorities, issues of structural management, and the identity of a new host. This intensive effort resulted in an unpublished but comprehensive business plan, completed in late 2007, assuming a \$20 million budget. In early

2008, the EPA initiated the first solicitation for a new host and Marcus Peacock, Deputy EPA Administrator, convened agency leaders for that effort. One respondent noted that then-Deputy Administrator Marcus Peacock asked for a request of \$800,000 for each USG agency (for a total USG commitment of \$6 million) which would be leveraged to raise another \$15 million from the private sector—though increasing resource constraints

and an uncertain political climate fueled reticence all around. The EPA submitted a \$1 million commitment (toward the 20M projected budget) but all other agencies, while expressing interest in the proposal, were unable to make multi-year commitments—in part due to pending U.S. presidential elections and changing Administrations. Thus, the interagency commitment bid failed, and Moss decided to wait until after the 2008 elections to pitch

the project.²⁰ Some respondents noted the nonpartisan nature of the P3 issue: the Bush Administration after all had made progress on partnership endeavors in late 2007 as Secretary Rice established the GPC, a clearinghouse for multisector partnerships under Chief of Mission authority, reflecting the perceived potential of such collaborations.²¹

Despite the interagency commitment failure, the solicitation exercise resulted in unexpected gains: most importantly, the establishment of an interagency network of interested partners (including NIH and CDC) that began to meet regularly to discuss the collaborative cookstoves effort. One study respondent noted that this interagency process highlighted the relevance of the whole “bundle of issues wrapped up in clean cookstoves” to each of their respective organizations:

these pretty senior officials began to think, ‘this is a very important issue that our institutions should be engaged in’...They were clear that they could not and were not committing any resources; but they substantively supported the concept...and they wanted to see where it went.”²²

Thus, this regularized and collaborative concept-building outcome in effect established the collaborative-interagency framework that enabled the ultimate multi-agency commitment to the Alliance mission and model.

Notably, the PCIA provided the institutional and process framework—not to mention much of the expertise and talent—for USG agencies to conduct an internal conversation about the cookstoves sector and partnership. As one respondent noted, despite limited tangible resources, the meeting convened

by EPA Deputy Administrator Peacock had brought in diverse agencies concerned with health (CDC, NIH), climate and pollution (EPA), energy (DOE), development (USAID), and later in the process, women (the Office of the Special Representative for Women's Issues), and even foreign policy (State).²³ Informal interagency working group meetings began in May of 2008, reflecting general agreement that the cookstoves initiative was relevant to each agency's mission or agenda—though concrete resources were scarce. These meetings continued regularly until the 2010 announcement of the interagency commitment to the Alliance—a commitment exceeding \$50 million. The strength of

As another respondent notes, the private sector at the conference injected a “business perspective” into the project concept—and that changed much of the future direction of the global cookstoves initiative.

the interagency network included shared expertise, a widening commitment to the cookstoves concept, personal relationships forged, among other items. In fact, the existence of this interagency group

and its wealth of expertise buttressed Secretary Clinton's decision to lend her personal support to the cookstoves concept, which itself helped enlarge subsequent agency commitments marshaled for the CGI formal launch of the Alliance.²⁴

Simultaneously in 2008, new leadership at the Shell Foundation (Shell-F), which had committed from 2002 to developing the cookstoves sector, worked to convince the Shell Corporation (Shell-C) to increase its investment and expand its vision beyond a regional focus in India, where its major efforts to date were concentrated. Shell-C's interests were driven in part by the fact that no other major energy company had yet chosen to invest in the area. As one respondent explained: “We landed on cookstoves as being the area. Why? Because others were looking at it...like BP had been looking at it for several years, but had decided it wasn't for them commercially, which is one of the reasons why the Foundation was doing it.”²⁵ In September 2008, following six months of intensive lobbying, Shell-C made a verbal commitment to Shell-F of \$20 million devoted to the global cookstoves effort. This victory was short-lived, however, as the global financial crisis soon forced Shell-C to reduce this total to \$2 million, earmarked for awareness efforts already underway in India.²⁶

Informal efforts to identify a host for PCIA continued into the spring of 2008, during which time Jacob Moss approached scores of organizations with preliminary discussions to sound out their interest in serving as the host for a globalized cookstoves initiative. Among these was the UNF, where Moss found a high level of interest and the willingness to embrace the complexity of the sector and its attendant issues. Although the formal solicitation process stalled, ongoing discussions continued between EPA and UNF during the spring of 2008 as interest in a globally-scaled cookstoves program housed at UNF increased.

In fact, a change-agent leader recognized the opportunity of such timing, as UNF was itself undergoing organizational change. Transitioning from a true (lending) foundation to an operating charity, UNF needed to raise funds beyond its initial endowment. This change-agent leader was, thus, given some organizational “bandwidth” to assess the idea for UNF management and in the course of doing so, met extensively with the PCIA network and other sector-affiliated parties in the public, private, and NGO sectors. By the end of 2008, UNF began to solidify its ideas about managing a global cookstoves project housed within their energy and climate division. In early 2009, UNF committed half a million dollars to explore the integration of a cookstoves project into UNF's existing program agenda in their environmental division. As one respondent noted: “if this had happened five years earlier, it probably wouldn't have been well-received because they [UNF] weren't in that operating charity mode yet and five years later it might not have happened either...”²⁷ Timing was, thus, a critical factor that cut several ways, encouraging some organizations, such as the UNF to seize the moment, while at the same time, other organizations (Shell-F) and USG agencies, were in an externally motivated holding pattern.

When that moment finally arrived—a moment of political opportunity associated with and seized by the rising Clinton State Department—it was the result of several critical factors including, serendipitous interpersonal connections. Most significantly, the global cookstoves idea came to the attention of a Clinton advisor and then to the Secretary herself in a series of linked events that energized the concept and sector.

The financial crisis that hit international markets in late 2008, followed by the election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States, realigned the U.S. political environment and forced all interested cookstoves parties to reassess their commitments and efforts. The first six months of 2009 showed much resultant activity: part of the UNF internal commitment of \$500,000 to formalize a cookstoves project plan in their energy and climate group included convening a cross-sector stakeholders' conference in Washington, DC in March 2010. UNF and Shell-F co-hosted the event for the sector to explore potential collaborative models. While initial ideas generated there were described by respondents as “some of the worst” and “terrible,” the unexpected high level of attendance resulted in a strengthened sector network of stakeholders in ways pivotal for future success. The meeting was the subject of several shared impressions, including discussions of other global models (i.e. the global hand-washing partnership)—but it was consistently described as “a great success.” The event provided a much-needed opportunity for sector mobilization and strengthening, self-awareness of stakeholders, brainstorming and idea generation, and the addition of a pivotal new perspective. As one respondent emphasized, the cookstoves concept at the time was restricted to standards and testing, awareness raising, fundraising, and research to assess impact. Entrepreneurial develop-

ment had not been part of the vision or discussion yet. As another respondent notes, the private sector at the conference injected a “business perspective” into the project concept—and that changed much of the future direction of the global cookstoves initiative.

But within the USG generally, more was happening on multiple fronts, injecting new energy and opportunities for advancing cookstoves from different angles. In mid-2009, with the advent of a new State Department administration, Secretary Rice’s Global Partnerships Center (GPC) was transformed into the Global Partnerships Initiative (GPI) and designated a Secretary’s (S) Office, reflecting the new Secretary’s P3 priorities. This Office would prove critical in helping to evolve the Alliance. The PCIA initiative also came to the attention of several Obama appointees, who recognized its alignment with their own P3 experience, and its potential ability to address cross-cutting foreign policy priorities, subsequently highlighted in State’s own first QDDR, released in February 2010.²⁸

Likewise, in June 2009, Jacob Moss briefed the new Assistant Administrator for EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation, Gina McCarthy, on the cookstoves effort. McCarthy immediately realized both its potential and the need to significantly increase its scale. While Moss had briefed newly-appointed Assistant Administrator McCarthy on the status of the project to secure continued support in the search for a host outside of EPA, one respondent noted that McCarthy did “far more” than that—she immediately grasped the idea, its potential for expansion on a global scale, the value of the project’s cross-cutting objectives and structure, and its alignment with the new Obama Administration’s partnership focus and State foreign policy priorities. But while McCarthy was willing to advocate for the project, she recognized it could not be implemented from the limited platform offered at EPA and, hence, she tasked Moss to draft a new proposal on a significantly larger scale.²⁹ Once given the green light to reconceive the project on a global scale, Moss built up the prior business plan (completed in 2007)³⁰ as a basis for the global cookstoves structure. Moss provided McCarthy with a revised business plan two weeks later.

In July 2009, McCarthy took the globally-scaled plan to then-EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, who recognized the proposal as a viable collaborative partnership in line with Secretary Clinton’s own vision and experiences. In August 2009, Jackson had the opportunity to share the revised proposal with Clinton, who was intrigued; she immediately tasked Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Michael Fuchs to begin due diligence on the concept. His inquiries resulted in negative responses from a number



of agencies, who were subsequently gathered at a meeting in October 2009 to interact directly with Moss on the proposal. At that meeting, Moss pitched his cookstoves idea directly to this group of “naysayers,” as one respondent described them, many of whom seemed only “to offer push-back” against his idea. Clinton’s longtime advisor and newly-appointed Managing Director of GPI, Kris Balderston witnessed these dynamics at the presentation and it made a deep impression upon him. Balderston, a long-time Clinton advisor, became Special Representative for Global Partnerships in November 2010. Despite the fact that Moss was being “beaten up” by attendant critics, Balderston recognized his deep and broad expertise, his passion, and the timely potential of Moss’s concept for anchoring an effective global partnership on complex and cross-cutting development issues. He also understood, importantly, the possibility of a far-reaching solution embedded in the cookstoves idea and partnership.

Cognizant of the fact that this proposal would appeal to Secretary Clinton both structurally (as a global partnership) and conceptually (addressing many issue areas prioritized by the Secretary), the political operational leader requested a meeting with Moss. Intrigued by Moss’ manifest command of the sector, Balderston pursued the concept with Moss in the months following this initial meeting. In June of 2010, Jacob Moss was invited to present the cookstoves partnership proposal to three critical advisors to Clinton: Kris Balderston, Todd Stern (Special Representative for Climate Change) and Melanne Verveer (Special Representative for Women’s Issues). Briefed by this group following the meeting, Secretary Clinton officially expressed her support for the proposal. She then subsequently informed the agencies vying for spots to announce initiatives at the 2010 Clinton Global Initiative that the cookstoves partnership would be one of the three she supported.³¹ Their positive review confirmed Balderston’s instincts and helped secure Clinton’s decision in June 2010 to support the cookstoves project at the

upcoming CGI. A number of interviewees also indicated that pre-existent collaboration between several agencies strengthened the case for Secretary Clinton's support of the cookstoves partnership.

As the idea gained traction within State, its own institutional infrastructure—the Secretary's Office for Global Initiatives, later the Secretary's Office for Global Partnerships (S/GP)—would simultaneously evolve to support the development of the Alliance partnership. As mentioned, in the fall of 2009 Secretary Rice's Global Partnership Center (GPC) had been renamed the Global Partnerships Initiative (GPI) and was elevated to the status of a Secretarial office (S/GP).³² During the course of Secretary Clinton's tenure, the S/GP would recruit a small but dedicated team of career officials to facilitate the development of P3s in the pursuit of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. The creation of this bureaucratic structure was, in turn, supported by a number of important policy instruments as well, most importantly the President's Executive Order and the QDDR (February 2010) in which public-private partnership arrangements were posited as effective and innovative in the current global environment. The cookstoves initiative was highlighted in the QDDR as an exemplar of a successful collaborative engagement between the public and private sectors in finding effective solutions to complex global problems.

During this generative period, the EPA and Shell-F were also conducting their own due diligence on the UNF to gage its fit and to finalize the decision as to whether they would support the UNF bid to manage an expanded PCIA. Despite concerns regarding UNF capacity to manage a project of this magnitude, UNF leaders' genuine commitment, expertise, and interest in the

Within this process, a keen interest—heightened and leveraged by savvy SME and political operational leaders—grew to see the resultant commitments by external stakeholders.

cross-cutting nature of the idea earned support from critics. After the decision, weekly meetings began in March 2010, bringing together the five or six major partners to hammer out issues of funding, organizational

structure, and mission. During the first half of 2010, UNF, Shell-F, EPA and a number of other key partners continued to collaborate in conceiving of a strategic approach to creating a global partnership for the cookstoves sector. Described as a "painful but necessary process," this core group addressed potential barriers and sticking points of politics, history, and culture in a process that, in turn, strengthened the collaborative relationships needed to create a successful strategic plan.³³

Secretary Clinton's decision in June 2010 to announce the launch of the Alliance at the CGI in September 2010 accelerated the original launch timetable, which had been tentatively scheduled for 2011. This compressed timeframe, in turn, forced the cookstoves team into a high-stakes process of operationalizing what had been, up to that point, several business plans, strategies,

and concepts. The imminent reality of the CGI announcement in only three months created a sense of urgency that galvanized the process of formalizing the Alliance at many levels, among PCIA and EPA stakeholders and leaders, throughout the existing USG interagency process, at the UNF, and among private sector partners. Within this process, a keen interest—heightened and leveraged by savvy SME and political operational leaders—grew to see the resultant commitments by external stakeholders. Resembling a campaign effort, the process encouraging many to commit and invest in the Alliance was highly inclusive, bringing together great hierarchical diversity within the USG. Meetings were strategically held in the Secretary's own conference room and were described by respondents as "government at its best," as senior officials interacted with and mentored younger participants, as many were infused with the excitement and potential of this shared partnership endeavor.

This process resembled a political campaign in other respects as well: messaging was highly focused and accessible, designed to emphasize the universal appeal of the GACC project, evident in the early motto of the sector: "Cooking shouldn't kill."³⁴ Communications and media exposure were orchestrated for maximum impact, as in the choice to publicly launch at the 2010 CGI. Likewise, several processes associated with the Alliance were "campaign-like": recruiting partners, raising money, pounding the "halls" to share the message across "the building" and other USG agencies. All efforts were framed by the deadline-driven urgency that infused the atmosphere, given that the CGI launch was just around the corner. In many respects, this initial, galvanizing deadline—a moment which depended on powerful stakeholders joining and validating the effort—was deliberately structured as a campaign, given the wisdom of SME and political operational leadership. A priority was placed on who would join the mobilization effort and why.

Thus, for the next several months, Balderston organized regular, intensive, close-knit, and collegial meetings at State with agency representatives to build a collaborative foundation for these efforts. Emphasizing young leaders (deputies), pitched as hierarchically inclusive and diverse, these campaign-style meetings, held in the Secretary's conference room, created, not only urgency, but a sense of the high-level commitment to the cookstoves idea and effort. Resources-commitment and mobilization were at the core of Balderston's strategy: EPA and GPI leaders co-managed this process to achieve significant interagency commitment, to inject needed resources into the nascent partnership, to motivate all "founding partners" to give at maximum levels through the USG example, and to signal to all stakeholders that the effort had the highest level of USG support in its champion leaders, including and beyond Secretary Clinton. These regular meetings with agency representatives, many of them young professionals, were orchestrated in order to build collaboration, support and a sense of community around the cookstoves effort.³⁵

In July of 2010, the State Department convened administrators from the relevant agencies to pitch the idea of a significant in-

teragency commitment to the cookstoves partnership. In passionate terms, high-level officials presented the proposal, and while no specific “ask” was made at this first meeting, agency officials were asked to return to a second meeting in two weeks’ time with their commitments on the table. An important aspect of this meeting was the opportunity for agencies with diverse missions and agendas to discover what others were doing and to recognize the intersections among their own and the cookstoves effort, in short, to work together to achieve greater results in a time of scarce resources.³⁶ This process of mutual identification of interests and potential synergies lay at the heart of the successful interagency collaboration. On August 10, 2010, the State Department hosted the official agency commitment

meeting. The EPA opened the process by offering a commitment package of \$6 million to the cookstoves project, setting the tone for generous contributions by other agencies.³⁷ At the end of the meeting, total USG commitments had been secured in excess of \$35 million for the establishment of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, and these increased to over \$50 million in the following two weeks, as a result of further solicitations.³⁸ External stakeholders watched this process with interest, gauging the tangible USG commitment to the Alliance, and determining their own investments based on this initial response.³⁹

In 2010, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and a number of other champion leaders from USG agencies and external sector stakeholders joined Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

TABLE 3. U.S. INTERAGENCY COMMITMENT TO THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COOKSTOVES, AUGUST 2010 ⁴²

UNITED STATES COMMITMENT: \$50.82 MILLION OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS (BROKEN DOWN BY AGENCY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE/U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID AND DEVELOPMENT (USAID) \$9.02 MILLION

State and AID will commit \$9.02 million over the next five years to address the harmful effects of smoke exposure from traditional cookstoves and will utilize its diplomatic outreach to encourage foreign government support. Funding will support applied and operational research into how people use improved stove technology and how indoor air quality and sanitation interventions can improve household environments and promote economic opportunities for women.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) \$6 MILLION

EPA will contribute \$6 million over the next 5 years to work with partners across the globe to advance this field in critical areas including:

- » Stove testing and evaluation in both the lab and the field;
- » Cookstove design innovations, possibly including a design competition and prize;
- » Assessments focused on health and exposure benefits of improved stoves.

In addition, it will draw the expertise, lessons learned, and network that we have developed in launching and leading the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air since 2002 to help the Alliance meet its 2020 goal.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) \$10 MILLION

DOE will contribute \$10 million over the next five years and conduct research aimed at addressing technical barriers to the development of low emission, high efficiency cookstoves through activities in areas such as combustion, heat transfer, and materials development.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS)

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) \$24.7 MILLION

NIH will commit about \$24.7 million over five years to support ongoing research and research training projects, as well as new efforts to develop improved measuring devices, expand epidemiological studies and conduct clinical trials. Ongoing projects include studies on the cookstove-related effects on pulmonary and cardiac diseases, the relationship between indoor air pollution and low-birth weight, and studies on the most effective ways to introduce and educate users on safety and the proper use of cookstoves. Training programs help prepare scientists in low- and middle-income countries to engage in related research and evaluation activities. NIH will also lead and co-sponsor an international state-of-science cookstoves conference in late Spring 2011. The Office of Global Health Affairs, within HHS’ Office of the Secretary, will contribute \$100,000 to support this conference.

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) \$1 MILLION

As a founding member the CDC is committing to working closely with Alliance members and the global community to:

- » Demonstrate the health benefits of implementing clean cookstove programs
- » Better understand the relationship between human exposures and health outcomes
- » Integrate cookstove implementation with other public health programs
- » Evaluate cookstove program implementation

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE CHAMPION AND OPERATIONAL LEADERS

We describe the role of several “champion leaders” across USG and non-USG entities in playing critical roles in the creation of the Alliance.

The Champion Leader:

- 1) lends to the project the credibility, reputation and influence of a high-level position;
- 2) contextualizes diverse interests into a larger vision, itself integrated into broader policy objectives;
- 3) provides the project with access to a larger platform;
- 4) offers access to a larger resource base;
- 5) utilizes power associated with the position to advocate for the project;
- 6) employs influence to create policy/procedural/institutional change necessary for the success of the endeavor; and
- 7) is able to force ideas through moments of internal resistance.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the so-called Clinton factor—as champion leader and in mobilizing the institutional weight of State as the most authoritative convening agency for the developing project—was insufficient on its own for Alliance success. As mentioned, the preexisting concept, project, and partnership infrastructure existed with the PCIA and the well-versed, committed, and persistent epistemic community, as well as SME leaders, scientists, among other leader types, that had long committed their careers to achievement in the clean cooking and fuels space. In fact, much of the early story of the Alliance’s conception involves these and other key actors and organizations, most especially *SME Leaders* and the EPA in their choice to seize the opportunity that the Secretary’s Office presented.

This opportunity was largely identified, captured, and expressed through the actions by a third leader-type: the *Operational leader*, also critical to this partnership and most P3’s success. *It is also important to recognize from an analytical perspective*

that, given the role of the champion leader in bringing visibility to an endeavor, it is easy to miss other leadership roles and collaborative processes, which are essential to success. To do that is a mistake—most especially for understanding how to replicate future successful P3s.

Of all leader types in the foreign policy and development domain, the *Political Operational Leader*, which we also term a “boundary spanning” leader, is the most difficult to characterize as its functional expertise encompasses such a range and amalgamation of roles, skillsets, and zones of influence. This is so not only because this domain is expansive and complex—it is where national meets international politics—but because individual leaders must anchor a developing partnership within organizational structures, which are themselves embedded in bureaucratic institutions and processes. That process is an art, not a science. This leader is, thus, at once an authoritative representative of the champion leader; an interpreter and translator of that leader’s mission and goals, a transactional and transformational leader type, albeit using another leader’s power and position to meet shared goals.

Most importantly, this Political operational leader is an institutional and process visionary; hence, the name “*Political Operational Leader*,” a person who has fully mastered—not necessarily the substantive content or scientific subject matter related to a given project (though they tend to be highly conversant on these materials)—but on the political and bureaucratic terrain and institutional processes in which the business of that particularly project takes place.

In this case, the bureaucratic processes and politics of the State Department—because of its broad-based mandate to manage U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy and development, and its institutional diversity and hierarchies, most notably in its many segmented bureaus—is a wildly complex environment. This leader, in short, knows the business of politics generally, the nature of federal govern-

ment processes, the bureaucratic dynamics associated with specific political processes and federal agencies, and is well versed in relevant personalities, positions, and figures that make up the field of influence in this domain.

Overall, the *Political Operational Leader* is committed to achievement on existing political-bureaucratic terms and is adapt and agile at working the levers of accomplishment and influence in this context. *Like the SME leader, this political operations leader is irreplaceable in the foreign policy process of P3 development on a global scale.*

The *Champion Leader*—and Clinton’s role specifically—operates differently. In this case, Clinton encapsulates political opportunity, the capacity of the champion leader to mobilize the weight of her office to exert significant influence on existing institutional processes to elevate the cookstoves idea and project it to a nationally-prioritized level. It was up to the existing PCIA network to seize that opportunity—and they did. But it is also true that the capacity to create political opportunity for a project is no insignificant step: it presumes multiple, long-earned sources and layers of political knowledge, authority, and experience in bureaucratic politics.

Some examples include: facility with the federal bureaucracies and how they work; agility in agenda setting in the context of existing national domestic politics; the ability to mobilize other executive agencies and their leadership; the ability to mobilize the private-sector network long cultivated by Clinton; and, most distinctively, Clinton’s ability to activate her existing international reputation to push the cookstoves idea onto the global stage. But the very cookstoves opportunity was neither identified nor leveraged by Clinton herself—that role fell to the *SME and Political Operational Leaders*, as mentioned.

on stage at the CGI to announce the launch of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC), a public-private partnership led by the United Nations Foundation, focuses on creating a thriving global market for clean and efficient household cooking and fuels solutions. GACC, built upon the extensive network

that comprised the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, formally integrated the PCIA into its organization in 2012.⁴⁰ The activities and initiatives conducted under the auspices of this integrated entity represent a collaborative effort to support the mission of the Alliance to achieve its target of '100 by 20', that is, 100 million

TABLE 4. FOUNDING PARTNERS: THE PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND NGOS

On September 21, 2010, the U.S. State Department issued a Fact Sheet announcing the launch the previous day of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: 20 "founding partners" were identified representing public, private and NGO stakeholders committed to achieving "the adoption of clean efficient cookstoves and fuels in 100 million households by 2020."

THE FOUNDING PARTNERS OF THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COOKSTOVES⁴³ (* DENOTES A FUNDING PARTNER)⁴⁴

PUBLIC PARTNERS	PRIVATE PARTNERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » U.S. Department of State* » U.S. Environmental Protection Agency* » World Health Organization (WHO) » German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)* » Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)* » UN-Energy » World Food Programme (WFP) » UN Environment Programme (UNEP) » UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), » U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)* » U.S. Department of Energy* » U.S. Department of Health and Human Services » (National Institutes of Health; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)* » UN High Commissioner for Refugees » SNV Netherlands Development Organization* » Government of Peru » Government of Norway* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Shell* » Morgan Stanley*
	NGO PARTNERS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » United Nations Foundation* » Shell Foundation* » Morgan Stanley Foundation*

homes to adopt clean and efficient stoves and fuels by 2020.⁴¹ Recognizing the limitations preventing the EPA from undertaking any effort on its own that would significantly impact this situation, SME leaders effectively leveraged EPA's reputation to announce the formation of the Alliance.

3.2.2 PHASE 2: FROM CGI 2010 TO CREATING THE P3 STRUCTURE: "LAUNCH IT, THEN BUILD IT...."

At the moment of launch, the Alliance was merely a P3 vision—not an organizational entity or even a genuine partnership. All founding partners and key stakeholders recognized that the work of creating the entity was at its very beginning. One respondent noted "there hadn't been a clear statement of what this Alliance would stand for beyond that vision that Hillary Clinton laid out, so how would we add value to the other partners in the sector? What would be our role?"

Despite the need to iron out details, Secretary Clinton pledged State support and leadership to mobilize resources for the P3 process of developing the Alliance, which the core team had de-

fined as a market-based initiative fostering the use and adoption of clean cookstoves with a planned scope of 100 million households effected worldwide by 2020. Clinton also announced that more than \$100 million was committed by 19 founding partners and, further, in 2011, that celebrated actress Julia Roberts would act as Alliance spokesperson. Most importantly, the Alliance vision itself unveiled at CGI went far beyond the aspirations of the PCIA model and the UNF Concept Note, and its expanded objectives interfaced with partner priorities: (1.) the pursuit of American foreign policy goals associated with global development issues; and (2.) the firm commitment to the utilization of a market-based approach in promoting the cookstoves sector. Only eight years after the PCIA formed, the new Alliance entity was envisioned as a public-private partnership that would operationalize priorities expressed in the recently written QDDR 2010: collaboration in the pursuit of solutions to global problems through the consolidation of the resources, strengths, and commitment of the public, private and NGO sectors.

With the GCI announcement, the Alliance enters its second phase: from concept formation to strategic planning-directed

at organization and institution building. The announcement also signaled the capacity of founding partners and their respective leaders to conduct a rapid-paced preparatory phase in the months before the CGI launch in September 2010, under the Political operational leadership of the S/GP office and the SME leadership, associated with an EPA detail, among the other leadership roles discussed, including Sector strategic leadership. This combined leadership pressed stakeholders in less than three months to use the CGI deadline to fast-track early planning efforts, build significant energy, mobilize necessary recruitment and resources efforts, field needed discussions about the Alliance concept, model structure, governance, and partner relations, etc. This process, no doubt, was a continuation of the 2009 interagency discussion that Shell-F and UNF had instigated. But it was significantly more intensified: during the months that followed the CGI September 2010 meeting launch, important actions occurred on many fronts. Secretary Clinton personally called federal agency leaders (CDC, NIH, etc.) and national leaders at the highest levels to create “buy in” in a personal touch that coincided—at least in the international domain—with excitement about her tenure at State, particularly by many foreign governments.

Within State itself, the Alliance comprised a new organizational challenge, eliciting worries and reticence from some quarters. As the QDDR 2010 anticipated: “State’s lack of an easily understandable framework for partnerships” was an obstacle to pursuing P3s in the service of foreign policy objectives. To address these concerns, the S/GP team worked through, wrote, and published the Policy Framework and Legal Guidelines for Partnerships, a document offering partnership templates and a legal framework to “streamlin[e] the process for developing public-private partnerships.”⁴⁵ Efforts in the State Department also included a number of pivotal personnel appointments: most notably, in November 2010, Kris Balderston was named Special Representative for Global Partnerships, with James Thompson as Deputy Special Representative. Thomas Debass was also recruited from the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to manage a team focusing on economic growth entrepreneurship. Jacob Moss, one key force behind cookstoves at EPA, was detailed from EPA to State as Director of the U.S. Cookstoves Initiative. The Shell Foundation assigned Simon Bishop fulltime to the cookstoves effort, and Leslie Cordes led the small team already in place at the UN Foundation. Most of this leadership and many more members of the team of committed stakeholders would guide the Alliance through the critical first year, managing “the massive amount of activity” unleashed by the CGI announcement and launch of the Alliance.

The pivotal leaders in the Alliance recognized the need for two critical benchmarks for GACC to become an institution capable of fulfilling its mandate: the first priority was the need for a strategic plan to provide a 10-year roadmap for guiding decision-making, priorities, and evaluation metrics. Along with Shell-F’s insistence on the market-based development of the sector and a pre-existing EPA business plan for the global en-

tity, the process that unfolded was resolutely inclusive both of the existing cookstoves community and of the specific players involved in the budding Alliance. Over the course of the first six months post-GCI launch, as many as 14 working groups, made up of about 20 experts each, worked to create a plan of action to address these needs. Although this process was unwieldy and complex, the result was the active integration of the ideas, perspectives, experiences, and expertise of between 350 and 400 experts, comprising “all major players in the sector.” That process created a natural evolving commitment and personal stake among participants so that in the period from the Alliance’s formal announcement to the final draft of the strategic plan, stakeholders had built a thoroughly active, inclusive, expert-based, and invested community. That inclusivity—and the ability to mobilize significant expertise and talented leadership in the service of this P3—is a consistent feature of the cookstoves project and understood by many to be an essential component of its success and sustainability.

The second prioritized benchmark was the need for a formal management infrastructure within the UNF and a finalized GACC governance plan. Necessarily more contentious than strategic planning as it involves real people in real jobs, the UNF proposed placing the Alliance under the auspices of the existing UNF Energy and Climate team, led by a Program Manager. S/GP and Shell-F leadership disagreed: they believed the Alliance should stand on its own with an executive director reporting directly to the CEO of the UNF. State-affiliated SME leaders noted that this was one of the very few moments when the S/GP Office exercised its influence within the Alliance development process, taking a strong stance on the issue of placement of the cookstoves initiative within the UNF organizational hierarchy.

After a long and again inclusive search process, in September 2011, a year later, Rahda Muthiah was chosen to become GACC’s first formal executive director, bringing with her two decades of a distinctive leadership expertise in working in both the private and NGO sectors. The executive director immediately set about addressing significant gaps: a lack of unifying infrastructure, a clear business plan, rigorous results-based metrics, a plan for relations with partners, etc. These were all top priorities in the first three months of the executive director’s tenure. In this early period, one of the most fateful decisions made by the executive director was in choosing to develop the business plan and these metrics “in-house” rather than hiring an external consultant. This decision was followed by intensive and prioritized work in developing a detailed and practical business plan—embedded in the broad goals of the strategic plan—along with an ambitious set of metrics used to assess target countries based on consistent and neutral parameters. Placing a 10-week hold on all decisions about specific programs in countries, the executive director began the detailed process of building the GACC as an organization and institution, including formalizing staffing and conducting country assessments in 15 countries. The executive director during this period also established the Board of Governors, as well as a separate Leadership Council, both of which

were to play critical roles in decision-making, transparency, and oversight at the Alliance.

The process of creating the Alliance was not typical as it involved a “launch, then build it” approach—a reversal of the usual process. Those Political operational leaders who guided the “launch” portion and attended the CGI launch, noted:

When I was contacted later, that's when I realized, 'oh, they are just actually kicking this off.' When I came into the organization I heard that they weren't exactly quite ready to launch when we did in September, but it was more of an opportune moment and the Secretary wanted to do that. So they had sort of announced [the Alliance P3's existence] when they were really in the process of building it. You know in some cases it's usually the other way around.⁴⁶

This reversed process arose from the push to take advantage of a short window of opportunity, as well as the intention of the leadership to achieve tangible progress during Secretary Clinton's tenure at State. Jacob Moss noted that this urgency was simultaneously stressful and exhilarating for early partners:

Once we had that meeting in March and the blessing of that set of sort of geeky level partners, you know, the cookstove sector as it was at the time, then it's like well when are we going to try to launch this? And people were thinking, 'Well, we'll try in a year, a year and a half.' You know, these things take years at times. But [one of the Political operational leaders] was like 'no,' because he was thinking: 'What is it now? It's 2010 at this point, right? So we've got 3 ½ years really, really 3 years to do anything, or 2 ½ years right?' He probably knew at some level Clinton would not want to be Secretary for eight years you know, so his horizon was 3 years. So he's like, 'No, let's do this at CGI in the fall.' And I'm like, 'This is the end of March, so April, May, June, July, August, that's 6 ½ months—5 ½ months, actually. That's insane to pull some of this together.' And he's like, 'Well, let's go for it.'⁴⁷

Thus, as a novel foray into the P3 process, implementing the Alliance required pushing boundaries along several content and process parameters, including internal leadership negotiations, as this example illustrates. Alliance core leaders and members also “pushed the envelope” in terms of stakeholder membership and inclusive participation, cross-cutting issues, shared values coupled with interest-based opportunities, in the ability to link foreign policy objectives with partnership activities, and in sequencing aspects of the design and implementation processes.

Additionally, the GACC strategic plan has been identified by key leaders as a critical component of the Alliance's success: it was conceived not as a plan exclusively for the partnership, nor any specific partner member, but for the sector as a whole. That was the strategic genius of the Operational leader affiliated with this second-phase process of building the institutional “back-end” of the GACC. This Operational leader conceived of the Alliance as nested both within the clean cooking and fuels global sector and in the international development environment. In fact, this Operational leader was extremely savvy about moving the

Alliance—in the operational planning process—away from the USG terrain in which in many respects its initial early conception had been framed. The strategic plan focused not only on the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholder groups within that broadened international context, it defined the dynamic and added value of the Alliance P3 role in building a strong, global market-based sector and in achieving international development goals within the self-sustaining and self-reproducing dictates of market solutions.

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

We distinguish Political operational leaders from Operational leaders in this case and in general in several ways. While they share many traits and while both are masters of institutional systems and networks, in this case the operational leader assumes responsibility for translating the partnership vision into an achievable reality, all while serving as the guardian of the P3 entity and the “big picture”—in short, this leader possess the capacity to know and integrate all P3 goals, external conditions, and partner interests into a unified and implementable approach. In this respect, the operational leader has to build a foundation on a moving target—a fluid plane of relationships, challenges, and competing interests—all while managing resources and time constraints. In this role, the operational leader oversees steady and phased development, the implementation of system-wide indicators and measures of success, and this leader remains cognizant of the evolutionary needs of the partnership, facilitates learning and adaptation within the system, and manages the internal processes of collaboration between stakeholders to ensure that diverse needs and interests, as well as those of the sector as a whole, are best served.

SME leadership—which has continued to be an important liaison between the Alliance and the interagency group comprising the USG partnership members—shifted from daily operations of the GACC to a coordinator role with the Alliance to leverage USG resources and connections in support of Alliance operations (i.e., organizing the attendance of US Ambassadors at international events and supporting the recent effort to mobilize resource commitments presented at the Cookstoves Future Summit for Phase 2 of the strategic plan.)

3.2.3 PHASE 3: FROM IGNITING CHANGE TO THE 2014 COOKSTOVES FUTURE SUMMIT: P3 GRADUATION

In November 2011, the Alliance published Igniting Change, A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels, the first public presentation of the recommendations resulting from the working group process. The report identified three principal strategies for accomplishing the 100 million by 2020 goal and the ultimate vision of universal adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels. These goals included: (a.) Enhancing the

demand for clean cookstoves and fuels; (2.) Strengthening the supply of clean cookstoves and fuels; and (3.) Fostering an enabling environment for a thriving market for clean cookstoves and fuels. Offering concrete examples of interventions aimed at achieving each, the report concluded that the sector was at a tipping point, prepared to make significant strides in resolving myriad problems caused by prevalent cooking practices—through a combination of expertise, committed donors, and a clear strategy.

Igniting Change also highlighted the fact of the Alliance, its stakeholder heft, its organizational ambitions in its partnership model, its cross-cutting goals, and most importantly, its ability to make significant, transformative progress in the cookstove and clean fuels sector and across the development priorities it had staked out. The report showcased the two critical benchmarks mentioned: high-quality management and customized governance structures suited to such an ambitious P3. Alliance leadership attention now turned to the objectives of the partnership: “a concerted and coordinated international approach among all key stakeholders to create a robust market for clean cookstoves and fuels” with the goal of bringing clean cooking solutions to 100 million homes by the year 2020.

In this third developmental phase, two trends dominate the evolution of the partnership: (1.) the first trend was the changing role of the Alliance entity itself from a U.S.-centric organization to an international one, with the consequent changes for its most influential founding partner, the USG; (2.) the second trend was the intense and rapid activity of Alliance leadership in establishing activities identified as priorities by the working groups in the strategic plan. In the first case, the evolution of the USG-GACC relationship was a matter of wise Operational leadership decision-making, as the very credibility and international status of the P3 depended upon this shift. Relatedly, productive country-level engagement could not proceed with the requisite speed and intensity needed if the Alliance was perceived as a USG organ. Likewise, S/GP leadership knew the Alliance must become disentangled from the State Department, noting “the first thing that we learned about the GACC and the model that we’ve (S/GP) adopted formally is that we should never own a partnership.” This view represents a change in the historical approach of the USG to its collaborative endeavors with external entities, an approach that had traditionally generally cast the USG in the leading role, actively controlling the process and the messaging.

But Alliance Operational leadership also strategically leveraged the complexity of the relationship between the Alliance and USG. Acknowledging the unique contributions and critical importance of USG support for the P3, operational leaders nonetheless emphasized the equal importance of making the GACC an independent entity, thus, avoiding the view among part-

ners that it was a proxy for U.S. policy interests. This move was a critical factor in transforming the GACC into a neutral global representative of the clean cookstove/clean fuels sector and its evolution into its ultimately self-sustaining entity (whether as an industry association or otherwise) envisioned by Operational leaders.

Consistent with such a perspective, the Igniting Change report also signaled a shift in USG

direct involvement in Alliance daily operations and the Office’s own subsequent evolution. In the spring of 2012, the newly designated Secretary’s Office for Global Partnerships (S/GP) announced the launch of a new partnership effort: Accelerated Market-Driven Partnerships (AMP). While State continued as an important player in GACC, there was a desire to move forward with other partnerships and avoid the narrowing of the S/GP mission or its perception as a “one-act show” associated only with the Alliance. Under S/GP Operational leadership, the Office directed its efforts to expanding its P3 repertoire and becoming conscious—as a learning organization—about the P3 development process. GACC began to be referred to as a “graduated partnership”—the preferred final status of all S/GP partnership endeavors.

By February 2013, Hillary Clinton had resigned as Secretary of State, choosing not to stay in the position for the Obama administration’s second term. Kris Balderston left the S/GP soon thereafter. John Kerry, the new U.S. Secretary of State, maintained the S/GP office, placing a close aide, Andrew O’Brien, at its helm. Secretary Kerry then proceeded to direct the energies of the S/GP into creating new partnerships aligned with issues most pressing for his own foreign policy vision and agenda.

Alliance efforts on behalf of the cookstoves sector gained momentum and achieved notable success against its stated objectives. In October 2011, the Alliance published its comprehensive 10-year Business Plan, outlining a 3-phase approach to achieving its goal of reaching 100 million households by 2020. During the first phase of this plan (2012-2014), the Alliance proposed to focus on achieving rapid growth in the sector through global and in-country awareness campaigns, market capacity-building,



impact research, the expansion of its partnership and resource base, the establishment of strong metrics and evaluation practices for the sector, and the development of mechanisms to share knowledge and best practices.

In November 2014, in conjunction with the Cookstoves Future Summit, the Alliance released its Phase One Final Report, a retrospective look at the partnership's major achievements during the first of its three-phase strategic plan to create a dynamic market-based approach to the promotion of clean cooking practices. The report identified nine principal accomplishments that met or exceeded its original goals for this first phase:

- » Growing the partner base and expanding the clean cooking sector: representing over 1,000 diverse partners (governments, UN agencies, private sector corporations and entrepreneurs, financial institutions and NGOs, as well as members of the academic and research communities.)
- » Driving Innovation and building enterprise capacity: GACC established both its own funding and grant mechanisms to support entrepreneurial innovation and development in the sector and mobilized significant resources from a number of investors. In addition, GACC is actively working to facilitate access to carbon credit revenues for clean cooking enterprises.
- » Mobilizing grants and investment in clean cookstoves and fuels: GACC successfully raised funds for the activities of the Secretariat and sector during the first phase and has significant commitments for funds for the second phase.
- » Developing global standards and testing: GACC has played a critical role in supporting the work of the International Standards Organization to develop the first set of standards for the clean cookstoves sector; it also supports 13 Regional Testing and Knowledge Centers situated in Africa, Asia and Latin America, providing better access to critical knowledge to local entrepreneurs from these regions.
- » Promoting clean fuels to achieve health and environmental benefits: Understanding the widespread adoption of clean cookstoves requires access to clean fuels, thus, GACC has dedicated significant effort to reduce barriers to universal access and build the capacity of clean fuel enterprises.
- » Integrating women into the clean cooking value chain: GACC recognized the critical role of women in the successful adoption of clean cooking practices and thus has prioritized the integration of women into the clean cooking value chain through training, capacity-building, and grants targeted at efforts to empower women.
- » Taking action and sharing knowledge: GACC has sought to expand its knowledge base of the sector through targeted studies and extensive interaction with diverse actors and customers in the sector, sharing findings with investors, government leaders, and stakeholders.
- » Building the evidence base by galvanizing and coordinating the research community: The support of research on a variety of issues associated with clean cookstoves is a critical component of GACC activities; it has provided competitive grants, a platform for sharing and utilizing relevant findings, and it serves as a networking hub for stakeholders.
- » Raising awareness of household air pollution and advocating for change: Through the recruitment of a diverse group of high-profile ambassadors (including Clinton) GACC has taken advantage of diplomatic and media opportunities to highlight the urgency of the issue of household air pollution and the solutions offered by clean cooking.

The S/GP considers the Alliance its most mature success and an exemplary model of what can be achieved through the mechanism of public-private partnerships.

3.2.4 PHASE 4: ONWARD: ASSESSING IMPACT, INCORPORATING LESSONS LEARNED, AND ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY

In October 2015, the Alliance will reach the halfway mark of its 10 year timeframe (2010-2020) for accomplishing its objectives. With phase one complete, two remaining phases of the 3-phased business plan include: Phase 2 (2015-2017) focused on “driving investments, innovations and operations to scale” through increased efforts to develop and implement standards, to influence governments to create favorable financial and regulatory environments for the sector, to promote continued research and knowledge sharing, and to coordinate financing mechanisms that support sector growth. Phase 3 (2018-2020) efforts will focus on the “establishment of a thriving and sustainable market for clean cookstoves and fuels,” attracting private sector interests and commitments and advocating to keep the issues associated with the clean cookstoves movement in the spotlight. These activities were the topics under discussion by an impressive array of individuals and organizations represented on various panels at the November 2014 Cookstoves Future Summit.⁴⁸

In addition to the implementation of these diverse and complex programmatic endeavors, GACC has been committed to a strong monitoring and evaluation process designed to allow the P3 to self-assess its own progress against its goals and objectives, adjust programming to improve performance, accordingly, and share results with partners. This effort is guided by a set of six value propositions, as well as a balanced scorecard approach, that captures the complexity of the cookstoves sector as a whole and the various objectives being pursued.⁴⁹

3.2.5 CONCLUSION: REALIZING PARTNERSHIPS AT THE INTERSECTION OF INTERESTS AND OPPORTUNITY

As mentioned, the creation of a collaborative partnership is predicated on the idea that each partner has an interest in the partnership, that each partner organization will have traveled some path, through its own experiences and processes, to come to the conclusion that acting in partnership is a more feasible alternative than independent action. Such a conclusion is dependent on assessing a number of critical factors: accumulating knowledge on the nature of the problem; clarifying organizational related aims and goals; establishing functional operational parameters and boundaries; assessing resource needs and sources; and networking internally to solidify support for a partnership and externally to determine viable co-partners. Each of the most important players from the public, private and NGO sectors independently came to the conclusion that a collaborative partnership represented an effective means to specific respective ends. In addition to converging interests, a critical element in the story of the creation of the Alliance is the timely manifestation of opportunity in the form of shifts in the domestic and international political landscape involving the clean cooking/clean fuels sector. Though opportunity is a factor that cannot be controlled for, its value resides in the ability to take advantage

of it. Those processes which unfolded in the early phases positioned stakeholders and leaders to seize upon such available opportunities and leverage those opportunities into a realized P3. Thus, the idea for a collaborative global partnership of multiple stakeholders leveraging market forces to solve cooking-related global health, environment, and development problems was begun and advanced by stakeholders willing and committed to pursue the hard work of collaboration in a P3 structure.

Yet, critical to the development of the Alliance was the passionate and unrelenting advocacy of the cookstoves/clean fuels sector, an operationalized vision shepherded from idea to entity by the diverse, talented, and multifaceted leaders associated with this sector and the Alliance P3. This group includes, notably, private sector partners and leaders, including the entrepreneurial efforts, in both the small and larger-scale projects, such as Shell-F's Breathing Space project,⁵⁰ a group which not only increased the recognition of the problem, but offered organizational and industry-specific strengths to the problem solving process.⁵¹ It also includes the power of SME expertise in government and in development communities, as well as the integration of such

Yet, critical to the development of the Alliance was the passionate and unrelenting advocacy of the cookstoves/clean fuels sector, an operationalized vision shepherded from idea to entity by the diverse, talented, and multifaceted leaders associated with this sector and the Alliance P3

leadership in the resulting GACC vision and structure. Elemental principles in the PCIA "legacy website" note a lasting partnership approach "focused on four priority areas which have proved to be essential elements

for sustainable household energy and health programs in developing countries: (i) Meeting social/behavioral needs; (ii) Developing local markets; (iii) Improving technology design and performance; and (iv) Monitoring impacts of interventions."⁵² In these priorities one can see not only the formative role of the PCIA in the evolution of the GACC but the relevance of these priorities for the whole sector and in organizing a partnership model that could be both globally scaled and collaborative at the same time.

3.3 FOUNDING PARTNERS: THE PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND NGOS

We want to say a final word in this section about the role of the partners involved in GACC and the interests and sectors they represented, as they were critical to the development of the P3 and its form of collaboration.

3.3.1 THE PUBLIC SECTOR

While not the only public sector partner, the U.S. Government, through a number of agencies, was the most influential player from this sector in supporting the Alliance. Although air quality

issues have driven much U.S. research and policy-making since the passage of the original Clean Air Act in 1970, SME and Sector-Strategic leaders—visionary and persistent—condensed and recast an old and growing problem in terms of the simple act of cooking, as practiced in much of the developing world. As we noted above, the foci of PCIA precursor efforts, as well as the scale of GACC aspirations, helped scope out a forum using the P3 mechanism. As also mentioned, the PCIA had already established a networked cookstoves sector, as well as venues for the accumulation of knowledge, all of which helped to facilitate the vast expertise needed for the ultimate success of the partnership. USG supports—at the agency, research, investment, expertise, even the individual career level—were critical to such efforts. A diverse group of agencies addressing health (CDC, NIH), climate and pollution (EPA), energy issues (DOE), development (USAID), women's issues (The Office of the Special Representative for Women's Issues) and foreign policy objectives (the State Department) joined this conversation. Each furthermore determined that the Cookstoves P3 was relevant to each of their particular agendas and interests. As the idea gained traction, State, with Champion, Visionary, and Political Operational leadership assets, built the accompanying USG institutional infrastructure in the GPI and, later, the S/GP to support the P3's development and to develop the leadership talent to lend their extensive knowledge and abilities to help in the formation of the cookstoves project.

3.3.2 THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Shell Foundation was a founding partner of PCIA and, through its long association and active participation as the largest private stakeholder in the sector, Shell-F experts cultivated a strong relationship with SME leaders at EPA, State, UNF and elsewhere. Shell Oil Company—with its interests represented by Shell-F—was the most influential private stakeholder in the Alliance's formative phase. Equally pivotal, private sector actors, especially in the Alliance's core area of clean fuel, contributed another pivotal leadership type to partnership development: the Sector strategic leader.

The private sector brought to the cookstoves endeavor a business and market-oriented lens. Its interests furthermore dictated that the Alliance approach include the development of infrastructure supporting these markets. The Sector strategic leader brings to the partnership development process critical knowledge of a specific sector—in this example, the private sector—in order to infuse the P3 culture and strategy with sector specific assets and capacities, in this case, market-based approaches and business thinking.⁵³ Ensuring the pursuit of the core interests of private sector stakeholders, the Sector strategic leader serves as a critical player in the strategic planning for the sector as a whole, and as a liaison between the partnership and the private stakeholders.

While Shell had long been involved in the clean fuel and cookstoves sector, two elements stand out in its initiatives. Described as "a patchwork of lots of small ideas, not organizations," Shell's

own core interest in the sector emerged from its business mission: solving 21st century energy challenges by providing clean energy to the world's population and reducing CO2 emissions. The cookstoves concept, with its promise of reduced biomass fuels and CO2 and the attendant increase in the demand for clean fuel sources, aligned naturally with the company's core business—and its desire to open new markets. But Shell's early efforts were focused on India, where an estimated 30 million "improved cookstoves" funded by Shell had been distributed (i.e., given away) by the Indian government in the 1980s-1990s. The experience of these "giveaway programs" had not been positive—they involved broad-based distribution of untested and often substandard stoves without any accompanying infrastructure for service, repair, financing, or fuel distribution, follow-up research, or means for modification, assessment, and improvement. There also remained a serious lack of trust by local communities for these modern cookstoves. In short, the overall effort was deemed challenging at best, a failure, at worst.

Even more concerning, the very approach to the global development problems embedded in clean cooking and fuels—severe public health issues and climate instability—were not addressed by this donation model, what some respondents' termed the "freebie" development model. For some time, scholars and practitioners in public affairs have identified the unintended, even deleterious consequences of aid provisioning schemes dependent upon foreign donations. Keenly aware of these clusters of failures—in aid models and in specific project experiments—the Shell-F became a founding member of the PCIA in 2002, where it implemented a number of projects. In 2005, under the auspices of the PCIA, Shell launched its "Breathing Space" project, aimed at reducing air pollution caused by household energy use. Touting a market-based and commercially viable approach, Shell-F set the target of reaching 20 million households in five years in five target countries: China, India, Brazil, Uganda and Kenya. This foray into a global partnership model reflected the interests of Shell in pursuing a market-based approach to address development in the sector, as well as the perception of the scale of the issue. As one Sector strategic leader noted, even in these early days, the spark of a "back of an envelope idea" suggested the creation of a global entity that would represent the sector.⁵⁴

When a new group of Sector strategic leaders joined the Shell-F cookstoves project in early 2008, they prioritized efforts to realize the global potential of the project: this began with a six-month crusade to build a rapport of trust with Shell Oil, and to convince the parent company to support the global entity concept with resources. Arguing that the project aligned perfectly with the company message, and emphasizing the fact that no other energy companies were in the mix, Sector strategic leaders successfully convinced the company that cookstoves represented an important investment project for Shell. In September 2008, just weeks before the devastating financial crisis that shook the global economy, Shell-F obtained a verbal commitment from its parent company for \$20 million towards this endeavor. But,

in the aftermath of the financial crisis, this commitment would be withdrawn and the objectives restricted: first, India would remain a key target, with local efforts focusing on implementing a cultural campaign to raise awareness at the village level on household air pollution and the impact of using clean cookstoves; and second, at the national level, Shell-F proposed a lobbying campaign to raise awareness within the Indian government and to encourage government support for a market infrastructure for the sector.⁵⁵

Thinking pragmatically in this case, this Sector strategic leader expressed the view that the Shell-F's ultimate commitment to the Alliance hinged upon the level of USG commitment

Despite this financial setback, Shell-F leaders were aware of the political shift in Washington and, thus, remained on the lookout for potential opportunities. Shell-F Sector strategic leaders played an active support role alongside Jacob Moss at EPA in exploring the role of UNF as a host for the PCIA. As the prospect for a globally-scaled entity emerged in talks between EPA and State throughout 2009, the Shell Foundation conducted its own due diligence on the UNF's suitability as a potential host and as a managing partner. Along with a handful of interested stakeholders representing the public and private sectors (including Shell-F, EPA, UNF, Morgan Stanley, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)), Shell-F contributed to the creation of an initial vision of a global cookstoves entity to pitch to State. This "painful" process, involving the resolution of political, historical, language, and cultural issues between these entities relied heavily on Sector strategic leadership and helped solidify a collaborative working relationship critical to the eventual strategic plan and the Alliance itself. As one Sector strategic leader noted:

Any public private partnership is by definition painful because the outcome in the goal of striking forward is bringing together the different competencies of different sectors to create more than the sum of the individual parts; that's what you're shooting for. It's worth it in the right sector and certainly worth it when, as in this case, you'll create a market.⁵⁶

Thinking pragmatically in this case, this Sector strategic leader expressed the view that the Shell-F's ultimate commitment to the Alliance hinged upon the level of USG commitment—that is why upper-echelon Sector Strategic leaders watched closely as the interagency process evolved and issued results: namely, a combined \$50 million commitment to the Alliance, organizational and technical support through the auspices of the S/GP, and the endorsement of the Secretary of State herself. As another Sector strategic leader described the process:

We worked the whole summer to get Shell, the company, to come in (to commit to the Alliance), but really it was about nudg-



ing everyone above the power pit at the same time. We were all nudging our respective organizations and the U.S. government coming with that (\$56 million), I think helped us push Shell, the company, over the line with its \$6 million commitment.

In this case, Shell-F Sector strategic leaders were able to push the parent company to commit an additional \$6 million to the total \$56 million commitment established by S/GP—but many Sector strategic leaders in other sectors and organizations were doing the same thing.

3.3.3 THE NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTOR

Established in 1998 with a \$1 billion grant from Ted Turner, the UNF prioritizes three issues: energy and climate change, global health, and women, girls, and population growth. While the programs established in UNF's first decade shared the purpose of supporting UN initiatives, there was no requirement to back such cross-cutting programs. Nevertheless, in 2008 the UNF began a transition from a foundation, supported primarily by the Turner contribution, to an operating charity in which fundraising and partnership development became essential operations: as part of that shift, UNF needed to explore revenue-generating approaches and opportunities. In this transition, UNF recruited senior-level professional staff adept at strategic partnerships.

The recognition of the need for this type of leadership in the NGO and the foundation space defines another type of operative leadership at work in the Alliance development process: the Institutional change agent leader. This type of leader, existing across the public, private and NGO domains, like the Sector strategic leader, serves as an institutional expert, holding extensive expertise regarding the internal bureaucratic processes relevant to the project. The Institutional change agent leader has the expertise to understand the implications of the integration of new programming into the institutional framework and to adapt existing processes necessary to facilitate innovative approaches to

problem-solving. Institutional change agent leaders are often the source of the dedicated energy, attention, and focus required to move the project forward in a consistent manner—especially when such efforts hit internal or external resistance.

As part of the early network building efforts in 2008, UNF leaders were contacted by Jacob Moss. In the aftermath, UNF leaders—intrigued by the novel cross-cutting nature of the cookstoves endeavor—developed a six-month exploration process of the P3's potential for the UNF. The results of that information gathering process included outreach efforts to stakeholders throughout the sector, internal UNF discussions, and a \$500,000 commitment from the UNF director in

early 2009 for the Energy & Climate team at UNF to formalize the concept.

The resulting “concept note” proposed an alliance of diverse stakeholders in the sector, with an emphasis on four objectives: (a.) standards and testing; (2.) raising issue awareness; (3.) fundraising for projects; and (4.) research to assess impacts. Concept note authors also proposed the goal of reaching 100 million people with clean cookstoves by 2020. In this account, entrepreneurial capacity development was not a primary focus—but developed over subsequent months largely through the influence of private sector leaders committed to “injecting businesslike thinking” into the process.⁵⁷

In March of 2010, UNF, along with the Shell Foundation and the EPA, hosted a conference in Washington, D.C. with members of the cookstoves community to present this model defined in the UNF Energy and Climate team's concept note. Meeting organizers expected about 30 to 40 attendees and were taken aback at the arrival of almost twice this number of over 75 participants, all eager to discuss the topic and connect with other sector stakeholders. UNF leadership recognized that the initial March 2009 meeting represented a critical opportunity for interested stakeholders from the public and private sectors, the NGO community, and academia to meet in person—in many cases for the first time. This groundswell of interest expressed by important meeting participants promoted the UNF to modify the cookstoves concept, not as a separate initiative, but as a program managed by the UNF Energy and Climate team.

Inspired by the appointment of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State (announced December 1, 2008, confirmed January 21, 2009) and of the Shell Foundation's interests in the endeavor, in the coming months, both the GPI (S/GP) Office and its leadership, as well as EPA leaders—who had attended this UNF-sponsored meeting—increased their activity. We describe this forma-

tive period as one of co-creation (see Phase one above) in which founding members worked through the arduous collaborative effort to determine what a global entity representing the cookstoves sector would look like. As many interviewees notes, one question was whether UNF “had the chops” to pull off the evolving vision which was far larger than the PCIA. The Director of the U.S. Cookstoves Initiative, Jacob Moss described this phase as an “exciting moment for this field” in which:

you’ve got the private sector guys involved, you’ve got the health people, the climate folks, the financing tools coming to the table...so the question becomes: ‘how can we take all of this interest and put it into a sort of coordinated strategy to push the field past the tipping point so that we’re not all doing individual project-based stuff like has been happening for the past 20 years?’⁵⁸

1 Henry Mintzberg, *The Nature of Managerial Work* (Harper & Row, 1973); John P. Kotter, *What Leaders Really Do* (Harvard Business Press, 1999; 2013).

2 Details of the history and accomplishments of the PCIA are available from the organization’s website: <http://www.pciaonline.org/files/PCIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf>. Notably the PCIA contributed these elements to the development of GACC: (1.) first and foremost, in its role as an early, generative organizational locus for producing SME expertise and leadership in the clean cooking and fuels space pivotal for the development partnership model; (2.) second, in offering a dynamic forum for the acquisition and sharing of expertise and in the process networking the whole cookstove sector, as well as an ongoing vehicle for incentivizing and accumulating more research and knowledge on the nexus of development issues and clean fuel and air; (3.) third, in sharing organizational expertise, goals, and vision in ways that were instrumental in defining the Alliance concept, structure, and partnership organizational template

3 The partnership attracted a diverse membership of public, private and civil society partners (590 partners joined between 2002 and 2012). The organization reports that, by 2010, “key PCIA Partners reported helping approx. 2.5 million households to adopt clean cooking and heating practices, reducing harmful exposures for more than 15 million people” and improving “health, livelihood, and quality of life by reducing exposure to indoor air pollution, primarily among women and children, from household energy use” through the efforts of the partners. <http://www.pciaonline.org/node/2>

4 According to Jacob Moss and confirmed by several other sources, the interest in a clean cookstoves solution, while initially embraced with some reticence, was gaining steam on many fronts in the decade between the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the decision by the State Department to pursue it on a global scale. This rising interest was attributable in great part to the unrelenting efforts of the managing staff of the PCIA.

5 The Shell Foundation. (2012). *Shell Sustainability Report 2012* (p. 24). The Shell Foundation. Retrieved from http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2012/servicepages/downloads/files/shell_foundation_shell_sr12.pdf

6 An inclusive bibliography documenting the history of USAID efforts

in the cookstoves sector can be found at: <http://blogs.washplus.org/iaqupdates/2010/04/a-bibliography-of-usaid-reports-on-cookstoves-and-or-ia/>

7 The definition is associated with Peter Haas (1990) *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press): 3. An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as die basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. For the debate and history of the concept, see John Ruggie, “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration”, *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1972): 874-893; Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” and “Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” in *International Organization*, 46(1) 1992: 368-371; Claire Dunlop, “Epistemic communities: a Reply to Toke,” *Politics* 20.3 (2000): 137-144. Ernst Haas argues that epistemic communities “operate only in fields of policy where science matters. In the field of human rights . . . [t]here are no epistemic communities. Science is irrelevant to that field. In environmental politics, it matters a great deal,” see Ernst Haas, “Science and Progress in International Relations: Conversation with Ernst B. Haas”, available at: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Haas/haas-con3.html> [6 Oct. 2001], p. 3.

8 James Sebenius, “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Co-operation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), p. 325.

9 For example, see Brenda Doroski, *Exciting New Developments and New Evidence for Action Title*, 2009 PCIA FORUM, http://www.pciaonline.org/files/Tuesday_Exciting_New_Developments_Framing_Doroski.pdf; see also Brenda Doroski & John Mitchell, *PCIA CO-Directors, 2007 Finalists in National Security & International Affairs*, Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals, http://servicetoamericamedals.org/honorees/view_profile.php?profile=165

10 While we have anonymized all respondent identities and institutional affiliations, we reflect the distinctive perspectives brought to bear by SME leaders on developing the Alliance partnership and the global challenges they aimed to solve with this P3 model.

11 Leslie Cordes in *Igniting Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels* (Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, Washington, D.C.): p. 4 points out that “Not only is adoption of clean cooking solutions a health, economic, gender, and environmental imperative, it is essential for achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for child mortality, maternal health, poverty eradication, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. In fact, by the UNDP

2009 estimates, 1.9 billion people will need access to modern fuels by 2015 to meet the MDG for poverty reduction.”

- 12 Biography for Jacob Moss, available at: http://www.terina.org/usindiasummit/2013/pdf/Jacob_Moss.pdf
- 13 Jacob Moss Interview, SU research team, Washington, DC, December, 2014.
- 14 PCIA Factsheet, <http://www.who.int/indoorair/interventions/en/factsheet.pdf?ua=1>. These early partners included: Canada, Commission for Central American Development (CCAD, for Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize), Italy, Mexico, Mozambique, South Africa, USA, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO). Aprovecho Research Center, Colorado State University Engines and Energy Conversion Laboratory, Global Environment and Technology Foundation, Health Effects Institute, HELPS International, Intermediate Technology Development Group, Prolena, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Shell Foundation, UC/Berkeley's Renewable and Appropriate Energy Lab, Resources for the Future, Trees, Water & People, University of WA, Winrock International, LPG Association of Southern Africa
- 15 PCIA Factsheet. <http://www.who.int/indoorair/interventions/en/factsheet.pdf?ua=1>
- 16 PCIA Legacy Website. <http://www.pciaonline.org/>. The EPA's PCIA continued after the Alliance was launched, and the final handover came at Rio+20 in June 2012.
- 17 Details of the history and accomplishments of the PCIA are available from the organization's website: <http://www.pciaonline.org/files/PCIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf>
- 18 PCIA Legacy Website, <http://www.pciaonline.org/>; John Mitchell, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Slide Deck: PCIA, CSD15. May 4, 2007, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/sustdev/csd/csd15/PF/info/J_Mitchell.pdf; Brenda Doroski, Speech, Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, 5th Biennial Partnership for Clean Indoor Air Forum Opening Day Ceremony, Feb. 21, 2011, available at: http://www.pciaonline.org/files/Monday_PCIA_Speech_Doroski.pdf
- 19 The global scale issue also defined PCIA limits: Hosted at the EPA, a regulatory agency, the PCIA management team understood those restrictions would be overcome only if PCIA was managed by an external partner. It was with this relocation in mind that PCIA leadership originally approached the UNF in the spring of 2008. A change-agent leader at the UNF notes that this timely proposal interfaced with UNF's own transitioning from a “true foundation” to an “operational charity,” the prospect of a money-raising venture all the more appealing. PCIA objectives already aligned neatly with issue areas in focus at UNF: energy, children's health, women and girls, and biodiversity.
- 20 Jacob Moss Interview, SU research team, Washington, DC, December 2014.
- 21 See CRS brief on COM authority: <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751906>.
- 22 Interviewed by SU Research team, Washington, DC. December 2014.
- 23 Several SME leaders from various agencies recounted these events during interviews.
- 24 A Political Operational leader noted that Secretary Clinton's decision to personally attribute her name to the project was influenced by the existence of an internal collaborative partnership of USG agencies willing to commit to a cookstoves project.
- 25 Sector Strategic Leader interview, conducted by SU research team, January 2015.
- 26 Sector Strategic Leader interview, conducted by SU research team,

January 2015.

- 27 Interview with Institutional Change Agent Leader, SU research team, December 2015.
- 28 These priorities and proposed actions are discussed in detail in 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. U.S. Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power (2010): 68-73.
- 29 Interviewed by SU Research team. Washington, DC. December 2014.
- 30 Jacob Moss described this business plan as the result of a year-long process that included more than 100 interviews with diverse stakeholders from the cookstoves sector focused on issues of strategies and management for a strong partnership in the sector. The goal of the effort was to explore an effective business strategy for the USG to pursue through the auspices of a relocated PCIA.
- 31 Interviews with SME and Political Operational Leaders indicate that this long process was “smart” as it allowed the development of a strong interagency collaboration to evolve in support of the project (bottom-up) coupled with Clinton's decision to support the project (top-down); this resulted in a highly cohesive effort.
- 32 The mission is as follows: “The Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships is the entry point for collaboration between the US Department of State, the public and private sectors, and civil society. Launched in 2009, S/GP aims to strengthen and deepen US diplomacy and development around the world through partnerships that leverage the creativity, innovation, and core business resources of partners for greater impact,” <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/>
- 33 SU research team, Interview with Sector Strategic Leader, Dec. 2015.
- 34 This and other key messaging strategies were developed by UNF and Alliance public affairs teams.
- 35 SU research team, Interview with Operational Leader, Dec. 2015.
- 36 Interview with Operational Leader.
- 37 Moss suggests that, had the EPA not opened with this significant commitment, other agencies would have held back and been less generous with theirs. It was also noted that some agencies remained reticent about the project, but made commitments nonetheless after discussions with high-level leadership. Interviewed by SU Research team. Washington, DC. December 2014.
- 38 The majority of this commitment consisted of “alignments” or research oriented contributions. The only monetary contribution to the Alliance was from the EPA. (Confirmed by several interviewees, including the Jacob Moss and Political Operational Leader.)
- 39 Interview with Sector Strategic Leader.
- 40 As we have emphasized, PCIA was itself launched at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the original partnership included approximately 30 partners from the public (national governments/ government agencies), private, NGO and IO sectors. At the time of its integration into the GACC in 2012, PCIA had approximately 580 partners. To achieve such success the PCIA was also shepherded by SME and operational leaders at EPA.
- 41 Mission statement of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. <http://cleancookstoves.org/about/our-mission/>
- 42 US Department of State. Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: The United States Commitment by the Numbers, Fact Sheet, Sept. 21, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147494.htm>
- 43 US Department of State, Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: The United States Commitment by the Numbers, Fact Sheet, Sept. 21, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147494.htm>
- 44 Data from UN Foundation Online factsheet entitled: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/cookstoves/global_alliance_for_clean_cookstoves_frequently_asked_questions_508.pdf

- 45 U.S. Dept. of State, Policy Framework and Legal Guidelines for Partnerships (Washington, DC, Feb 2011): 4, <http://www.iecjournal.org/files/state-guidelines-for-partnership.pdf>
- 46 Operational Leader, Interview with SU research team, December 2015.
- 47 Jacob Moss, Interview with SU research team, December 2015.
- 48 See November 2014 Cookstoves Future Summit: Post-Summit Report, Nov 20-21, 2014, New York, available at: http://cleancookstoves.org/resources_files/post-summit-report.pdf
- 49 For the discussion of GACC evaluation processes, see <http://clean-cookstoves.org/research-and-evaluation/>
- 50 On December 9, 2005, the Shell Foundation presented Shell's Breathing Space Strategy and Business Plan to reduce indoor air pollution from household energy use. This strategy aimed at achieving a long-term reduction in the incidence of IAP by deploying market-oriented and commercially viable approaches to reach 20 million households globally over the next 5 years. Their strategy included a biomass focus, incorporated a commercial model with a technology push, and focused on "middle income" groups (\$1-3/day), with a mix of grants and financing options. Initial priority countries include China, India, Brazil, Uganda, and Kenya, and their approach included a decentralized commercial model for rural areas, and a centralized urban commercial model. See the Shell Foundation Strategy and Business <http://www.pciaonline.org/files/SF-HEH-Strategy.pdf>.
- 51 In a 2013 report, Shell Foundation explores what are characterized as the continuing challenges related to the demand and distribution aspects of the clean cookstoves market, through the lens of their decade of experience in the field. Shell Foundation Report: Social Marketing in India, Lessons learned from efforts to foster demand for cleaner cookstoves. 2013. Found at https://www.shellfoundation.org/Shell-Foundation.org_new/media/Shell-Foundation-Reports/shell_foundation_social_marketing_in_india.pdf. This program evolved to become the Room to Breathe initiative, which focused on social marketing in targeted communities in India, and aimed at addressing serious barriers to clean cooking techniques due to factors such as affordability, diverse consumer demands and reticence to adopt the technologies, issues of delivery and support of products.
- 52 Details of the history and accomplishments of the PCIA are available from the organization's website: <http://www.pciaonline.org/files/PCIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf>
- 53 Interview with Sector Strategic Leader, Phone interview by SU Research team, January, 2015.
- 54 Interview with Sector Strategic Leader, Phone interview by SU Research team, January, 2015.
- 55 Sector Strategic Leader, Phone interview by SU Research team, January 2015.
- 56 Sector Strategic Leader, Phone Interview by SU Research team, January 2015.
- 57 Sector Strategic Leader, Phone interview with SU research team, January 2015.
- 58 Public interview with Jacob Moss, available at: <http://savings-revolution.org/energy-links-podcasts/2012/9/10/jacob-moss-and-the-partnership-for-clean-indoor-air.html>)

4.0 FINDINGS: MEASURES OF SUCCESS



The focus of this report thus far has been to introduce S/GP's role in helping to support the creation, launch, and success of the Alliance. On the whole, the story, thus far, is one of sector

Many historical and context-specific factors helped stakeholders seize upon favorable conditions in establishing a successful P3.

perseverance, agile and innovative leadership, talent, and subject matter expertise, new partnership models adapted to contemporary international development, and the role of a young and

innovative office (S/GP) in functioning as a connector, convener, and galvanizer in the development arena.

We now turn to the key data-driven metrics of success, a review of the main factors that account for S/GP's role in its stewardship of the successful GACC P3 over time, drawn from our analysis of collected primary data, including interviews with key stakeholders in S/GP and the Alliance, and a review of the P3 literature and relevant public institutional documents.

Section 4.0 is, thus, divided into several main parts: The first two subsections (4.1-4.2) and Tables 5-7 (below) provide an overview of the facilitating conditions and indicators (inductive and de-

ductive) that contribute to S/GP's ability to help in the creation of the innovative P3 model and the key factors involved in GACC success. We have determined these indicators from two sources: (1.) Using the interdisciplinary literature on partnerships and collaboration, we identify key attributes that studies repeatedly show define the criteria for successful collaboration, both in public-private partnerships and in intergovernmental collaboration; and (2.) Second, we identify the consistent attributes that respondents noted throughout the interviews as key factors in the success of the cookstoves project and in S/GP's facilitation of this partnership.

Part two of this section and its subsections (4.3) then provides a more detailed discussion of a select number of key issues raised within these success indicators. While we cannot address them all, important, interesting, or counterintuitive findings are discussed in more detail and in ways that help to provide the foundation for our last Section 5.0 on "Recommendations and Challenges." Ultimately this section provides our distilled insights about the critical characteristics and processes that S/GP should pay attention to for thinking about successful future partnerships.

4.1 FACILITATING CONDITIONS: IDENTIFYING INDICATORS

Many historical and context-specific factors helped stakeholders seize upon favorable conditions in establishing a successful P3. In the following twin charts, we identify both external and internal factors that helped to shape a hospitable climate for the launch of the GACC and the evolution of the S/GP Office; and we then isolate specific attributes from those internal factors (i.e., governance, leadership, goal-setting, among others) for showing the S/GP’s special role in such P3 endeavors.

In Table 5 (below), in the first column, we abstract the broad social, economic, policy, and organizational external conditions nationally and internationally that made the time “ripe” for P3 development on a global scale in the clean cookstoves/clean

fuel sector. These findings are deduced largely from U.S. foreign policy documents and from multilateral and international organizational discussions across aid, development, and economic institutions (i.e., World Bank, USAID, UN Millennium Development Goals, etc.). In the second column, we then identify key internal capabilities associated with the clean cooking/clean fuels community, network, and sector (including the PCIA) that offered internal strengths and capacities which were effectively used in establishing the GACC by partners, including S/GP and others. These items are by no means comprehensive, but they do help readers understand the environment in which S/GP and GACC agents were working together to build the Alliance.

As a matter of approach, our analysis—as described in

TABLE 5. FACILITATING CONDITIONS FOR S/GP SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING GACC: INTERNAL & EXTERNAL FACTORS

FACILITATING CONDITIONS	
EXTERNAL/CONTEXTUAL	INTERNAL/ASSOCIATIVE
» Global economic climate, including financial crisis	» Leadership depth, capacity and variety
» USG new administration and policy initiatives (EO; QDDR 2010)	» Robust epistemic community
» State Dept. leadership & bureaucratic political conditions	» Preexisting infrastructure in the PCIA
» Private sector interest and support	» Global, cross-cutting nature of the problem
» Private foreign direct aid investment outpacing public sector support	» Convening power of State
» International development sector moving to collaboration models	» Interagency coordination apparatus
» Impact and results-based development delivery models	» “Cookstoves” problem-solution framing concept
» Development traction on wicked problems (MDGs, extreme poverty)	» Science, data & technical expertise

detail in Section 2.0. “Methods”—depends upon the interview questions asked of GACC and S/GP stakeholders (see the Interview Protocol in Appendix). In broad strokes, the interview framework was organized around three prioritized areas: (1.) the environment for creating and sustaining GACC, including S/GP’s distinctive role in fostering, leveraging, and supporting that environment; (2.) S/GP’s partnership design and development process with an emphasis on S/GP definition of P3s and its own informal and diverse (across partners) measures of success; and (3.) the key elements and processes identified by respondents for launching, graduating, and replicating successful partnerships, including challenges, barriers, and obstacles that might undercut or derail such plans. In interpreting this primary data, we also reviewed the P3 academic literature (intergovernmental, development oriented, and infrastructure-based) and assessed many GACC and S/GP publicly available documents, including principals’ statements and scientific research and trials on cookstoves.

In Table 6 (below), we categorize the results from this data analysis process into eight overarching thematic areas:

- » Institutional drivers for GACC success;
- » Organizational culture, identity, and enabling networks for S/GP and GACC, including the PCIA precursor partnership;
- » S/GP partnership design and development processes and mechanisms;
- » S/GP role in supporting the development of GACC systems and governance structures and the P3 template;
- » Human capital resources in P3 expertise, operational savvy, and leadership;
- » S/GP role in P3 concept framing and goal development, including resources;
- » Challenges, mistakes, and concerns recognized and/or overcome;
- » Lessons for sustainability and replicability of this and other partnerships.

We then identify from these broad thematic categories important indicators, taken directly from respondent input. Ultimately, we scored each attribute to discover (a.) how important they were perceived to be in GACC success and S/GP P3 strategy more generally; and (b.) whether they represent core metrics of success for future S/GP and USG P3 development.

TABLE 6. EMERGENT THEMES & ATTRIBUTES FOR S/GP ROLE IN GACC AND P3 DEVELOPMENT

THEME	ATTRIBUTES/INDICATORS
1. Institutional Drivers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Powerful USG agencies/institutional players » Well-established clean air, cooking and fuels sector » Preexisting partnership infrastructure in PCIA » Existing private sector partners » Existing participating NGO/Civil society partners » Role of other nations » USAID as institutional model/memory » EPA as sector developer
2. Organizational Culture, Identity & Networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » “Disrupters”/Start-up culture; subvert the bureaucracy » Coordination authority/convening power of DOS » Cabinet-level leadership of State Secretary » Vision for whole clean cookstoves/clean fuel sector; guardian of sector » Broad USG and sector leadership network » Non-regulatory agency » Hill-orientation and savvy » Development and diplomacy mission » Partnership mandate » Fresh ideas in the development space » Impact-based investing and aid delivery » Young, activist, friendly, ‘go-getter’ team » Make good things happen; get things done
3. P3 Design & Development Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Infuse private sector approach into P3 DNA » USG stakeholder agency network » Issue-specific Interagency process » Relationship-building authority and capacity » PCIA partners and stakeholder network » Complementary interests among partners » Strategic planning iterative process » Collective ownership » Ability to use and leverage bureaucratic politics » Access to international development platforms (CGI launch) » Phasing/sequencing S/GP active-passive management role » Use of “details” at State » “S” Office authority » Commitment to building “uncommon” partnerships in the USG/FP space » Role of SMEs in anchoring initiatives
4. S/GP Facilitated P3 Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Globally-scale P3 into Alliance » Managing partner » Executive director » Innovations in contract models, RFPs, legal structure » Leveraging USG interagency procedures » Steering and advisory committees » Partner role and engagement » Values: transparency, inclusivity, collaboration, accountability » Objective metrics built into system

5. Human Capital, Leadership & People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Leveraging epistemic community » Champions » Political operatives » Collaborative model of leadership » Opportunity structure » Deputy-level (#2) leadership models » Complementary leadership/match » Powerful dyads & proxies: Hilary/Kris (proxy); Jacob & Ginny (proxy) » High value for SME/expertise, science, data and research » Friends/family cohort and structure for work process » Alliance success aligned with individual career trajectories
6. P3 Goals, Priorities & Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Concept maturity—partially cooked—and fairly mature collaboration » Clear and compelling story » Embedded in global crises and constraints » Results/impacts-based development » Unapologetic innovation » Issue framing: tangible, relatable, concrete concept » Cookstoves as solution to global problem » Interface with new USG policy directives and frameworks » Leveraged frontier development resource dynamics » Captured strategic alignment of foreign policy problems: gender, climate, environment, health, vulnerable populations » Clear, data-driven metrics » Efficiency and accountability measures » Innovative approach to funding/budgetary lines (using partner priorities) » Leveraged symbolic value of partner contributions to effect momentum » Integrate partner's expertise and capacity
7. Failures, Mistakes, Challenges & Concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Sustainability of S/GP "disrupter" identity » Missed private partners needs and insecurities (Shell: decreased investment; Dow Corning pulled out) » Undifferentiated P3 concepts » USAID (at unit-level) reluctant partner/competitor » Failed cookstoves trials » Hype/strategic diplomacy overtakes real results » Impacts of political transition on P3 leaders, partnerships, S/GP Office » P3 and USG foreign policy alignment: few feedback loops, assessments, metrics » Research deprioritized & underfunded, lack of awareness of its role in P3 success » S/GP high personnel turnover, potential loss of P3 institutional learning » Whole S/GP mission depends upon Sec who "gets" P3s » Global/wicked problems require transformational dynamics with uneven outcomes (requires careful M&E approaches) » S/GP as potential victim of GACC success: replicability pressures undercut P3 selection » No formal organizational learning process, P3 concept selection, exit strategies » Missing private sector lens in USG personnel » Stakeholder outreach good; engagement limited » Corporate citizenship for private partners limited; need other engagement model
8. P3 Sustainability & Replicability Lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » P3 typology for aiding decision-making on investment » Knowledge management process for evolution of S/GP Office and its leadership (career side, political appointee side) » Role of SME leadership in anchoring initiatives » Collective buy in at highest USG agency levels » Developing an organizational lexicon and process » Offering a broad champion network » Providing a hub for P3 energy & vision » Managing the innovation curve

4.2 MEASURES OF SUCCESS: DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE FINDINGS

In the following Table 7 (below), we turn to the key indicators and factors that account for P3 success, drawn from both our analysis of our interviews with key stakeholders in S/GP and the Alliance, and a review of secondary data in the P3 literature and relevant public institutional documents. We divide these indicators into two categories: (a.) deductive findings, established from the interdisciplinary P3 literature, and (b.) new, supplemental inductive findings, determined from our primary interview data. Please note that only new (not repeated, of which there were many) attributes were included in the inductive section.

In the first row of Table 7 below, we identify key deductive attributes that academic studies repeatedly show define the criteria for successful collaboration, both in public-private partnerships and in intergovernmental collaboration. Likewise, in the second row below, we determine the consistent attributes that respon-

dents indicated throughout the interviews were key factors in the success of the cookstoves project and in S/GP's facilitation of it. Using the academic literature on P3s (e.g., Hodge and Greve 2007; Schaferhoff et al. 2009; Forrer et al. 2010), S/GP's own definition of a P3, and comments from interviewees, we have structured a set of metrics that are indicative of a successful collaborative partnership. Our proposed set of metrics is commensurate in many places with those found by McKinsey and Company (2009) in their study of 15 global transnational P3s (e.g., Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition, Global Village Energy Partnership, Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics, and Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap). Having identified metrics, we were interested in how often they were talked about in discussions of GACC. In the scoring columns in Table 7 (below), we provide a simple score—present (+) or not present (–)—for whether a given deductive or inductive attribute was at work in the S/GP and GACC design and development process.

TABLE 7. DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE MEASURES OF COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS

PRESENCE IN GACC OR S/GP: SCORES		
1. DEDUCTIVE INDICATORS. P3 & COLLABORATIVE LITERATURE SUCCESS INDICATORS	+	–
Public-sector champions	+	
Public-sector organizational structure (interagency; legal & policy climate)	+	
Detailed business plan	+	
Clearly-defined revenue streams	+	
Stakeholder support	+	
Careful partner selection & vetting (i.e., financial capacity)	+	
Clear, common vision and shared goals and purpose	+	
Right people, right skills	+	
Mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities	+	
Realistic expectations and simple action plan		–
Accountability metrics and milestones	+	
Tangible near and long-term results	+	
Clear communication and common language that's shared	+	
Proper scaling as conditions change	+	
Ground rules for proper behavior		–
Investment from all partners	+	
Formalized structures with shared decision-making		–
Long-term success/sustainability	NA	
Shared risks and their deliberate negotiation		–
Win-win process/everyone benefits	+	
Built-in face-time/interactions	+	
Improvisation	+	
Persistence	+	
Focus on performance	+	
Inclusive process	+	

2. INDUCTIVE/DATA-DRIVEN SUCCESS INDICATORS (GACC & S/GP INTERVIEWEES)	+	-
Nature and framing of issue (i.e. problem-solution nexus)	+	
Bureaucratic innovation	+	
Adaptive organizational culture	+	
Preexisting P3 infrastructure (PCIA)	+	
Ability to replicate P3 design & development process (not a 'one off')	+	
Knowledge management (learning, evaluation)	+	
Formal process for handling mistakes/adaptive/resilient		-
Personnel turnover		-
Adaptive resource & funding acquisition processes & procedures	+	
Building P3 identity	+	
Added value (P3=1+1+3)	+	
Deep stakeholder engagement (not only outreach)	+	
Robust network of stakeholders	+	
Cultivating epistemic community for P3 success	+	
Quality (not just quantity) of partners	+	
Changed identity/role of personnel and cohort affiliated with P3	+	
Critical mass	+	
Ability to leverage timing/sequencing (pivotal moments)	+	
Multivariate & complementary leadership	+	
Recognizing opportunity	+	
Leverage subject matter expertise	+	

KEY QUESTIONS TO ASSESS FACILITATING CONDITIONS

Since many facilitating conditions mentioned in the twin tables above are inseparable from the historical and contextual dynamics at work in launching the GACC, the trick is to identify and maximize favorable circumstances and opportunities, even if one cannot control them. The kinds of questions that therefore need to be asked in the service of this awareness include the following:

- » What is the opportunity structure available to make a collaboration possible?
- » Which foreign policy, development and aid climate and dynamics will enhance collaborative efforts?
- » Is the idea for the partnership and the sector that supports it mature enough, thoroughly researched and understood, “cooked,” and ready to go live?
- » Are there existing processes and initiatives that may form a natural backdrop

and contextualizing structure—a preexisting foundation of sorts, whether in knowledge, organizational initiatives and programs, and networks of supporters—already available to work with?

- » Does the initiative require brand new lines of funding or is it possible to re-purpose or join existing funding resources?
- » Are there larger organizational allies and supporters undergoing pressures or transitions that make an alignment possible and plausible?
- » Is there available leadership talent and subject matter expertise associated with the P3 idea and platform?
- » With respect to potential partners for the initiative, what is the degree of mutuality: shared strategic vision; view of the problems/issues; best approaches?

4.3 MAIN DRIVERS OF COLLABORATION IN P3 DEVELOPMENT AT GACC AND S/GP

While we do not intend to discuss all identified attributes, as mentioned, the following items, clustered thematically, were pivotal to S/GP’s role in the GACC effort and are likely to be key ingredients for P3 decision-making in the future. We frame these drivers in relation to the emergent themes, identified from interviews (see Table 6 above), so that readers may understand the relationships between emergent themes, the attributes at work in the GACC and S/GP processes, and our ultimate findings about P3 development at State for the foreign policy space.

4.3.1 CONCEPT FRAMING: PROBLEM/SOLUTION NEXUS IN THE CLEAN COOKING/CLEAN FUELS SECTOR

1) A tangible issue that enjoys broad support, has dire consequences if left unaddressed, and is considered by key constituents to be a “root” cause of threats to global development.

S/GP’s success with the cookstoves initiative must be seen in light of the broad appeal, global impacts, and tangible nature of cookstoves themselves. Unlike other development initiatives (i.e., family planning, poverty reduction, or democratization), the importance of clean cooking and clean fuels is largely uni-

versal—with no obvious opportunities for politicization or opposition. Likewise, the negative effects of traditional indoor cooking practices are easy to imagine and demonstrate both with statistical data and first-person accounts. The potential reach of interventions is also compelling: nearly half of the world's population (over 3 billion people) prepare and cook food and heat their homes using rudimentary cooking and heating technologies with ill health effects, such as, over 4 million premature deaths annually, chronic disease and injuries, with the most severe impacts on women and children and the environment. Healthy or “clean” cooking and fuel initiatives thus had the potential to reap benefits across a global swath of the human population and multiple developmental priorities: food security, women and children's health and empowerment, economic self-sufficiency, global climate change, environmental protection, and energy resource innovation. Most important, the very concept of “cookstoves” formulates this nexus of cross-cutting global problems in terms of an applied solution which helps to increase its base of support. This relationship between the problem and solution—what we call the problem-solution nexus—is a key means for framing the issue around which a P3 is to be successfully formed.

2) The innovative formulation of the wicked problem of clean fuels/clean cooking into a “problem-solution nexus.”

Framing this concept globally and in terms of a solution was supported by a systematic effort and well-established global community of scientists, advocates, and development experts already at work on the problem of “clean cooking” as an antidote to indoor air pollution. As mentioned, PCIA was an earlier partnership incarnation of this issue, founded by EPA (launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002), involving 13 countries, 5 international organizations, 14 NGOs, and 1 private energy company, and focused on capacity building, technical assistance, program implementation, and knowledge management. Much of the meaning of the concept of “clean cookstoves,” thus, depended on PCIA's spadework, along with three decades of research, development initiatives and advocacy, agency and organizational support, including from private industry and energy sector. Thus, the broad salience and appeal of clean cookstoves was developed from the preexisting infrastructure and expert networks associated with the clean cooking/clean fuels sector, PCIA, the work of the EPA and other partner organizations, including well-established related research programs at NIH, CDC, universities, and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the framing of the cookstoves initiative as a solution to the problem—what we call the problem or issue/solution framing nexus—was at the heart of expanding a limited cookstoves initiative into a globally-scaled P3. This anchoring approach made the idea of clean cookstoves a feasible, effective, tangible, and broadly intelligible solution. S/GP helped in creating that coherent framework, supported by the sector epistemic community and its scientific data, to demonstrate the effectiveness and relevance of the cookstoves solution to a broad range

of critical international development challenges, U.S. foreign policy objectives, and private-sector priorities.

Underlying the concept-framing effort was also the need to address critical and complex foreign policy issues and challenges that have defied unilateral solutions. In this sense, GACC was designed to create innovative solutions and achieve global-scale impact in interdependent areas (health, indoor air quality, climate change, the protection of rights and opportunities for women and girls, market and economic development, etc.). These constellation issues which cookstoves intended to remedy are a classic example of a “wicked problem,” as defined by Rittel & Webber (1973)¹. Part of what makes complex problems “wicked,” as Ritchey notes, is their “ill-defined” or “ambiguous” nature, even as they are associated with “strong moral, political, and professional issues.”² Effectively framing the problem in terms of a practical solution is, thus, critical to manage complexity, diverse worldviews and motivations in sector stakeholders, and to garner broad investment, resources, and commitments.

3) S/GP embraced the global complexity and reach of wicked problems, using interdependent impacts as a strength and as a platform to create broad multi-sectoral support for cookstoves.

While complexity is often cast as a fundamentally negative aspect of wicked problems, S/GP capitalized on the complexity and web of issues related to clean fuels and clean cooking. That creative and rather daring approach to the framing process itself evolved over time and was dependent on leadership. Originally focused on indoor air quality, for instance, respondents remembered Secretary Clinton early on insisted the problem be expanded to encompass related core issues. As one respondent recounted:

... the health impact, the health burden,. . .and I think for her personally the gender angle was very important....When we would brief her, she would make all of these connections and she would say things like: 'can you make a better link between this and the climate and clean air coalition?' We had been trying to do that, but weren't making much progress, because that's not what the working group was focused on... They were like: 'the Cookstove thing is what we're doing.' She was like: 'No, these things are intimately connected. We have to talk about them in an integrated way.'

This approach interfaced perfectly with what the epistemic community and SME and Sector strategic leaders already knew. Such alignment at the highest levels of leadership (in the Champion leader) made it easier to develop a proposed organizing concept and solution—clean cookstoves—which was then linked to progress with specific metrics on a number of development fronts.

While Secretary Clinton recognized the opportunities that complexity offered, the responsibility for fleshing out a coherent, manageable, and marketable framework, appealing to diverse target stakeholders, fell to SME, Political Operational, and Opera-

tional leaders at the Alliance, S/GP, and across the sector. As one respondent explained:

... you have to explain to people why it's good for them. We talked about the shared values outside of government, between government and business... but you also need to talk about the shared value within government. So we go around the building and you know I went to the (USG climate change leaders) and said: 'you're working to make climate change relevant to average human beings. Think of all the women that are affected by this problem with cooking, and by the way, it's also 20 percent of the world's black carbon.' So he becomes generous because he's trying to make his own abstruse issue relevant to the world. If you go to (USG leaders for women's issues internationally) and you say: 'You know, most of the people dying are women,' then all of a sudden she buys in. And then you go to OES (Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs), then you go to OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) and then you go to MCC (Millennium Change Corporation) and all of these internal actors and leaders get on board.

Ultimately, stakeholders from both the public and private sectors acknowledged the power played by the cross-cutting nature of the solution in realizing GACC.

4) Other organizations—those not yet familiar or adept at such global, cross-cutting initiatives—learned from S/GP and the Alliance and ultimately gained confidence in engaging or tackling global problems.

Uncharacteristic of implementing partners, the UNF likewise embraced this cross-cutting framework, and internal agency partners gradually came to appreciate the ability to leverage their individual interests and resources to achieve greater results. As one respondent noted:

We had the good fortune of having this initiative being driven not only by health but also by climate, by deforestation, by addressing fundamental mechanisms of gender violence for women's empowerment. Everything from trying to reduce infant mortality in low and middle income countries, to saving the planet from global warming, was implicated. This issue galvanized attention from knowledgeable people progressively over several years. Much of the success is really a part of the issue itself.

The UNF was instrumental in leveraging—in transforming complexity into a strength—in realizing that the cross-cutting nature of the cookstoves problem and solution could ultimately mean that many more partners would become invested in the issue.

5) Having the right goals: S/GP must recognize the operational value of the goal-framing process and the need to develop succinct and concrete goals.

The goals and objectives promulgated by GACC constituted critical elements of the success of the partnership because they exhibited a number of important characteristics:

- » While embedded in global cross-cutting issues, goals are refined in scope and limited in number.
- » Establish intended outcomes of an ambitious but realistic scale.
- » Intended outcomes are widely recognized by stakeholders as impactful results.
- » Intended outcomes are linked to clear and compelling issues, widely experienced, and addressing universal basic human needs.
- » Objectives are largely apolitical, with outcomes universal relevant; this characteristic also means the cookstoves project represents 'political safe space' that can be utilized effectively as a topic for discussion by officials in diplomatic settings.
- » Goals are effectively communicated using simple messaging, causal logics, and broadly effective tools.
- » Objectives developed with the needs and interests of diverse partners and targeted audiences in mind and demonstrable linkages between them.
- » Objectives whose outcomes can be manifested in a tangible form (i.e., clean cookstoves) are more readily accessible and explicable to stakeholders.

As a Secretary's Office, S/GP must be responsive to the priorities of a particular Secretary of State but S/GP must 'translate' them into concrete and operational objectives, endowed with the characteristics listed above. The inherently complex nature of large-scale development issues and solutions risks diluting the clarity and comprehensibility of goals. At a recent Maxwell lecture, for instance, J. Brian Atwood noted this tendency with respect to the revision of the Millennium Development Goals: 17 goals (with 169 associated indicators) comprise the new Sustainable Development Goals—a fact that he felt would lead them to be incomprehensible to implementers and lay people in the long run.

One interviewee had similar concerns about goals in another S/GP P3 related to diaspora. The respondent noted:

You know, it's basically about working with diaspora communities on avenues for building bridges in ways that are important to them, and that's flexible right? Now it could be entrepreneurship, but in three years, there could be a strong shift toward voluntarism, heading back to what are more creative ways of leveraging remittances. It's not about their domestic issues or migration rights or any of that kind of stuff—it's about what they're doing on their own for the betterment of their countries of heritage. I think, you know, with every changing administration they just want to get away from the past administration. But I think from a political standpoint it survives because it's kind of tough for State to say all of a sudden, 'we don't support Diaspora communities anymore.'

But, from a broader organizational perspective—beyond GACC success—S/GP does not seem to have thought hard about or employed sufficiently proactive strategies to identify and select potential ideas ripe for future P3 initiatives or the "types" of P3s such ideas would take, or come up with sustained means to cultivate a host of potential "uncommon partners" to pursue collaborative relationships. Beyond Global Partnership Week, responsibility for idea generation seem haphazard, to lie primarily with the initiative of external actors (Embassies, private sectors) who may not be cognizant of S/GP capacity, foreign policy priorities, or their own mutual interests and opportunities

for collaborative interaction. Such a process risks missed opportunities, especially interagency partnerships. More deliberative strategies and discussions should contemplate “mining” relevant sources—including SME experts and programs across USG agencies—to generate new P3 ideas, raise the profile of S/GP as an actor in this space, and make S/GP staff aware of synergistic emergent or existing programs and partners and shared objectives. Down the road, a more nimble and broad-based outreach strategy should be developed including partners that have not been regularly tapped—Silicon Valley, universities—to facilitate the discovery of opportunities and synergies. A core part of that process should then be problem-solution development.

4.3.2 EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN P3 PROGRESS.

6) An epistemic community committed to understanding and solving the problem.

As mentioned, complex global problems involving highly technical issues, uncertainty, and the need for broad-based resource support and policy coordination across sectors (such as those targeted by the GACC) pose particular challenges to policymakers and development leaders. Generally lacking technical expertise necessary to understand these problems in terms of policy interests and viable solutions, leaders are often forced to seek out information and advice, for which they come to rely heavily on the guidance of knowledge-based experts or “epistemic communities.” In a widely used definition, Peter Haas defines this community as: “...a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”³

Sharing strong conceptual and normative frameworks, often (but not necessarily) based in scientific research and data, epistemic communities serve as gatekeepers and progenitors of knowledge and can play various critical roles in policy-making processes, particularly in response to “wicked problems.” These roles include: 1) elucidating, through the use of evidence, the nature of the problem and the complex web of interrelated issues associated with it; 2) developing causal logic that explores the impact of various response alternatives; 3) providing information that clarifies the framing of problems in terms of interests and objectives; 4) influencing policy decisions; 5) establishing metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of policy initiatives; and 6) gathering, analyzing and sharing data that serves as the critical evidence-base.⁴

With GACC, such an epistemic community not only existed, but played a vital role in the realization of the P3—as mentioned. The accomplishments of the PCIA over its lifetime represented the effort by the cookstoves community to consolidate their cumulative knowledge and coordinate their activities around the problems associated with indoor air pollution—to create, in essence, an organized scientific knowledge community keen on applying their findings to positively impact global policy

processes. As a sign of this commitment, many members of the clean cooking/clean fuels epistemic community worked in government (EPA, CDC, NIH, DOE, etc.), not to mention subject-related NGOs. While the PCIA ultimately comprised more than 650 members, across sectors and specialties, all were focused on finding a solution to the problem of indoor air pollution—a core component of which was clean cooking practices. As the limitations of the original P3 structure became evident, Operational leadership at PCIA extended the epistemic community by forging connections with other elements of the scientific community, including, for example, the NIH and the CDC.

Our findings, thus, indicate that a critical factor in the ability of S/GP to help conceptualize, frame, and realize the GACC partnership was the prior existence of a highly networked epistemic community committed to understanding and solving the problem and willing to commit its expertise to the endeavor. The problem of traditional indoor cooking (detrimental health effects, lack of economic progress, deforestation, and sustainability) was well understood by a whole swath of scientific experts, advocates, and organizations by the time S/GP helped to launch the GACC initiative. Shell Co. had already devoted considerable resources to develop clean cookstoves and clean fuel expertise and technologies prior to the launch of GACC, for instance. S/GP was thus able to ‘plug-into’ this pre-existing epistemic community and leverage its highly distinctive SME leadership, even as it worked to organize federal agencies around a broader USG-supported initiative. This is to say, the very broad salience and appeal of clean cookstoves was developed from the preexisting infrastructure, expert networks, and SME leadership talent associated with the clean cooking/clean fuels sector and the work of partner organizations, including well-established research programs on indoor air pollution and the role of cooking and fuels in these hazardous processes at NIH, CDC, universities, and elsewhere.

7) SME and scientists within the epistemic community who will force institutional change and innovation in the process to solve the problem.

From the outset, both the early PCIA—and ultimately GACC—developed shared conceptual, strategic, and normative frameworks.⁵ This allowed the broad epistemic community over time to become representative of the sector and function as a source of highly credible subject matter expertise and leadership talent. This community and its experts were accessible to the public sector through the linkages forged by EPA and its own SME leaders—a relationship that offered to the broader sector passionately committed advocates who successfully persisted in pressing forward the sector’s agenda in policy circles and bringing the issue and proposed solutions (repeatedly) to the attention of high-level officials with the influence to promote it on a larger scale. A scientific and rigorous understanding of the nature and magnitude of the problem, as well as its alignment with USG policy objectives, were based on the prior work completed by this epistemic community—such that this communi-

ty's interpretation was ultimately accepted at the highest levels with a minimum of contestation. In fact, in many ways this epistemic community in certain representative SME leaders functioned as sector and USG champions and change agents in ways that modified existing bureaucratic processes, much of this ultimately captured and institutionalized in S/GP's own approach to P3 development.

8) The need for persistent SME leaders as credible representatives of the scientific and/or epistemic community who build institutional connections and relationships inside and across existing policymaking apparatus.

Once critical policymakers (first within EPA and then at State) formalized their commitment to the clean cookstoves agenda, the epistemic community continued to play a pivotal role in the realization of the GACC P3—in myriad ways. Already strongly networked as a result of almost a decade of cooperative efforts, the members of the clean cookstoves and fuels sector engaged in an unprecedented collaborative process that: 1) created the formal strategic plan that continues to guide the work of the Alliance today; 2) ensured the unified buy-in of the sector membership as a whole; 3) contributed to the determination of the metrics that define the success of the P3 and its endeavors; and 4) has driven the evidence-based orientation of the GACC through the continued expansion of its expertise and knowledge base. Given the urgent timeframe for GACC, it is difficult to imagine how the P3 could have been realized had this community not been well-established and if it had not already synthesized its experiences into a coherent conceptual framework that was credible, salient, and timely with respect to policymakers' objectives. As one respondent noted, "for months," Jacob Moss at EPA "tutored" State Department personnel on the science of clean cookstoves.

9) Available strong data that supports an easy understanding of the problem and helps persuade partners to voluntarily participate.

In short, the epistemic community proved increasingly important over time, establishing the "deep structure" that science, research, and evidence-based inquiry offered for anchoring GACC P3 efforts and for even influencing S/GP's framework and processes associated with future P3 development. One of the signal strengths of the cookstoves initiative was its reliance upon the well-researched health, environmental, and economic effects, established scientifically, impacting vulnerable communities. Organizing stakeholders to embrace the cookstoves ambitious agenda depended upon this research and the cohort of compelling experts affiliated with the sector. In the case of GACC, S/GP leaders were able to marshal the knowledge and data required for such an undertaking and present it in a clear and concise



manner to relevant potential partners and constituencies. One can imagine that for other related foreign policy objectives, such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, there would be considerable push back on the science.

10) Establishing an ongoing institutional role for epistemic community in P3 design and development process.

This data and evidence-based emphasis was prioritized throughout the partnership-development process: at the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) launch of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves in September 2010, for instance; during State Department leaders' attempts to mobilize other USG and private partners; and in the very data-driven summative goals established for the GACC initiative itself in creating regional and global cookstoves markets for the adoption of clean cookstoves by 100 million households worldwide by 2020. This epistemic community, strongly anchored in data, science, and research continued to play an ongoing role in the establishment of the independent GACC entity, including in the strategic planning process and in designing GACC summative metrics, as we describe in more detail below.

4.3.3 AVAILABLE PARTNERS WILLING TO TAKE RISKS.

11) Without available potential partners—many Alliance "Founding Partners"—in the public, private, and NGO sectors, the scale of Alliance success would not have been possible.

Continuing the scaffolding analogy, if GACC success was built in part on a previously existing and robust foundation (of experts, prior partnerships, leadership talent, etc.), much of its success also depended on available and interested partner organizations, aware of the scope and nature of the problem. PCIA was again instrumental here, not only as a P3 itself, but in its cultivation of the energy sector. In general, GACC reached out to partners that included a broad swath of relevant organizations, and S/GP spent time and resources (throughout the interagency working group process) to cultivate robust relations with partners: U.S. federal agencies, each with their own mission-based

stake in the issue (EPA, USAID, CDC, NIH, DOE); the preexisting EPA-PCIA program and the informal interagency working group associated with it that expanded the reach of the program; the private sector actors who were often innovators in the sector, including Shell Oil Co. and Shell Foundation, and ultimately Dow Corning Foundation; and the NGO sector, including the UN Foundation itself, the Clinton Global Initiative, and multiple regional NGOs involved in organizing the cookstoves sector locally, regionally, and in countries.

12) The availability of a well-known and respected entity (UNF) to take the role of managing partner, champion it, and links its own success to its evolving mission.

Launching and sustaining P3s requires a lead organization with credibility, reputation, and international reach to support them. S/GP found that partner in the UNF. Founded in 1998 to support Ted Turner's \$1 billion pledge to support the United Nations, the UNF already had a history of leveraging the capabilities of the business and nongovernmental community to address development, health, and environmental issues. Accordingly, rather than 'starting from scratch,' UNF was able to leverage prior relationships and practices in support of GACC programing. In turn, UNF was able to leverage the GACC to meet its own institutional and organizational goals, namely, the need to shift from a donation-supported "pure" foundation to an organization that would offer management services.

13) A balanced representation of NGO, business, and government support for the initiative.

GACC and S/GP was also successful in cultivating and selecting partners for the P3 in ways that avoided the appearance of bias, advocacy, or a political agenda. Free-market champions, such as Shell, were just as enthusiastic about lending their support to the effort as were NGOs, which in another context might view Shell as antithetical to their priorities. Indeed, Shell, and other private sector advocates worked toward and applauded the fact that GACC was set up in a way as to promote a market for cookstoves (as opposed to giving them away)—an anti—"freebie" development approach increasing across the aid and development community by those (practitioners, academics, policymakers) bent on sustainable initiatives.

14) Harnessing the dynamism of private sector partners in their sensitivity to building sustainable commercial markets and market conditions and for long-term planning for such endeavors.

But the private sector—with its dynamism, international capacity, and ability to address problem solving via self-reproducing mechanisms (i.e., markets)—was also critical to both this balance and to GACC success. As one respondent noted, the business sector "planned out 50 years ahead" in its strategic vision and diagnosis of challenges impacting markets and market conditions—something unheard of in government, even in federal agencies devoted to research.

4.3.4 PEOPLE AND LEADERSHIP

15) Successful global partnerships require diverse leadership types and overlapping skillsets tailored to the operational realities of the given intervention and foreign policy space: Champions and Operational Leaders suited to specific bureaucracies and their work processes; leaders at complementary (elite, grassroots) levels; and Change Agent and Sector Strategic leaders to usher in institutional change and plug in the talent of existing sectors to specific initiatives. Often these roles overlap.

SME leaders (from longstanding experience and responsibilities in PCIA) took the lead at the grassroots level, anchoring the whole initiative in basic, data-driven research, creating an ongoing working group process and network to advance the issue, and maintaining a system of communication across stakeholder groups over the long-term. At the elite level, State and EPA Visionary and Champion leaders pushed the Cookstoves agenda forward by adopting it as key signature agenda items, pressing the Cookstoves agenda with relevant federal agencies, business leaders, NGOs, heads of state. Such elite leaders also authorized Political Operational leaders to proceed accordingly (often on instincts) to design and resource the Alliance. It is unlikely that S/GP's efforts to launch GACC would have been successful without leadership 'at both ends' of the spectrum and across the diversity of functions.

16) A translator, process, and political bureaucracy specialist able to put together the top-level champion with the grass-roots champion.

This critical translator and bureaucratic specialist role was played by Political Operational leaders at S/GP, who were instrumental in connecting Secretary Clinton with SME leaders, a connection that would not have been possible absent their involvement. Critically important was the Political Operational leaders' recognition of the connection between the Secretary's new vision for State (QDDR 2010) and the potential of the clean cookstoves issue for advancing that vision—in fact S/GP's awareness of the working group on clean cookstoves was by no means the result of a strategic review of all potential partnership activities but one of many serendipitous moments in which the right leaders made a strategic decision with lasting impacts. At the same time, without Political Operational leaders' astute understanding of the Secretary's policy predilections it would have been difficult to make the connection. The political savvy at multiple levels—bureaucratic institutions, emergent policy priorities, understanding the federal bureaucratic process and the various executive agency identities and norms—cannot be underestimated in this leadership role and position associated with P3 development at S/GP.

17) The momentum of working group processes, including their informal meetings and conversations, across multiple platforms

over a number of years, with a resulting network structure of core group members.

Working groups of often deputy-level professional staff formed the stakeholder structure of the initial GACC-partnership effort. Through close working relationships, these members of a pre-existing and emerging network associated with the Alliance effected the work needing to be done: the creation of a strategic business plan that interfaced with emergent national foreign policy frameworks and legal guidelines; the recruitment founding partners and helping those partners develop their own relevant mission-based investments in the GACC; the development of the role of the managing partner (at the UNF); and ultimately, the provision of executive-level direction for the GACC.

The working group, originally assembled by EPA SME leadership, worked together through successive periods of obscurity and possibility—in fact there were several points in the life of the working group where it seemed wise to abandon the effort altogether. Yet the group continued to meet until such time that the environment became conducive to prioritizing S/GP's GACC efforts. Not to be overlooked in this process of endurance was the critical role that SME Leadership—and professional respect—as well as friendship and trust played in facilitating the creation of the GACC P3. Many respondents reported that they genuinely respected the passion and overwhelming expertise of SME Leaders, they liked the individuals assembled for the GACC initiative, felt profound respect for their ability to accomplish prioritized goals in their organizations. It was this professional respect, friendship, trust, and mutual commitment—a good portion of which was facilitated by Political Operational leadership and long hours together moving the initiative forward. In this sense one may assert that when it comes to collaborative partnerships “the soft stuff is the hard stuff.” In other words, an issue can be pressing, clear, and relevant to USG goals and priorities, but it will never get off the ground if the individuals working on it neither trust nor like and respect each other. Partnership design and maintenance requires long hours together with an incentive structure that is not always clear. Friendship is critical to sustain such efforts.

4.3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OF S/GP: “DISRUPTORS” IN PARTNERSHIP MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

18) A culture of risk taking and innovation in the S G/P.

Traditionally, the State Department is known as a classic clunky bureaucratic machine: as a hierarchical and highly-segmented organization it is slow moving and cautious. S/GP from the start ran self-consciously counter to this organizational identity. Partly this was organizational. By working across the various departments, bureaus, and programs at State, S/GP was structured in such a way as to avoid this drag. Moreover, S/GP administrators, both political appointees and career officers, were able to cultivate a culture of risk taking and innovation—often from previous agency experience or through ‘proxy-power’ (in their re-

lationship to the Secretary's agenda and as an “S” Office). But in any case this disruptor identity, which was common across S/GP Operational leadership, played a critical role in P3 support and development at all levels.

19) S/GP aligned its organizational culture and identity to its strategic leadership role in P3 development, including learning different priorities of the private sector.

In fact, much of the success in supporting the standing up of GACC depended upon certain prioritized elements in the organizational culture at S/GP, most especially, its bureaucratically innovative role in State and across USG agencies. This innovative role is anchored in a cultural identity—S/GP staff call themselves “the disrupters”—and was addressed consciously by many interviewees. Part of this agility is institutionally determined: S/GP is the locus at State for P3 strategy and development and the point of interface with the private sector for P3 collaboration across the USG. In fact, some of S/GP's innovative culture arises from its learning and relationship with actors outside government—namely, the dynamic private sector. As one respondent explains:

We build a large network with the private sector because we are the sole face for the private sector for the whole State Department, so we almost act as a broker, so the private sector can enter through us, or we can reach out to the private sector.

In fact, a secondary dimension to S/GP's innovative culture has to do with the Office's enthusiastic role in cultivating such capacity to design, develop, launch and support P3s. Many respondents expressed S/GP's willingness to champion that expertise throughout “the building” and beyond. As one respondent noted:

Our favorite thing is cheerleading throughout the building and kind of increasing awareness for public private partnerships, so that's always on our mind; how can we help other people form public private partnerships.

There is likewise much awareness on the part of interviewees that the S/GP Office is “young, we've only been around since 2009,” but that its young organizational status is an asset and means to justify doing things differently. This approach is evident in the way that many bureaus at State rely upon S/GP for P3 advice and guidance. As one respondent noted:

we get a lot of calls about forming new partnerships, and other bureaus are increasingly making their activities into public private partnership, so we walk them through the process, the different types of forms to fill out; how unlike just a simple grant program, this is different, which is often difficult for many to understand. Or we get asked about how to get the private sector onboard—not a lot of people know how to just make those cold calls, what to say, how to network with the private sector, who to meet with. Not it just comes naturally to our Office, we just get how to pick up the phone and call and say, ‘hey, you've worked with our Office before,’ or ‘you know the Special Representative,’ or there might not even be a connection and you just say, ‘hello,

I'm from the State Department.... Most bureaus don't know to do that or don't know how to make that call and that's what walking them through, which is also kind of difficult for them to understand.

Part of this influence involves the identity of S/GP core personnel and staff. As one respondent noted,

We're unique; we're bubbly, happy, diplomatic people here. We can talk to a lot of different personalities—you just have to. But you also have to be part hustler. You have to know how to talk to the private sector, how to get stuff done, and being nice gets you the conversation, helps get your foot in the door—but you also need to get down to business and say, 'ok at the end of the day, we're giving this, what are you giving? Because we're a leveraging office, we have to turn our one dollar into two dollars or even bigger. Since 2009 we've leveraged over \$800 million dollars, which we've done really well, but we have to get that done in a certain way because everyone wants things for free and they also want to be a part of a public private partnership like Cookstoves that could boost their name as well as working with the State Department.

Again, interviewees understood the attributes needed to maintain an innovative and nimble bureaucratic structure in a relatively new area for State.

20) Conduct private sector outreach and build an extensive private sector network to anchor S/GP's strategic leadership role in P3 development.

Additionally, respondents recognized the need to get outside “the building” and even the Beltway—beyond the USG itself to maintain leadership and innovation in the P3 space. As one respondent noted:

The ingredients that need to make success happen involve our private sector network; it's huge and growing. That's why we do a lot of outreach we do like events outside of State like we try and if we're launching a partnership we try to do it outside of the building because although State has such a reputation and it takes people places, we like to walk the talk (and collaborate). Public private partnerships are about talking to people.

Likewise, when discussing the need to evaluate GACC, a respondent also noted the desire to apply such values to themselves—despite the bureaucratic obstacles:

We came up with the idea that, 'well, we have to continue to be different; we can't just go through the preferred organizations for evaluations; let's walk the talk and do a public-private partnership in the evaluation process,' so many phone calls later explaining that and working out what that exactly means and getting everyone on board, we made it happen.

4.3.6 S/GP “SPECTRUM OF PARTNERSHIPS” TYPOLOGY

21) S/GP should identify a “spectrum of partnerships” for deliberating P3 design and development and for organizing S/

GP investment of resources, in relation to prioritized foreign policy aims.

The globally-scaled GACC represents the largest and most intensive P3 initiatives associated with the S/GP Office in its early phase. Many interviewees noted its difference from other more limited or circumscribed partnership initiatives (see Appendix D for some examples). In the design and development processes, along with other deliberations, S/GP must contemplate partnership type—size and scale, nexus of issues addressed, solutions, products, and deliverables, structure and governance, and S/GP's own investment in supporting such an initiative and for how long—relative to foreign policy priorities and the type of P3 created.

Drawing on interviewee data and the research literature, we have provided a “spectrum of partnership” typology (below) to aid in this deliberative process and to describe different types of P3s reflecting what we heard about S/GP collaborative types. Much of the collaboration and P3 literature, as well as practitioner recommendations, defines P3 initiatives according to types associated with sectors (i.e., critical infrastructure), financing structure (i.e. contract model), or prioritized features and goals (i.e., degree of private sector control or investment).⁶

It is important to identify a P3 typology in the foreign policy and development domains because as one respondent noted, “public private partnerships are such a rapidly moving device, in part because the private sector is just on such a different pace than government, that it's our continual struggle, to figure out ways to adapt the P3 and to speed up the process of doing so.” In this case, we have organized the typology along intensity of collaboration and in relation to S/GP's investment, itself framed by its institutional leadership role in developing P3s that interface with current foreign policy goals. In short, the utility of this typology is to facilitate S/GP's self-reflexive process—not to label or narrow existing or future P3s down to available types.

We noticed that many interviewees made informal attempts to define and characterize different P3s at S/GP, using different criteria and terms, such as short-term “love matches,” “flagship” P3s like GACC, or “long-term investments.” Likewise, in describing P3 types, another respondent noted that GACC was a “grand slam” P3, while another said it was “our ideal type,” our “first and most successful P3 to date,” whereas others described the very act of creating P3s as a “process of hit or miss,” in which “you take swings and sometimes you get hits, including small hits, which can be just as impactful.” Another respondent explained that some small P3s are understood as “short-term partnerships,”

which can continue on their own, but we only had a little bit of involvement in it, and that can be anywhere from we write the MOU or help them throw an event if we have a stake in what they're doing, and we give them that boost if we believe in their cause. For an event or something, we will say, 'hey, come here to State and we'll give you backing,' and that can be a partnership.

In trying to grasp type and continuum, many respondents described each and every S/GP P3 as different, an entity unto itself.⁷

One respondent conceded, for instance, that while successful P3s at S/GP have similar traits—they must have “measurable success within five years,” for instance—he also said “each P3 will look different from every other partnership.” Another respondent described in detail how her team operationalized an individualized process of building a P3 to the “specs” of a given set of stakeholders. She noted that her team: “built out each RFP based on the needs of the partnership and how we wanted to utilize that particular stream of funding.” Yet another respondent described each P3 as a “fingerprint,” completely unique and distinctive:

We kind of took a step back and realized, ok, well, public private partnerships are so vastly different and can just take different forms, as well as change rapidly, so that everyone just seems like a fingerprint, it's unique. But is there is a successful model, a way to blend all of the ingredients that we need? Can we come up with a model that can be flexible for its different organizations? What are the rights, what are the wrongs, are there any? There may not be because public private partnerships are so fluid.

Within this acknowledged fluidity and diversity of P3 types, however, a set of associated criteria and expectations also emerged from interviewees. In another case, when S/GP was partnering with USAID, one respondent noted that:

we put out a call asking very specifically for a managing partner that would be able to build out the program according to the general scope we laid out and the fact that it was intended to sort of have its own staff, with S/GP providing only a sort of strategic guidance in the background as to how we'd like certain initiatives to be sort of framed or launched or timelines.

In this example, S/GP offered largely strategic guidance—but very minimal investments of personnel time, money, and other concrete resources. In certain respects, the type of P3—more of an S/GP affiliation than a full-blown alliance—dictated the project scope and activities. This affiliation-based P3, as we describe as the first type of P3 (below), is at the low end of S/GP’s organizational investment of resources and expertise—unlike the globally-scaled GACC at the other end of the spectrum (see below).

Another respondent discussed the role of S/GP in its P3 design process in anticipating urgent international aid needs such as natural disasters and, thus, identified another avenue driving the P3 recruitment and selection process at S/GP: Embassies contacting S/GP and identifying urgent issues around which P3s could then create solutions. One example cited was the typhoon in the Philippines in which State coordinated multiple private companies to address urgent aid needs. In doing this, the respondent noted, such P3s successfully generated “critical mass”—by which was meant the broad-based “buy in” for the P3’s solutions, services, or products delivered to target communities. This respondent also noted that GACC was able to generate similar “critical mass too” because “they had a product,” they “staked out a geography” (in both the physical sense and in issue areas and sectors) in which they could deliver products and become experts, and “they have the numbers, the metrics,” to give direction to their goals and demonstrate their success “at any time.” In this respect, S/GP helped to develop a different kind of P3 type based in the coordination of needed products or services, such as aid delivery.

Another respondent helped us understand S/GP’s “ideal” type of P3 and why GACC was an exemplar of this model and the kind of intensive, long-term planning and investment this P3 type required. As she noted:

We support Cookstoves wherever we can and our ideal public private partnership is Cookstoves. That's our biggest success story, and we did it without any funding from ourselves and that's pretty incredible. We would love to do that again and it is perfect because our idea of an ideal public private partnership is we help bake it, we put the ingredients in with the private sector, and do the planning etc., we sort of incubate it, get it started, and then we like to let it fly on its own, and that's what Cookstoves is doing. It has almost a bigger staff than we do now and it's still flourishing.

While this respondent also explained that “every partnership is so different,” she noted that when the Secretary commits to a P3 in which they have “a strong stake,” they will lend their own support to the effort—so this “very important” public official (even

FIGURE 1. SPECTRUM OF P3 TYPES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DOMAIN



outside State), when “aligned with the specific partnership,” might “speak for it and launch it.” This occurred recently when Vice President Biden helped launch an S/GP P3 initiative, for instance. If it’s a P3 “at that level, and many of our partnerships are, since we’re a Secretary’s Office, and we want to make sure that our P3 are making impacts, we make sure the impact is big.” Such “flagship” P3s are not common—S/GP may have developed ten or so, since becoming a permanent office.

We thus describe a P3 typology specific to the ways in which S/GP has used the P3 mechanism for foreign policy objectives in some of the following types, based on a continuum (from low to high) of significant S/GP resource investment in the collaboration (see below).

- » First, S/GP develops some P3s as loose affiliated networks in which it plays some “matchmaking” role but invests little in time and resources, including in the P3’s development, management, and governance.
- » Second, S/GP may develop P3s designed for coordination purposes, often for development or aid delivery emergencies, and these types involve more S/GP input but are still very limited in organizational investment.
- » Third along the continuum are P3s designed as more robust cooperative units in which all partners are playing significant roles and S/GP has contributed more of its resources in establishing, supporting, structuring, and monitoring the P3.
- » Fourth, S/GP creates highly formalized and developed P3s with significant investment by S/GP in the P3 structure and design and development process, with the expectation that the P3 will represent some aspect of State’s foreign policy priorities or mandate.
- » Last, S/GP creates formal, significant, and globally-scaled P3s in which it invests sustained and significant resources and positions the P3 as delivering on core foreign policy objectives. These P3s are often designed to last over a long time.

4.3.7 POSITIVE P3 INTERFACE WITH PRESSING USG FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

22) Develop S/GP Office habits and norms—if not formal procedures—for addressing how S/GP’s P3s interface with reigning U.S. foreign policy priorities.

One conundrum for the research team was evaluating how S/GP handled—both in decision-making processes about P3 selection, development, and subsequent monitoring—a P3’s relation to U.S. foreign policy aims and national interests. The problem had many dimensions:

- » How does S/GP and its P3s fare with political transition—the different priorities, for instance, with a new Secretary, new Administration, as embedded in QDDR 2010 and QDDR 2015?
- » How does S/GP ensure that a given P3 continues to promote U.S. foreign policy aims after it “graduates” and will some P3s, as GACC did in its phase two evolution, find this U.S. policy framework constricting to its aims, impacts, and mission?
- » Who decides at the P3 design level to “match” good P3 ideas with foreign policy objectives?

While we cannot fully answer these questions, they are worth thinking about and potentially developing S/GP habits and norms (beyond S/GP’s vetting service) in the P3 design, development, and graduation process. We have not suggested formal

procedures because we recognize S/GP’s desire to remain nimble and innovative, along the lines of a more “start-up” approach, in incubating P3s. It is also worthwhile to establish a rapport with other State bureaus (and elsewhere) on this issue. That is, parallels at State include the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), which states that it will “ensure that all our diplomatic relationships advance our interests in having access to secure, reliable, and ever-cleaner sources of energy.”⁸

23) Consider an alternative approach for framing S/GP’s role in advancing U.S. foreign policy priorities: rather than making direct contribution to foreign policy interests, S/GP’s value-added is in strengthening the P3 ecosystem in the foreign policy and development domains and the resulting ongoing networks.

As an alternative paradigm, S/GP might consider reframing its contributions—from direct to indirect—U.S. foreign policy goals in strengthening the USG P3 ecosystem for generating solutions to “wicked problems,” thereby, providing concrete and sustainable mechanisms for advancing U.S. foreign policy leadership internationally. This “value-added” approach, evident in both GACC and the S/GP Office, may invite such future S/GP self-assessment questions as: Has S/GP’s P3 involvement (in a given case or across many partnership cases):

- » Yielded positive and impactful linkages with other programs and actors, beyond individual partners in any given P3?
- » Produced new leadership talent agile and adept at cross-sector collaboration and solving “wicked problems” in the foreign policy space and its respective sectors (climate)?
- » Contributed to the epistemic community for solving challenging problems?
- » Created lasting networks still active and important to S/GP and State (e.g. philanthropy networks, media networks, microcredit or extension movement networks, Team B, scientific or other unions, humanitarian networks, etc.)?
- » Influenced the commitment of other actors—public and private sector—to become more active in solving a global problem or changing the scope or depth of their engagement?

On this last question, a recent example might be evident in Dow Corning’s March 2012 statement regarding their ongoing commitment to GACC:

*March 2012 Dow Corning remains committed to making a material difference with the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. The organization has made an initial contribution of \$1,000,000 to the United Nations Foundation, enabling that organization to serve as the alliance secretariat. As an advisory member to The United Nations Foundation, Dow Corning participated in regional meetings in the U.S., India, and Germany to raise awareness of the necessity for expanding the use of clean cookstoves. The organization has served and continues to serve as an example of a public-private partnership to other organizations.*⁹

A last self-assessment question might include: How has S/GP’s own performance changed through its participation/leadership in standing up a given P3?

4.3.8 S/GP ROLE IN P3 GOVERNANCE: DEFINITIONS, MANAGING PARTNERS, AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

By “governance” in a collaboration, we mean both the set of guiding principles, objectives, and strategies that define actions and goals in the partnership, as well as the structures of leadership, authority, and organizing action. This broad definition goes beyond the established organizational architecture and includes adopting procedural mechanisms that facilitate both the P3 design and development and continued functioning. In the P3 context and in specific case of GACC, effective governance structures needed to be customized to the complex goals of the P3: these structures must facilitate the ability to be well-managed and engage in decisive decision-making, while remaining responsive and acceptable to partner stakeholders. The governance structures must also provide infrastructure for top-down decision-making in the more traditional understanding of the term, as well as mechanisms that facilitate collaborative decision-making when appropriate. Overall, GACC was successful in achieving each of these critical components of good governance, and the experience of creating this partnership offers S/GP important lessons for future P3 endeavors.

24) While not formally identified as a part of the governance structure of GACC, S/GP performed critical governance functions in its role in leading the coordination of the USG coalition of agencies for participation in the Alliance.

The Alliance experience suggests that S/GP, while precluded from serving as an official member of any P3 secretariat governance structure (thus limiting its sustained governance role) performs a number of governance-related functions critical in establishing especially large-scale/global P3s. S/GP, as a Secretary’s office, can potentially wield significant influence to galvanize action along two dimensions: internally, among USG agencies, which constitute a powerful partner coalition for a prospective P3; and externally, among global partners whose participation can be more readily secured with the credibility offered via State/USG commitment.

25) Managing partners (MP): the establishment of a sound governance structure within the organizational architecture of the managing partner must be a high priority concern for S/GP in developing especially globally-scaled P3s.

In its role as the primary site for governance mechanisms and processes, the managing partner is a critical lynchpin in the overall success of a public-private partnership. The choice of a managing partner is, thus, crucial: this organization is a core member of the partnership and must possess a diverse set of core competencies and management skills, as well as an institutional culture that can facilitate collaborative governance. Our findings indicate that the choice of managing partner, the primary vehicle for governance of the P3, is a critical component of both building and sustaining a P3, including GACC. This functional role is complex, requiring organizational mastery of a variety of specific management capacities and administrative requirements

as well as facility with diverse partners with disparate interests and resources. Core competencies include the ability to convene partners, to offer project management, fundraise, and perform monitoring/evaluation/learning processes that meet reporting requirements (including of each of the partners). Equally critical to the managing partner role is the ability to employ a collaborative approach that responds to the needs of multiple, even competing constituencies.

In the Alliance model, the UNF plays the role of both master and servant of the partnership, balancing its authoritative decision-making and management role with a sensitivity to the fact that, as the partnership is composed of voluntary members and is thus dependent on their continued satisfaction, it must also be responsive to evolving needs and member interests—all with an eye to benefiting the sector as a whole. In finding the right “fit,” the GACC experience suggests a number of factors, many addressed by interviewees. Critical requirements were that 1) the managing partner have an appropriate scope of vision and reach for the project, and 2) the existence of alignment between the guiding mission and expertise of the managing partner and that of the new partnership.

GACC founding partners sought a managing partner with a global vision (not regional or local) and cross-cutting expertise in specific, expected impact areas (women’s and children’s health, climate, pollution), and the ability to implement a market-based approach to the sector. While UNF had not formerly linked its programs in this cross-cutting way, nor did it have specific expertise with cookstoves, it had experience in all of the major content areas targeted by the cookstoves project and possessed an international reputation and network to viably implement a program on a global scale. UNF also grasped the potential effectiveness of such a cross-cutting approach rather than its disadvantages.

In addition to these characteristics, GACC founding partners sought a managing organization that had a proven track record of management competence—a capacity that any P3 managing partner must demonstrate. For S/GP specifically, representing USG entities that made up the interagency affiliates to the partnership, it was critical that the managing partner have familiarity with the regulations for the management of USG funding, as well as reporting requirements. On these issues, the founding partners prioritized the managing partner’s ability to manage resources efficiently, to raise funds and other resources to further GACC activities, to house a decision-making mechanism for the sector as a whole, and to serve as the hub for coordinating

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the bank of knowledge being gathered through research associated with the project.

In assessing these factors in choosing a managing partner, concerns were raised by founding partners. UNF had greatly depleted its original endowment and was transitioning to a fundraising organization, a new approach to operating still being developed and understood—with implications for UNF spending and readiness to conduct fundraising on a scale needed for a global program. UNF did, however, convey great interest in the opportunity to engage in a project that would require creating synergy from the cross-cutting nature of issues tackled and the energy of diverse partners involved. The willingness to embrace this complex task, often seen as daunting by similar organizations, was persuasive in the founding partner's decision-making process in choosing the UNF as managing partner for the Alliance.

S/GP had many experience with managing partners either lacking in the core competencies necessary to implement the partnership, or which did not possess an organizational culture predisposed to implementing a collaborative partnership model. Interviewees identified these experiences as failures, and attributed them to a poor choice in the managing partner. S/GP should develop a P3-tailored informal evaluative process—organized by questions and discussions with key stakeholders—that enables the assessment of a MP's potential, based on identified core competencies, organizational culture, and issue-area experience. Training could fill in some gaps (such as the management of USG resources).

26) Identify core competencies needed for P3 Managing Partner success and develop some evaluation process for assessing MP capacity against these competencies and P3 mission.

While the specifics will vary with particular partnerships, our research suggests that successful governance will demonstrate the following characteristics:

- » A global partnership and its governance structure must reside at a high level within the managing partner organization, empowering the leadership with the gravitas and authority to develop the partnership on a global scale with international partners.
- » Conceiving of a partnership as something more than a “program” enables it to operate more effectively within the global environment, to more readily take advantage of opportunity structures, and to expand its vision to encompass cross-cutting issues and potential solutions.
- » Likewise, the managing partner must be designed as something greater than a “program implementer”—an authoritative entity providing the organizational framework for sector-wide decision-making, strategic planning, large-scale networking and fundraising activities. Such an entity requires that its internal top leadership be granted sufficient status to command the respect of partners and to carry off these diverse and complex tasks. The importance of this element of the creation of a successful partnership is clearly demonstrated by the Alliance experience.
- » Managing partner organizational strength helps determine the P3's ability to attract a diverse and resourceful global membership, to act independently with respect to the needs of the partnership, to exercise sufficient gravitas and author-

ity to play its guiding and decision-making roles within the sector, and to address issues of global significance.

To ensure that GACC would not become “just another small program” embedded in the UNF structure, the founding partners rejected the initial proposal of the UN Foundation to house it as a program within its Energy and Climate division, led by a program manager. Instead, S/GP and Shell-F insisted that the partnership be elevated as its own division, led by an Executive Director answering directly to the UNF President and Chief Executive Officer. This leadership structure has enhanced the ability of the Alliance secretariat to position itself strategically within the sector and to accrue a number of critical advantages with respect to its mission.

Unexpectedly, those precepts have led to some happy unintended consequences: the Executive Director and the Alliance secretariat are better able to embrace the cross-cutting nature of this project—an achievement that would have been significantly more challenging had the Alliance been placed under the purview of any single issue-focused division at UNF. While GACC benefits from its identification as part of the respected UNF, it has organizational space to grow far larger than any other program run within the UNF and to build an individual organizational status and reputation necessary to convince more than 1,000 diverse partners (at last count) of its competence and value. This structure, and the enhanced status that it has afforded the Alliance, has allowed the Alliance to pursue resources more broadly, including intangible resources such as access to potential international government partners through its ties with the USG, and to focus its available resources on meeting the needs of its partnership.

27) Creating the governance structure with a strong Executive Director at the helm is one component of prioritizing effective leadership of the P3.

The governance structure has also enhanced the collaborative decision-making process, which has been designed to be as inclusive as possible, while maintaining clarity and guidance through the strong leadership offered by the Executive Director. Equally critical is the recruitment of an individual who is able to fulfill the diverse and challenging roles inherent in the Executive Director position. The requisite skills will be determined to some extent by the P3 specific objectives. But in the case of P3s created for solving global problems and issues in development and foreign policy, a number of capacities are important: Among these are experience with the processes and driving forces behind each core partner sector (the public, private and civil society factions). Thus, the ED must possess 1) broad business acumen that will allow him/her to interact not only with donors but with beneficiary entrepreneurs as well; 2) knowledge of government procedures and limitations, and 3) sensitivity to the goals and principles driving the civil society partners. In addition, an Executive Director must be capable of walking the fine line between a directive and a collaborative style of leadership.

The Alliance experience supports this analysis. The impact of GACC's ED's tenure was universally identified by interviewees as critical and a game changer in the successful evolution of GACC into an independent P3. The ED, of course, possessed each of these competencies (above), given years of professional experience in business and NGO sectors, extensive knowledge of the issue areas targeted by Cookstoves, and a personal leadership style that integrates well decisive leadership, especially strategic planning, with skillful collaboration. This has contributed to the ability of the GACC leadership to maintain clarity of purpose and strategy for the organization, as well as an inclusive environment for its membership.

28) Governance infrastructure for a partnership must also include entities that provide founding partners and critical stakeholders with advisory and oversight mechanisms.

GACC is guided by both Leadership and Advisory Councils, "composed of select high-level stakeholders, donors and experts who advise the Alliance in all strategic matters, including decisions related to its mission, programmatic focus, growth and development." The Leadership Council provides stakeholders prohibited from holding positions on formal decision-making governance boards (including the USG) with a mechanism for maintaining oversight and for offering input into decision-making processes.

29) Founding documents that provide clear points of reference with respect to partnership goals and strategies are also a critical element of good governance of a partnership.

In GACC, the primary guiding document is the partnership's strategic plan, co-created and responsive to its diverse membership. This document was the result of a long-term collaborative foundational exercise that established a strong sense of identity among partners. This process, while time-consuming and complex, resulted in a high level of buy-in among the members, essential to the ability of the Alliance leadership to represent the sector and to engage in effective decision-making for the sector. The task of creating broad participation in the creation of such goals and strategies is an arduous one, as was noted by several interviewees intimately involved in this process for the Alliance—but it is a critical means to develop "buy in" and representative goals and to use partner expertise and capacity effectively.

4.3.9 COLLABORATION AND PARTNER OBJECTIVES

In the partner outreach and the P3 M&E processes, S/GP might develop ways to assess (even informally) whether partner involvement in a given P3 is meeting the organization's objectives and what to do to "course correct," if not.

One of the most essential conditions for partner involvement in any P3, particularly in challenging arenas (i.e., climate, energy, developing economies, gender), is the ability for partners to meet their own (organization's) objectives via P3 involvement. In this respect, partners should be able to affirm that their own

organization's performance (i.e., tangible and intangible performance gains) has changed—positively—through their participation in the P3. This was certainly true and often reported by respondents in the case of organizations and the GACC. A more sophisticated level of analysis on this issue would examine organization's trade-offs, losses, or challenges in the collaboration, and whether it has modified the organization's responsiveness to its constituencies (i.e., improved, dampened, complicated, increased, threatened, made more or less accountable, etc.?).

S/GP identifies four critical functional roles that it plays in contributing to the creation of global partnerships: convener, catalyst, collaborator and cultivator. The overall impact of these functions is the facilitation of effective USG engagement in public-private partnerships through a number of mechanisms:

Another way of addressing this issue is to identify the "degree of partnership mutuality," of a given partner from initial involvement to decision-making processes inside the P3. Part of this process would involve examining the expectations of partners and how information sharing, dialogue, and communication occurs inside the P3. Some of these questions are also relevant: Has your organization been enhanced by collaboration in the P3 and do the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs (opportunity costs, actual costs) involved in building tighter relationships or changing processes and investments to meet P3 vision or goals? Relatedly, S/GP may consider whether partners share strategic visions and best approaches for addressing the issue are informing the P3?

- 1 The magnitude and interrelatedness of these issue areas qualify them as what are generally referred to as "wicked" problems, which Rittel and Webber define by ten distinguishing characteristics:
 - i. *There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.*
 - ii. *Wicked problems have no stopping rule.*
 - iii. *Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good or bad.*
 - iv. *There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.*
 - v. *Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.*
 - vi. *Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.*
 - vii. *Every wicked problem is essentially unique.*
 - viii. *Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.*
 - ix. *The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution.*
 - x. *The social planner has no right to be wrong (i.e., planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate).*
- 2 Ritchey, T. (2011), "Wicked Problems – Social Messes: Decision support Modeling with Morphological Analysis," Berlin: Springer. "Since they are strongly stakeholder dependent, there is often little consen-

sus about what the problem is, let alone how to resolve it. Furthermore, wicked problems won't keep still: they are sets of complex, interacting issues evolving in a dynamic social context. Often, new forms of wicked problems emerge as a result of trying to understand and solve one of them."

3 Haas, P. (1992) Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination, *International Organization* 46:1, 1-35 While these experts may hail from a variety of sectors, disciplinary or ideological backgrounds and fields of expertise, Haas suggests that, as a community, they exhibit four unifying characteristics:

- i. *A shared set of normative and principled beliefs which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members;*
- ii. *Shared causal beliefs which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes;*
- iii. *Shared notions of validity, i.e., intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and*
- iv. *A common policy enterprise, or set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (1992, 3)*

4 This list is an extension of the policymaking roles proposed by Haas, 1992: pp. 14-15.

5 Even at its early stages, the EPA, taking the lead in the organization of the PCIA, understood a number of critical dimensions of addressing a topic as broad and complex as the modification of cooking traditions to improve indoor air quality, as is evidenced by the PCIA Fact Sheet disseminated in 2003.

- i. *The global nature of the problem. "Over 2 billion people worldwide use traditional biomass fuels (e.g., wood, dung, crop residues) for cooking and heating. As a result, an estimated 2 million people - particularly women and children - die each year from breathing elevated levels of indoor smoke...."*
- ii. *The necessity to frame the cross-cutting nature of the problem. "The broad lesson is that to achieve sustainable progress, the Partnership must tackle this problem not just on*

technology front, but as a health, economic, and environmental issue as well."

- iii. *The importance of a market-based strategy. "Long-term sustainability through local market and business development will be prioritized."*
- iv. *The need for strategic planning, metrics, and evaluation. "Performance will be evaluated, approaches (outreach modules, business models, and financing mechanisms) refined, and longer-term implementation plans identified."*
- v. *The need for a cross-sector global partnership approach to address the complexity and magnitude of the problem. "While this issue is easy to solve in any individual case, its dispersed nature makes it enormously complicated to solve on the broader scale.....The Partners are contributing their resources and expertise to implement the (global) goals of the initiative...."*

Evident in these statements are basic principles that became critical elements of the GACC approach.

6 For some examples, see World Bank, "PPP Arrangements/Types of Public Private Partnership Agreements," <http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements>.

7 The literature appears to agree. See Carol Jacobson and Sang Ok Choi, (2008),"Success Factors: Public Works and Public-Private Partnerships," *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 21(6): 637 - 657, p. 642: "As the word of the successes of these partnerships grows, PPPs have become more widespread to all public jurisdiction sizes. However, literature clearly agrees that PPP appears to have no clear definition or standard implementation methods."

8 See <http://www.state.gov/e/enr/>. Notice that ENR was a direct result of the QDDR (2010).

9 See CGI, "Advancing Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: Commitment by Dow Corning Corporation," <https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/advancing-global-alliance-clean-cookstoves>

5.0 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHALLENGES



The following recommendations are derived from the above analyses and may guide future S/GP efforts in supporting P3s to contribute to U.S. foreign policy objectives. We categorize these recommendations, accordingly, into key ideas and development phases. When relevant, we have also included related challenges.

5.1 STRENGTHEN S/GP OFFICE POLICIES FOR P3 DEVELOPMENT, OUTREACH, AND INCUBATION

Recommendation 1: Adopt an assessment process in keeping with the S/GP “disruptors” identity for seizing P3 opportunities.

A P3 is not a viable or preferable approach for every challenge in international affairs. A fundamental precept of the S/GP mandate is identifying opportunities that show strong potential for the P3 “fit”—while lack of “fit” may result from any number of deficits (i.e., lack of mature concept, little interest from the private sector, challenges in achieving scale, viability of proposed solutions, etc.). A critical first step in the P3 selection process, thus, is conducting an assessment to clarify where on the international affairs plane the potential P3 initiative will make its intervention, who are its targeted partners and collaborators, and what resources will be required to push forward.

S/GP should, thus, develop a nimble assessment framework to

evaluate potential partnerships and to guide decision-making in a process that includes assessing both internal and external resources invested in an initiative, the ‘ripeness’ of the initiative to be supported and scaled, and the level of resource commitment expected from all partners. The ‘spectrum’ concept included in this report may provide a basis for the assessment of partner type in these opportunities.

A core part of this effort requires that S/GP’s “incubation” concept must be defined and understood more clearly within the organization and pursued with more intention. That is, in its role as incubator of potential P3 concepts, S/GP might examine private sector analogues (Silicon Valley venture capital idea selection processes) to develop a more deliberative process for soliciting ideas and for surveying the broad field of possible collaborative ideas as these interface with the most severe or pressing international challenges. Such a process can include S/GP’s convening power and State’s authority to facilitate incoming ideas, but also its “situational awareness” of potentially “ripe” ideas for P3 development, as a networking hub for high-level leaders, champions, interagency collaboration, aligning interests in relation to the private sector.

Recommendation 2: Actively foster initiatives that demonstrate broad, cross-cutting salience, rather than narrow interests, in order to appeal to a broad base of stakeholders.

Since the creation of the Office, GPI/S/GP has pursued a number of diverse P3 initiatives with varied results. Our research indicates that a core component of the suitability of the Cookstoves project to a P3 approach was its ability to address multiple, cross-cutting, interdependent issues (indoor air quality, climate, women's issues, health, market development, energy equality, etc.). This multi-faceted framework of issues made GACC salient to a diverse group of internal USG and external stakeholders, allowing each to find "hooks" aligned with their respective missions and interests. The resultant broad base of stakeholders increased the level of internal commitment that the USG was able to bring to the table, which, in turn, influenced the level of commitment of external partners.

In the case of the Alliance, S/GP engaged in effective 'development diplomacy' by playing these roles: promoting the complex global framing of these cross-cutting interests (beyond the capacity of any individual Agency working within a proscribed mandate); proactively pursuing and convening stakeholders with relevant agendas; and galvanizing the momentum necessary for shared interests to be transformed into shared effort. While not all initiatives will demonstrate salience across such a broad spectrum of issues, S/GP should lead efforts to identify such "wicked problems," define issue linkages, convey these to stakeholders (even those who may be previously unaware of the relevance of an initiative to their interests), and facilitate networking using the authority of the Secretary's office to its advantage.

Recommendation 3: Prioritize opportunities that demonstrate a clear, tangible issue/solution nexus, supported by scientific research and data.

The complexity of the global development landscape today presents steep challenges, even when tackled by combined resources. Our research indicates that one critical factor in the success of the cookstoves initiative is the clarity with which the issue and proposed solution were defined, often by logical, data-driven connections demonstrated between them, what we have called: the issue/solution nexus. Most critical in the case of the Alliance was the demonstrable relationship between the cookstove solution and the predicted results associated with it. Research supports the perception that the resultant impact is measurable and will be significant, thus creating the sense that objectives can and will be accomplished. Despite the highly technical nature of cookstove development and the scientific research that informs it, the cookstoves solution generates strong universal and human appeal. While P3s do not always need to result in developing tangible, physical objects, our findings suggest that S/GP should ensure that any initiative undertaken demonstrates a strong issue/solution nexus, supported by reliable scientific research in the problem and proposed solution.

Recommendation 4: Focus efforts on incubating ideas and idea builders vs. stakeholders

Fundamental to S/GP's success with the GACC partnership was a well-developed idea that had already achieved a high level

of maturity before its association with the GPI/S/GP office. The evolutionary process of this idea created a strong and knowledgeable cohort of idea builders – subject matter experts committed to achieving a solution to the problem (as opposed to that of creating a public-private partnership.) Through a focused effort aimed at further refining the cookstoves concept to render it suitable for a global scale effort, and the inspired use of the "detail" process to harness those Agency-level experts and leaders most experienced and knowledgeable about the endeavor, S/GP successfully enabled the creation of a coherent and compelling narrative with broad appeal to external stakeholders. We note specifically that the incubation process in this case was directed primarily towards the enhancement of an existent idea, and the empowerment of idea leaders associated with it through high-level networking connections and the influence wielded by the authority of the Secretary's Office.

S/GP should commit resources, including possibly a dedicated staff position, to intensive outreach directed at USG bureaus and agencies to build rapport with their internal leadership, and to create a detailed database of current work being undertaken across USG institutions. Such a process would provide S/GP with a larger view of the overall development work underway in the USG, a perspective from which to identify promising programs, natural synergies that may not be recognized from a lower vantage point, and to recruit talented expert personnel to support the creation of public-private partnerships around these ideas.

Recommendation 5: Seek out opportunities to build on existing partnership or development initiatives.

The successful and timely creation of GACC was facilitated by the fact that GPI-S/GP was able to build upon an existent conceptual and collaborative organizational infrastructure that had its origins in almost a decade of preliminary work instigated by PCIA. The primary role of the S/GP was thus not in creation per se of the cookstoves partnership concept, but rather in reframing and scaling this small-scale public-private partnership initiative to conform to the broader political agenda (collaborative public-private partnerships intended to pursue global foreign policy objectives) endorsed by the Obama Administration and the Clinton State Department. This approach was effective as it capitalized on interest and momentum that had already begun to converge from both the public and private sectors (inherently signaling the viability of the project), and utilized strong existing resources (extensive networks, a developing identity and consensus within the sector, an expanding base of scientific research and data supporting the fundamental premises of the initiative) as a base for expansion. In addition, the fact that much of this groundwork was already well underway allowed S/GP to focus its efforts on aspects of the project that highlight strong value-adds that the Office brings to the table: its ability to facilitate access to larger platforms and critical high-level leadership, and the authority to convene and influence inherent in its position as a Secretary's office. Given the time and resource constraints with which S/GP must contend, this "head start" represented a great advantage over partnerships that must be

constructed from the ground up. Identification and prioritization of partnership initiatives that have independently reached a threshold of critical mass constitutes a strong strategy for the successful development of future partnerships.

Recommendation 6: Scale efforts along the “spectrum of partnership” configurations to achieve results relative to aims.

In the process of selecting P3 ideas to support, S/GP should keep in mind—and develop with more rigor—a typology of available P3 models commonly used at State and in related USG development initiatives (i.e., DoD, USAID, OPIC). The purpose of situating a proposed P3 on the partnership spectrum is not to attempt to fit new ideas within existing infrastructural templates, but to think proactively about how to form a P3 governance structure according to projected results and impacts. This “impacts-based” approach to organizing the P3 infrastructure was used effectively in the Alliance, particularly with the choice of heavy metrics to direct the initiative’s clear goals (i.e., 100M cookstoves by 2020). In other P3s, evidence of lack of an integrated awareness of results in the P3 design were evident, as project managers tinkered with a partnerships governance structure to try to course correct or make progress. While modifications are often helpful and necessary, it is better to modify a P3 from the vantage point of a concrete and objective appreciation of expected results—small or large—an endeavor that requires S/GP personnel to think carefully about the P3 as a delivery system specific to a specific intervention.

Recommendation 7: Continue to cultivate/champion ideas.

S/GP’s early history closely coincided with an emerging multilateral interest in generating a P3 cookstoves partnership on a global scale. While S/GP cannot take credit for the germination of the concept of clean cookstoves, it was the critical link in recognizing the potential of this concept and connecting grassroots expertise and leadership with high-level leaders with international presence whose support was pivotal to its viability. In short, it is unlikely that the cookstoves idea would have been able to transition from concept to realization without S/GP efforts and the global platform it offered. S/GP should, thus, retain and develop additional strategies for mining ideas upon which to base P3s—beyond private sector outreach, the Global Partnership Week conference, competitions, and Embassy routes, etc. To enhance these effort, S/GP might create a dedicated venue to explore possible ideas to champion in ways that solicit and invite ideas—beyond grant processes—that brings together “uncommon partners” unaware that such synergy exists.

The ability to have champions come to S G/P ‘on loan’ is critical.

5.2 BUILD RESPONSIVE INFRASTRUCTURES AT S/GP AND BEYOND

Recommendation 8: Establish internal operational mechanisms that allow for flexibility and adjustment.

Our research indicates that a critical strategy utilized by leaders at all levels in the creation of GACC involved the synchronization

RELATED CHALLENGES

S/GP is not staffed to generate partnership ideas (the staff does not consist of content experts per se) but is designed to recognize synergies and “match-make” between compatible partners. This means that staff must be trained to seek out and assess the potential of ideas to become viable partnerships. Staff must also be networked sufficiently within the USG to identify and convene partners from diverse settings that may have a mutual interest in partnership.

The recruitment of expert SME leadership in the development stages of a P3 may not be a straightforward as in GACC; however the value of SME leaders has been widely identified as a critical element to success.

Finally, the transitory nature of the S/GP staff poses challenges to the cultivation of the skills and network integration to facilitate this process.

of efforts with the timing of significant windows of opportunity that present in both the public and private realms. Important examples of the use of this strategy include early decisions to maintain the cookstoves initiative in a relative holding pattern, with the expectation that agency commitments would resolve with the stability of a new incoming Administration. On the other end of the spectrum, Secretary Clinton’s endorsement of the efforts to create a global public-private cookstoves partnership unleashed activity at a furious pace, galvanized first by the need to coordinate a unified interagency commitment, and then by the mandate to finalize the establishment of the P3 within a 3-year window, anticipating that Secretary would not continue to serve in a second term. Interviewees expressed that, in order to be a viable partner, the USG and its agencies need to be equally responsive to patterns of activity within the private sector, which generally demonstrate the ability to respond quickly and decisively to changing circumstances. S/GP has acknowledged the need to be ‘disruptive’ with respect to standard operating procedures within the USG environment. While this is an enormous task, expanded efforts to cultivate new ways of operating that allow for flexibility and responsiveness are critical to the future success of public-private partnerships.

Recommendation 9: Fostering an organizational culture that encourages innovative thinking and supports collaborative approaches.

Our research suggests that the leadership of the cookstoves partnership project was adept at creating a working climate among stakeholders and internal staff that generated the commitment and sustained effort necessary to accomplish an enormous amount of work on an accelerated timetable. Among the characteristics of this environment were: 1) a sense of urgency, associated both with the critical need to address the issue as well as with the imposed deadlines; 2) inclusiveness/egalitarianism at many levels, including drawing in younger, lower echelon

professionals within the public sector, and engaging the cookstoves sector in its entirety in strategic planning; 3) creation of an intimate atmosphere which was fun, exciting, inspiring; 4) adoption of a 'disruptive' attitude – the sense of instigating procedural change in the interest of enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the USG. Interviewees conveyed their acknowledgment of the importance of organizational culture in fostering the human connections essential to successful trust-building, collaboration, and commitment. This understanding is physically manifested in the design of the new S/GP office space, but should also include processes that encourage innovative thinking.

Recommendation 10: Integrating “learning” more fully into the P3 process.

When asked directly how the GACC experience could inform the process of standing up future public-private partnerships, a number of interviewees expressed a lack of deep knowledge about the creation of the Alliance. S/GP staff could benefit greatly from the integration of more formal learning processes into its preparation of staff, as well as in the assessment process for new potential partnerships. Learning should include critical lessons gained from successes, failures and best practices derived from the experiences related not only to the cookstoves partnership, but from the entire gamut of partnership efforts undertaken by S/GP in the course of its existence. Such knowledge should be made readily available to bureaus and agencies outside S/GP in the interest of expanding the skills and understanding of public-private partnerships across USG institutions.

Recommendation 11: Utilize the advantages of S/GP's position as a Secretary's Office to cultivate expanded interagency collaboration and internal partnership.

A hallmark feature of the Alliance endeavor is the broad-based and coordinated interagency commitment that initiated its successful transformation to a global public-private partnership. S/GP has demonstrated the capacity to drive such collaboration and its vantage point as a Secretary's office provides the added advantage of a broader view of trends and programs that, through cooperative efforts, could create collaborative advantage. S/GP should continue to commit significant efforts to the process of identifying potential synergies and facilitating their connection. This will require that S/GP expand its knowledge of the activities of agencies across the USG, and bring together critical leaders from within those agencies to explore ideas that could be effectively addressed by a public-private partnership approach.

Recommendation 12: Utilize the vetting process to fuller advantage.

Subsequent to the successful establishment of the GACC, and in the interest of enhancing USG's ability to respond in a timely way to opportunities for collaboration with external entities, S/GP has created a vetting process that it will make increasingly available for use across Agencies. While this is a valuable ser-

vice in general, S/GP should consider how the process could be modified to respond to its own particular needs, specifically the identification of potential managing partners. Our research indicates that the managing partner is a critical lynchpin in the success of a P3, and that the organizations must demonstrate a wide variety of management and collaborative capacities in order to effectively fill the responsibilities associated with this role. Creation of an additional module to the vetting process that would constitute an assessment of these capacities would constitute an effective strategy for identifying potential managing partners, and understanding their strengths and weaknesses.

5.3 CONFRONT PROBLEMS OF SUSTAINABILITY AND REPLICABILITY

Recommendation 13: Utilize metrics and data effectively to orient the activities and projected impacts of partnerships.

Complexity, as the GACC experience illustrates, constantly threatens the focus and integrity of partnership activities—the revelation of an ever-expanding web of interdependent development issues can overwhelm a collaborative effort or lead to a siphoning of resources to tangential activities, diluting original intentions. A well-considered system of metrics, bolstered by the support of data-driven results is critical to maintaining the coherence and effectiveness of partnerships. These systems offer frameworks against which often difficult decisions can be weighed and should be integrated fully into all partnership efforts. At their core, such systems of metrics should be impacts-driven. Interviewees from all sectors noted the critical role of the strategic planning process, for instance, in building such a framework for directing Alliance goals, priorities, activities, and ultimately, success. In short, an essential characteristic of these metrics is the positioning of impact as the core guiding principle, allowing for necessary adjustments over the lifetime of the partnership to be oriented against a constant point of reference. The collaborative public-private partnership model envisioned as an effective mechanism for pooling the global resources necessary to tackle wicked international development problems will require an impacts-based and data-driven approach to become central in the public sector.

Recommendation 14: In contrast with S/GP's disruptor identity, the Office must institutionalize P3 organizational knowledge to strengthen the USG P3 ecosystem.

In many respects, the GACC model not only effected results, but expanded the field of organizational resources within the foreign policy domain for development and diplomacy work, during a continued period of restricted resources and aid flows. The challenge is to maximize and institutionalize those organizational resources, linking them while distinguishing them from what other USG Agencies offer (USAID). That organizational knowledge is not only essential to the success of any given P3 but to the persistence of the S/GP Office and to its ability to strengthen the P3 ecosystem in the diplomacy and development domains.

Recommendation 15: Recognize not only S/GP's P3 leadership—but management—role for USG.

As noted, public-sector generated global partnerships of any scale must develop along two dimensions: internal and external. Interviewees found the coordinated response created via the internal USG interagency process as critical to GACC success. Such coordinated talks, of course, may not result in real resources committed but the networks built may be leveraged later, as in Secretary Clinton's decision to champion Cookstoves. Ultimately, effective participation in a large-scale partnership of this type cannot be managed ad hoc, with individual agencies acting independently. Insofar as S/GP's mandate dictates its role as a focal point for USG P3 commitments in foreign policy, State has a powerful management role—not just a leadership role—to play in these arrangements. State's convening power is just the tip of the iceberg, symptomatic not only of S/GP's P3 leadership role, but the management demands on S/GP, especially in developing collaborations and even early governance issues.

Recommendation 16: Create bureaucratic change to facilitate "sustainable innovation" in P3s for the public sector.

Interview data suggests the novelty of the Alliance—plus its high-level support and urgency—helped break through bureaucratic resistance. As S/GP engages future P3 endeavors such processes need to be put in place to support forward momentum and S/GP operational leadership has put significant effort

RELATED CHALLENGE

Much criticism surrounds the "labor intensive" aspects of P3s and building collaborations. S/GP's challenge will be in balancing its default management role in P3 design and development for State and the USG's foreign policy affairs.¹ S/GP may ultimately be faced with a paradox: either more management work than it can handle, or the opposite, the waning of the need for the Office, as other agencies realize the value of P3s and develop internal offices.

into doing so, including creation a vetting system, new contract and RFP collaborative models, modifying existing frameworks governing partnership creation, etc. There is a widespread sense that the bureaucratic process currently in place for such endeavors is too cumbersome and inflexible – discouraging productive relationships with potential private partners especially. Through the streamlining of vetting processes and efforts to coordinate and clarify pertinent legal frameworks, S/GP is the catalyst for structural change to facilitate future global partnership development. S/GP should do more of this and secure champion and change agent leaders on this important matter. To do so will also continually reinvigorate S/GP's disrupter identity.

RELATED CHALLENGE

Bureaucratic procedures can be monolithic and modifications may require significant investments—investments that risk diverting resources from partnership creation.

Recommendation 17: For effective leadership to occur at S/GP, people matter.

Without some of the specific people associated with the Alliance and the S/GP Office, progress would not have been made in either case. In addition to their leadership functions and roles (i.e., Change Agents, Operational, Political Operational, SME, Strategic Sector), many of the personalities associated with GACC success were extremely compelling individuals—accomplished experts, public service oriented, devoted and passionate, wonderful team players, with a long list of often remarked upon admirable characteristics and traits. Most of these individuals also possessed the capacity to persevere and push, even in the face of significant "push back." In many respects, they create the template of "good" leadership models and practices at S/GP. In this context, leadership means, for instance, some of the following traits: (a.) an ability to package multiple interests under the banner of the project mission; (b.) an ability to empower others to lead (until you need to); (c.) patience in the face of a very slowly moving bureaucratic process that lies in contrast to the fast-paced private sector pace; (d.) activating USG pockets of innovators and networks of influence to achieve bureaucratic innovation; (e.) clarity and transparency with all partners; (f.) a willingness to publicly fail and make mistakes

RELATED CHALLENGE

The challenge for S/GP going forward is that the high-turnover rate that characterizes the Office will make it difficult to "grow" this kind of leader. As this expertise is somewhat "new territory," State lacks a pre-existing leadership pool to draw from—there is no ready or "go to" set of leaders to adopt S/GP initiatives or to create a pool of candidates that have established these traits.

1 Keast and Chamberlain, "Collaboration-Decision," p. 25.

6.0 APPENDICES

6.1 APPENDIX A: TIMELINE: INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY S/GP AND GACC

PHASE 1: GALVANIZING MOMENTUM IN A SECTOR: EARLY 2000S TO CGI 2010 ANNOUNCEMENT

Major Trends:

- » Interest in cookstoves developing independently within public, private, and NGO entities.
- » Interest in P3 and market-based approach for implementing the cookstoves project.
- » Political shift in US brings new emphasis on collaboration and partnership as viable vehicle for addressing foreign policy issues.
- » Important networks established—interagency, public-private (USG-Shell), UNF, sector-wide (PCIA) —critical to the gathering of commitments at CGI.
- » Recognition that political and business interests are intersecting with challenges and opportunities in the case of cookstoves.

2000s

2000 Shell Foundation was set up in 2000 with Shell providing a \$250 million endowment and further contributions of \$176 million over time. *Its mission is to support enterprise-based initiatives to address issues associated with sustainable development.*

2002 (January) Jacob Moss responds to State call for proposals to build P3s around development priorities to present at World Summit on Sustainable Development.

EPA is coordinating international efforts and Jacob Moss has a personal connection with issues of clean indoor air and early efforts to create clean cookstoves—many with prior international experiences abroad (i.e., Peace Corps, travel). Moss notes that “no one had any idea of what we are talking about” at this early stage. January–August spent on EPA due diligence for the idea and State RFP. Initially 5 partners, expanded to about 14 by the time of the Summit.

(September) Creation of Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA), World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Led by US and EPA, EPA SME leaders are the primary drivers of the creation of the PCIA, managed within EPA for 10 years until absorbed into GACC. Original commitments: USAID = \$1 million; EPA = \$500,000 for a couple of years. SME leaders original conception was research and learning based: a partnership centered on learning about the issue, determining a feasible global course of action to address it.

Shell Foundation Involvement (Strategic Sector Leadership). In 2002, the Shell Foundation begins serious involvement in the cookstoves sector.

The sector is a “patchwork” of “lots of small ideas—not organizations, but stove manufacturers”. Shell is “one of the largest players in a very small place.” Shell-F pushes company to develop a 3-level approach: local, national, global. This effort is in response to experience in India with a “giveaway” program “doomed to fail.” Shell-F was involved in much lobbying of the Indian government to raise awareness. Even at this early stage, the idea was expressed, a “back of an envelope” idea, to “create a global entity to represent the sector as well.”

2003 PCIA Management Infrastructure Established within EPA

Until it was integrated into the GACC in 2012, the PCIA was hosted within EPA. In the first few months of 2003, EPA hired a team of dynamic individuals who led the organization throughout its lifetime: Brenda Doroski and John Mitchell.

2005 (July) US Resource Flow data published.

Reports balance of Official Development Assistance vs. private capital flows—1969: 70% of resource flow to developing world in form of ODA/1980: more than 80% resource flow to developing work in form of private capital.

Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) established. President Bill Clinton establishes CGI annual meetings. Purpose: to convene global leaders to forge solutions to the world's most pressing challenges (HBS report).

(December) Shell Foundation unveils Breathing Space Strategy and Business Plan

On Dec. 9, 2005, Shell-F gives a presentation to donors and NGOs on Shell's Breathing Space Strategy and Business Plan to reduce indoor air pollution (IAP) from household energy use (see Proceedings page). Shell-F shares their strategy aimed at achieving a long-term reduction in the incidence of IAP by deploying market-oriented and commercially viable approaches to reach \$20M households over 5 years. The strategy has a biomass focus, incorporates a commercial model with a technology push, and focuses on “middle income” groups (\$1–3/day), with a mix of grants and financing options. Initial priorities are China, India, Brazil, Uganda, and Kenya, a decentralized commercial model for rural areas, and a centralized urban commercial model. Shell-F seeks partners to implement this strategy. <http://www.pciaonline.org/node/427>

- 2006 (September) EPA's Jacob Moss assigned (initially 1 year) exclusively to the task of exploring a business strategy for USG to pursue around cookstoves through PCIA.
- Jacob Moss interviews 100+ people assessing sector priorities, strategies for a good partnership, issues of structural management, etc. Connects with UNF Sector Institutional Change Agent leader through mutual acquaintance late in 2007.*
- 2007 (December) Moss completes initial business plan draft for a global cookstoves partnership entity evolving out of PCIA. Assignment is extended another year.
- (December) Creation of Global Partnerships Center (GPC).
- Creation of Global Partnerships Clearinghouse—first database of multi-sectoral P3s created under Chief of Mission authority. CRS brief on COM authority <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751906>*
- 2008 (Early) Moss leads first solicitation process to find a new host for PCIA.
- Idea is to have a competitive solicitation to be new PCIA host. EPA willing to commit \$1M to the process. Plan is to ask 4-5 other agencies to commit \$800,000 each (total \$6M) and use this to leverage another \$15M elsewhere. The business plan drafted based on \$20M budget. EPA Deputy Administrator under Bush, Marcus Peacock, convenes USG agencies—but unwilling/unable to commit resources. This is at the end of the Bush administration.*
- After interagency commitment bid fails, EPA SME, Change Agent and Strategic leaders decide to wait out the election and pitch the project to the new administration rather than continuing with the \$1M solicitation based only on EPA money.*
- (May) Interagency Working Group meetings begin (informal).
- Although USG agencies do not commit resources at the meeting convened by Peacock, a number of agencies showed strong interest in the project, which later evolved into resource support (NIH, CDC, USAID, etc.). CDC senior staff member, Henry Falk, suggested at the time continuing the conversation with an informal interagency working group—hence, the beginning of regular meetings a few months later, which created the network that subsequently supported the interagency commitment in 2010.*
- (Spring) Jacob Moss briefs Institutional Change Agent Leader at UN Foundation on the cookstoves partnership idea.
- Moss participates in several briefings with UNF during the spring quarter 2008—sensing interest by UNF in starting their own small-scale cookstove program, possibly in 2009.*
- In this period UNF transitions from a “true foundation” to an “operating charity”—beyond Turner's initial donation, most money raised and external partnerships created. Primary UNF interests are energy, biodiversity, children's health, women and girls, each operating in a “siloe space.” After UNF and EPA leader discussions, UNF gives “bandwidth” to its leaders to explore the idea; Change Agent leader spends about 6 months talking to NGOs, corporations, continuing dialogue with Jacob Moss.*
- Change Agent leader came to UNF from EPA to help with UNF transition process. Cookstoves alliance might not have been relevant to UNF 5 years earlier when they were in foundation mode. UNF is particularly good at campaigns.*
- Sector strategic leader joins Cookstoves project at Shell-F and begins six-month effort to convince Shell Co to contribute more money/resources, pushing them to support creation of global entity. Lobbying efforts in London/Hague result in go-ahead to Shell Foundation to explore the creation of a global entity for sector.
- Sector strategic leader, with communications expertise background, moves to new position with this mission: “crudely, get more money and resources out of the Shell Co.” Not just money but other things too. Cookstoves was become pivotal because others in the energy private sector were looking at it—BP (but decided it wasn't for them commercially), which is one of the reasons why Shell Foundation was doing it.*
- (September) Shell Co. makes verbal commitment to Shell-F for global effort of approximately \$20M.
- (Q4) As UNF begins to solidify its ideas about a cookstoves project, EPA Jacob Moss and Shell-F Sector strategic leader become principle advisors to UNF.
- (October) Financial crisis hits.
- 2009 (January) Shell Co. commitment reduced to about \$2M and refocused on India awareness effort.
- (January) President Obama takes office.
- (Early) A proposal is submitted to UNF, which grants \$500,000 to Change agent leader to formalize the exploration/integration of a cookstoves effort.
- This dovetailed with other work in the UNF Energy and Climate team, especially with respect to energy access, a growing priority at UNF.*

(June) The New York Time article about cookstoves and the Harvard paper are published.

(June) Jacob Moss meets with Gina McCarthy to present cookstoves project.

McCarthy arrives at EPA as Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation and asks Moss to draft a new proposal on significantly larger scale.

(January) Hilary Clinton becomes 67th Secretary of State. Lisa Jackson becomes 12th Administrator of the EPA.

Global Partnerships Center (GPC) becomes Global Partnerships Initiative (S/GPI)

Secretary Clinton renames the formerly Resource Management office with new expanded mission. Becomes a Secretarial office.

Mission: The Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships is the entry point for collaboration between the U.S. Department of State, the public and private sectors, and civil society. Launched in 2009, S/GP aims to strengthen and deepen U.S. diplomacy and development around the world through partnerships that leverage the creativity, innovation, and core business resources of partners for greater impact. (from website).

Kris Balderston named Managing Director S/GPI.

(July) EPA Assistant Administrator McCarthy presents Moss' revised (globally scaled) cookstoves proposal to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson.

(August) Jackson communicates information about cookstoves idea to Secretary Clinton.

Jackson's previous discussions with Clinton and recognition of her interest in such collaborative partnerships led her to determine this was an attractive and viable collaborative project.

Secretary Clinton asks Michael Fuchs to begin due diligence examination of proposal. In his search for a viable organizational home for such an endeavor, Fuchs approached the climate community, and the India Rupee Fund – both of these avenues failed. The GPI responded positively to the idea.

(October) EPA's Jacob Moss presents cookstoves idea at State Department.

Michael Fuchs brings together critics and "naysayers" to give "pushback" to presentation where S/GPI managing director, Kris Balderston, and Robert Hainie, Senior Partnerships Advisor in S/GPI, are in attendance. Balderston sees Moss with clear command of expertise being "beaten up" by people from OES. Tells Hainie that whatever presenter is selling he wants to be part of it, as he is passionate, well-informed, and actually has a solution. Balderston requests meeting with EPA's Jacob Moss.

(December) *New Yorker* Article published: Hearth Surgery

A "state of the union" discussion of clean cookstove technology, bringing public attention to the issues surrounding clean cooking.

2010s

2010 (January-March) EPA/Shell due diligence on UNF as potential managing partner. Decision made to support UNF in this role.

One aspect of this process was an exploration of whether UNF had the "chops" to pull off a program of a scale significantly larger than PCIA. UNF does not have the resources to run such a program themselves but are seen as efficient fundraisers, neutral enough to attract a diverse stakeholders, interested in the cross-cutting nature of the idea, and have in-house ample SME. However, UNF is inexperienced in market side of cookstoves sector and had never run a program of this magnitude. EPA decides better to partner with a truly interested organization than compete with them – commits to doing everything possible to make it successful.

(February) Release of 2010 QDDR.

Clinton proposes public-private partnership arrangements as effective way of pursuing US foreign policy objectives, and as a new mode of operation for State. Novelty lies in the pursuit of collaborative relationships in the private and NGO sector – not through strictly internal partnerships or exclusively through traditional grant-based mechanisms.

(March) After February meeting of potential stakeholders is cancelled by "Snowmageddon," a March meeting is scheduled, hosted by UNF and Shell—not USG.

Approximately 80 people attend from 50-60 organizations representing sector stakeholders. EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and EPA Assistant Administrator Gina McCarthy speak at the conference and S/GP's Political Operational leadership attends and expresses commitment of US State Department on behalf of Secretary

Clinton. This increases collaborative relationship between Shell and UNF, critical to the eventual creation of the strategic plan.

SME, Strategic sector, Change agent leadership characterizes this conference as based on “some of their worst ideas,” just “terrible.” Also, Undersecretary of State was not fully committed and wanted to bid the idea out. But the meeting was “a great success.” Attendance was far higher than expected – the sector was ripe for connecting, talking, and networking. UNF Change Agent leadership prepared a concept note for this process which emphasized: standards and testing, awareness raising, fundraising, and research to assess impact. Entrepreneurial development was not part of the vision at this time.

(March) Majors members of the Partnership are working together to create a global entity to represent the cookstoves sector.

Weekly meetings (sometimes more often) are occurring during this period between the 5-6 major partners. These were held to work through major questions of structure, funding, etc. for global organization in preparing for announcement at CGI. Sector Strategic leadership sees this process as necessary but at times painful – dealing with politics, history, culture issues.

(April) S/GP P3 Partners for a New Beginning (PNB) is launched.

Response to Obama speech in Cairo (June 4, 2009), taking the “smart power” angle (i.e. diplomacy and persuasion rather than force): local chapters in Muslim countries to improve relations across the Middle East.

(May) Moss puts together a draft outline of a potential USG commitment.

(June) Jacob Moss invited to State to meet with S/GP leadership, Todd Stern (Special Representative for Climate Change) and Melanne Verveer (Special Representative for Women's Issues).

Political Operational leader had approached Stern and Verveer to pitch the connection with cookstoves idea and their issues. Moss finds this meeting an hour and a half “murder board” grilling from which he left feeling they had been effectively convinced.

The effort was well spent as S/GP leadership, Stern, and Verveer meet soon afterwards with Secretary Clinton who says, “I’m in. Do it.”

This was “smart” strategy as the interagency process had created a cohort of individuals/agencies who already had bought into the necessity for the project. Clinton’s decision to support meant that there was top-down and bottom-up support for the idea.

(Summer) Meeting takes place with Secretary Clinton, S/GP Political operational leaders, Stern, Verveer, and other agencies (about 15) that want initiatives to be announced at CGI. Clinton informs group that Cookstoves will be one of the three she supports.

S/GP Political operational leader attributes some of this early success to the fact that there was already existent collaboration between agencies on the issue.

(Summer) S/GP Political operational leader orchestrates regular meetings with agency representatives (many of them young people) to build collaboration, support for the cookstoves effort.

These meetings are held in Secretary’s conference room. Created a sense of urgency, importance, family – all contributing to the success using a campaign style and format. Critical: Inclusive nature of these meetings/the environment in general (hierarchical diversity). Government at its best – the senior people interacting with / mentoring younger people.

(July) State Department calls meeting with administrators from relevant agencies to gather resources for GACC commitment. No specific “ask” at this meeting – announcement of a second meeting in two weeks for agencies to bring their commitments.

High-level officials pitched the cookstoves idea (S/GP leaders, Stern, Verveer, McCarthy, Kurian Jones); many leaders noted it was one of “the most exciting government meetings you’ll ever be in...passionate...and all the very senior people around the table heard it.”

Others noted this meeting offered diverse agencies like the CDC, DOE, EPA, etc., the opportunity to discover what other agencies were doing, and to recognize the intersections that would allow them to work together in a time of scarce resources.

(August 1) Total commitment at this point to GACC is approximately \$1million.

(August 10) State Department hosts (second) agency commitment meeting. Gathers commitments of \$50+ million.

Two weeks after staffers meeting, all US agencies that were approached made pledges of funding and expertise (according to specialties.) EPA opens by putting \$6 million on the table—which sets the stage for others. Note that the commitments vary greatly in nature and magnitude. Also note there is no real cash to UNF except the EPA money—other commitments are “alignments” or research-oriented contributions and some were committed “under duress” (USAID, DOE).

Many leaders discuss this pledging process. Shell-F watches with great interest the commitment that USG will make to the cookstoves P3 and finds its own ability to push Shell Co. to make its large commitment stems from USG leadership in this pledging and commitment process.

(September) Secretary Clinton meets with private sector stakeholders in advance of the CGI to discuss cookstoves initiative.

PHASE 2: CREATING THE PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE: FROM THE CGI ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LAUNCH OF THE ALLIANCE TO THE RELEASE OF IGNITING CHANGE REPORT

2010 (September 21) CGI Announcement of Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC)

At 2010 CGI, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced the USG commitment to the cookstoves initiative and Secretary Clinton pledged State leadership to mobilize partnerships to solve widespread global challenges affecting the environment, health and women's lives: including clean cookstoves. Goal: create market for adoption of clean cookstoves by 100 million households worldwide by 2020. Note: 19 founding partners (5 US agencies; 5 government partners (Germany (2), Peru, Norway, Netherlands)); 4 private foundations/companies; 6 UN Agencies).

S/GP Political operational leader notes that total commitment for GACC announced at the CGI exceeded \$100M for Year 1. Julia Roberts is also added as a spokesperson. These conditions allowed cookstoves to move from basement to center stage at CGI.

Operational leaders note that this is a case of "launch it, then build it" – usually these things happen the other way around.

Sector strategic leaders note that though there were 19 formal partners, there were already lots of "partners" from the sector. Many hoped the connection with State and Clinton would result in more traction with private sector than actually materialized, but it was still critical to have the State support.

(October) Working groups begin work on the creation of the strategic business plan for GACC ultimately unveiled in the Igniting Change report.

This process lasts approximately 6 months and involves the work of 9 to 14 working groups made up of about 20 key stakeholders each. Each working group is tasked to develop a plan of action to address the needs in their particular area of expertise, each a major component of the cookstoves effort. Involved 350 to 400 experts (almost all major players in the sector.) Emphasis on a market-based development of the sector.

During this time, the complexity of the issue becomes more evident, as well as the differences between the cookstoves project and other programs that UNF had in the past (like Bednet distributions or previous awareness raising campaigns for the UN).

UNF Cookstoves staffing at this point consists of one Change agent leader and 1 or 2 other staff at half time. Strategic sector leadership at Shell-F assigned 80% time to cookstoves effort.

Original business plan from EPA resembles in fundamentals the plan that ultimately the group came up with and the important impact of Shell in the process – they were, after all, "all about creating businesses to do this. . ."

(November) Kris Balderston named Special Representative for Global Partnerships; Jim Thompson is Deputy Special Representative for Global Partnerships; Thomas Debass recruited to Secretary's Office for Global Initiatives.

Debass was recruited to manage a team focusing on economic growth entrepreneurship and to work on partnerships more generally – something for which he had a reputation at OPIC and at USAID.

2011 (January) Jacob Moss moves (detailed) to State as Director of US Cookstoves Initiative.

Major roles involve assisting UNF as they get up to speed dealing with the massive amount of activity happening and to make the informal interagency process into a formal process.

(February) "Policy Framework and Legal Guidelines for Partnerships" released.

Guidelines published by S/GP team. Effort to create internal support and capacities for P3 development at State. Provides tangible information on types of partnerships that exist, due diligence activities for partner screening, process for establishing a partnership.

Disagreements between UNF and USG/Shell over the designation and location of the head of the Cookstoves project (i.e., Program Manager in the UNF Energy and Climate Office vs. Executive Director reporting directly to the CEO of UNF).

This may be the only time some form of “veto” power was exercised by the partners and a sense that State had a hand in the decision of the ultimate choice of executive director.

(June) Secretary Clinton visits Ethiopia and recruits 6 African nations as partners to the GACC.

Secretary Clinton also visits China in 2011 (SAID conference) and presents the cookstoves idea at the lunch.

Moss recognizes a large part of State role at this point is to help GACC to acquire partners, especially national government partners. Political operational leader with access to Clinton's schedule aids in this effort. Both leaders attend 2012 SAID conference in China, where cookstoves development is highlighted.

(June) UNF holds meeting of all strategic plan working group co-chairs to integrate recommendations into a unified strategic plan. This effort results in Igniting Change report, November 2011.

(September) Radha Muthiah appointed Executive Director of GACC.

Muthiah comes to GACC from CARE with 2 decades experience split between private and NGO sectors. Note: ED came to GACC after working group process that developed the strategic plan and was onboard with major precepts, especially market-based initiative, and then proceeded to put her stamp on it immediately.

GACC Operational leader recognizes lack of unifying infrastructure and guiding strategy—plus no business plan/strategy; makes these top priorities. Chooses not to hire a consultant to create the strategic plan, choosing in-house, given need to create ownership and connection with partners. In first 10 weeks, places a 10-week hold on all decisions about specific programs/target countries until such plans are in place. Begins process of creating GACC as independent institution; formalizes staffing (only about 5 staff at this time). Holds feedback sessions in 15 countries.

At UNF, GACC was housed in Energy and Climate group before new ED; it is then moved to the Health program and becomes a separate initiative with SME leadership liaison between GACC and USG, responsible for interagency task force and briefing interested parties.

(September) The PCIA is formally handed off from EPA to UNF.

Grants signed, and UNF takes on the role of managing PCIA. (In 2012, PCIA is officially absorbed into GACC)—this handoff was not between State and UNF, and State stays involved until Political Operational leadership exists.

(November) Publication of “Igniting Change.” First major publication of GACC as independent entity: presents 3-phase strategic plan, the result of the work of 350 experts through 9 working groups, 2 cross-cutting committees.

Operational leader formulates GACC strategic plan as plan “for the sector,” not just for the P3, partner members or USG. The plan focuses on “roles and responsibilities,” lays out “what we thought we were going to do and how we (UNF) were going to add value to the sector and what others could do to support the growth and development of the sector.” This was designed to create a hard-wired “blueprint” so all resources go to continually build sector.

(November) Publication of the RESPIRE Study Results: Effect of reduction in household air pollution on childhood pneumonia in Guatemala (RESPIRE).

PHASE 3: “GRADUATING” THE PARTNERSHIP: FROM IGNITING CHANGE RELEASE TO THE 2014 COOKSTOVES SUMMIT

2012 (April) Launch at S/GP of Accelerated Market-Driven Partnerships (AMP).

P3 designed to bring together cross-sector partners to focus on impact investing: evaluating investment decisions based on social and environmental impact in addition to profit. The launch is planned for Brazil, and Secretary Clinton introduces AMP at Global Impact Economy Forum.

(July) GACC Guatemala Delegation.

Guatemala considered showcase for GACC project: 120,000 cookstoves installed. However, still low awareness, little government support.

(August) GACC Business Plan finalized.

Priority areas identified: awareness, research, financing, and policies.

(Sept. 24) Secretary Clinton addresses CGI, emphasizing partnership model.

Emphasizes importance of public-private partnerships throughout federal government in order to address global problems. Urges partnerships across sectors and governments to increase impact through combined actions. Supports multi-partner engagements.

(December) Publication of the 2012 Global Burden of Disease Study.

(December) Thomas Debass becomes slated for Deputy Special Representative for Global Partnerships.

2013 (Feb. 1) Hillary Clinton resigns as US Secretary of State. John Kerry becomes 68th US Secretary of State. Kris Balderston leaves S/GP.

(May) Andrew O'Brien named Special Representative for Global Partnerships

2014 (April) Creation of USAID Global Development Lab (GDL)

Launched on April 3, 2014, the U.S. Global Development Lab seeks to increase the application of science, technology, innovation, and partnerships to extend AID's development impact in helping to end extreme poverty. The Lab works closely with diverse partners to discover, test, and scale breakthrough innovations to solve development challenges faster and cheaper in 9 focus areas: food security; modernizing food assistance; ending preventable child and maternal deaths; energy access; water solutions; child literacy; financial inclusion; human rights; and humanitarian response.

PHASE 4: POST-GRADUATION: ASSESSING IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY, AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM GACC EXPERIENCE

Period: From Cookstoves Summit (November 2014) onward.

2014 (November) GACC Summit in NYC.

Announcement of completion of Phase 1; discussion of critical issues for Phase 2 (testing, standards, building markets, finance, education, etc.); day 2 was pledging day: note by invitation only. Commitments of \$412 million were made at the Summit.

(Beyond 2014) UNF GACC serves as a role model and mentor for other organizations seeking to create P3s (structure, process, etc.).

6.2 APPENDIX B: WORKS CITED AND BIBLIOGRAPHY BY RESEARCH AREA

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6.3 APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL [DESIGNED, NOV. 19, 2014]

Subject: The Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP) Evaluation Study for the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: Understanding P3s for Global Governance and International Development Priorities

Introduction

Thanks so much for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is _____ and this is my co-moderator _____. We're social science researchers from Syracuse University's Maxwell School. We're visiting to conduct interviews with key people involved in the Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships and the process that helped to develop the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (the Alliance) and other partnerships. Our task is to help the S/GP understand how this partnership developed, why it was so successful, and how to replicate that process with other partnerships. We hope to take about an hour of your time to discuss your views and insights on this issue.

Disclosures

Before we begin, we want to provide you with a consent form for this interview and to request your permission to digitally record our conversation (You may keep one consent form for your records). The consent form runs through some research and procedural issues, including:

- » Confidentiality: Your names and identity will not be revealed anywhere in our final report; your comments will remain private and anonymous; and we ask you to maintain other participants' confidentiality, so that all participants may feel free to speak freely.
- » Voluntary participation: Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you can stop at any time; and you don't have to answer any questions that you don't want to.
- » Digital Recording: We are digitally recording our interview sessions for purposes of accuracy. The tapes and transcriptions will be viewed only by our research team.

Let's begin with Introductions. Please introduce yourself and tell us...

Your role & responsibilities with respect to S/GP partnerships and the Alliance. We're interested in anything you'd like to share about your involvement or your views of such partnerships: what do you think about them? Do they these programs actually work? Why are they prevalent now?

1) Let's first talk about the Environment For Creating & Sustaining The Alliance: S/GP

There are 2 dimensions of interest to us here: (1.) the critical elements or moments or processes that helped make the Alliance possible and (2.) S/GP's distinctive role in creating & sustaining this and other partnerships?

Key Processes & Enabling Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">» We know these partnerships are hard to start given fiscal, political, organizational constraints.» Can you describe the process by which the S/GP & Alliance were started & what processes sustained them?» Key enabling conditions? Key events or decisions critical for creating the Alliance & similar partnerships?
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none">» Was leadership a key element—who were the leaders in creating the S/GP, the Alliance, the partnership model?» Were there specific leadership skills, styles, decisions at critical moments that proved important?» Did leaders have certain qualities—or sources of power and persuasion? Vision?» Network or constellation of personalities?
State Dept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">» What about the State Dept. as an institution and the S/GP office itself—was it a leader agency, a change agent, a catalyst, collaborator, convener?» Has that leadership role of S/GP evolved as the Alliance & other partnerships have become more established?» Did prior experience and planning play a critical role?» What about politics—having a supporter in the Secretary, elsewhere?» Financial drivers? Regulatory environment? Networks?» What about the specificity of the project itself—why was cookstoves selected?

Obstacles/ Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What were the most serious obstacles or challenges in the early period—and later? » Why did it “fail” at EPA but not at State? » How conscious were S/GP & Alliance actors in identifying obstacles—challenges or threats to the process, organizational learning (evaluation/adaptation through lessons learned)?
Partnership Model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What about the nature of the partnership model itself and the influence of foreign policy/diplomatic objectives? » Is the Alliance a traditional P3? What are its principle characteristics? » How were original partners found and recruited? Were they critical? How did S/GP—give them a stake? » As the partnership has grown, who have been the most pivotal partners and why? » Superficially, it looks like the Alliance got off the ground through lots of help from media and energy sector industries? Is that true? Are those the “go-to” groups for this particular project or are they well-resourced, dependable friends? » Did this partnership initiative interface well with FP objectives—which objectives were prioritized, strategic?

2) The S/GP Partnership Process: Defining “Success” & Performance Metrics

Our team has been asked to assess S/GP’s success—how & why S/GP was able to create such a successful partnership in the Alliance. Please share with us your views on whether you see the Alliance as successful, is it indeed an exemplar, what made it so successful, how do you define “success” and what are its measures or “indicators”?

“Success”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What accounts for S/GP’s success with the Alliance? Does that carry over into other partnership initiatives? » How would you define “success”? What are its metrics/measures/indicators? Who created those standards or measures? » Have conditions at the start changed over the life of the partnership? Is the partnership sustainable and resilient? Are those part of the definition of success? » What role did resource acquisition & management play in S/GP’s process of standing up the Alliance and helping to let it go? » Communication and information sharing play? » How much was the collaborative process (managerial, administrative, M&E, etc.) of establishing the Alliance responsible for its success? Would it have succeeded with a less labor intensive/sophisticated/networked process? » The literature on partnerships and collaborations often focuses on resources, management, communication, process and networks—which were essential to S/GP’s success in building the Alliance?
State Dept. FP goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » How much does success depend upon achieving strategic foreign policy goals or implementing them? Did the Alliance do that? Do those goals shift with new administration/Secretaries? How does S/GP negotiate that? » Have conflicts regarding program goals or implementation ever arisen within the partnership and how are these managed?
Partnership & Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Did State/S/GP need to “sell” its partnership vision to other stakeholders—Congress, federal agencies, other states, private sectors, NGOs? Was that part of its success? » Has S/GP done well attracting partners—numbers, types—to the Alliance essential to its success?
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Is the S/GP satisfied with its leadership role? Was that preordained or did it make it up as you went along? Did S/GP monitor progress towards its goals as a mark of success?
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » A goal identified by the State Dept. has been pooling resources across public, private and civil society sectors to amplify U.S. foreign policy goals of development and democracy. Has the partnership model depended on attracting sufficient partners and resources? Describe the role S/GP played in the process?

3) Replicating successful partnerships

Our third and last set of questions asks you to help us understand the most important elements or processes in replicating successful partnerships like the Alliance? What are those principle characteristics or processes—and obstacles—that make the partnership model replicable in other programs?

Experience/ Lessons Learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What specific experiences/lessons learned can S/GP leverage in the creation of new partnerships? » What processes have evolved that can help replicate such a partnership? Are there best practices?
Conditions for Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Which enabling conditions & partnership characteristics of the Alliance (discussed above) do you believe are essential to the replication of other successful partnerships? » Was the Alliance a “perfect storm” phenomenon or capable of being reproduced on other issues and initiatives? » Are there significant changes in these conditions that will encourage/threaten the formation of future partnerships? » Does S/GP have a selection process for building future partnerships?
Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » What aspects of the creation of partnerships in the pursuit of S/GP/State goals would be critical?
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » In your opinion, are there particular leaders (or leadership types) that must be associated with future partnership endeavors?
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Is resource acquisition (both “startup” and long-term) an issue of concern with respect to replicability?

Is there anything we missed that we’ve missed that you would like to add?

Thank You

We would like to offer our sincere appreciation for your willingness to participate in this interview. We appreciate your time, opinions, and points of view, especially given the serious obligations that you have at the present time.

6.4 APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL CLIMATE P3S DISCUSSED: INTERVIEWEES AND PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Background from the DOS 2014-2017 Strategic Plan (p. 27)

“The United States supports bilateral and multilateral programs working with the most vulnerable communities, least developed and developing nations, and the major greenhouse gas emitters. Among the programs and efforts to achieve our overall climate change objectives, State and USAID have chosen to highlight one program, Low Emission Development Strategies (LEDS), as a cross-cutting Agency Priority Goal. LEDS seeks to guide policy-makers in analyzing, formulating, and making policy decisions enabling them to develop along a lower emission pathway, which contributes to greenhouse gas reduction efforts. LEDS is a unique State and USAID partnership that blends our respective strengths in diplomacy and development. LEDS stands as a key element of U.S. support, alongside our critical efforts including the Major Economies Forum, Clean Energy Ministerial, Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Tropical Forest Alliance 2020, and a range of multilateral funds, such as the Clean Investment Funds and funds focusing on adaptation such as the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.”

DOS Webpage on Global Climate Change

“The working partnerships the United States has created or strengthened with other major economies has reinforced the importance of results-driven action both internationally and domestically. U.S.-supported partnerships such as the Major Economies Forum on Clean Energy and Climate Change, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, the Enhancing Capacity for Low Emission Development Strategies and the Low Emission Development Strategies Global Partnership are achieving measurable impacts now to help countries reduce their long-term greenhouse gas emissions.”

Low Emission Development Strategies Global Partnership

Highlighted in the DOS 2014-17 strategic plan as a key global partnership, the website is a wiki or global portal on Low Emission Development strategies... There are regional platforms, working groups, steering groups, and a secretariat, but it very hard to see the mix of P3 and what “members” means. There are a large number of governmental members, and “international members” which mixes UN, consultants, businesses, foundations, think tanks and NGOs—many local.

CCAC P3: Climate and Clean Air Coalition

Officially launched on September 23, 2014 at the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)’s Oil and Gas Methane Partnership provides partner organizations a systematic, cost-effective approach for reducing their methane emissions, and for credibly demonstrating the impacts of their actions. The CCAC conducted a year-long

consultation process with experts from oil and gas companies, International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association IPIECA, NGOs, reporting initiatives and other experts to develop the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership. This partnership supports the State Department’s concerted actions to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Partners included: EPA, UN Environment Programme, World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative, Norway, UK, and private sector partners including BG Group, ENI, Pemex, PTT, Southwestern Energy, Statoil, and Total. The partnership received \$750,000 from the CCAC to launch, and an additional \$750,000 is available to support implementation. Task forces are currently developing and implementing the key elements of the program, including a reporting framework and technical guidance documents.

wPower P3

From Clinton: “...I’m pleased we are announcing new initiatives today. One called wPower looks at the cross-cutting challenges of climate change, access to clean energy, technology, and economic opportunity for women. We will be working with the MacArthur Foundation, USAID, CARE International Solar Sister, GACC, and the Wangari Maathai Institute to provide training for more than 7,000 women entrepreneurs, helping them to sell new technologies, like clean cookstoves and solar lanterns in India, Nigeria, and throughout East Africa...”

U.S. Water Partnership (USWP) (from 2014 State of Global Partnerships)

U.S. expertise in water resources management is widely recognized around the world. Launched by State in 2012, USWP unites and mobilizes the best of U.S. expertise, resources, and ingenuity to address global water challenges, especially where needs are greatest. USWP has 8 signature initiatives to streamline access to America’s water knowledge and resources: WASH Access improves water and sanitation for more than 100,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa; Alliance for Global Water Adaptation designs decision support system tools to help policymakers adapt to climate change; Asia Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Network explores collaboration on pilot programs in Vietnam and Indonesia; Great Rivers Partnership supports America’s Watershed Initiative basin report card; Multiple Use Water Services facilitates a learning exchange in Tanzania to encourage integrated water service use in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa; Sustainable Agriculture adopts center-pivot irrigation for smallholder farmers across sub-Saharan Africa; Water Security develops a landscape review on civil society engagement; U.S. Water Web Portal is a single entry point providing easy access to the “best of U.S.” information.

PUBLIC REFERENCES

See Sec. Clinton's 2009-2013 remarks posted by State Department:

- » 12/17/09 Remarks at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Copenhagen, Denmark
- » 01/26/09 Appointment of Special Envoy on Climate Change; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Announcement of appointment; Washington, DC.
- » 07/28/09 Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Treaty Room; Washington, DC.
- » 04/27/09 Remarks at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Loy Henderson Conference Room; Washington, DC.
- » 02/21/09 Dialogue on U.S.-China Partnership on Clean Energy; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State; With Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern And President of GE Energy China Jack Wen; Taiyang Gong Power Plant, Beijing, China

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