



**NOVEMBER 2015**

## **UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY**

**Exploring the Role of the US Department of State's  
Office of Global Partnership in Public-Private  
Partnership (P3) Development of the  
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves**

**REPORT BY CORRI ZOLI, MARGARET HERMANN, CATHERINE GERARD,  
CHRISTIANE PAGE, AND WENDY WICKER**



**Program for the Advancement of Research  
on Conflict and Collaboration**

# **UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY**

Exploring the Role of the US Department of State's  
Office of Global Partnership in Public-Private  
Partnership (P3) Development of the  
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves

Prepared by

Corri Zoli, Margaret Hermann, Catherine Gerard,  
Wendy Wicker, and Christiane Page

**Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs**

**Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism**

**Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration**

**Syracuse University**

November 2015



THIS REPORT represents an evaluation study commissioned by the Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships, US Department of State, of its activities surrounding the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. It was supported by Department of State Award S-LMAQM-14-CA-1196 to the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. A Technical Report that contains the data supporting this report and a P3 Toolkit built from the results of this study are available from the Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships.

THIS REPORT was funded (in part) by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

SUGGESTED CITATION: C. Zoli, M. Hermann, C. Gerard, W. Wicker, & C. Page. Understanding Global Opportunity: Exploring the Role of the US Department of State's Office of Global Partnership in Public-Private Partnership (P3) Development of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, and Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration, Syracuse University, November 2015).

ON THE COVER: A clean cookstove in use in Africa. (Source: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves/Darby Jack/<http://cleancookstoves.org/about/news/09-30-2015-countdown-to-the-clean-cooking-forum-2015.html>)

# CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	5
The Problem .....	5
Nature of Report.....	5
Key Definition.....	5
What Role Did S/GP Play in the Establishment and Success of GACC?.....	5
What Generalizable Lessons Does GACC have for S/GP? .....	6
What Actionable Insights Does the Study Propose for S/GP? .....	8
INTRODUCTION.....	9
The Problem .....	9
The Story and Our Approach.....	9
Key Definitions and Premises .....	9
Methods and Sources .....	10
About the Contribution .....	10
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT ROLE DID S/GP PLAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUCCESS OF GACC?1 .....	11
Public-Private Partnerships at the US State Department: New Paradigms.....	11
Why Cookstoves and GACC? Building the Foundation for Collaboration .....	12
S/GP and GACC: A case of Bureaucratic Innovation.....	15
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: WHAT GENERALIZABLE LESSONS DOES GACC HAVE FOR S/GP?1 .....	19
Facilitating Conditions for P3 Success .....	19
P3 Metrics of Success .....	20
Lessons Learned .....	21
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: WHAT “ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS” COME OUT OF THIS STUDY FOR S/GP?.....	29
Identify and Foster Opportunities Appropriate for a P3 Approach.....	29
Work to Build a Responsive S/GP and USG Infrastructure .....	31
Identify and Attract Potential Partners (Both Internal and External to USG).....	32
Work to Sustain Partnerships .....	32
REFERENCES .....	34
APPENDIX.....	35
Methodology.....	35
Interview Protocol .....	35
Materials Examined in Course of Study.....	37



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



## THE PROBLEM

How can the US Department of State address the mounting challenges that demand global solutions in an environment of diminishing resources and with an increasing number of state and non-state actors involving themselves in the process? One increasingly compelling response is the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) to leverage United States Government (USG) interests around the world.

## NATURE OF REPORT

This report tells the story and evaluates the US Department of State Secretary's Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP) and its involvement in helping to establish the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (hereafter GACC or the Alliance), a particularly successful exemplar of a P3. It addresses three questions:

- » What role did S/GP play in the establishment and success of GACC?
- » What generalizable lessons does this case hold for S/GP, its P3 model, and for future collaborative partnership development in the USG foreign policy domain?
- » What "best practices" and "actionable insights" are critical for S/GP to understand from this case, given its own organizational trajectory?

This report is meant to serve as a "road map" for what works and does not work with respect to S/GP's conceptualization, development, and sustainable launch of P3s.

## KEY DEFINITION

According to S/GP and, in turn, the US Department of State, a P3 is defined as:

*a collaborative working relationship with non-governmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance as well as roles and responsibilities are mutually determined and decision making is shared. Partnerships are characterized by: complimentary equities, openness and transparency, mutual benefit, shared risks and rewards, and accountability.*

## WHAT ROLE DID S/GP PLAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUCCESS OF GACC?

### S/GP AND P3S: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT

- » Initial steps were taken by Secretary Rice when she created the Global Partnership Center—a "matchmaker" office linking private organizations with government agencies and involved in developing a clearinghouse database of P3s across the USG.
- » Secretary Clinton proposed the P3 model as a new type of delivery system for meeting highly interdependent global problems, particularly given the 2008 global financial crisis and increased resource constraints.
- » Clinton designed S/GP as an entry point for global forms of collaboration between the USG, the public and private sectors, and global civil society, using Department of State convening power and developing an incubator model for the development of P3s in the USG.

- » P3s were viewed as facilitating USG participation in global problem solving without becoming the dominant face of the partnership, allowing for inclusion of non-state actors and broader buy-in and ownership of mission/goals, and providing for a wider resource base while engaging different types of expertise.

## WHY COOKSTOVES AND THE ALLIANCE?

- » Having clean cookstoves and fuels is a global problem with ramifications for a number of global challenges—about 3 billion people prepare and cook food and heat their homes with open fires or ineffective cookstoves which affect health, child mortality, human capital development, food security, environmental degradation, and economic progress, etc.
- » Problem came with an epistemic community of subject matter experts and scientists knowledgeable about what is feasible and what is not; the kernel of the idea for the Alliance already existed in the EPA's Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA).
- » Problem came with a sense of urgency as that P3 (PCIA) needed a new host given that the EPA is a regulatory agency and can not receive outside funding.
- » Problem came with an already existing informal USG interagency collaborative network.
- » Problem had champions inside and outside of the government pushing for creation of a new P3 focusing on clean cookstoves who insured it got noticed at the State Department.

## S/GP AND GACC: A CASE OF BUREAUCRATIC INNOVATION

- » S/GP provided GACC with a public sector champion in Secretary Clinton who could leverage her power to interest a broad range of USG agencies in becoming involved.
- » The leader of S/GP at the time was cognizant of which problems and challenges would capture the interest of the Secretary and went looking for where such opportunities could be found across the USG.
- » S/GP focused on a global challenge—cooking over open fires—that affected the interests of a range of USG agencies and had a feasible and recognized solution—clean cookstoves.
- » S/GP developed a win-win (collaborative) process that was inclusive and built in face-to-face interaction, identifying and bringing together people with the right skills across the public and private sectors.
- » S/GP became part of the strategic planning and institution building process but did not push to lead once GACC was launched at the Clinton Global Initiative.
- » S/GP let the GACC P3 become its own entity at the United Nations Foundation (UNF) once it had the requisite business plan, manager, and structure.

## WHAT GENERALIZABLE LESSONS DOES GACC HAVE FOR S/GP?

### FACILITATING CONDITIONS FOR GACC'S SUCCESS

Among the contextual conditions that facilitated the success of a P3 such as GACC were: the global economic climate as the Obama Administration came into office, the facts that current global challenges generally demand collective action and that private sector foreign direct aid/investment is outpacing that of the public sector, PCIA needed a new host, the United Nations



Foundation was undergoing an organizational change from a foundation to a charitable organization, there was private sector interest in and expertise with cookstoves, and the State Department's leadership was interested in using P3s as a foreign policy tool.

S/GP built on these contextual factors as they took advantage of the epistemic community that had grown up around PCIA and its infrastructure, the fact that focusing on clean cookstoves provided the Office with a global cross-cutting problem with a feasible solution, the convening power of the State Department in the USG, an already existing informal interagency collaborative network, and access to an international development platform in the Clinton Global Initiative.

S/GP came into existence because of the context but it worked to take advantage of the opportunities that this context provided as it incubated GACC. In effect, it acted as a convener, catalyst, collaborator, and cultivator—four functions built into the definition of S/GP's role.

### METRICS OF SUCCESS

S/GP worked to insure that the following P3 metrics of success were present in the Alliance: a clear, common vision and shared goals; presence of public sector champions; careful partner selection and vetting—right people, right skills; investment and risk sharing by all partners; mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities, tangible near and long-term results; and a focus on insuring all partners invested time and expertise as well as funds in the enterprise.

S/GP was less involved in the following P3 metrics of success with regard to GACC: development of a detailed business plan, creation of formalized structures centered around shared decision making, determination of accountability metrics and milestones, proper scaling as conditions changed, and minimization of transaction costs to balance public sector consensus building with the private sector's instinct to "get things done." These metrics of success were met as GACC became a stand-alone entity located in the United Nations Foundation.

## FRAMING OF MISSION

GACC was particularly successful because it focused on the solution to a problem that had relevance for a broad set of interdependent and complex issues, appealed to a broad range of stakeholders, no one group or organization could solve the problem on its own, and its solution was universally accepted as a feasible and practical way of dealing with the problem. Remember that it is often the proposed solution to a complex problem that drives the identity of the universe of issues that are engaged with it.

## LEADERSHIP

Leadership of P3s is a balancing act. Whether it is pairing people with opportunities, balancing the push and pull of powerful institutional forces, brokering ideas among influential third parties, or mobilizing resources while banking on the legitimacy of an agenda, leadership of such networks involves high-value trade-offs while at the same time remaining steadfast to the work of clarifying commitments with stakeholders to achieve goals. In effect, such leadership involves persuasion in the service of an agenda, building networks, and accomplishing things.

Leadership of P3s that are collaborative networks like GACC involves the following roles: champions, boundary spanners, visionaries, subject matter experts, sector/agency liaisons, and operational managers. P3s like GACC require leaders who understand how to actively engage and nurture independent cohorts in a collaborative network as well as those who are capable of orchestrating opportunities that energize and structure the partnership.

## S/GP'S ROLE IN INCUBATING GACC

- » Catalyst in bringing the idea germinating in the USG of what could become a P3 around clean cookstoves to the Secretary of State's attention
- » Convener in using the power of the State Department to convene USG agencies with an interest in dealing with problems surrounding the use of open fires and ineffective cookstoves
- » Cultivator of new partners and resources both inside and outside the USG
- » Collaborator in helping to build the network of partners that was to become GACC and in assisting in the development of the stand-alone entity that would become the independent global alliance.


## REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDING THE COLLABORATIVE NETWORK S/GP DEFINES AS A P3

Collaboration as a management strategy involves:

- » an interest in working together on a common purpose that brings benefits to all the organizations involved in the partnership
- » a sense of urgency to achieve the mission
- » a clear directive from the top for spending time together, forging trust among the partners, and developing a common vision
- » built-in face-to-face interaction so all partners get to know and understand the others' points of view and concerns in working on a solution

## TYPOLGY OF P3s

We propose a "spectrum of partnerships" to aid S/GP in its deliberative process that resulted from this study. The spectrum involves five types with increasing degrees of collaboration among the partners in the P3 and increasing investment on S/GP's part of personnel, resources, and time commitment. We note that S/GP has engaged in working on all five.





- » patience with the process which is time consuming
- » focus on getting something done about the common problem
- » a need to overcome the “time, turf, and ego” that often limit what organizations are willing to become involved
- » the necessity of providing incentives for people and organizations to work across boundaries—the role S/GP was designed to play

### EFFECT OF TRANSITIONS ON THE ROLE S/GP CAN PLAY

- » **Transition of Secretary of State**—At issue is how to adjust to new interpretations of S/GP with a change in Secretary of State whose own ideas for P3s and their relevance to diplomacy may differ from his/her predecessor. How does the office keep the distinctive personality—part cheerleader for P3s and part hustler—and expertise that it became known for with GACC as it becomes more bureaucratized in response to continued changes in Secretaries?
- » **Time to “Graduate” a P3**—Since S/GP was not set up to own a partnership, how does it decide when it is time to launch a P3 as an independent entity? At issue is how the office gains a reputation for developing successful P3s if they give each one to someone else to manage and move forward; what if they do not find the “right” managing partner, and what if they lose control and are embarrassed.

### WHAT ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS DOES THE STUDY PROPOSE FOR S/GP?

#### IDENTIFY AND FOSTER OPPORTUNITIES APPROPRIATE TO BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE P3

- » Adopt a formal process for the assessment of potential P3s as a guide to decision making and commitments
- » Actively foster P3 initiatives that demonstrate broad, cross-cutting salience across a range of stakeholders
- » Tackle problems that have a clear, tangible solution
- » Focus efforts on incubating ideas and enlisting the aid of “idea champions” from across the USG
- » Seek opportunities to work with and build on existing P3 initiatives
- » Seek to scale efforts at P3 development along the spectrum of partnerships

#### IDENTIFY AND ATTRACT POTENTIAL PARTNERS (BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO THE USG)

- » Utilize the advantages of S/GP’s position as a Secretary’s office to cultivate expanded interagency collaborations and internal partnerships
- » Utilize the vetting process to fuller advantage by vetting not only potential private partners but potential managing partners and potential “idea champions”

### WORK TO SUSTAIN PARTNERSHIPS

- » Insure that partnership endeavors are guided by an impacts-driven strategy
- » Utilize metrics and data effectively to orient the activities of partnerships
- » Work to institutionalize knowledge about how to organize P3s within the USG
- » Recognize not only S/GP’s P3 leadership role but also its management role of such partnerships within the USG
- » Acknowledge that to maintain an effective leadership role in working with P3s at S/GP, people matter
- » Work to Build a Responsive S/GP and USG Infrastructure
- » Build the capability to take advantage of windows of opportunity that present themselves in both the public and private sectors
- » Foster an organizational culture in S/GP that encourages innovative thinking and supports collaboration
- » Select personnel strategically based on the roles and associated functions described under “generalizable lessons” above
- » Integrate “learning” and “lessons learned” more fully into the P3 process



# INTRODUCTION



## THE PROBLEM

How can the US Department of State address the mounting challenges that demand global solutions in an environment of diminishing resources and with an increasing number of state and non-state actors involving themselves in the process? One increasingly compelling response is the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) to leverage United States Government (USG) interests around the world. But how to ‘stand-up’ such partnerships in an environment where the various government agencies, business groups, and international stakeholders intent on remedying such challenges do not typically coordinate their efforts or collaborate particularly well—indeed, are often in competition for resources and attention?

## THE STORY AND OUR APPROACH

This report tells the story and evaluates one highly successful effort to tackle just such a challenge: the establishment of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (hereafter GACC or the Alliance). It is an exemplar of the State Department’s relatively recent public-private partnership strategy launched through the efforts of one of its newest offices, the Secretary’s Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP).

We have approached this evaluation study as a chance to provide S/GP with not only independent metrics for indicating the success of GACC but also the analytical resources necessary to identify unique and ongoing opportunities to leverage future

public-private partnerships (P3s) that are available to the S/GP, the State Department, the USG, and its agencies more generally. This document is framed by three research questions:

- » What role did S/GP play in the establishment and the success of GACC?
- » What generalizable lessons does this case hold for S/GP, its P3 model, and for future collaborative partnership development in the USG foreign policy domain? In other words, is the process replicable and under what conditions?
- » What “best practices” and “actionable insights”—both positive and negative—are critical for the S/GP Office to understand from this case, given its own organizational trajectory and “disruptor” identity?

## KEY DEFINITIONS AND PREMISES

To do this analysis, we began with the definition of partnership established for the State Department by the S/GP Office itself. According to S/GP, a partnership is defined as:

*a collaborative working relationship with non-governmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance as well as roles and responsibilities, are mutually determined and decision making is shared. Partnerships are characterized by: complimentary equities; openness and transparency; mutual benefit; shared risks and rewards; and accountability.<sup>1</sup>*

Growing out of this definition, S/GP is tasked with leveraging USG resources to establish a new generation of public-private partnerships in the service of US foreign policy objectives; to maximize the impact of foreign aid; and to enhance collaboration among the public sector, private sector, and civil society



to solve global challenges. Among the flagship initiatives of S/GP is the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (the Alliance or GACC), which has proven to be an unusually innovative, globally-scaled, public-private partnership that supports a global market for clean and efficient household cooking methods and technologies.

## METHODS AND SOURCES

The study is based on four sources of information which include a review of archival data, interviews with key stakeholders from multiple sectors, participation in several S/GP and GACC events, and a review of the research literature on P3s and collaboration. We structured our research as a revelatory case study using GACC-specific insights to abstract P3 lessons and best practices for S/GP in the foreign policy and development domains. Our findings and recommendations focus on conditions that can be controlled to enable successful P3s in the foreign policy domain as well as conditions that are more difficult to control. We also make available at the end of the document a list of the primary source materials used and references from the research literature. A fuller description of the approach and methodology along with these materials can be found in the Appendix.

## ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION

This report evaluates S/GP as it was involved in *incubating* the GACC initiative from its transformation from an EPA P3 to its formal launch as a fully independent entity housed within the United Nations Foundation (UNF). Our evaluation examines how S/GP participated in the building of the GACC partnership base, how S/GP worked to maintain this collaborative partnership structure given challenges to it; and the ways that S/GP has worked to insure GACC's success. In addition to providing a historical overview of key milestones in S/GP's efforts for clean cookstoves, this report also provides insights into definitions of success in using P3s in international diplomacy and development in the foreign policy domain and the critical facilitating

conditions that account for both positive and negative movement in S/GP efforts to stand-up collaborative partnerships. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for S/GP regarding its P3 development in the future. Ultimately this evaluation is meant to serve as a "road map" for what works and does not work with respect to the conceptualization, development, and sustainable launch of future P3s.

- 1 U.S. Department of State, State of Global Partnerships Report (March 28, 2014): 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224308.pdf>.



## RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT ROLE DID S/GP PLAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUCCESS OF GACC?<sup>1</sup>



The following is a narrative history of the establishment of GACC as seen through the eyes of those involved in the process.

### **PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AT THE US STATE DEPARTMENT: NEW PARADIGMS**

#### **BEFORE S/GP: SECRETARY RICE AND THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP CENTER (GPC)**

S/GP was not the first of its kind in the State Department. The importance of partnerships and the need for an entity to facilitate and support them had a prior history. In December 2007, Secretary Condoleezza Rice established the Global Partnership Center (GPC) to advance results-based, public-private partnerships as a mainstream tool for US diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> The Center's managing director until 2009 described the entity as a "matchmaker" office linking private organizations with government agencies to advance US foreign policy objectives. The need for the office was reflected in the fact that "[e]mbassies are no longer the U.S. presence overseas," as diplomacy, aid, and development initiatives now include "the U.S. government, for-profit companies, non-governmental organizations, foundations and other partners."<sup>3</sup> Coke, for instance—in its brand presence and philanthropic and development efforts to protect its supply chain—projects American national identity as much as traditional State Department bureaus and embassies.<sup>4</sup> The advisory committee that helped Secretary Rice develop her Transformational Diplomacy strate-

gy recommended the GPC Office as a means for "better doing [State Department] business" given "21st century technological and geopolitical realities" and as "non-traditional actors" (including thousands of NGOs) proliferate.<sup>5</sup> Aside from toolkits to build partnerships, the GPC developed a "clearinghouse" database of all private-public partnerships across the federal government to identify best practices for federal partnerships and to align strategic priorities across executive agencies.

#### **THE CLINTON STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE P3 AS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE TOOL**

Having used partnerships for dealing with domestic issues in her role as a New York Senator, Secretary Clinton understood the potential of the P3 model as a mechanism for solving highly difficult problems (e.g., public health, sustainable energy, climate change, gender equality) that could only hope to be resolved by building a coalition among a range of actors. One study participant, for instance, recalled a key moment when then Senator Clinton insisted that there must be better ways to link Central New York farmers and their ample products to downstate demand for fresh "farm to table" products in urban New York City and its boroughs. Clinton was struck by the natural opportunity for a "mutually beneficial" partnership that this conundrum presented. In effect, Clinton's inclination to seek collaborative opportunities to solve public-sector problems through involving the private sector and linking up existing actors was a well-es-

established policy preference by the time she entered the Secretary's Office.

Within the newly elected Obama administration itself, such innovative collaborative thinking was also taking hold. One of the first memoranda issued in 2009 recommends that “governments should be collaborative” and that “executive departments and agencies should use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate among themselves, across all levels of government and with nonprofit organizations, businesses, and individuals in the private sector.” With the global financial crisis that the State Department found itself facing, new inventive strategies were made more urgent. Expanding on Rice's existing GPC office, Secretary Clinton understood that the P3 model could be useful as a functional foreign diplomatic and development “delivery system” in a period of global fiscal constraint and at a time when the private sector had vastly outmatched public sector actors in investing resources in addressing global problems. P3s were promising precisely because countries faced resource constraints and a crowded field of non-traditional actors, including tens of thousands of NGOs, all with specialized missions, resources, and capabilities. In light of these historical contingencies, a new concept was demanded and we see the development of the notion of international, collaborative partnerships become operational in the foreign policy domain. GACC is one instance of the successful operationalization of this concept.

Part of Secretary Clinton's innovation was in understanding that the time was right to build a bureaucratic structure to take advantage of the opportunity that the P3 model represented for helping State work toward its foreign policy goals in the areas of diplomacy, development, and defense, as described in the QDDR 2010. The P3 tool was particularly useful in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, when even strong states struggled with fiscal policies to reorient their economies. Moreover, the US was dealing with the costs associated with the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which, when combined with sequestration, reduced State's already limited resources for proactive foreign policy initiatives and cast a pall over the US government's (USG) traditional forward-leaning posture in the world. No doubt Clinton was well aware that these constraints chafed against dealing with such global problems as climate-based conflict, water deficits, food insecurity, rising energy needs, and increasing tests of international access to the global commons. Globally scaled, well-coordinated, and sustainable interventions that leveraged

The case for the P3 model in the foreign policy domain was laid out in State's 2010 QDDR in the following terms. P3s involve: (1) collaboration—far beyond interagency cooperation; (2) market driven mechanisms; (3) bundling foreign policy objectives; (4) using alliance and inter-sector models to grapple with the global complexities and interdependencies shaping most problems; (5) a high risk, but high reward method meant to focus on the biggest, most interlinked global problems.<sup>6</sup>

all relevant resources and actors—in capacity, commitment, and expertise—were recognized as sorely needed.

## KEY TAKEAWAYS

- » In the current global environment it is impossible to separate development from diplomacy, demanding a new way of designing and meeting US foreign policy goals.
- » Initial steps were taken by Secretary Rice in creating GPC—a “matchmaker” office linking private organizations with government agencies and developing a clearinghouse database of P3 partnerships across the USG.
- » Given the 2008 global financial crisis and resource constraints, Secretary Clinton proposed the P3 model as a new type of delivery system for confronting highly interdependent global problems and for meeting US foreign policy objectives.
- » Clinton designed S/GP as an entry point for global forms of collaboration between USG, the public and private sectors, and global civil society using Department of State convening power and developing an incubator model for public-private partnerships in the USG.
- » P3s were viewed as facilitating USG participation in global problem solving without it becoming the dominant face of the partnership, allowing for inclusion of non-state actors and broader buy-in and ownership of mission/goals; and providing for a wider resource base while engaging different types of expertise.

## WHY COOKSTOVES AND GACC? BUILDING THE FOUNDATION FOR COLLABORATION

### THE PRESENCE OF A PREEXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE

The kernel of the idea for GACC already existed in the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA). This P3 was launched at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development with founding members consisting of 13 countries, 5 international organizations, 14 NGOs, and 1 private energy company. It was focused on reducing indoor air pollution and toxic exposure from household energy use.<sup>7</sup> By most measures, PCIA was a successful partnership, impacting about 2.5 million households and 15 million people. In effect, with this P3 the EPA had staked out a claim as an active player in this sector, committing funding, expertise, and personnel to the operational management of the partnership. But they were by no means the only ones. There was a rather large epistemic community focused on improving indoor air quality and one of its causes—cookstoves. There was work going on independently at the United Nations Foundation (UNF), in the private and NGO sectors, and within USAID (active in the sector since the mid-1980s).

There is no question that the genesis of GACC was enabled by this PCIA precursor and many of its material and nonmaterial assets, including a cohesive network of subject matter experts and international partners, an established research and scientific knowledge base concerning the problem and its solution, a persistent and organized cohort of individuals from which talented leaders could be drawn, and an early organizational structure with committed stakeholders and partners. In fact, perhaps the most critical resource PCIA offered to GACC was its collec-



tion of subject matter and scientific experts who had gained extensive knowledge about the problem over time, understood the fundamental science and scale of the problem, and had appraised the institutional and procedural challenges involved in making progress on achieving their goal. From the perspective of these subject matter experts (SMEs), a wholly new vision was needed—one focused more on what they perceived to be the solution “clean cookstoves” than on the more amorphous goal of “clean indoor air.”

## **GLOBAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM**

To understand why the issue of cookstoves became a candidate for scaling up to a full global partnership, consider the magnitude of the problems embodied in clean cooking in the developing world and the negative spinoff effects bad practices can have on such critical arenas as public health, child mortality, human capital development, food security, environmental degradation, and economic progress, etc. The facts are that nearly half the world’s population—about 3 billion people—prepare and cook food and heat their homes using rudimentary solid or biomass (wood, dung, sticks, straw, crop residue, coal and charcoal) cooking and heating implements (i.e., open fires or inefficient cookstoves). The health effects from the resulting household pollution are dramatic. Indeed, unsafe exposure results in over 4 million premature deaths annually and countless chronic diseases and injuries (e.g., lung and heart disease, burns, disfigurement). Women and children are disproportionately impacted as they are often culturally, socially, and economically tasked with cooking and fuel collection. In gathering fuel, these groups also face increased exposure to violence, including gender-based violence, in remote, conflict-ridden, or unstable contexts. Aside from health, safety, and security issues—directly or indirectly related to fuel needs—the whole system leads to squandering human capital given the time wasted in seeking fuel, with its equally dramatic secondary effects for development and economic opportunities.<sup>8</sup> The massive scale of the problem also has implications for environmental degradation, itself linked to food security challenges.

## **THE NEED FOR A NEW HOST**

Despite its success in summative outcomes and in its capacity to develop SME talent as well as to define the core priorities, issues, and agenda relative to the problem, PCIA faced structural challenges. Because the EPA where PCIA was housed is a regulatory agency, it was limiting what the P3 could do. PCIA needed a new home. In September 2006, PCIA leaders at EPA were tasked with relocating PCIA. These PCIA-affiliated leaders interviewed more than 100 stakeholders from across the cookstoves and fuel sectors to assess sector priorities, issues of structural management, and the identity of a new host. This intensive effort resulted in an unpublished but comprehensive business plan for PCIA, completed in late 2007, that assumed a \$20 million dollar budget. In early 2008, the EPA initiated the first solicitation for a new host and Marcus Peacock, Deputy EPA Administrator, convened

relevant USG agency leaders for that effort. The EPA made a \$1 million commitment toward the \$20M projected budget but the other agencies attending, while expressing interest in the proposal, did not commit tangible resources due to increasing resource constraints and an uncertain political climate associated with upcoming elections. As a result, EPA and PCIA leaders decided to wait until after the 2008 elections to pitch the project during a new administration.

## **BUILDING A USG INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION**

Despite the failure of the interagency group to commit resources to PCIA, the solicitation exercise resulted in unexpected gains, most importantly, the establishment of an interagency network of interested partners (including NIH and CDC) that began to meet regularly to discuss a collaborative cookstoves effort. One study respondent noted that this interagency process highlighted the relevance of the whole bundle of issues that were wrapped up in clean cookstoves that had implications for each of their respective organizations: “These pretty senior officials began to think, ‘this is a very important issue that our institutions should be engaged in’..They were all explicitly clear that they could not and were not committing any resources; but they substantively supported the concept and they wanted to see where it went.” These regularized interagency meetings, in effect, established the collaborative framework that enabled the ultimate multi-agency commitment to the GACC mission and model. Notably, PCIA provided the institutional and process framework for USG agencies to conduct an internal conversation about the cookstoves sector and partnership. As several study respondents observed, despite the lack of tangible resources, the meeting convened by EPA Deputy Administrator Peacock had brought in diverse agencies concerned with health (CDC, NIH), climate and pollution (EPA), energy (DOE), development (USAID), and later in the process, women (the Office of the Special Representative for Women’s Issues), and foreign policy (State). The strengths of the interagency network included shared expertise, a widening commitment to the cookstoves concept, and the personal relationships that were forged across the USG.

## **SEEKING PARTNERS BEYOND THE USG**

In 2008, the PCIA and EPA leadership engaged external entities critical to the global cookstoves effort. Several core PCIA leaders attempted to convince the Shell Foundation (Shell-F), which had committed from its start in 2000 to developing the cookstoves sector, to increase its investment and expand its vision of cookstoves beyond its regional focus in India. The Shell Corporation’s (Shell-C) interest in cookstoves occurred in part because no other major energy company had yet chosen to invest in this area. Shell-C became interested in cookstoves because, as one study respondent put it, “others were looking at it—like BP had been looking at it for several years, but had decided it wasn’t for them commercially.” In September 2008, following six months of intensive lobbying, Shell-C made a verbal commitment to Shell-F of \$20 million dollars devoted to the global cookstoves effort.

This victory was short-lived, however, as the global financial crisis forced Shell-C to reduce this total to \$2 million dollars, earmarked for awareness efforts already underway in India.

Informal efforts to identify a host for PCIA continued into the spring of 2008, when EPA leadership approached the United Nations Foundation (UNF) management with preliminary discussions of it as a potential new host for a globalized PCIA. During the preparations for the failed PCIA solicitation of funds and hosts, EPA leaders had approached the UNF to submit a bid for this role and, despite the stalled solicitation process, ongoing discussions continued between EPA and UNF during the spring of 2008 as interest in a cookstoves program at UNF increased. The timing was particularly opportune as UNF was itself undergoing organizational change, transitioning from a true (lending) foundation to an operating charity. UNF needed to raise funds beyond its initial endowment. Leadership at UNF was given some organizational “bandwidth” to assess the idea for it to become the new host of PCIA. In the process, the leadership met extensively with the PCIA network and other sector-affiliated parties in the public, private, and NGO sectors. By the end of 2008, UNF began to solidify its ideas about managing a cookstoves project housed within their energy and climate division. In early 2009, UNF committed half a million dollars to explore the integration of a cookstoves project into UNF’s existing program agenda. As one study respondent noted: “if this had happened five years earlier, it probably wouldn’t have been well-received because they [UNF] weren’t in that operating charity mode—and five years later it might not have happened either.”

Timing was, indeed, a critical factor. With the election of Barack Obama and his expressed interest in P3s and cross-government collaboration, UNF and Shell-F indicated their continued interest by co-hosting an event for those involved in the cookstoves sector to explore potential collaborative models. While initial ideas generated there were described by study respondents as “some of the worst” and “terrible,” the unexpected high level of attendance resulted in a strengthening of the sector network and stakeholders in ways that were critical to future success. The event provided a much-needed opportunity for sector mobilization and strengthening, not to mention brainstorming and idea generation, and the addition of a pivotal new perspective. As one study respondent emphasized, the cookstoves concept at the time was restricted to standards and testing, awareness raising, fundraising, and research to assess impact, whereas entrepreneurial development had not been part of the vision or discussion. The private sector at the conference injected a “business perspective” into the project concept.

## DIRECTIVE FROM THE TOP

In June 2009, the PCIA leadership briefed the new Deputy EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy on what was happening with PCIA and the cookstoves effort. McCarthy immediately recognized its potential and the need to significantly increase its scale—but outside the EPA. While the PCIA leadership had only approached newly-appointed Deputy Administrator McCarthy to secure her continued support, one study respondent noted that McCarthy

did far more than that. She immediately grasped the idea, its potential for expansion to a global scale, the value of the project’s cross-cutting objectives and structure, and its alignment with the new Obama Administration’s partnership focus and State’s foreign policy priorities. McCarthy, while willing to advocate for the project, recognized it could not be implemented from the limited platform offered at the EPA, and, hence, tasked a member of the PCIA leadership, Jacob Moss, to draft a new proposal on a significantly

larger scale. Once given the green light to reconceive the project on a global scale, Moss used the prior business plan developed out of discussions among stakeholders in the search for a new host as a basis for the global cookstove structure.

He provided McCarthy with a revised business plan two weeks later, and in July 2009, McCarthy took this globally-scaled plan to then-EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson. Like McCarthy, Jackson also recognized that this proposal represented the kind of viable global collaborative partnership that was in line with what she had heard was the new Secretary of State Clinton’s vision. In August 2009, Administrator Jackson had the opportunity to share the revised proposal with Secretary Clinton, who was intrigued, and immediately asked Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Michael Fuchs to begin due diligence on the concept. His inquiries resulted in negative responses from a number of agencies, who were subsequently gathered at a meeting in October of 2009 to interact directly with the PCIA leadership on the proposal. Fuchs had gathered a critical group of “naysayers,” as one study respondent noted, many of whom seemed only “to offer push-back” against the idea. Secretary Clinton’s longtime advisor and newly-appointed Managing Director of the Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), Kris Balderston, was in attendance at the presentation. Despite the fact that the person representing PCIA, Jacob Moss, was being “beaten up” by attendant critics, he was intrigued by Moss’ passion and expertise as well as was cognizant of the fact that this proposal would appeal to Secretary Clinton both structurally (as a global partnership) and conceptually (addressing many issue areas prioritized by the Secretary). Balderston requested a meeting with this PCIA spokesperson and the process of creating GACC began.

To understand why the issue of cookstoves became a candidate for scaling up to a full global partnership, consider the magnitude of the problems embodied in clean cooking in the developing world and the negative spinoff effects bad practices can have.

## KEY TAKEAWAYS

PCIA facilitated the creation of GACC in the following ways:

- » Dealt with a global problem that had ramifications for a variety of USG agencies.
- » Came with an epistemic community of subject matter experts and scientists knowledgeable about what was feasible and what was not.
- » Came with a sense of urgency as it needed a new host or home given the EPA was a regulatory agency and could not receive outside funding.



- » Came with a built-in USG informal interagency collaborative network.
- » Involved stakeholders outside the USG, including a private sector organization.
- » Had champions at the top of the EPA who insured it got noticed at the State Department.

## **S/GP AND GACC: A CASE OF BUREAUCRATIC INNOVATION**

### **CLINTON BECOMES PUBLIC SECTOR CHAMPION FOR GACC**

As already noted, intrigued by Jacob Moss's passion and manifest expertise regarding the possibilities for a global cookstoves P3, Kris Balderston, then Managing Director of State's Global Partnership Initiative, pursued the concept with Moss. In June 2010 he invited Moss to present the cookstoves partnership proposal to three critical advisors of Clinton: himself, Todd Stern (Special Representative for Climate Change) and Melanne Verveer (Special Representative for Women's Issues). Briefed by this group following the meeting with Moss, Secretary Clinton officially expressed her support for the proposal and subsequently informed the agencies vying for spots to announce their initiatives at the 2010 Clinton Global Initiative meeting that the cookstoves partnership would be one of the three she supported. Her positive position confirmed Balderston's instincts. A number of study respondents observed that the already existent collaboration among a group of USG agencies strengthened the case for Secretary Clinton to lend her support to the cookstoves partnership.

By saying yes to the cookstoves partnership as being one of the three she would support, Secretary Clinton (1) lent the project the credibility, reputation, and influence of her position; (2) provided the project with access to a larger platform within the USG; (3) offered access to a larger resource base; (4) gave the project access to the prestige of being talked about at the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI), and (5) set up an organizational structure in S/GP through which to facilitate the success of the partnership. In effect, by saying yes Clinton provided Moss and Balderston with a political opportunity to move the cookstoves partnership forward by using the weight of her office to exert

influence on existing institutional processes to elevate it to a national priority and through CGI to the global level.

As the idea of a global cookstoves P3 gained traction within State, its own institutional infrastructure was simultaneously evolving to support its development. Rice's Global Partnership Center (GPC) was renamed the Global Partnerships Initiative (GPI) and was soon elevated to the status of a Secretarial office (S/GP). This office was viewed as the entry point for collaborations between the Department of State, the public-private sectors, and civil society. During the course of Secretary Clinton's tenure, the S/GP recruited a small but dedicated team of career officials to facilitate the development of public-private partnerships in the pursuit of US foreign policy objectives. As already men-

tioned, the creation of this bureaucratic structure was supported by a number of important policy instruments as well, most importantly the President's Executive Order and the QDDR released by the Clinton State Department in February of 2010<sup>9</sup> in which public-private partnership arrangements were posited as an effective and innovative way of carrying out US foreign policy in the current global environment.

### **S/GP BECOMES AN INCUBATOR FOR GACC**

Secretary Clinton's decision in March 2010 to announce the launch of the new global cookstove partnership at the CGI meeting that September forced the S/GP team into a high-stakes process of operationalizing what had been—up to that point—business plans, strategies, and concepts. The imminent reality of announcing the partnership only six months later created a sense of urgency that served to galvanize the process of formalizing GACC at many levels, among PCIA and EPA stakeholders and leaders, throughout the existing USG interagency process, at the UNF, and among private sector partners. Within this process, a keen interest—heightened and leveraged by Balderston as head of S/GP—developed to insure the commitment on the part of stakeholders. Resembling a campaign, the process was highly inclusive, bringing together people from across the hierarchical diversity represented in the USG. Held in the Secretary's conference room, these meetings were described by a study respondent as “government at its best” with senior officials interacting with and mentoring younger participants and all participants infused with the excitement regarding the potential of this new endeavor. Messaging was highly focused and accessible, designed to emphasize the apolitical and universal appeal of the project (consider, for example, an early motto “Cooking shouldn't kill”). Media exposure was orchestrated for maximum impact, illustrated by the choice to publicly launch the GACC at the 2010 meeting of CGI. Processes included recruiting volunteers, raising money, pounding the streets (in this case, perhaps, the “halls”) to share the message. Always looming over every



step was the deadline-driven urgency of being prepared for the launch of GACC at CGI. In many respects, this was an initial, galvanizing moment that depended on the assembled team recruiting powerful stakeholders to join and validate the enlarged effort. It was extremely important who joined the mobilization effort and why. Resource commitment and mobilization were the keys to Balderston's work process and strategy with EPA and S/GP leaders co-managing the process. Doing it together was intended to achieve a significant interagency commitment to inject needed resources into the nascent partnership, to motivate all "founding partners" to give at maximum levels through the USG example, and to signal to all stakeholders that the effort had the highest level of USG support in champion leaders including and beyond Secretary Clinton.

In mid-summer, the State Department convened administrators from the agencies involved in the ongoing meetings to pitch the idea of a significant interagency commitment of funds to the cookstoves partnership. In passionate terms, high-level officials presented the proposal, and while no specific ask was made at this first meeting, agency officials were requested to return to a second meeting in two weeks' time with their commitments ready to put on the table. An important aspect of this meeting was the opportunity it provided for agencies with diverse missions and agendas to discover what others were doing as well as to recognize the intersections that existed among their individual efforts that would allow them to work together to achieve greater results collaboratively in a time of scarce resources. This process of mutual identification of interests and potential synergies lay at the heart of building and sustaining a successful interagency collaboration for the cookstoves partnership. On August 10, 2010, the State Department hosted the official agency commitment meeting. The EPA opened the process by offering a commitment package of \$6 million dollars to the cookstoves project, setting the tone for generous commitments on the part of other agencies. Among the agencies contributing, in addition to the EPA and State Department/USAID were the Department of Energy and the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. At the end of the meeting, commitments in excess of \$50 million dollars had been gathered as the USG contribution to the establishment of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. The funding was to cover a five-year period of time. External stakeholders watched this process with interest, gauging the USG commitment to the Alliance and determining their own levels of commitment based on this response.

On September 20, 2010, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and a number of other critical leaders from USG agencies and external sector stakeholders joined Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on stage at the Clinton Global Initiative meeting to announce the launch of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC), a public-private partnership led by the United Nations Foundation intended to focus on creating a thriving global market for clean and efficient household cooking solutions. Indeed, as part

of the launch Secretary Clinton announced that GACC's goal was to have 100 million homes adopt clean and efficient stoves and fuels by 2020—under the motto of '100 by 20.' GACC built upon the extensive network of organizations that comprised PCIA and at its launch had 20 founding partners, among them the USG agencies who had committed funds plus four other countries, Shell and Morgan Stanley Companies in addition to their foundations, the UN Foundation, and four UN agencies.<sup>10</sup> These founding members of the GACC P3 had committed \$100 million dollars to get the partnership off the ground.

Within the State Department itself, GACC posed a new organizational challenge, eliciting worries and reticence from many quarters.

### **S/GP WORKS WITH OTHER PARTNERS TO CREATE GACC'S STRUCTURE**

At the moment of launch, everyone involved knew that GACC was merely a P3 vision—not an organization or even a genuine partnership. All founding partners and key stakeholders recognized that the work of creating the entity was only at its beginning. One study respondent noted that "there hadn't been a clear statement of what this Alliance would stand for beyond that vision that Hillary Clinton laid out, so how would we add value to the other partners in the sector? What would be our role?" Another added that the GACC motto after its launch could have been "launch it, then build it." During the months that followed the CGI launch, important actions occurred on many fronts. Secretary Clinton personally called both US federal agency leaders and other national leaders at the highest levels to create buy-in for the cookstoves partnership. These personal contacts coincided with excitement about her tenure at State, particularly on the part of many foreign governments.

Within the State Department itself, GACC posed a new organizational challenge, eliciting worries and reticence from many quarters. As the 2010 QDDR anticipated, "State's lack of an easily understandable framework for partnerships" was an obstacle to the use of collaboration for pursuing foreign policy objectives. To address these concerns, the S/GP team wrote and published the Policy Framework and Legal Guidelines for Partnerships, a document offering partnership templates and a legal framework to streamline the process for developing public-private partnerships. Efforts in the State Department also included a number of pivotal personnel appointments: most notably, in November 2010, Kris Balderston was named Special Representative for Global Partnerships, with James Thompson as Deputy Special Representative. Thomas Debass was recruited from OPIC to S/GP to manage a team focusing on economic growth entrepreneurship. Jacob Moss, a longtime driving force behind the PCIA cookstoves effort at EPA, was detailed from EPA to the State Department as Director of the US Cookstoves Initiative. The Shell Foundation assigned Simon Bishop from their orga-

nization fulltime to the cookstoves effort, and Leslie Cordes led the small team already in place at the UN Foundation.

These pivotal leaders recognized the need for two critical benchmarks for GACC to become an institution capable of fulfilling its mandate. The first priority was the need for a strategic plan to provide a 10-year roadmap for the Alliance, guiding decision-making priorities as well as metrics for its evaluation. Along with Shell Foundation's insistence that GACC be market-based and a pre-existing EPA business plan for a global entity for the cookstoves sector, the process that unfolded was resolutely inclusive of both the existing cookstoves community and the specific players involved in the burgeoning Alliance. Over the course of six months, as many as 14 working groups, made up of 20 experts each, worked to create a plan of action to address the needs of the Alliance. Although this process was unwieldy and complex, the result was the active inclusion of the ideas, perspectives, experiences, and expertise of between 350 and 400 experts, comprising "all major players in the sector." This process created a naturally evolving commitment and personal stake among participants in GACC so that in the period from the Alliance's formal announcement to the final draft of the strategic plan, stakeholders had built a thoroughly inclusive, expert-based, and committed community. That inclusivity—and the ability to mobilize significant experts and talented leaders in the service of this P3—is a consistent feature of the cookstoves project and understood by many to be an essential component of its sustainability.

In the fall of 2011, the Alliance published *Igniting Change, A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels*, the first public presentation of the recommendations resulting from the working group process. The report identified three principal strategies for the accomplishment of GACC's 100 million by 2020 goal, and the ultimate vision of universal adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels. These included: (1) enhancing the demand for clean cookstoves and fuels; (2) strengthening the supply of clean cookstoves and fuels; and (3) fostering an enabling environment for a thriving market for clean cookstoves and fuels. Offering concrete examples of interventions aimed at achieving each, the report concluded that the sector was at a tipping point, prepared to make significant strides in the resolution of the myriad problems caused by prevalent cooking practices through a combination of expertise, committed donors, and a clear strategy—through something like GACC.

*Igniting Change* highlighted the presence of the Alliance, its stakeholder heft, the organizational ambitions in its partnership model, its cross-cutting goals, and, perhaps most importantly, its ability to make significant and transformative progress both in the cookstove and clean fuels sector and across the development priorities it had staked out. The GACC strategic plan has been identified by key leaders as a critical component of the Alliance's success. It was conceived not as a plan exclusively for the partnership, nor for any particular member of the partnership, but rather as a plan for the sector. The strategic plan focuses on roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholder groups

within the sector, and seeks to define, within that context, the added value that the Alliance partnership can bring to the process of building a strong market-based sector and achieving the development goals to which it is committed.

GACC leadership's attention also was focused on the second priority: the need for a formal management infrastructure within the UNF and a finalized GACC governance plan. Necessarily more contentious than strategic planning given this process involved real people in real jobs, the UNF proposed placing the Alliance under the auspices of its existing Energy and Climate team, led by a Program Manager. S/GP and Shell Foundation leadership believed the Alliance should stand on its own with an executive director reporting directly to the CEO of the UNF. State Department affiliated study respondents noted that this was one of the very few moments when the S/GP office, along with their Shell Foundation counterpart, exercised "veto" power within the Alliance, opting for the stand-alone entity.

After a long and, once again, inclusive search process, Rahda Muthiah was chosen to become the executive director of GACC, bringing with her two decades of experience working in both the private and NGO sectors. As executive director, she immediately set about putting her stamp on the organization, including addressing significant gaps: a lack of unifying infrastructure, a step-by-step business plan, and rigorous results-based metrics, all top priorities in the first three months of the executive director's tenure. In this early period one of the most fateful decisions made by the executive director was in choosing to develop the business plan and metrics "in-house" rather than hiring an external consultant. This decision was followed by an intensive period of work on developing a detailed and practical business plan—embedded in the broad goals of the strategic plan—along with an ambitious set of metrics used to assess potential target countries on which GACC would focus based on consistent and neutral parameters. Placing a 10-week hold on all decisions about specific programs in countries, the executive director began the detailed process of building GACC as an institution, including formalizing staffing and conducting country assessments in 15 countries. The executive director during this period also established an Advisory Council as well as a separate Leadership Council, both of which were to play critical roles in decision making and oversight of the Alliance.

### **S/GP RECEDES INTO BACKGROUND AS GACC BECOMES AN ESTABLISHED P3**

Once GACC became a stand-alone entity within the UNF, two things happened: (1) the Alliance shifted from being a US-centric organization to an international one, with a consequent change in its relations with its most influential founding partner, the USG; and (2) the Alliance leadership rapidly established and engaged in activities identified as priorities by the working groups in the strategic plan. In the first case, the evolution of the USG-GACC relationship was a matter of wise Alliance leadership decision making: the executive director knew that cred-

ibility and country-level engagement could not proceed with the requisite speed and intensity needed if GACC was viewed as predominantly a USG bureaucracy. Likewise, S/GP leadership, as observed by several study respondents, knew the Alliance must become disentangled from the State Department, noting “the first thing that we learned about GACC and the model that we’ve (S/GP) adopted formally is that we should never own a partnership.” It was critical that GACC be viewed as an independent entity and as a neutral global representative of the cookstove sector as a whole.

Consistent with such a perspective, the Igniting Change report signaled this shift in USG direct involvement in daily operations and the subsequent Alliance evolution as an independent entity. Indeed, in the spring of 2012, S/GP announced the launch of a new partnership effort Accelerated Market-Driven Partnerships (AMP). While the State Department continued as a player in GACC, there was a desire to avoid the perception that S/GP was a one-act show and, under its leadership, the office directed its efforts at expanding its P3 repertoire. GACC began to be referred to as a “graduated partnership”—the preferred final status of all of the S/GP partnership endeavors.

By spring 2013 there was a new Secretary of State, John Kerry. Clinton and Balderston were gone. Secretary Kerry, however, maintained the S/GP office, placing a close aide, Andrew O’Brien, at its helm. Secretary Kerry proceeded to direct the energies of the S/GP into creating new partnerships aligned with issues most pressing to his foreign policy agenda. Jacob Moss, who has continued to be an important liaison between the Alliance and the interagency group comprising the USG partnership members, notes that he no longer plays a role in the daily operations of GACC, but rather coordinates with the Alliance to leverage USG resources and connections in support of Alliance operations (e.g., organizing the attendance of US Ambassadors at international events and supporting the recent effort to mobilize resource commitments presented at the Cookstoves Future Summit for Phase 2 of its strategic plan.)

Alliance efforts on behalf of the cookstoves sector have continued to gain momentum and to work successfully toward stated objectives. Indeed, in November 2014, in conjunction with the Cookstoves Future Summit, GACC released its Phase One final report, a retrospective look at the partnership’s major achievements during the first of its three-phase strategic plan to create a dynamic market-based approach to the promotion of clean cooking practices. The report identified nine principal accomplishments that met or exceeded its original goals for this first phase. Among them were growing the partner base, building enterprise capacity, mobilizing research and investment in clean cookstoves and fuels, developing global standards for the clean cookstove sector, integrating women in the clean cookstove value chain, and raising awareness of household air pollution and advocating for change.

## KEY TAKEAWAYS

S/GP facilitated the successful incubation of the GACC P3 by:

- » Providing it with a public sector champion who could leverage her power to interest other USG agencies in becoming involved.
- » Having a leader of its organization cognizant of which problems and challenges would capture the interest of the public sector champion and looking for where such opportunities could be found across the USG.
- » Focusing on a global challenge that affected the interests of a range of USG agencies and had a solution.
- » Developing a win-win process that was inclusive and built in face-to-face interaction.
- » Identifying and bringing together the right people with the right skills across the public and private sectors.
- » Being willing to become part of the strategic planning and institution building process but not have to lead it.
- » Letting the GACC P3 become its own entity when it had the requisite business plan and structure.

- 1 For a timeline indicating the institutional history between S/GP and GACC see Appendix A in the Technical Report, pages 83-94, available from S/GP.
- 2 David Francis, “The State Department’s Public-Private Matchmaker,” 10 Mar. 2009, DevEx, <https://www.devex.com/news/the-state-department-s-public-private-matchmaker-59312>.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 See the Coca-Cola Company & World Wildlife Fund Global Freshwater Partnership 2013 Annual Review Report, Partnering to Protect our Freshwater Resources, <http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/708/files/original/2013-coca-cola-and-wwf-annual-partnership-review-basic.PDF?1405106064>
- 5 See US Department of State, Office of the Secretary, State Department Publication 11484: A Call to Action: The Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (ACTD), Jan. 2008, p. 2, available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.
- 6 US Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power (2010): 68-73.
- 7 Details of the history and accomplishments of the PCIA are available from the organization’s website: <http://www.pciaonline.org/files/PCIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf>
- 8 Leslie Cordes in Igniting Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels (Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, Washington, D.C.: 2011): p. 4 points out that “Not only is adoption of clean cooking solutions a health, economic, gender, and environmental imperative, it is essential for achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for child mortality, maternal health, poverty eradication, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. In fact, by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2009 estimates, 1.9 billion people will need access to modern fuels by 2015 to meet the MDG for poverty reduction.”
- 9 The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010. <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>
- 10 Mission statement of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. <http://cleancookstoves.org/about/our-mission/>



## RESEARCH QUESTION 2: WHAT GENERALIZABLE LESSONS DOES GACC HAVE FOR S/GP?<sup>1</sup>



What generalizable lessons can we learn about the relationship between S/GP and GACC? The history of GACC, a content analysis of interviews conducted with key stakeholders and of available documents, and a reading of the academic and applied literature on P3s and collaboration provide ample evidence that the success of GACC can be generalized and replicated.

### FACILITATING CONDITIONS FOR P3 SUCCESS

A number of factors or facilitating conditions helped set the stage for GACC's success. We have divided them into two categories: those that were contextual or external to S/GP's efforts and those that were process-oriented, reflecting conditions that S/GP was able to use to its advantage. Table 1 presents these two types of conditions.

It is important to note in Table 1 that in both categories some conditions are unique to a particular moment in time while others are more controllable or, at the least, can be shaped by those bent on creating a P3 like GACC. Examining the contextual facilitating conditions, consider what is controllable and what is not. The new administration and State Department leadership had a predisposition toward P3s and collaboration which may not always be the case. And even administrations that state an interest in P3s may not be as committed to them as a foreign policy tool as Secretary Clinton appears to have been or the Secretary could conceive of them differently. As noted above, GACC came along just at the right time to take advantage of the organizational change at UNF from a foundation to a charitable

organization. On the other hand, we can be fairly sure that the number of global challenges that cannot be solved by the US government alone is likely to grow in the future, increasing the usefulness of P3s across time. Moreover, we probably are going to be living in a global economic environment defined by fiscal constraints for a while. As a result, private sector actors are probably likely to continue to lead the public sector in foreign aid monies—these are contextual factors we can count on. Knowing these contextual factors affords S/GP the opportunity to engage private sector partners in P3s in the future, particularly if they are already involved with other non-governmental and public sector organizations like Shell was in PCIA. Similarly the international development sector is more and more turning to collaboration models and results-based approaches to global problems—something PCIA was already taking advantage of. Because PCIA needed a new host, it offered a P3 that had already laid the groundwork to be scaled up to something like GACC. It had many of the experienced and interested stakeholders necessary to make a successful global P3—it afforded S/GP the material for incubation. Finding such already started P3s in the USG presents S/GP with the possibility of creating new P3s like GACC.

But the last sentence takes us over to the process-oriented facilitating conditions that S/GP has to use or take advantage of to build P3s like GACC. And here again some are more controllable than others. If Balderston had accepted the naysayers point of view and not been intrigued by Moss' passion and expertise regarding what was possible with a GACC, we probably would not

**TABLE 1. FACILITATING CONDITIONS FOR S/GP SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING GACC: CONTEXTUAL AND PROCESS-ORIENTED FACTORS**

Facilitating Conditions	
Contextual	Process-Oriented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Global economic climate, including 2008 financial crisis</li> <li>» Increasing number of global challenges demanding collective action</li> <li>» USG new administration and policy initiatives (EO; QDDR 2010)</li> <li>» State Dept. leadership's interest in P3s as a foreign policy tool</li> <li>» Private sector interest in and support of P3s</li> <li>» Private foreign direct aid/investment outpacing public sector support</li> <li>» International development sector moving to collaboration models</li> <li>» Focus on impact and results-based development delivery models</li> <li>» Some traction on difficult global problems (MDGs, extreme poverty)</li> <li>» UNF undergoing organizational change</li> <li>» PCIA requiring new host/home base</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Leadership capacity and variety</li> <li>» Epistemic community of subject matter experts</li> <li>» Pre-existing infrastructure in PCIA</li> <li>» Global cross-cutting nature of the problem</li> <li>» Convening power of State Dept.</li> <li>» Presence of Interagency collaboration apparatus</li> <li>» Global problem came with a scalable solution</li> <li>» Science, data, &amp; technical expertise available</li> <li>» "Disruptor" culture in S/GP</li> <li>» Use of "details" on staff in S/GP.</li> <li>» Access to international development platform (CGI)</li> </ul>

be doing this study. Balderston took advantage of an opportunity because the cookstoves solution being advanced by Moss fit many of the interests of Secretary Clinton and he thought would capture her interest. Moreover, Clinton could make decisions regarding what she and the USG would sponsor at the Clinton Global Initiative meeting and gain the access to present her proposals. It was S/GP, however, and its personnel that used the convening power of the State Department and their political skills to both build and expand on the interagency collaboration EPA had developed for PCIA to gain the partners and the funding commitments needed to launch GACC. It was the organizational culture of S/GP that facilitated the incubation of GACC and the development of the strategic plan that GACC follows.

### P3 METRICS OF SUCCESS

Using the academic literature on P3s (e.g., Hodge and Greve 2007; Schaferhoff et al. 2009; Forrer et al. 2010), S/GP's own definition of a P3, and comments from interviewees, we have structured a set of metrics that are indicative of a successful collaborative partnership. Our proposed set of metrics is roughly similar to those found by McKinsey and Company (2009) in their study of 15 global transnational P3s (e.g., Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition, Global Village Energy Partnership, Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics, and Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap). Once having identified the metrics, we were interested in how often they were talked about in discussions of GACC. Table 2 presents the metrics and an indication of whether they were mentioned often (Hi), some of the time (Mo), or relatively infrequently (Lo).

These metrics of success, much like the narrative accounts of the history of GACC, divide into two types of concerns: (1) concerns about defining the common vision and building collaboration among partners, both within and outside the government and

(2) concerns about shaping the structure that will guide GACC into the future. The data in Table 2 suggest that S/GP was more focused on shaping GACC and the process of building and managing partners than on the development of its formal structure for implementing and measuring results. As GACC moved to become more institutionalized, S/GP became one partner among many, no longer assuming the leadership role as the P3 moved into the UNF and had its own executive director. Like its own literature indicates, S/GP is intended to play four "shaping" roles in the development of P3s: convener, catalyst, collaborator, and cultivator. It is to use the office of the Secretary of State to convene potential partners, to seek out already existing partnerships that would facilitate the US moving on a foreign policy goal, to work with such partners to develop a common mission and strategic plan as well as to involve partners from the private sector and from civil society, and to provide such partnerships the space to incubate and launch.

To some degree S/GP is the "matchmaker" first proposed by Secretary Rice when she contemplated creating the Global Partnership Center. However, unlike the matchmaker who just introduces the partners meant to be part of the match, S/GP is intended to incubate and launch the partnership and see that the P3 is focused on solving a problem relevant to US foreign policy that the US cannot solve on its own. S/GP has a process orientation and as Tables 1 and 2 indicate is most engaged in this part of the P3 creation.

In studying 15 global transnational P3s, McKinsey and Company (2009) discovered several interesting metrics of success that were peculiar to them. Since this is the type of P3 that S/GP is focused on fostering, it is important to add them to the list in Table 2 and to highlight them. The first additional metric of success revolves around the fact that there appear to be four types of global transnational P3s. All are focused on global challenges that no one government, corporation, non-governmental, or in-

**TABLE 2. METRICS FOR ASSESSING SUCCESS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS**

Indicators of Success of Public-Private Partnerships	Ratings from Discussions
» Clear, common vision and shared goals and purpose	» Hi
» Public sector champions	» Hi
» Careful partner selection & vetting—right people, right skills	» Hi
» Investment and shared risks by all partners	» Hi
» Detailed business plan	» Mo
» Mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities	» Hi
» Formalized structures with shared decision making	» Lo
» Tangible near and long-term results	» Hi
» Accountability metrics and milestones	» Mo
» Proper scaling as conditions change	» Mo

tergovernmental organization can deal with on its own and all are attending to goals that affect US foreign policy. Thus, there are global transnational P3s whose focus is on coordination, that is, they are engaged in harmonizing the activities among a group of partners to minimize duplication—“they enable partners to insure that their different activities complement each other in building toward a common objective” (McKinsey and Company 2009 13). The second type are what are called “funding P3s”; they work on consolidating funding around a particular global issue like poverty and on encouraging more partners to join in the effort. A third type of global P3 focuses on product development; multiple partners pool their resources and expertise while sharing risk in the research and development of a product none could do on their own. And, lastly, there are global P3s that are involved in the delivery of a product using the on-the-ground facilities and services necessary to successfully engage the population and deliver the product. GACC at different stages in its development could have been classified as all four, although now it is involved in delivering a product and working toward its motto of “100 by 20.” Which one of these global P3s is S/GP interested in incubating? Or are they interested in all four with the understanding that those like GACC are the hardest and probably most time consuming to construct?

McKinsey and Company (2009) also say that there is a particular metric of success facing global transnational P3s that mix multinational corporations with public sector interagency working groups. This metric is stated as “minimize transaction costs to balance public sector consensus building with private sector instinct ‘to get things done’” (p. 28). This organizational culture difference, they indicate, has led many corporations to leave partnerships and is something their leadership tends to seek to learn more about in signing on to a partnership. Moreover, these researchers add a metric of success that focuses on insuring that all partners invest time and expertise as well as funds in the enterprise. In other words, private partners should see the endeavor as more than satisfying their corporate social re-

sponsibility goals and public partners should not be able to take the easy way out. For global transnational P3s to succeed, they would argue, all partners must be committed to the goal and be investing themselves and their organizations in the process of achieving that goal—and, if there is a payoff, enhancing their organizations’ own interests.

## LESSONS LEARNED

In addition to what McKinsey and Company would have us add, we have a number of generalizable lessons that have come out of our study concerning process and the challenges that such a focus raises that S/GP should consider as they move forward in their work with global transnational P3s. Among such lessons are the framing of the P3 mission, the kinds of leadership needed to develop a P3, what is involved in the notion of incubation of a P3, the challenges that arise in building and managing collaborative networks, what is involved in managing transitions, and the spectrum of partnerships that are available. We will address each of these in what follows.

## FRAMING OF THE P3 MISSION

The successful expansion of a small cookstoves initiative (PCIA) into a globally-scaled P3 (GACC) must be understood in terms of S/GP’s success in creating a coherent conceptual framework, supported by scientific data, that demonstrated the relevance of clean cookstoves as a solution to a broad range of issues critical to both American foreign policy objectives and the priorities of the private sector. GACC was framed as working toward solving a major development challenge. It was intended to have a significant global-scale impact in the areas of health, indoor air quality, climate change, the protection of rights and opportunities for women and girls, and market and economic development. GACC’s focus was to use clean cookstoves to remedy a set of interdependent but complex problems. Framing the problems in terms of a practical solution was a way of managing their complexity while still keeping the broad web of issues



that could draw a range of stakeholders into the partnership. As Ritchey (2011) has observed, it is often the proposed solution to a complex problem that drives the identification of the universe of issues that are engaged with it.

That framing process itself evolved across time. Originally focused on issues of indoor air quality, Secretary Clinton insisted the problem be expanded to encompass other critical issues. As one study respondent recounted:

*... the health impact, the health burden, ...and I think for her personally the gender angle was very important....When we would brief her, she would make all of these connections and she would say things like: "can you make a better link between this and the climate and clean air coalition?" We had been trying to do that, but weren't making much progress, because that's not what the working group was focused on... They were like: "the Cookstove thing is what we're doing." She was like: "No, these things are intimately connected. We have to talk about them in an integrated way."*

While Secretary Clinton recognized the opportunities that this complexity offered, the responsibility for fleshing out a coherent, manageable, and marketable framework that would appeal to the diverse target group of potential stakeholders fell to S/GP. Consider the following way one study respondent used clean cookstoves as a frame to bring stakeholders on board:

*...you have to explain to people why it's good for them... So you go around the building and say: 'you're working to make climate change relevant to average human beings. Think of all the women that are affected by this problem with cooking, and by the way, it's also 20 percent of the world's black carbon.' So that person becomes generous because he's trying to make his own issue relevant to the world. And you go to (USG leaders for women's issues internationally) and you say: 'You know, most of the people dying are women,' then all of a sudden they buy in. And then you go to OES (Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs), then you go to OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) and then you go to MCC (Millennium Change Corporation) and all of these internal actors and leaders get on board.*

Ultimately, stakeholders from both the public and private sectors acknowledged the power that the cross-cutting nature of the solution played in facilitating GACC.

S/GP's success with the clean cookstoves initiative must also be seen in light of the tangible nature of cookstoves themselves. Unlike other development initiatives (i.e., family planning, poverty reduction, or democratization) where there are often disputes regarding how to deal with the problem, the relevance of clean cookstoves as a potential solution to a myriad of problems was largely universally accepted. Likewise, the negative effects of traditional indoor cooking practices are easy to imagine and to demonstrate with both statistical data and first-person narrative accounts. The potential reach of interventions is also compelling since nearly half the world's population (over 3 billion

people) prepare and cook food and heat their homes using rudimentary cooking and heating implements with resulting death, chronic disease, and injuries, with the most severe impacts on women and children not to mention the effects on the environment. Providing people with healthy or "clean" cooking tools has the potential to reap benefits across a global swath of the human population while working on multiple other development priorities. Using a practical solution as the framing concept for GACC made it easier to understand the mission of the P3 and to garner support and partners for its creation.

[L]eadership of P3s involves persuasion in the service of an agenda, building networks (coalitions), and accomplishing things.

## TYPES OF LEADERSHIP REQUIRED

Leadership of a P3 is a balancing act. Whether it is pairing people with opportunities, balancing the push and pull of powerful institutional forces, brokering ideas among influential third parties, or mobilizing resources while banking on the legitimacy of an agenda, such leadership involves high-value trade-offs while staying steadfast on the work of clarifying commitments with stakeholders to achieve goals. That is, leadership of P3s involves persuasion in the service of an agenda, building networks (coalitions), and accomplishing things (Hermann 2014). Driving a P3 like GACC, while at the same time nurturing partners, implies that goals are at times achieved by listening and encouraging current partners' aspirations. At other times, goals are accomplished by pushing boundaries to catalyze an agenda that will harness change across and beyond the margins of the collaboration. Understanding how to actively engage independent cohorts and people in the collaborative network that a P3 is requires orchestrating opportunity as it emerges as well as structuring it so the partnership flourishes.

Table 3 presents a classification of the various leadership roles that those involved in building and launching GACC played. It not only identifies the roles but indicates the functions those holding a particular role need to fulfill for P3s like GACC to be created, incubated, and launched.

Studies of SES officials in the US government (O'Leary, Choi, and Gerard 2012), of CEOs of transnational non-governmental organizations (Hermann 2013), and of national political leaders (Derksen 2015) indicate that there are certain leadership styles that accompany roles focused on the building of collaborative networks and those intended to advocate for a particular agenda and set of interests. The functions reported for the roles in Table 3 suggest that these roles also involve this difference. For example, the champion and the visionary are likely to share the characteristics of the advocate while the boundary spanner and sector/agency liaisons are likely to share those of the leaders focused on coalition building. The studies suggest that the more advocate-like leaders are likely to work to sell their positions, to use any clout they may have to push their agenda forward, to be

TABLE 3. LEADERSHIP ROLES PLAYED BY THOSE INVOLVED WITH GACC

Leadership Role	Critical Functions of Role
<b>Champion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» lends the credibility, reputation, and influence of a high-level leadership position to the project through association.</li> <li>» contextualizes diverse interests into a larger vision, integrated into broader policy objectives</li> <li>» provides project with access to a larger—preferably global—platform</li> <li>» offers access to a larger resource base</li> <li>» utilizes power associated with position to advocate for project</li> <li>» employs influence to create policy/procedural/ institutional change necessary for the success of the endeavor, and is able to force ideas through moments of internal resistance</li> </ul>
<b>Boundary Spanner</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» recognizes moments of convergence between interest and opportunity through astute awareness of the agendas and motivations of actors across the stakeholder spectrum.</li> <li>» provides the essential nexus point between top-down and bottom-up momentum, connecting critical grassroots leaders with champion leaders able to further the cause.</li> <li>» understands and, when necessary, massages the processes needed to effectively implement the objectives of the program.</li> <li>» maintains the “eyes on the prize” for the endeavor, scanning the environment for successful working relationships, and creating the sense of urgency needed to take timely advantage of political opportunities that arise.</li> <li>» facilitates bureaucratic and political processes necessary to success of the project</li> </ul>
<b>Visionary</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» assumes responsibility for translation of the partnership vision into an achievable reality</li> <li>» serves as guardian of the “big picture”—ensuring integration of the individual interests of the many into a unified and cohesive approach.</li> <li>» oversees development and implementation of system-wide indicators and measures of success.</li> <li>» remains cognizant of the evolutionary needs of the partnership, facilitating learning and adaptation within the system</li> <li>» manages the internal collaborative process between stakeholders to ensure that their diverse needs and interests, as well as those of the sector as a whole, are being served.</li> </ul>
<b>Subject Matter Expert</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» generates and maintains the evidentiary knowledge base utilized by interested stakeholders to understand and promote the cause.</li> <li>» serves as critical evidence-based link in connecting programmatic vision and realistic expectations.</li> <li>» provides data that informs results-based program design, adaptation and other learning components of the project.</li> <li>» is source of long-term commitment and interest in objectives that are relatively unsusceptible to transient political shifts.</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Change Agent</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» serves as institutional expert, holding extensive knowledge of internal bureaucratic processes relevant to the project</li> <li>» engages in groundwork to facilitate the integration of new programming into the institutional framework of their organization.</li> <li>» envisions and pursues adaptation of those institutional processes necessary to facilitate innovative approaches to problem-solving</li> <li>» provides the dedicated energy, attention, and focus required to move the project forward in a consistent manner</li> <li>» assumes responsibility for integrating learning into future programming</li> </ul>
<b>Sector Liaison</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» serves as critical player in the development of strategic planning for the sector as a whole</li> <li>» provides critical knowledge of the functioning of the private sector to infuse partnership strategy with market-based approaches and businesslike thinking.</li> <li>» represents interests of important non-public sector stakeholders</li> </ul>
<b>P3 Operational Manager</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» manages critical day-to-day operations of partnership operations.</li> <li>» serves as essential node for connection/ interaction between potential partners from public, private, and NGO sectors</li> <li>» organizes opportunities to encourage collaboration</li> <li>» facilitates the dissemination of learning exercises to external parties</li> <li>» projects institutional resource needs and manages the acquisition process</li> <li>» responsible for accountability metrics and milestones</li> <li>» holds institutional memory</li> </ul>
<b>Agency Liaison</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» provides agency-level expertise and experience to the collaborative effort</li> <li>» facilitates interaction between home agency and external institutional entities promulgating the collaborative effort</li> <li>» advocates for home agency interests and perspectives</li> </ul>

passionate about what they are doing, and to use information from the environment to ferret out how best to convince others that they are right. Generally they are more focused on ideas and getting the problem solved than process, although some are charismatic and easily move between selling ideas and creating them. Leaders focused on coalition building—on engaging in collaboration—are generally more pragmatic and interested in listening to others' interests and concerns with an ear to how to work with them, they are open-minded and patient with process, believing that persistence will pay off; they are good negotiators and work well in interagency groups. The process is more important than solving the problem quickly if it facilitates the group building trust and working well together. The research just described has found that the greater the “match” between the leader's style and the functions demanded by the role, the more effective the person will be as a leader in that role.

A computer-based content analysis of the interviews from this study supports these points.<sup>2</sup> Those with traits linked to being an advocate or more agenda-driven were in roles that matched their traits and style. The same was true for those more interested in coalition building and collaboration. Overall, however, given that GACC is a collaborative network, the greater percentage of those involved evidenced more collaborative-oriented leadership styles (some 70%) than those of an advocate. Of particular interest were several individuals who manifested a strategic leadership style, meaning they could move back and forth between advocating for their agenda and listening and working with partners in a collaborative setting. They had long-term goals they wanted to see achieved but waited to do so until the timing was right and they could move the whole collaborative network together. Such leaders often seem less effective than they really are as their intention is to let the others involved perceive they were critical to the result. Interestingly, although bureaucratic politics could easily have caused problems for the partners in GACC, most of those involved tended to be trusting and to deal with political issues on a situational basis—that is, case-by-case. Only one-third tended to see politics as a zero-sum game with winners and losers.

### WHAT IS INVOLVED IN INCUBATING A P3?

A study of the history of GACC like that done in the first part of this report suggests that there was a rather well-developed infrastructure in place before S/GP became part of the process. There was a proposed tangible solution—clean cookstoves—to a set of

global problems perceived to be important by both public and private sector leaders and organizations. There was a well-established global epistemic community of scientists, advocates, and development experts already at work on the problem of “clean cooking” as part of PCIA with its focus on clean indoor air. There



were research data available on the health, environmental, and economic effects of traditional indoor cooking. Moreover, Shell Corporation had already devoted considerable resources to developing clean cookstoves and clean fuel expertise and technologies growing out of these data. Indeed, Jacob Moss, one of the subject matter experts affiliated with PCIA, had developed an informal business plan for the P3 involving these experts and building on their data. And there was an interagency working group in the USG of those interested in the

clean cookstoves idea as well public sector champions for the idea of a GACC in Jacob Moss, Gina McCarthy, and Lisa Jackson ready to sell the notion to others. So just what did S/GP do and must this kind of infrastructure be in place to create a P3 like GACC?

S/GP is structured as a Secretary's Office to have the ear of the Secretary of State and has the mandate to establish public-private partnerships with relevance to US foreign policy objectives. It is the locus within the State Department for P3 strategy and development and the interface with the private sector. So how did S/GP learn about GACC? Was it watching across the USG for global P3s in the making? Actually the GACC ideas came from one of the EPA champions who knew of the Secretary of State's commitment to P3s. Their talk focused on the potential of GACC and the range of issues it could address. In effect, the idea walked in by foot through a personal network and contact. It was then that the skills and personnel at S/GP came into play as its leadership acted as a catalyst by realizing how relevant a GACC could be in addressing the Secretary's concerns and they pursued raising her interest in the P3 idea. In the process the leadership accepted and began to use the infrastructure that came with the idea of GACC that is spelled out above. Through the convening power of the Secretary of State, they brought together representatives of agencies already involved in the PCIA informal interagency working group plus others, popping in the Secretary at propitious moments to cultivate continuing interest and momentum. But it was the urgency of launching GACC at the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) at Secretary Clinton's insistence that solidified the collaborative network and facilitated getting the resources necessary to bring the private and non-governmental organizations on board. And it was the participation



of S/GP leadership on the group that drafted GACC's strategic plan once it was launched and pushed for its location as an independent entity in the UNF that helped to institutionalize the P3. Throughout S/GP cultivated the partners who had agreed to become part of GACC. S/GP performed the four functions at the heart of the office's mandate. It acted as a catalyst in bringing the idea of what GACC could become and the Secretary together, as a convener in using the clout of the State Department to convene USG agencies already interested in GACC, as a cultivator in urging these attendees to participate in launching GACC with resource commitments, and as a collaborator in building the network that would become GACC.

S/GP performed as it was intended. It did engage in incubating and launching GACC. At issue is whether it could have done any of its functions without the infrastructure that the EPA and its champions had built around the idea of transforming PCIA into GACC. Without such infrastructure, what was there for S/GP to be a catalyst around, to convene, to cultivate, or to collaborate with? In effect, S/GP would have had to design the P3 from scratch. But with the infrastructure, S/GP could play the roles that they were designed to do and develop the idea into a functioning and institutionalized P3. Also important is who the Secretary of State is and his/her view of P3s. Notice how many times Secretary Clinton was brought into the process of building GACC. Without her push to launch GACC at CGI and her access to that platform, would GACC still be an idea or merely a work in progress? The relationship that the head of S/GP has with the Secretary can affect the role the office can play in fulfilling its mandate.

## **CHALLENGES TO BUILDING THE COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS THAT COMPRISE P3S**

Collaboration as a management strategy generally involves work toward a common purpose that brings with it shared benefits to the organizations involved in the collaborative effort; it involves, in effect, creating a win-win bargaining environment where every organization involved gains while arriving at an integrative solution for dealing with the problem; there is built-in face-to-face interaction so that all parties can get to know and understand the others' points of view and concerns in working on a solution; there is a willingness among parties to listen to each other and patience with the process; and there is a focus on getting something done about the common problem (see, e.g., O'Leary and Gerard 2012; Ashkenas 2015). It is a time-consuming process and usually is used when tackling problems that require different types of expertise and are not easily solvable by one organization by itself (Agranoff and McGuire 2004). This is the type of working relationship S/GP has proposed defines a P3.

GACC, as it turned out, is a good example of such a collaborative undertaking. The cookstoves problem formed just such a challenge to the interagency and cross-partner groups that were brought together in the process of building GACC. As was ob-

served in our interviews: "Cookstoves was like this huge issue with each organization thinking we do a piece of it. We sort of had the basis for working together and thought it a good idea to create an interagency group and meet regularly." And as several others noted: "When we're sitting at the table and everybody's pitching in, it's a team and we each do have a role and we can do things. Each agency is talking about and sharing regarding what they do best." The need for such a collaboration was put best by one study respondent who indicated that people recognize what a problem clean cookstoves "poses for us but nobody had a good handle on how to go about addressing it in a coordinated kind of way; the organization that GACC has brought together is invaluable in getting us all thinking about how we all have something to provide to a solution that is not possible individually." Indeed "part of it was the people, we just all liked each other, even though that sounds really corny, but we get along well, we all bring different strengths."

Two conditions that the research on collaboration and surveys of government employees involved in interagency operations argue are important to facilitating collaboration are a sense of urgency and directives from the top (see O'Leary and Gerard 2012). The sense of urgency speeds up the process and forces those involved to commit time and resources to the endeavor. The directive from the top becomes a catalyst for spending time together and forging commitment to moving forward. S/PG offered both of these preconditions as it took over incubating GACC. Secretary Clinton's support of the GACC proposal and her turning over "making it happen" to S/GP was, in effect, a directive from the top. Because she was to announce the launch of GACC at the Clinton Global Initiative meeting several months hence gave the whole process a sense of urgency and a deadline. Indeed, the fact that the original public-private partnership PCIA needed a new home also pushed the process along. As one respondent observed: "Partnerships are about more than money. They're about bringing together networks, values, intellectual property, other things and Secretary Clinton used the power to convene and interact with attendees to come up with a commitment." And another noted: "At the end of March Secretary Clinton said she planned to announce the launch of GACC at the CGI meeting in September. That is only April, May, June, July, August. . . 6 1/2 months...that's insane to pull this thing together in that short a period of time but she had said let's go for it. Talk about a sense of urgency!"

But there are challenges to building collaborative relationships. As SES-level respondents to a survey regarding collaboration put them succinctly, the challenges to developing such working relationships are "time, turf, and ego" or "cash, credit, and control" (O'Leary and Gerard 2012: 21). The amount of time needed to develop a collaborative relationship can be particularly challenging to P3s because of the differences already noted in how the public and private sectors view what is the "appropriate" amount of time to complete a task. Maintaining the collaboration may depend on cutting down transaction time and costs. Having the "right people" involved is also critical. Those likely to

see the setting as a zero-sum game with winners and losers are not good candidates for a collaboration exercise. Furthermore, the presence of fiscal constraints may indicate that it is futile to try to engage in collaboration unless there is some sense that working together can overcome such constraints in the future.

In the USG, one of the biggest challenges to collaboration is that of the silos in which agencies find themselves with little incentive to work across silos. It is this last challenge that S/GP was created to try to overcome—to “disrupt” and break down these silos. At issue is whether those in S/GP view themselves as disrupting the silos only in the State Department or across the large number of agencies that are involved in diplomacy and development? GACC is an example of a collaboration that broke down the silos and offered incentives for agencies to come aboard and benefit. Breaking down silos requires skills as well as energy and mindset. Federal SES leaders engaged in collaboration identified the need for high level relational skills in interpersonal communication, facilitation, negotiation, and consensus-building as well as visionary or strategic leadership skills as being critical to success in such endeavors (O’Leary, Choi, and Gerard 2012). In other words, facilitative leadership, sometimes described as leading horizontally, is a requirement for collaborative work and was very useful in overcoming the challenges faced by those involved in developing GACC.

## WHAT IS INVOLVED IN MANAGING TRANSITIONS?

S/GP is involved in managing at least two types of transitions. The first is the transition among Secretaries of State as administrations change or those holding that office leave. The second focus is on “graduating” P3s, that is, institutionalizing them enough that they can act outside the control of S/GP and the State Department.

GACC is an interesting P3 in that it was created and launched within Secretary Clinton’s tenure in office. It would appear that the infrastructure that GACC had already in place before the Secretary and S/GP became interested in it facilitated its rather “quick” movement into an institutionalized P3. Secretary Clinton’s ability to use the CGI meeting as a launch site also sped up the process, as we noted above, giving S/GP and those involved in GACC a deadline and sense of urgency. At issue here is what happens to P3s and S/GP when the Secretary changes? Interestingly Secretary Rice who preceded Secretary Clinton was the person who introduced the notion of global public-private partnerships into the lexicon of the State Department and created the precursor to S/GP. Secretary Clinton, having worked with P3s and having a well-developed concern about a wide-range of global challenges affecting women and children, elevated S/GP to a Secretary’s office allowing it to benefit from her name and reputation. With Secretary Kerry, S/GP has adapted a more entrepreneurial role—“entrepreneurial exportation—with a focus on getting the private sector more involved or, at the least, introduced to one another and the idea of P3s. There also appears to be a belief that they are to build P3s, not seek out what is there as was the case with GACC. Or they are to play the funder to

facilitate getting P3s going and then send them on their way. The question becomes how to adjust to new interpretations of S/GP with a change in Secretary to a person whose own ideas for P3s and their relevance to diplomacy may differ from his/her predecessor? And how does the office keep the distinctive personality and expertise that it has become known for as it becomes more bureaucratized in response to continued change in Secretaries? As several study respondents observed: “Our favorite thing is cheerleading throughout the building and increasing awareness of public-private partnerships.” Indeed, “we get a lot of calls from other bureaus asking us how to form new partnerships or how to get the private sector onboard.” “We’re unique—we can talk to a lot of different personalities—you have to. But we also have to be part hustler, know how to talk to the private sector, how to get stuff done.”


“Cookstoves was like this huge issue with each organization thinking we do a piece of it. We sort of had the basis for working together and thought it a good idea to create an interagency group and meet regularly.”

The second type of transition revolves around when to let a P3 go off on its own—when to “graduate” the P3. GACC graduated after the leadership of its founding partners developed a strategic plan for the P3 and set it up at the UNF as its own entity with its own executive director. The collaboration literature (Ashkenas 2015) refers to the GACC *Igniting Change* strategic plan as a collaboration contract binding the founding members and officially institutionalizing the P3. Like most of the 15 global transnational P3s studied by McKinsey and Company (2009), representatives of S/GP served as advisors after GACC graduated. For GACC and these other 15 P3s, this meant continuing to participate in its governance. But as observed earlier in this report, members of S/GP at the time acknowledged that it was not their office’s or the State Department’s intention to own a partnership. Besides such a move indicated that GACC was an independent, neutral entity and not under the control of the State Department or the USG. The problem is, as one respondent stated, “what if we lose control and are embarrassed” Or, as another offered, “how do we gain a reputation for our office and keep control over P3s if like cookstoves we give it to someone else to manage and move forward?” After all, “a GACC P3 is very rare” and “those providing the leadership for GACC were passionate, patient, and relentless and had particular expertise; what if the leaders are not like them?” And still another raised “what if you do not find the right managing partner like GACC did?” All are reasonable questions and suggest concerns about just what the long-term relationship between S/GP and the P3s it works with should be.

## TOWARD DEVELOPING A TYPOLOGY OF PARTNERSHIPS

In many respects, GACC, with its global reach, is one of the largest and most complex P3 initiatives associated with the S/GP

FIGURE 1: SPECTRUM OF PARTNERSHIPS



**Degree of collaboration needed in providing a solution to the problem.**

**Intensity of S/GP investment: Leadership, personnel, resources, timeframe of commitment.**

Office. Many of our interviewees noted its difference from other more limited and circumscribed partnership initiatives in which S/GP has engaged. Given such views, it seems valuable for S/GP to consider the range of partnership types that are available as it makes decisions on what to support. For example, partnerships can differ in size and scale; the nexus of needs and issues addressed; solutions, products, and deliverables; structure and governance; and S/GP's own investment in supporting such an initiative and for how long. Indeed, much of the collaboration literature, as well as practitioner recommendations, tend to define P3s according to types, for example, by sector, financing structure (e.g., contract model), and priorities or goals.<sup>3</sup> We noted earlier a typology of transnational P3s based on function (McKinsey and Company 2009).

Drawing on interviewee data and the research literature, we would like to propose a "spectrum of partnerships" typology to aid S/GP in its deliberative process that resulted from this study. Figure 1 presents the proposed typology. We have organized the typology in Figure 1 based on the degree of collaboration among the partners in relation to the intensity of S/GP's engagement, commitment, and investment in the partnership.

It should be remembered that the intent of developing this typology is to facilitate S/GP's deliberative process, not to narrow or confine P3s in all of their possible configurations to a given set of labels or types. The typology evolved as we noticed that many of our interviewees made informal attempts to define and characterize different types of P3s at S/GP, using different criteria, such as short-term "love matches," "flagship" P3s like GACC, or "long-term investments." Likewise, in describing P3 types in terms of a continuum, one study respondent noted that GACC was a "grand slam" P3, while another said it was "our ideal type," our "first and most successful P3 to date." While others described the very act of creating P3s as a "process of hit or miss," in which "you take swings and sometimes you get hits, including small hits, which can be just as impactful." Another respondent explained that some small P3s are understood as "short-term partnerships," "which can continue on their own, we only have a little

bit of involvement in them, anywhere from writing an MOU to helping throw an event to giving them a boost if we believe in their cause." Moreover, S/GP members indicated that they might monitor a small P3 and see how it is doing, even as a pilot, and if it goes well and appears to be having an impact, they may invest in it and make it a larger or permanent partnership.

Being unable to come up with types and a continuum, many respondents in the study described each and every S/GP P3 as different, as an entity unto itself.<sup>4</sup> One interviewee conceded, for instance, that while successful P3s at S/GP have similar traits—they must have "measurable success within five years," for instance—"each P3 will look different from every other partnership." Another described in detail this individualized process of building a P3 to the specific needs of a given set of stakeholders. That interviewee's team "built each RFP based on the needs of the partnership and how we wanted to utilize that particular stream of funding." Yet another respondent described each P3 as a "fingerprint," completely unique and distinctive:

Within this acknowledged fluidity and diversity of P3 types, however, a set of criteria and expectations associated with specific P3 types also emerged from our discussions with interviewees. For example, when S/GP was partnering with USAID, one respondent noted that: "we put out a call asking very specifically for a managing partner that would be able to build out the program according to the general scope we laid out and the fact that it was intended to have its own staff." In this case, S/GP offered largely strategic guidance—but with very minimal investments of personnel time, money, and other concrete resources. In certain respects, this type of P3—more of an S/GP affiliation than a full-blown global alliance—dictated the project's scope and its activities. This affiliation-based P3 is the first type of P3 in Figure 1. It is at the low end in requiring S/GP to invest organizational capital, resources, or expertise—unlike the stand-alone GACC at the other end of the spectrum.

Another study respondent discussed the role of S/GP in its P3 design process as anticipating urgent international aid needs



such as in natural disasters and, thus, identified another avenue driving the P3 selection process at S/GP: embassies contacting the Office and identifying urgent issues around which P3s then organize to create solutions to address these needs. One example cited was the typhoon in the Philippines in which the State Department coordinated multiple private companies as a vehicle to solve urgent aid needs. In doing so, the interviewee noted, such P3s successfully generated “critical mass”— by which was meant broad-based “buy in” for the solutions, services, and/or products delivered by both stakeholders and target communities. In cases like this one, S/GP is involved in a second type of P3 focused around coordination of needed products or services, such as aid delivery.

Another study respondent helped us understand S/GP’s “ideal” type of P3 and why GACC was an exemplar of this model and the kind of intensive, long-term planning and investment such a P3 requires. As was noted:

*Our ideal public-private partnership is the Alliance. That’s our biggest success story. We would love to do that again. It is perfect because our idea of an ideal public-private partnership is we help bake it, we put the ingredients in with the private sector, and do the planning etc., we incubate it, get it started, and then we let it fly on its own, and that’s what GACC is doing. It has almost a bigger staff than we do now and it’s still flourishing.*

Figure 1 contains a P3 type for every one of the ways in which S/GP has used the P3 mechanism based on a continuum (from low to high) suggesting the extent of S/GP resource investment in the partnership and the degree of collaboration demanded among the partners. In the first type, S/GP has designed and developed P3s as loosely affiliated networks in which it played a “matchmaking” role investing very little of its time and resources in the P3. Second on the continuum, S/GP has developed P3s designed with coordination as the objective, often for development or for delivery of aid. These types involve more S/GP input into the process but are still very limited in terms of its organizational investment as well as they require less long-term collaboration among those involved. Third along the continuum are P3s designed as more robust cooperative units in which all partners are invested and playing a role and S/GP has contributed more of its resources to supporting and monitoring the P3. But this is the type where the private partner may become frustrated if things take too long and the public partners are still trying to align their goals and resources with each other in real time (see Ashkenas 2015). Partners are being more cooperative than collaborative in this P3 effort—waiting for the other to act.

In the fourth type, S/GP invests in incubating the P3 and creating a formal structure but here the collaboration needs, but does not have, the glue that a long-term strategic plan, an executive director, and becoming a stand-alone entity could add. In the last type, S/GP creates a formal, institutionalized, stand-alone P3 in which it invests sustained and significant resources.

The phases that GACC went through illustrate the last three types of P3. It was in the cooperative mold (type 3) when the idea of a cookstove alliance was born and an informal interagency group was created but it was more talk than action. PCIA is an example of the formally developed partnership (type 4). It was seeking a host that would facilitate it becoming independent. And GACC is an example of the stand-alone, independent P3 or type 5. While our typology is similar to a more generic model of collaborative networks known as the “3Cs”—that is, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (Brown and Keast 2003; Keast et al. 2007)—our interviewees created a more nuanced framework that we believe provides more specific guidance to S/GP for future work.

- 1 Data supporting the conclusions in this section are found in the Technical Report, pages 52-75 which is available from S/GP.
- 2 The software that was used is called Leadership Trait Analysis and it is a program on the Profiler Plus platform created and managed by Social Science Automation in Hilliard, Ohio. (See also Hermann 2008.)
- 3 For some examples, see World Bank, “PPP Arrangements/Types of Public Private Partnership Agreements,” available at: <http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements>.
- 4 The research literature has somewhat the same problem. See Jacobson and Choi (2008: 642): “As the word of the successes of these partnerships grows, PPPs have become more widespread in all public jurisdiction sizes. However, the literature clearly agrees that PPP appears to have no clear definition or standard implementation methods.”

## RESEARCH QUESTION 3: WHAT “ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS” COME OUT OF THIS STUDY FOR S/GP?<sup>1</sup>



The “actionable insights” described in this section are offered as a guide to future S/GP efforts to establish effective P3s aimed at meeting the State Department’s mandate for the Office. They are derived from the findings already described in this report.

### IDENTIFY AND FOSTER OPPORTUNITIES APPROPRIATE FOR A P3 APPROACH

Interviewees from all sectors reminded us that a P3 is not a viable or even preferable approach to use in responding to a wide range of State Department issues. A P3 approach may not be appropriate without a number of the facilitating conditions that we described earlier in this report. A fundamental component of the mandate of the S/GP office, however, is that it identify and foster opportunities that do exhibit strong potential for such an approach. A critical first step in this process is to clarify where on the spectrum of partnerships the one proposed falls and what resources will be required in order to push it forward. The following are proposals for identifying and assessing future P3 opportunities.

#### ADOPT A FORMAL PROCESS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL P3S

S/GP decisions to undertake new initiatives are constrained by limitations of budget, manpower, and operational timeframes. While many issues may theoretically lend themselves to a P3 ap-

proach, the S/GP leadership may choose to pass on an issue or stakeholder proposal that has not matured to a threshold that will allow for the achievement of success within the capacity of available time, manpower, and resources. We encourage S/GP to consider adopting a formal assessment process for evaluating potential partnerships as a guide to decision making and commitments. This assessment process should include a detailed assessment of both the internal and external resources that have already been invested in the initiative, the “ripeness” of the initiative to be scaled up to the global or transnational level, the degree of collaboration already evident among its partners, and the level of resource commitment that can reasonably be expected from all partners to the initiative including those from the private sector. The “spectrum of partnerships” described in this report can provide one basis for the assessment of such opportunities.

#### ACTIVELY FOSTER P3 INITIATIVES THAT DEMONSTRATE BROAD, CROSS-CUTTING SALIENCE RATHER THAN NARROW INTERESTS

Since the creation of the Office, CPI/SGP has pursued a number of diverse P3 initiatives with varied degrees of success. Our research indicates that one critical component of the suitability of the cookstoves project for a P3 approach was its identification of multiple cross-cutting issues with which the initiative could be connected (indoor air quality, climate, women’s issues, health, energy equality, etc.). These linkages made the initiative

salient to a diverse group of internal USG and external stakeholders, allowing each to find its “hook” into the endeavor that aligned with its particular interests and mission. The resultant broad base of stakeholders increased the level of internal commitment that the USG was able to bring to the table which, in turn, influenced the level of commitment of external partners. In the case of GACC, S/GP engaged in effective “development diplomacy,” playing the critical role of promulgating the complex global framing of the cross-cutting issues and interests involved among the stakeholders, proactively pursuing and convening stakeholders with relevant individual agendas, and galvanizing the momentum necessary for shared interests to be transformed into shared efforts and shared effects. While not all initiatives will be salient across such a broad array of issues, S/GP should lead efforts to identify issue linkages, conveying these to potential stakeholders (even those who may be unaware of the relevance of an initiative to their interests) and facilitate networking using the authority of the Secretary’s office to its advantage.

### **PRIORITIZE OPPORTUNITIES THAT DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR, TANGIBLE ISSUE TO SOLUTION RELATIONSHIP SUPPORTED BY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH**

The complexity of the global development issues that we face today presents real challenges even when tackled by the combined resources found in collaborative P3s. Our research indicates that one of the reasons for GACC’s success was the demonstrable connection it could make between clean cookstoves and the results associated with them. Research supported the resultant impact which was measurable and significant, thus creating the sense that the proposed objectives could be accomplished. Additionally, despite the highly technical nature of cookstove development and the scientific research that informs it, cookstoves as a solution is quite appealing given its connection to the universal human experience of preparing food. The cookstove is a tangible solution that people and organizations can understand. While not suggesting that P3s must focus or result in the development of tangible, physical objects, our findings suggest that S/GP should insure that any initiative undertaken demonstrates a strong relation between the issue and a possible solution supported by reliable data and research.

### **FOCUS EFFORTS ON INCUBATING IDEAS AND IDEA CHAMPIONS VS. STAKEHOLDERS**

Fundamental to S/GP’s successful launch of GACC was a well-developed idea that had already achieved a level of maturity, albeit in the context of the smaller-scale PCIA initiative, before it became associated with the S/GP office. The evolutionary process of this idea as part of PCIA created a strong and knowledgeable cohort of subject matter experts who were committed to achieving a solution to the problem (as opposed to that of creating a P3). Through a focused effort aimed at further refining what was possible with clean cookstoves to render this idea suitable for a globally scaled effort and the inspired use of the “detail” process to effectively harness the expertise of the agency-level leaders

most experienced and knowledgeable about the endeavor, S/GP successfully enabled the creation of a coherent and compelling narrative with broad appeal to external stakeholders. We note specifically that the incubation process in this case was directed primarily toward the enhancement of an existent idea and the empowerment of those passionate about and involved with it. We encourage S/GP to commit resources, including possibly a dedicated staff position, to intensive outreach directed at USG bureaus and agencies in order to build rapport with their internal leadership and to create a detailed database of current P3 start-ups. Such a process would provide S/GP with a larger view of the overall work in the development arena going on in the USG, a perspective from which to identify promising programs, natural synergies that may not be recognized by those involved, and the ability to recruit talented expert personnel to support creation of P3s around these ideas.

### **SEEK OUT OPPORTUNITIES TO BUILD ON EXISTING P3 INITIATIVES**

The successful and timely creation of GACC was facilitated by the fact that S/GP could build upon an already existent collaborative infrastructure—that of PCI—that had almost a decade of preliminary work on factors related to clean indoor air. The primary role that S/GP played was not in GACC’s creation per se but rather in reframing and scaling up this particular P3 to conform with its broader political agenda—a collaborative P3 intended to pursue global development challenges. This approach was effective because it capitalized on interest and momentum that had already begun to converge from both public and private sectors and it utilized existing resources (e.g., extensive networks, a developing identity and consensus within the sector, an expanding base of scientific research and data supporting the fundamental premises of the initiative) as a basis for expansion. In addition, the fact that much of this groundwork was already well underway allowed S/GP to focus its efforts on its ability to facilitate access to larger platforms and critical high-level leadership and the authority to use the convening power and influence inherent in its position as a Secretary’s office. Given the manpower, time, and resource constraints with which S/GP must contend, this “head start” represented a great advantage over partnerships constructed from the ground up. Identifying and giving priority to P3 initiatives that have independently reached a critical mass constitutes a strong potential strategy to use in the choice of P3s to work with in the future.

### **SEEK TO SCALE EFFORTS AT P3 DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF PARTNERSHIPS**

In the process of selecting P3 ideas to support, S/GP should keep in mind—and develop with more rigor—a typology of available P3 models commonly used in the State Department and in related USG development initiatives (e.g., DOD, USAID, OPIC) like the spectrum of partnerships described earlier. The purpose of situating a proposed P3 on the partnership spectrum is not to attempt to fit new ideas within existing infrastructural templates, but to think proactively about how to form a P3 gover-



nance structure according to projected results and impacts. This “impacts-based” approach was used effectively in GACC, particularly with the choice of data and metrics used to direct the initiative’s clear goal (i.e., 100 million cookstoves by 2020). In other P3s, evidence of lack of an integrated awareness of results in the P3 design were evident, as project managers tinkered with the partnership’s governance structure to try to correct course to make progress. While modifications are often helpful and necessary, it is better to modify a P3 based on concrete and objective appreciation of expected results—small or large. Such an endeavor requires S/GP personnel to think carefully about the P3 as a delivery system specific to a particular problem.

## WORK TO BUILD A RESPONSIVE S/GP AND USG INFRASTRUCTURE

The findings in this report suggest that the collaborative P3 model envisioned by S/GP as an effective mechanism for pooling the resources necessary to tackle global development challenges will require innovation and change within the public sector. The following are proposals for building such an infrastructure.

### NEED TO ESTABLISH NEW WAYS OF OPERATING THAT ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY AND ADJUSTMENT

An important strategy utilized by leaders at all levels in the creation of GACC involved taking advantage of windows of opportunity that presented themselves in both the public and private sectors. Examples of this strategy include early decisions to maintain the cookstoves initiative in a relative holding pattern with the expectation that it would align more closely with the priorities of a potential Obama Administration. And then with Secretary Clinton’s endorsement of P3s as a development tool and her interest in the issue, the existing effort could be galvanized into action to achieve an interagency commitment and to finalize the establishment of a P3 within the three-year mandated timeframe. Interviewees expressed that, in order to be a viable partner, the USG and its agencies need to be equally responsive to patterns of activity within the private sector which generally has the ability to respond quickly and decisively to changing circumstances. People in S/GP have acknowledged the need to be “disruptive” with respect to standard operating procedures within the USG. While this is an enormous task, expanded efforts to cultivate new ways of operating that allow for flexibility and responsiveness are critical to having future success with P3s.



### NEED TO FOSTER AN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE THAT ENCOURAGES INNOVATIVE THINKING AND SUPPORTS COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES

The leadership of GACC was adept at creating a collaborative working environment among stakeholders and internal staff that generated the commitment and sustained effort necessary

to accomplish an enormous amount of work on an accelerated timetable. Among the characteristics of this environment were: (1) a sense of urgency associated with both the critical need to address the issue as well as imposed deadlines, (2) inclusiveness/egalitarianism across levels, including drawing in younger, lower echelon professionals from within the public sector and engaging the cookstoves sector in its entirety in strategic planning, (3) creation of an intimate atmosphere which was fun, exciting, inspiring, and (4)

adoption of a “disruptive” attitude, that is, the sense that they could instigate procedural change in the interest of enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the USG. Interviewees conveyed their acknowledgment of the importance of such an organizational culture in fostering the human connections essential to successful trust building in the development of collaboration. This understanding is physically manifested in the design of the new S/GP office space, but should also include processes that encourage innovative thinking.

### NEED TO SELECT THE “RIGHT” PEOPLE, “RIGHT” SKILLS

The “right” leaders and staff were an important piece of the infrastructure underpinning GACC’s success, and interviewees involved in GACC described them—their knowledge, style, and skills—as essential. S/GP should select personnel strategically based on the roles and associated functions described under “Lessons Learned” above. If S/GP plans to develop partnerships at the high end of the partnership spectrum (that is, alliances requiring high levels of collaboration and investment), then it needs to invest in the right combination of skilled leaders and staff. The fact that S/GP operates in a transitional environment with changing political leaders makes building a strong staff even more important and a definite priority.

### NEED TO INTEGRATE “LEARNING” MORE FULLY INTO THE P3 PROCESS

When asked directly how the GACC experience could inform the process of standing up future P3s, a number of interviewees expressed a lack of knowledge about what was involved in the

creation of this particular P3. S/GP could benefit from the integration of more formal learning processes into preparation of its staff. Learning should include lessons gained from the successes, failures, and best practices derived from experiences related not only to GACC but to the entire gamut of partnership efforts undertaken by S/GP in the course of its existence. Such knowledge should be made readily available to bureaus and agencies outside S/GP in the interest of expanding the skills and understanding of P3s across USG institutions.

## **IDENTIFY AND ATTRACT POTENTIAL PARTNERS (BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO USG)**

Choosing and cultivating the “right” partners is a critical area of effort for the S/GP. Determining which partners are essential to success and whether they bring the necessary skills, resources, and decision-making authority is a significant challenge to the success of a P3. The following proposals outline specific areas for attention.

### **UTILIZE THE ADVANTAGES OF S/GP'S POSITION AS A SECRETARY'S OFFICE TO CULTIVATE EXPANDED INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AND INTERNAL PARTNERSHIPS**

A hallmark of GACC is the broad-based interagency commitment that facilitated its successful transformation to a global P3. S/GP has demonstrated the capacity to drive such collaborations and its vantage point as a Secretary's office provides it with the added advantage of a broader view of trends and programs that with some effort might lead to another GACC. S/GP should continue to commit significant resources to the process of identifying potential synergies and facilitating their connection. Accepting this task will require that S/GP expand its knowledge of the activities of agencies across the USG and bring together relevant leaders from within those agencies to explore ideas that could effectively be addressed through a P3.

### **UTILIZE THE VETTING PROCESS TO FULLER ADVANTAGE**

Subsequent to the successful establishment of GACC and in the interest of enhancing the USG's ability to respond in a timely fashion to opportunities for collaboration with external entities, S/GP has created a vetting process that it intends to make increasingly available for use across agencies. While this is a valuable service in general, S/GP should consider how the process could be modified to respond to its own particular needs, specifically the identification of potential managing partners for stand-alone P3s. Our research indicates that the managing partner is a crucial linchpin in the success of a P3 and in its ability to become institutionalized as a stand-alone entity. Creation of an additional module in the vetting process that would allow for an assessment of the managerial and collaborative skills of potential managing directors could prove useful.

## **WORK TO SUSTAIN PARTNERSHIPS**

The final challenge for SG/P is to insure that their efforts in the incubation of P3s achieves results. The following proposals point to the need for agreed-upon plans and metrics.

### **INSURE THAT PARTNERSHIP ENDEAVORS ARE GUIDED BY AN IM-PACTS-DRIVEN STRATEGY**

Respondents that we interviewed from both the public and private sectors noted the critical role of GACC's strategic plan in providing a framework for its success. An essential characteristic of this strategy and resulting framework was the achievement of an impact as its core guiding principle. Note the motto “100 by 20.” Such a strategy allows for necessary adjustments over the lifetime of the partnership to be oriented against a constant point of reference.

### **UTILIZE METRICS AND DATA EFFECTIVELY TO ORIENT THE ACTIVITIES OF PARTNERSHIPS**

The experiences of GACC illustrate the challenges extant in addressing complex and interrelated development issues. The complexity constantly threatens the focus and integrity of partnership activities. The revelation of an ever-expanding web of related issues can lead to a siphoning off of resources to tangential activities, subsequently diluting the original intentions of the initiative. A well-considered system of metrics, bolstered by the support of data-driven results is critical to maintaining the coherence and effectiveness of P3s. These evaluative systems offer frameworks against which often difficult decisions can be weighed and should be integrated fully into all partnership efforts.

### **WORK TO INSTITUTIONALIZE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW TO ORGANIZE P3S WITHIN THE USG**

In many respects the GACC model not only shaped its results, but it expanded the field of organizational resources within the foreign policy domain for development and diplomacy during a continued period of restricted resources and aid flows. The challenge is to institutionalize these organizational resources within the USG. Such organizational knowledge is not only essential to the success of any given P3 but to the persistence of the S/GP Office and its ability to strengthen the P3 ecosystem in the diplomacy and development domains.

### **RECOGNIZE NOT ONLY S/GP'S LEADERSHIP ROLE BUT ALSO ITS MANAGEMENT ROLE WITHIN THE USG**

Public-sector generated global partnerships must develop along two dimensions: the internal and the external. Interviewees noted that the coordinated response created via the internal USG interagency process was critical to GACC's success. Such coordinated talks, of course, may not result in real resources being committed but the networks built may be leveraged later, as in

Secretary Clinton's decision to champion cookstoves. Ultimately effective participation in a large-scale partnership of this type cannot be managed ad hoc with individual agencies acting independently. Insofar as S/GP's mandate dictates its role as a focal point for USG P3 commitments to foreign policy, it has a powerful management role—not just a leadership role—to play in these arrangements. S/GP's convening power is just the tip of the iceberg; it must also be involved in building the collaborative network and in managing its governance issues.

**ACKNOWLEDGE THAT TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN WORKING WITH P3s AT S/GP, PEOPLE MATTER**

Without some of the specific people associated with GACC and the S/GP Office, progress would not have been made in the development of the Alliance. In addition to their leadership functions and roles, many of the persons associated with GACC's success were accomplished experts, public-service oriented, devoted, and passionate team players. Most of these individuals also possessed the capacity to persevere and push, even in the face of significant "push back." In many respects, they created the template for "good" leadership models and practices for S/GP as it moves to work with P3s. In this context, leadership means (a) an ability to package multiple interests under the banner of the project mission, (b) an ability to empower others to lead; (c) patience in the face of a very slow moving bureaucratic process that lies in contrast to the fast-paced private sector; (d) an ability to activate USG pockets of innovation and networks of influence to achieve bureaucratic innovation; (e) an ability to achieve clarity and transparency among all partners; and (f) a willingness to publicly fail and make mistakes.

1 For an elaboration of the material discussed in this section see the Technical Report, pages 76-82, available from S/GP.





## REFERENCES

- Agranoff, R. and M. McGuire. (2004) *Collaborative Public Management; New Strategies for Local Governments*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Ashkenas, R. (2015) There's a Difference Between Cooperation and Collaboration. *Harvard Business Review*, April 20.
- Cordes, L. (2011) *Igniting Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels*. Washington, DC: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves.
- Derksen, H. (2015) *Does One Size Fit All? The Relationship between a Country's Political Context and Its Rulers*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Syracuse University.
- Forrer, J., J.E. Kee, K.E. Newcomer, and E. Boyer. (2010) Public-Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question. *Public Administration Review* 70(3): 475-484.
- Hermann, M.G. (2008) *Using Content Analysis to Study Public Figures*. In *Qualitative Analysis in International Relations*, edited by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash. New York: Palgrave.
- Hermann, M.G. (2013) *To Challenge or Respect Constraints? Leadership Styles and Leadership in Non-Governmental Organizations*. Paper presented at the Workshop on Global Governance and the Neglected Issue of Leadership, European University Institute, December 13-14.
- Hermann, M.G. (2014) *Political Psychology and the Study of Political Leadership*. In the *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, edited by E.A.W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hodge, G. A. and C. Greve. (1007) *Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review*. *Public Administration Review* 67(3): 5450558.
- Jacobson, C. and Choi, S. O. (2008) *Success Factors: Public Works and Public-Private Partnerships*. *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 21(6): 637-657.
- Keast, R. and K. Brown. (2002). *The Government Service Delivery Program: A Case Study of the Push and Pull of Central Government Coordination*. *Public Management Review* 4(3): 1 –21.
- Keast, R., K. Brown and M. Mandell. (2007). *Getting the Right Mix: Unpacking Integration, Meanings, and Strategies*. *International Public Management Journal*, 10(1): 9 – 34.
- McKinsey and Company. (2009) *Public-Private Partnerships: Enabling the Private Sector to Enhance Social Impact*. The Social Sector Office, McKinsey and Company, December.
- O'Leary, R. and C.M. (2012) *Collaboration Across Boundaries: Insights and Tips from Federal Sector Executives*. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
- O'Leary, R., Y. Choi, and C.M. Gerard. (2012) *The Skill Set of the Successful Collaborator*. *Public Administration Review* 72: 1-14.
- Ritchey, T. (2011) *Wicked Problems—Social Messes*. New York: Springer.
- Schaferhoff, M., S. Campe, and C. Kaan. (2009) *Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results*. *International Studies Review* 11(3): 451-474.

## METHODOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

This study was designed to synthesize four types of information: (1) archival and program accounts associated with the S/GP Office and GACC; (2) interviews conducted with those involved in the evolution of GACC, (3) social science scholarship related to understanding collaboration and public-private partnerships, and (4) eyewitness accounts at several events held by S/GP and GACC. At the end of this appendix is a bibliography of the archival and research literatures examined in the study. We also include a copy of the interview protocol that was used. Members of the research team participated in the Cookstoves Future Summit that was held November 20-21, 2014 sponsored by GACC and the Global Partnership Week held March 9-15, 2015 under the auspices of S/GP.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in a location of the respondent's choosing or by online conference calls. The interviews were 60-90 minutes in length. Interviews were recorded unless the respondent declined. All interviews were conducted

off the record and interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. At least two members of the research team were present at all the interviews which allowed some give and take in the process. The interview protocol was semi-structured to facilitate such a process. The team was interested in interviewing as many of the principals involved in the development of GACC across the public and private sector as possible. We did so through a snowball sampling procedure by (1) first seeking recommendations from the S/GP administrative staff, (2) asking each interviewee to identify other key persons that we should talk with to insure a comprehensive grasp of the case, and (3) drawing upon named individuals associated with S/GP and GACC partner organizations identified in organizational reports. The interviewees included individuals from USG agencies, the nonprofit/civil society community, and the private sector.

1 A more expanded discussion of the methodology used in this study can be found in the Technical Report, pages 15-26, available from S/GP.

## INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

### 1. Let's first talk about the Environment For Creating & Sustaining The Alliance: S/GP

There are 2 dimensions of interest to us here: (1.) the critical elements or moments or processes that helped make the Alliance possible and (2.) S/GP's distinctive role in creating & sustaining this and other partnerships?

Key Processes & Enabling Conditions	We know these partnerships are hard to start given fiscal, political, organizational constraints. » Can you describe the process by which the S/GP & Alliance were started & what processes sustained them? » Key enabling conditions? Key events or decisions critical for creating the Alliance & similar partnerships?
Leadership	Was leadership a key element—who were the leaders in creating the S/GP, the Alliance, the partnership model? » Were there specific leadership skills, styles, decisions at critical moments that proved important? » Did leaders have certain qualities—or sources of power and persuasion? Vision? » Network or constellation of personalities?
State Department	What about the State Dept. as an institution and the S/GP office itself—was it a leader agency, a change agent, a catalyst, collaborator, convener? » Has that leadership role of S/GP evolved as the Alliance & other partnerships have become more established? » Did prior experience and planning play a critical role? » What about politics—having a supporter in the Secretary, elsewhere? » Financial drivers? Regulatory environment? Networks? » What about the specificity of the project itself—why was cookstoves selected?
Obstacles/Challenges	What were the most serious obstacles or challenges in the early period—and later? » Why did it “fail” at EPA but not at State? » How conscious were S/GP & Alliance actors in identifying obstacles—challenges or threats to the process, organizational learning (evaluation/adaptation through lessons learned)?
Partnership Model	What about the nature of the partnership model itself and the influence of foreign policy/diplomatic objectives? » Is the Alliance a traditional P3? What are its principle characteristics? » How were original partners found and recruited? Were they critical? <b>How did S/GP give them a stake?</b> » As the partnership has grown, who have been the most pivotal partners and why? » Superficially, it looks like the Alliance got off the ground through lots of help from media and energy sector industries? Is that true? Are those the “go-to” groups for this particular project or are they well-resourced, dependable friends? » Did this partnership initiative interface well with FP objectives—which objectives were prioritized, strategic?

## 2. The S/GP Partnership Process: Defining “Success” & Performance Metrics

Our team has been asked to assess S/GP’s success—how & why S/GP was able to create such a successful partnership in the Alliance. Please share with us your views on whether you see the Alliance as successful, is it indeed an exemplar, what made it so successful, how do you define “success” and what are its measures or “indicators”?

“Success”	<p>What accounts for S/GP’s success with the Alliance? Does that carry over into other partnership initiatives?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» How would you define “success”? What are its metrics/measures/indicators? Who created those standards or measures?</li> <li>» Have conditions at the start changed over the life of the partnership? Is the partnership sustainable and resilient? Are those part of the definition of success?</li> <li>» What role did resource acquisition &amp; management play in S/GP’s process of standing up the Alliance and helping to let it go?</li> <li>» Communication and information sharing play?</li> <li>» How much was the collaborative process (managerial, administrative, M&amp;E, etc.) of establishing the Alliance responsible for its success? Would it have succeeded with a less labor intensive/sophisticated/networked process?</li> <li>» The literature on partnerships and collaborations often focuses on resources, management, communication, process and networks—which were essential to S/GP’s success in building the Alliance?</li> </ul>
State Department FP Goals	<p>How much does success depend upon achieving strategic foreign policy goals or implementing them? Did the Alliance do that? Do those goals shift with new administration/Secretaries? How does S/GP negotiate that?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Have conflicts regarding program goals or implementation ever arisen within the partnership and how are these managed?</li> </ul>
Partnership & Partners	<p>Did State/S/GP need to “sell” its partnership vision to other stakeholders—Congress, federal agencies, other states, private sectors, NGOs? Was that part of its success?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Has S/GP done well attracting partners—numbers, types—to the Alliance essential to its success?</li> </ul>
Leadership	<p>Is the SGP satisfied with its leadership role? Was that preordained or did it make it up as you went along? Did S/GP monitor progress towards its goals as a mark of success?</p>
Resources	<p>A goal identified by the State Dept. has been pooling resources across public, private and civil society sectors to amplify U.S. foreign policy goals of development and democracy. Has the partnership model depended on attracting sufficient partners and resources? Describe the role S/GP played in the process?</p>

## 3. Replicating Successful Partnerships

Our third and last set of questions asks you to help us understand the most important elements or processes in replicating successful partnerships like the Alliance? What are those principle characteristics or processes—and obstacles—that make the partnership model replicable in other programs?

Experience/ Lessons Learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» What specific experiences/lessons learned can S/GP leverage in the creation of new partnerships?</li> <li>» What processes have evolved that can help replicate such a partnership? Are there best practices?</li> </ul>
Conditions for Sustainability	<p>Which enabling conditions &amp; partnership characteristics of the Alliance (discussed above) do you believe are essential to the replication of other successful partnerships?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Was the Alliance a “perfect storm” phenomenon or capable of being reproduced on other issues and initiatives?</li> <li>» Are there significant changes in these conditions that will encourage/threaten the formation of future partnerships?</li> <li>» Does S/GP have a selection process for building future partnerships?</li> </ul>
Partnership	<p>What aspects of the creation of partnerships in the pursuit of SGP/State goals would be critical?</p>
Leadership	<p>In your opinion, are there particular leaders (or leadership types) that must be associated with future partnership endeavors?</p>
Resources	<p>Is resource acquisition (both “startup” and long-term) an issue of concern with respect to replicability?</p>



## **MATERIALS EXAMINED IN COURSE OF STUDY**

### **GACC PARTNER ANNOUNCEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS**

- Advancing Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves Commitment by Dow Corning Corporation. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/advancing-global-alliance-clean-cookstoves>
- Andrew MacCalla. (2014, September 26). Innovative Finance for Clean Energy in Ghana Commitment by E+Co., Inc., Toyola Energy Limited. Retrieved from <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/innovative-finance-clean-energy-ghana>
- Calvert Foundation. (2014). Investment in Women: Empowerment Through Clean Energy Commitment by the Calvert Foundation. Retrieved from <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/investing-women-empowerment-through-clean-energy>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves Partners with Deutsche Bank to Help Mobilize \$100 Million of New Investment to Help Scale Clean Cooking Sector. (2014, September 24). Retrieved from <http://www.cleancookstoves.org/media-and-events/press/alliance-deutsche-bank-mobilize-investment.html>
- OPIC & GE Finance Clean Cookstove Project in East Africa. (2013, January 31). Retrieved from <http://www.opic.gov/press-releases/2013/opic-ge-finance-clean-cookstove-project-east-africa>
- Scaling Up Adoption of Clean & Efficient Cookstoves Commitment by United Nations Foundation, World Health Organization, Royal Dutch Shell, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of State. (2010). Retrieved from <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/scaling-adoption-clean-efficient-cookstoves>
- Statement by Durwood Zaelke, President, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development (IGSD). (2014, September 23). Retrieved from <http://www.unep.org/ccac/Portals/50162/docs/Durwood%20Zaelke,%20IGSD.pdf>
- The Partnership For Clean Indoor Air - Legacy Website. (n.d.). Retrieved August 17, 2015, from <http://www.pciaonline.org/>
- The United States and the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves : Fact Sheet. (2010, September 21). Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147490.htm>

### **COLLABORATION LITERATURE**

- Amirkhanyan, A. A. (2009). Collaborative Performance Measurement: Examining and Explaining the Prevalence of Collaboration in State and Local Government Contracts. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(3), 523–554. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun022>
- Andrews, R., & Entwistle, T. (2010). Does Cross-Sectoral Partnership Deliver? An Empirical Exploration of Public Service Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Equity. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(3), 679–701. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup045>
- Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth. (2011). Advancing Collaboration Practice - Fact Sheet 14 - Collaborative competencies capabilities. ARACY. Retrieved from <http://www.aracy.org.au/publications-resources/area?command=record&id=33&cid=6>
- Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth. (2013). What is Collaboration? Fact Sheet 1. ARACY. Retrieved from [http://www.aracy.org.au/publications-resources/command/download\\_file/id/230/filename/Advancing\\_Collaboration\\_Practice\\_-\\_Fact\\_Sheet\\_1\\_-\\_What\\_is\\_collaboration.PDF](http://www.aracy.org.au/publications-resources/command/download_file/id/230/filename/Advancing_Collaboration_Practice_-_Fact_Sheet_1_-_What_is_collaboration.PDF)
- Brown, L. D., & Ashman, D. (1996). Participation, social capital, and intersectoral problem solving: African and Asian cases. *World Development*, 24(9), 1467–1479. [http://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(96\)00053-8](http://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(96)00053-8)
- Bryer, T. A. (2009). Explaining Responsiveness in Collaboration: Administrator and Citizen Role Perceptions. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), 271–283. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01973.x>
- Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 44–55. <http://doi.org/10.1111/>
- Carpenter, R. C. (2011). Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms. *International Organization*, 65(1), 69–102.
- Chen, B. (2010). Antecedents or Processes? Determinants of Perceived Effectiveness of Interorganizational Collaborations for Public Service Delivery. *International Public Management Journal*, 13(4), 381–407. <http://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2010.524836>

- Chen, Y.-C., & Hsieh, J.-Y. (2009). Advancing E-Governance: Comparing Taiwan and the United States. *Public Administration Review*, 69, S151–S158. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02103.x>
- Choi, S., & Rainey, H. G. (2010). Managing Diversity in U.S. Federal Agencies: Effects of Diversity and Diversity Management on Employee Perceptions of Organizational Performance. *Public Administration Review*, 70(1), 109–121. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02115.x>
- Connelly, N. A., & Knuth, B. A. (2002). Using the Coorientation Model to Compare Community Leaders' and Local Residents' Views About Hudson River Ecosystem Restoration. *Society & Natural Resources*, 15(10), 933–948. <http://doi.org/10.1080/08941920290107666>
- Corley, E. A., & Sabharwal, M. (2010). Scholarly Collaboration and Productivity Patterns in Public Administration: Analyzing Recent Trends. *Public Administration*, 88(3), 627–648. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01830.x>
- Crosby, B. C., & Bryson, J. M. (2010a). Integrative leadership and the creation and maintenance of cross-sector collaborations. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 21(2), 211–230. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.01.003>
- Crosby, B. C., & Bryson, J. M. (2010b). Integrative leadership and the creation and maintenance of cross-sector collaborations. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 21(2), 211–230. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.01.003>
- Cunningham, R., Olshfski, D., & Abdelrazek, R. (2009). Paradoxes of Collaboration Managerial Decision Styles. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 29(1), 58–75. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X08326434>
- Daley, D. M. (2009). Interdisciplinary Problems and Agency Boundaries: Exploring Effective Cross-Agency Collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(3), 477–493. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun020>
- Dawes, S. S., Cresswell, A. M., & Pardo, T. A. (2009). From “Need to Know” to “Need to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public Sector Knowledge Networks. *Public Administration Review*, 69(3), 392–402. [http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01987\\_2.x](http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01987_2.x)
- Diefenbach, T. (2009). New Public Management in Public Sector Organizations: The Dark Sides of Managerialistic “enlightenment.” *Public Administration*, 87(4), 892–909. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01766.x>
- Donahue, J. D. (2010). The Race: Can Collaboration Outrun Rivalry between American Business and Government? *Public Administration Review*, 70, s151–s152. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02259.x>
- Dudau, A. I., & McAllister, L. (2010). Developing Collaborative Capabilities by Fostering Diversity in Organizations. *Public Management Review*, 12(3), 385–402. <http://doi.org/10.1080/14719030903286623>
- Feiock, R. C., Steinacker, A., & Park, H. J. (2009). Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), 256–270. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01972.x>
- Feldman, M. S. (2010). Managing the Organization of the Future. *Public Administration Review*, 70, s159–s163. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02262.x>
- Fuller, B. W., & Vu, K. M. (2011). Exploring the dynamics of policy interaction: Feedback among and impacts from multiple, concurrently applied policy approaches for promoting collaboration. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 30(2), 359–380. <http://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20572>
- Garrett, T. M. (2010). Interorganizational Collaboration and the Transition to the Department of Homeland Security A Knowledge Analytic Interpretation. *Administration & Society*, 42(3), 343–360. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399710362718>
- Gazley, B., Chang, W. K., & Bingham, L. B. (2010). Board Diversity, Stakeholder Representation, and Collaborative Performance in Community Mediation Centers. *Public Administration Review*, 70(4), 610–620. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02182.x>
- GETHA-TAYLOR, H. (2012). Cross-Sector Understanding and Trust. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 36(2), 216–229. <http://doi.org/10.2307/23484718>
- Getha-Taylor, H., Holmes, M. H., Jacobson, W. S., Morse, R. S., & Sowa, J. E. (2011). Focusing the Public Leadership Lens: Research Propositions and Questions in the Minnowbrook Tradition. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(suppl 1), i83–i97. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq069>
- Hibbert, P., & Huxham, C. (2010). The Past in Play: Tradition in the Structures of Collaboration. *Organization Studies*, 31(5), 525–554. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610372203>
- Himmelman, A. (2002). Collaboration for a Change, Definitions, Decision-making models, Roles, and Collaboration Process Guide. Himmelman Consulting. Retrieved from [http://depts.washington.edu/ccph/pdf\\_files/4achange.pdf](http://depts.washington.edu/ccph/pdf_files/4achange.pdf)

- Himmelman, A. T. (1992). *Communities working collaboratively for a change*, vol. Presented at the Minneapolis, MN:: The Himmelman Consulting Group. Retrieved from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/showciting?cid=743286>
- Hui, G., & Hayllar, M. R. (2010). Creating Public Value in E-Government: A Public-Private-Citizen Collaboration Framework in Web 2.0. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 69, S120–S131. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2009.00662.x>
- Huxham, C., & Hibbert, P. (2011). Use Matters ... and Matters of Use. *Public Management Review*, 13(2), 273–291. <http://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2010.532964>
- Jacobs, K. (2010). The Politics of Partnerships: A Study of Police and Housing Collaboration to Tackle Anti-Social Behaviour on Australian Public Housing Estates. *Public Administration*, 88(4), 928–942. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01851.x>
- Jill Hooks, & Nitha Palakshappa. (2009). Co-operation and collaboration: the case of the de-regulated New Zealand electricity industry. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 22(4), 292–309. <http://doi.org/10.1108/09513550910961583>
- Jing, Y., & Savas, E. S. (2009). Managing Collaborative Service Delivery: Comparing China and the United States. *Public Administration Review*, 69, S101–S107. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02096.x>
- Johnston, E. W., Hicks, D., Nan, N., & Auer, J. C. (2010). Managing the Inclusion Process in Collaborative Governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, muq045. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq045>
- Jones, H. (2011). A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence | Publication | Overseas Development Institute (ODI). ODI Annual Reports. Retrieved from <http://www.odi.org/publications/5252-monitoring-evaluation-me-policy-influence>
- Keast, R., Brown, K., & Mandell, M. (2007). Getting The Right Mix: Unpacking Integration Meanings and Strategies. *International Public Management Journal*, 10(1), 9–33. <http://doi.org/10.1080/10967490601185716>
- Keast, R., & Chamberlain, D. (2014). Course: Collaboration – Decision Support Tool. Southern Cross University. Retrieved from <http://etraining.communitydoor.org.au/course/view.php?id=15>
- Keast, R., Glasby, J., & Brown, K. (2009). Inter-agency working: good intentions and interaction dynamics. 13th International Research Society for Public Management Conference (IRSPM XIII). Retrieved from [http://epubs.scu.edu.au/bus\\_pubs/794](http://epubs.scu.edu.au/bus_pubs/794)
- Keast, R., Mandell, M. P., Brown, K., & Woolcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. *Public Administration Review*, 64(3), 363–371.
- Konrad, E. L. (1996). A multidimensional framework for conceptualizing human services integration initiatives. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 1996(69), 5–19. <http://doi.org/10.1002/ev.1024>
- Kosar, K. R. (2010). Collaborative Democracy on the Move. *Public Administration Review*, 70(4), 656–660. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02193.x>
- Kurt Thurmaier, Y.-C. C. (2009). Managing for Less: The Fiscal Attributes of Collaboration, 753.
- Kwon, S.-W., & Feiock, R. C. (2010). Overcoming the Barriers to Cooperation: Intergovernmental Service Agreements. *Public Administration Review*, 70(6), 876–884. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02219.x>
- Lathrop, D., & Ruma, L. (2010). *Open government*. Beijing; Cambridge [Mass.]: O'Reilly.
- LeRoux, K., Brandenburger, P. W., & Pandey, S. K. (2010). Interlocal Service Cooperation in U.S. Cities: A Social Network Explanation. *Public Administration Review*, 70(2), 268–278. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02133.x>
- Lips, A. M. B., O'Neill, R. R., & Eppel, E. A. (2011). Cross-Agency Collaboration in New Zealand: An Empirical Study of Information Sharing Practices, Enablers and Barriers in Managing for Shared Social Outcomes. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 34(4), 255–266. <http://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2010.533571>
- Mandell, M., & Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating Network Arrangements: Toward Revised Performance Measures. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 30(4), 574–597.
- Marek, L. I., Brock, D.-J. P., & Savla, J. (2014). Evaluating Collaboration for Effectiveness Conceptualization and Measurement. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 1098214014531068. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1098214014531068>
- Matthew A. Koschmann, T. R. K. (2012). A Communicative Framework of Value in Cross-Sector Partnerships. *The Academy of Management Review*, 37(3), 332–354. <http://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0314>
- McGuire, M., & Silvia, C. (2010). The Effect of Problem Severity, Managerial and Organizational Capacity, and Agency Structure on Intergovernmental Collaboration: Evidence from Local Emergency Management. *Public Administration Review*, 70(2), 279–288. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02134.x>



- Mullin, M., & Daley, D. M. (2010). Working with the State: Exploring Interagency Collaboration within a Federalist System. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(4), 757–778. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup029>
- Murphy, M., Perrot, F., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2012). New perspectives on learning and innovation in cross-sector collaborations. *Journal of Business Research*, 65(12), 1700–1709. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.02.011>
- Naff, K. C. (2009). Nancy Alfaro as an Exemplary Collaborative Public Manager: How Customer Service Was Aligned with Customer Needs. *Public Administration Review*, 69(3), 487–493. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01994.x>
- Nowell, B. (2010). Out of Sync and Unaware? Exploring the Effects of Problem Frame Alignment and Discordance in Community Collaboratives. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(1), 91–116. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup006>
- O’Leary, R. (2010). Guerrilla Employees: Should Managers Nurture, Tolerate, or Terminate Them? *Public Administration Review*, 70(1), 8–19. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02104.x>
- O’Leary, R., & Bingham, L. (2009). *The collaborative public manager: new ideas for the twenty-first century*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- O’Leary, R., Choi, Y., & Gerard, C. M. (2012). The Skill Set of the Successful Collaborator. *Public Administration Review*, 72(s1), S70–S83. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02667.x>
- O’Leary, R., & Gerard, C. M. (2012). Collaboration Across Boundaries: Insights and Tips from Federal Senior Executives. The IBM Center for the Business of Government. Retrieved from <http://businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Collaboration%20Across%20Boundaries.pdf>
- O’Leary, R., & Gerard, C. M. (2014). Collaboration as a Management and Leadership Strategy for Local Governments: Fad or Future? *Government Finance Review*, 30–38.
- O’Leary, R., & Van Slyke, D. M. (2010). Introduction to the Symposium on the Future of Public Administration in 2020. *Public Administration Review*, 70, s5–s11. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02241.x>
- Olivier Boiral, M. C. (2009). The Action Logics of Environmental Leadership: A Developmental Perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 85(4), 479–499. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9784-2>
- Ongaro, E. (Ed.). (2010). *Governance and intergovernmental relations in the European Union and the United States: theoretical perspectives*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Raynor, J. (2011, March). What Makes an Effective Coalition? Evidence-Based Indicators of Success. TCC Group for The California Endowment. Retrieved from [http://www.mcf.org/system/article\\_resources/0000/1297/What\\_Makes\\_an\\_Effective\\_Coalition.pdf](http://www.mcf.org/system/article_resources/0000/1297/What_Makes_an_Effective_Coalition.pdf)
- Rethemeyer, R. K. (2009). Making Sense of Collaboration and Governance: Issues and Challenges. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 32(4), 565–573. <http://doi.org/10.2753/PMR1530-9576320405>
- Richey, L. A., & Ponte, S. (2014). New actors and alliances in development. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(1), 1–21. <http://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.868979>
- Ritchey, T. (2011). *Wicked Problems - Social Messes*. Springer. Retrieved from <http://www.alibris.com/Wicked-Problems-Social-Messes-Tom-Ritchey/book/28654679>
- Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences*, 4 (1973), 155–169.
- Røiseland, A. (2011). Understanding Local Governance: Institutional Forms of Collaboration. *Public Administration*, 89(3), 879–893. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01887.x>
- Romzek, B., LeRoux, K., Johnston, J., Kempf, R. J., & Piatak, J. S. (2013). Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, mut027. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut027>
- Saz-Carranza, A., & Ospina, S. M. (2011). The Behavioral Dimension of Governing Interorganizational Goal-Directed Networks—Managing the Unity-Diversity Tension. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(2), 327–365. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq050>
- Smith, C. R. (2009). Institutional Determinants of Collaboration: An Empirical Study of County Open-Space Protection. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(1), 1–21. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum037>
- Solansky, S. T., & Beck, T. E. (2009). Enhancing Community Safety and Security Through Understanding Interagency Collaboration in Cyber-Terrorism Exercises. *Administration & Society*, 40(8), 852–875. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399708326345>

- Stalebrink, O. J. (2009). National Performance Mandates and Intergovernmental Collaboration An Examination of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). *The American Review of Public Administration*, 39(6), 619–639. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074008326589>
- Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L., & Miller, T. K. (2009). Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(1), 23–56. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum036>
- Turrini, A., Cristofoli, D., Frosini, F., & Nasi, G. (2010). Networking Literature About Determinants of Network Effectiveness. *Public Administration*, 88(2), 528–550. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01791.x>
- Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2011). The Tangled Web: Unraveling the Principle of Common Goals in Collaborations. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, mur065. <http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur065>
- Monitoring and Evaluation NEWS » Blog Archive » A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://mande.co.uk/2011/uncategorized/a-guide-to-monitoring-and-evaluating-policy-influence/>
- Using private investor capital to increase NGO impact: a framework and key considerations to facilitate engagement: PSI. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.psi.org/publication/using-private-investor-capital-to-increase-ngo-impact-a-framework-and-key-considerations-to-facilitate-engagement/>
- Vogel, R. (2010). Parallel, Transfer or Collaboration Strategy of Relating Theory to Practice? A Case Study of Public Management Debate in Germany. *Public Administration*, 88(3), 680–705. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01828.x>
- Weber, E. P. (2009). Explaining Institutional Change in Tough Cases of Collaboration: “Ideas” in the Blackfoot Watershed. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), 314–327. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01976.x>
- Weible, C. M., & Moore, R. H. (2010). Analytics and Beliefs: Competing Explanations for Defining Problems and Choosing Allies and Opponents in Collaborative Environmental Management. *Public Administration Review*, 70(5), 756–766. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02203.x>
- Wenger, E., Trayner, B., & de Laat, M. (2011). Promoting and assessing value creation in communities and networks: a conceptual framework (No. Report 18) (pp. 1–51). Netherlands: Open Universiteit. Retrieved from <http://wenger-trayner.com/resources/publications/evaluation-framework/>
- Whitford, A. B., Lee, S.-Y., Yun, T., & Jung, C. S. (2010). Collaborative Behavior and the Performance of Government Agencies. *International Public Management Journal*, 13(4), 321–349. <http://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2010.529378>
- Wilson-Grau, R., & Nuñez, M. (2007). Evaluating International Social-Change Networks: A Conceptual Framework for a Participatory Approach. *Development in Practice*, 17(2), 258–271.
- Woodland, R. H., & Hutton, M. S. (2012). Evaluating Organizational Collaborations Suggested Entry Points and Strategies. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 33(3), 366–383. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1098214012440028>

### **P3 LITERATURE BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Ashraf, N., Meschi, P.-X., & Spencer, R. (2014). Alliance Network Position, Embeddedness and Effects on the Carbon Performance of Firms in Emerging Economies. *Organization & Environment*, 27(1), 65–84. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1086026613519330>
- Bhagat, V., & Skromne, A. (2011). Natural Allies: The Government and the Private Sector Need Each Other to Advance the Climate Agenda. *Handshake, IFCs Quarterly Journal on Public-Private Partnerships*, (2), 6–12.
- Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2005). 9 Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Transnational Governance? ResearchGate. Retrieved from [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228616335\\_9\\_Public-Private\\_Partnerships\\_Effective\\_and\\_Legitimate\\_Tools\\_of\\_Transnational\\_Governance](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228616335_9_Public-Private_Partnerships_Effective_and_Legitimate_Tools_of_Transnational_Governance)
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2011). Public-private partnerships: Perspectives on purposes, publicness, and good governance. *Public Administration and Development*, 31(1), 2–14. <http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.584>
- Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Assessing and improving partnership relationships and outcomes: a proposed framework. *Evaluation and Program Planning*, 25(3), 215–231. [http://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-7189\(02\)00017-4](http://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-7189(02)00017-4)
- Coca-Cola Company, & World Wildlife Fund. (2013). Annual Review 2013 Partnering to Protect Our Freshwater Resources - Annual Report (Annual Report). Retrieved from <http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/708/files/original/2013-coca-cola-and-wwf-annual-partnership-review-basic.PDF?1405106064>
- Custos, D., & Reitz, J. (2010). Public-Private Partnerships. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 58, 555–584.

- Engel, E., Fischer, R., & Galetovic, A. (2011, February). Public-Private Partnerships to Revamp U.S. Infrastructure. The Hamilton Project. Retrieved from [http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\\_and\\_links/Final\\_BRIEF\\_ENGEL\\_Feb2011.pdf](http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/Final_BRIEF_ENGEL_Feb2011.pdf)
- Engel, E., Fischer, R., & Galetovic, A. (2013). The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(1), 83–111. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01105.x>
- Farquharson, E., Torres de Mästle, C., Yescombe, E. R., World Bank, & Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. (2011). How to engage with the private sector in public-private partnerships in emerging markets. Washington, DC: World Bank : Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.
- Forrer, J., Kee, J. E., Newcomer, K. E., & Boyer, E. (2010). Public-Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question. *Public Administration Review*, 70(3), 475–484. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02161.x>
- FPD Network & World Bank Institute. (2013, July 17). Implementing a Framework for Managing Fiscal Commitments From Public Private Partnerships | World Bank Institute (WBI). The World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/document/implementing-framework-managing-fiscal-commitments-public-private-partnerships>
- Gold, J. (2013). Designing a multi-stakeholder results framework: a toolkit to guide participatory diagnostics and planning for stronger results and effectiveness (No. 84383) (pp. 1–78). The World Bank. Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18882074/designing-multi-stakeholder-results-framework-toolkit-guide-participatory-diagnostics-planning-stronger-results-effectiveness#>
- Grimsey, D. (2005). Infrastructure public private partnerships. *Public Infrastructure Bulletin*, 1(5). Retrieved from <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/pib/vol1/iss5/7>
- Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2007). *Public private partnerships: the worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. K. (2005). Are Public Private Partnerships value for money?: Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views. *Accounting Forum*, 29(4), 345–378. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2005.01.001>
- Grossman, S. A. (2012). Introduction: The Emerging Role of Partnership Governance (II). *Public Performance & Management Review*, 36(2), 183–186. <http://doi.org/10.2307/23484715>
- Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization*, 46(1), 1–35.
- Herzberg, B. (2008, June). The Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook for Business Environment Reform. World Bank Group. Retrieved from [http://www.publicprivatedialogue.org/monitoring\\_and\\_evaluation/M&E%20Handbook%20July%2016%202008.pdf](http://www.publicprivatedialogue.org/monitoring_and_evaluation/M&E%20Handbook%20July%2016%202008.pdf)
- Hodge, G. A., & Greve, C. (2007). Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review. *Public Administration Review*, 67(3), 545–558. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00736.x>
- IASC Task Team on Humanitarian Financing. (2014, October). Best Practices to Accelerate Implementatin IASC Task Team.pdf. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Retrieved from <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/Best%20Practices%20to%20Accelerate%20Implementatin%20IASC%20Task%20Team.pdf>
- IEG World Bank. (2013). World Bank Group Support to Public-Private Partnerships (Approach Paper). IEG World Bank. Retrieved from <https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/world-bank-group-support-ppp>
- International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, & Inter-American Development Bank. (2004). Resource Book on PPP Case Studies. Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppresourcebook.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppresourcebook.pdf)
- International Finance Corporation. (2011). Health PPPs. Handshake, IFCs Quarterly Journal on Public-Private Partnerships, (3).
- Jing, Y., & Besharov, D. J. (2014). Collaboration Among Government, Market, and Society: Forging Partnerships and Encouraging Competition. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 33(3), 835–842. <http://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21772>
- Kim, J.-H. (2007). Performance Evaluation and Best Practice of Public-Private Partnerships | PPP Resources | World Bank. In Performance Evaluation and Best Practice of Public-Private Partnerships. Korea Development Institute. Retrieved from <http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/performance-evaluation-and-best-practice-public-private-partnerships>
- Martens, J. (2007). Multistakeholder Partnerships - Future Models of Multilateralism? ResearchGate, Occasional Papers, No. 29. Retrieved from [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237449360\\_Multistakeholder\\_Partnerships\\_-\\_Future\\_Models\\_of\\_Multilateralism](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237449360_Multistakeholder_Partnerships_-_Future_Models_of_Multilateralism)



- Martin, M. H., & Halachmi, A. (2012). Public-Private Partnerships in Global Health: Addressing Issues of Public Accountability, risk Management and Governance. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 36(2), 189–237.
- McKinsey & Company (2009, December). Public-private partnerships: Enabling the private sector to enhance social impact. McKinsey & Company. Retrieved from <http://mckinseysociety.com/public-private-partnerships-harnessing-the-private-sectors-unique-ability-to-enhance-social-impact/>
- Mendel, S. C., & Brudney, J. L. (2012). Putting the NP in PPP: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Public-Private Partnerships. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 35(4), 617–642. <http://doi.org/10.2307/23484758>
- Mu, R., Jong, M. de, & Koppenjan, J. (2011). The rise and fall of Public-Private Partnerships in China: a path-dependent approach. *Journal of Transport Geography*, 19(4), 794–806. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2010.10.002>
- Noble, G., & Jones, R. (2006). The Role of Boundary-Spanning Managers in the Establishment of Public-Private Partnerships. *Public Administration*, 84(4), 891–917. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00617.x>
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). *Public-private partnerships: in pursuit of risk sharing and value for money*. Paris: OECD.
- Organizational Resource Services. (2004). *Practical Guide To Documenting Influence And Leverage In Making Connections Communities*. Retrieved from <http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-MC-PracticalGuideToDocumentingInfluenceAndLeverage-InMakingConnectionsCommunities-2004.pdf>
- Paas, L., & Parry, J.-E. (2012, February). *Understanding Communities of Practice: An Overview for Adaptation Practitioners*. International Institute for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from [http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/understanding\\_communities\\_practice.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/understanding_communities_practice.pdf)
- Papadopoulus, Y. (2013). *The challenge of transnational private governance: Evaluating authorization, representation, and accountability*. Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire D'évaluation Des Politiques Publiques, LIEPP Working Paper No. 8. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencespo.fr/liepp/sites/sciencespo.fr/liepp/files/WP8.pdf>
- Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011). Clearing a Path Through the Forest: A Meta-Review of Interorganizational Relationships. *Journal of Management*, 37(4), 1108–1136. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311407507>
- Raymond, P. D. (2010, June). *Public-private partnerships: The US perspective*. Price Waterhouse Coopers. Retrieved from <http://www.pwc.com/us/en/capital-projects-infrastructure/publications/public-private-partnerships.jhtml>
- Richey, L. A., & Ponte, S. (2014). New actors and alliances in development. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(1), 1–21. <http://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.868979>
- Roberts, D., Fisher, S., Hill, D., & Gold, J. (2014). *Outcome-based learning field guide : tools to harvest and monitor outcomes and systematically learn from complex projects (No. 90176) (pp. 1–92)*. The World Bank. Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/20148635/outcome-based-learning-field-guide-tools-harvest-monitor-outcomes-systematically-learn-complex-projects>
- Rufin, C., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2012). Between Commonweal and Competition Understanding the Governance of Public-Private Partnerships. *Journal of Management*, 38(5), 1634–1654. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310373948>
- Saragiotis, P. (2008). *Public-private partnerships in infrastructure days 2008 (No. 53616) (pp. 1–124)*. The World Bank. Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/12/11989797/public-private-partnerships-infrastructure-days-2008>
- Schäferhoff, M., Campe, S., & Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results. *International Studies Review*, 11(3), 451–474. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00869.x>
- Selsky, J. W., & Parker, B. (2005). Cross-Sector Partnerships to Address Social Issues: Challenges to Theory and Practice. *Journal of Management*, 31(6), 849–873. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206305279601>
- Tang, L., Shen, Q., & Cheng, E. W. L. (2010). A review of studies on Public-Private Partnership projects in the construction industry. *International Journal of Project Management*, 28(7), 683–694. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.11.009>
- Taschereau, S., & Bolger, J. (2007). *Reflection Networks and capacity*. Proceedings of the European Center for Development Policy Management. Retrieved from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/CapacityChangePerformanceReport.pdf>
- Teisman, G. R., & Klijn, E.-H. (2002). Partnership Arrangements: Governmental Rhetoric or Governance Scheme? *Public Administration Review*, 62(2), 197–205.

- The World Bank. (2012a). *Public-Private-Partnerships-Reference-Guide.pdf*. The World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/Public-Private-Partnerships-Reference-Guide.pdf>
- The World Bank. (2012b, December). *Guide to Evaluating Capacity Development Results*. The World Bank Institute. Retrieved from [http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Guide%20to%20Evaluating%20Capacity%20Development%20Results\\_0.pdf](http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Guide%20to%20Evaluating%20Capacity%20Development%20Results_0.pdf)
- The World Bank. (2014, June). *Cases in Outcome Harvesting | World Bank Institute (WBI)*. The World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/document/cases-outcome-harvesting>
- Van Gestel, K., Voets, J., & Verhoest, K. (2012). *How Governance of Complex PPPs Affects Performance*. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 36(2), 140–188.
- Velotti, L., & Botti, A. (2012). *Public-Private Partnerships and Network Governance*. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 36(2), 340–365. <http://doi.org/10.2307/23484724>
- Vining, A. R., & Boardman, A. E. (2008). *Public—Private Partnerships Eight Rules for Governments*. *Public Works Management & Policy*, 13(2), 149–161. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1087724X08323843>
- Waddell, S., & Brown, L. D. (1997). *Fostering Intersectoral Partnering: A Guide to Promoting Cooperation Among Government, Business, and Civil Society Actors*. IRD Report, 13(3). Retrieved from [http://commdev.org/files/1305\\_file\\_fostering\\_intersectoral\\_partnering.pdf](http://commdev.org/files/1305_file_fostering_intersectoral_partnering.pdf)
- Wang, Y. (2009). *A Broken Fantasy of Public–Private Partnerships*. *Public Administration Review*, 69(4), 779–782. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02025.x>
- World Bank. (2010, March). *WBI Brochure: Focus on Public-Private Partnerships | World Bank Institute (WBI)*. The World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/document/public-private-partnerships-brochure>
- World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. (2004). *Monitoring and Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods and Approaches*. The International Bank for Reconstruction. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org/oed/ecd/tools/>

## **UNF/GACC REPORTS**

- Biello, D. (2014). *Ethanol Scheme to Clean Air in Billions of Kitchens Goes Up in Smoke*. *Scientific American*. Retrieved from <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ethanol-scheme-to-clean-air-in-billions-of-kitchens-goes-up-in-smoke/>
- Cordes, L. (2011). *Igniting Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels (Progress Report)*. Washington, DC USA: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/resources/272.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (2013). *Results Report 2012: Sharing Progress on the Path to Adoption of Clean Cooking Solutions (Full Report) (Progress Report)*. Washington, D.C.: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/resources/221.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (2014a). *2013 Results Report: Sharing Partner Progress on the Path to Adoption of Clean Cooking Solutions (Progress Report)*. Washington, D.C.: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/resources/285.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (2014b). *Cookstoves Futures Summit Report (News Report)*. Washington, DC USA: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/about/news/12-02-2014-cookstoves-future-summit-report-available.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (2014c). *Market Enabling Roadmap, Phase 2, 2015-2017*. Washington, D.C.: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/about/news/11-20-2014-market-enabling-roadmap-phase-2-2015-2017.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (2014d). *The Alliance Phase I Report: Fueling Markets, Catalyzing Action, Changing Lives (Progress Report)*. Washington, D.C.: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from <http://cleancookstoves.org/resources/283.html>
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (n.d.-a). *2012-2013 Developing Markets Worldwide (Progress Report)*. Washington, D.C.: Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. Retrieved from [http://cleancookstoves.org/resources\\_files/third-annual-report-developing-markets.pdf](http://cleancookstoves.org/resources_files/third-annual-report-developing-markets.pdf)
- Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. (n.d.-b). *Global Alliance For Clean Cookstoves: Mission Statement*. Retrieved August 17, 2015, from <http://cleancookstoves.org/about/our-mission/>

## US STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATIONS

- Balderston, K., & Faiz, L. (2012). Accelerating the Impact Economy Through Investment and Innovation (SSIR). Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from [http://ssir.org/articles/entry/at\\_the\\_state\\_dept.\\_contributing\\_to\\_an\\_impact\\_economy](http://ssir.org/articles/entry/at_the_state_dept._contributing_to_an_impact_economy)
- Balderston, K., & Moss, J. (2012, December 14). Cooking Shouldn't Kill. Retrieved from <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/12/14/cooking-shouldnt-kill#sthash.u3dS2u7l.dpuf>
- Calvin, K. Achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals: Progress Through Partnerships, Pub. L. No. 57-686 S Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (2010). Washington, DC USA: US Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hrg57686/pdf/CHRG-111hrg57686.pdf>
- Clinton, H. (2009, April). 2009\_GPF\_ConferenceTranscriptBook\_FINAL.pdf. Address to Global Philanthropy Forum presented at the Global Philanthropy Forum Conference 2009, San Francisco, CA. Retrieved from [http://philanthropyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2009\\_GPF\\_ConferenceTranscriptBook\\_FINAL.pdf](http://philanthropyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2009_GPF_ConferenceTranscriptBook_FINAL.pdf)
- Clinton, H. (2012a, February). Remarks at the Climate and Clean Air Coalition To Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants Initiative. Remarks|Remarks presented at the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Washington, DC USA. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184061.htm>
- Clinton, H. (2012b, April). Secretary Clinton at Global Impact Economy Forum. Transcript presented at the Global Impact Economy Forum, Washington, DC USA. Retrieved from <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/04/201204264618.html?distid=ucs#ixzz3FQDUeksl>
- Clinton, H. R. (2010). Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development. *Foreign Affairs*, 89(6), 13–24.
- Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, B. of P. A. (2008a). A Call to Action: The Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (ACTD) (Final Report No. State Department Publication 11484). US State Department. Retrieved from <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/diplomacy/99800.htm>
- Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, B. of P. A. (2008b). Final Report: The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (Final Report). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2007). FY 2007-2012 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan (Strategic plan). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/doss-trat/2007/>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2010a). Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (Press Release). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/cleancookstoves/>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2010b). The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Policy review). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2011). The United States Commitment to the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: Year One Progress Report (Press Release|Fact Sheet). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/173774.htm>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2012a). The Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (Press Release|Fact Sheet). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184055.htm>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2012b). The United States Commitment to the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves - Year Two Progress Report (Press Release|Fact Sheet). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198181.htm>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2013). The United States' Commitment to the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves: Year Three Progress Report (Press Release|Fact Sheet). Washington, DC USA: U. S. Department of State. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214799.htm>
- Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2014). State of Global Partnerships (Report). Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/releases/reports/2014/224096.htm>



Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A. (2015, April 28). The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2015/index.htm>

Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, B. of P. A., & Senior Official. (2012, February 16). Briefing on Global Climate Change and Clean Air Initiative. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184042.htm>

Francis, D. (2009). The State Department's Public-Private Matchmaker. DevEx. Retrieved from <https://www.devex.com/news/the-state-department-s-public-private-matchmaker-59312>

Kanter, R. M., & Malone, A.-L. J. (2012). Hillary Clinton & Partners: Leading Global Social Change from the US State Department. Harvard Business School Case Studies, 9-313-086.

Kris Balderston. (2012). Creating Value Through Uncommon Alliances (SSIR). Stanford Social Innovation Review, 23–24.

Marian Lawson. (2011, June 13). Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) - R41880.pdf. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41880.pdf>

Moss, J. (2010, November). Cookstoves and Black Carbon Senate Briefing. Senate Briefing, Washington, DC USA.

Moss, J., & Walker, J. (2013, January 30). State Dept Flagship Partnership Reaches Key Milestones. Retrieved from <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2013/01/14/flagship-partnerships-reach-key-milestones>

Office of Global Partnerships. (2012, September 2). 2014 P3 Impact Award Finalists - Fact Sheet. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/releases/fs/2014/231226.htm>

The White House. (2009, June 4). Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04-09. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>

US Department of State. (2011, February). United States Department of State Policy Framework and Legal Guidelines for Partnerships. US Department of State.

# SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

---

## **INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM**

300 Dineen Hall  
SU College of Law  
Syracuse, NY 13244  
[insct@syr.edu](mailto:insct@syr.edu)  
[insct.syr.edu](http://insct.syr.edu)  
315.443.2288

## **MOYNIHAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS**

346 Eggers Hall  
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs  
Syracuse, NY 13244  
[maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan](http://maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan)  
315.443.4022