Defense Policy

In Memoriam: Montgomery Meigs, Retired General and Former Bantle Chair

Gen. Montgomery Meigs
Gen. Montgomery Meigs (Ret.) at the 2013 Defense Strategies “Staff Ride” to Gettysburg.

Montgomery C. Meigs, a retired four-star general who commanded U.S. Army forces in Europe and served as the Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and Government Policy at the Maxwell School, died on July 6, 2021, in Austin, Texas. He was 76.

Meigs joined the Maxwell faculty in 2004, one year after it partnered with the College of Law to form the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT)–now known as the Institute for Security Policy and Law. He served as a senior faculty advisor for INSCT, where he taught History of American Strategic Practice, a cornerstone of its certificate programs.

In a 2006 interview, Meigs said the institute creates a “focus for students interested in this important new branch of national security studies, and for faculty seeking sponsorship for related research projects.” He added, “It’s also crucial as a place for alumni and for foundations who recognize the importance of these issues and who are interested in contributing direct support to this type of study.”

William Banks, professor emeritus of public administration and international affairs at the Maxwell School and College of Law Board of Advisors Distinguished Professor, was the founding director of the INSCT. He says Meigs was of “tremendous importance” in guiding the Maxwell School’s role in the partnership.

“Upon his arrival in Syracuse, Monty and I quickly recognized our shared interests, became friends, and worked hard to stitch together the interdisciplinary partnership in national security studies between Maxwell and Law,” says Banks. “Together, Monty and I orchestrated INSCT-Bantle symposia on cutting edge counterterrorism topics, developed a lasting partnership with the Interdisciplinary Institute in Herzliya, Israel and planned and delivered advanced coursework for graduate and law students interested in obtaining certificates of advanced study in our field.”

Adds Banks, “Monty was energetic but wise and prudent in his judgments and recommendations. He was of tremendous value to me as a mentor, colleague and friend.”

Not long after his arrival at the University, Meigs was named director of the Department of Defense’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, a role that had him reporting to the deputy secretary of defense. In 2005 he took a one-year leave from Maxwell to return to the Pentagon to develop ways to detect and destroy improvised explosive devices.

A West Point graduate with a doctorate in history from the University of Wisconsin, Meigs served in the U.S. Army for more than 35 years. He commanded armored units in Vietnam and during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. At the time of his retirement in 2003, he was Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, charged with the oversight of 60,000 soldiers and commanding NATO’s peacekeeping force in Bosnia. His awards included the Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.

In addition to Syracuse University, Meigs taught at the University of Texas and Georgetown University. He also worked as a military analyst with NBC and MSNBC. He published various articles on military policy and leadership, as well as a book, “Slide Rules and Submarines” (National Defense University Press, 1990). From 2010 to 2013, he was president and chief executive of Business Executives for National Security, a nonprofit organization that tries to bring awareness of strategic world problems to senior business leaders.

Meigs is survived by his wife of 53 years, Mary Ann Mellenbruch Meigs; sons, William Meigs and Matthew Meigs; and three grandchildren.

Professor Mark Nevitt: NATO’s Renewed Focus on Climate Change & Security—What You Need to Know

(Just Security | June 23, 2021) Last week, the 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member States released two important security documents: the Brussels Summit Communiqué as well as a Climate Change and Security Action Plan. The Communiqué reaffirmed NATO’s pledge to its founding document, the 1951 Washington Treaty and stated that it is “firmly committed” to the treaty’s critical Article 5 collective self-defense provision. Article 5 bonds each NATO member together, explicitly stating that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies. This Communique represented a welcome departure from the former Administration’s approach to NATO, which failed to even reaffirm the United States’ historic commitment to Article 5.

In addition, the Communiqué also reinvigorated NATO’s approach to climate change, characterizing climate as a security “threat multiplier” and “one of the defining challenges of our times.” In doing so, the Communiqué endorsed NATO’s new Action Plan on Climate Change and Security, which was released the same day. This pithy but powerful plan — just three pages – expressly acknowledges climate change’s role in state political fragility, conflict, displacement, and migration. It also specified four specific action items to keep an eye on:

  1. Awareness: Increase climate awareness among allies via an annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment.
  2. AdaptationAdapt to climate change by incorporating climate change considerations into its work on many areas to include defense planning, training and exercises, and disaster response.
  3. Mitigation: Mitigate NATO’s contribution of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by developing a novel “mapping and analytical methodology” for GHG emissions from military activities and installations.
  4. Outreach: Enhance outreach with a broad swath of climate-partners to include international and regional organizations, the United Nations, EU, academia, and industry.

NATO’s Climate Action Plan reinforces NATO’s commitment to prepare for the climate-security century. As I have previously argued, the future will increasingly be shaped by climate change’s destabilizing impacts — a vision now clearly shared by all 30 NATO members. NATO’s Brussels Communiqué and Climate Action Plan represent welcome, forward-looking steps on climate change. NATO’s focus on climate change is also completely aligned with President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategy, a key, strategic-level national security planning document where “climate” is mentioned 27 times.

Despite these bold pronouncements, questions remain on translating NATO’s bold, strategic climate initiatives into action. As NATO implements the Action Plan, I highlight three questions to help focus our collective attention.

1. How Does the NATO Climate Plan Translate into NATO Arctic Operations?

While the NATO Climate Plan does not explicitly mention the Arctic (a missed opportunity, in my opinion), the Plan should nevertheless signal a shift in NATO’s approach to the rapidly changing Arctic operational environment. Due to climate change, scientists estimate that the Arctic is warming 2-3 times faster than the rest of the world. That pace appears to be accelerating, due to a pernicious feedback melting loop. There even remains the possibility of an ice-free Arctic summer by 2035. This massive melt is opening new navigational trade routes for civilian and military vessels through the Northwest Passage (through Canada) and the Northern Sea Route (along the Russian coastline). Vessels are now increasingly able to transit once impenetrable waterways and are beginning to assess the risks of other historic routes, such as the crowded — and sometimes blocked — Suez Canal. Climate change is also renewing the possibility of natural resource extraction on each Arctic coastal state’s continental shelf. An estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas lies on the Arctic seabed …

Read the full article.

A DPA for the 21st Century

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By the Hon. James E. Baker

Some commentators say the field of artificial intelligence is ungovernable. It covers many fields and capabilities, they note, and involves a breadth of private and academic actors, many working in secrecy to protect intellectual property and profit potentials. But it is an overstatement to call AI ungovernable.

Several existing laws and executive orders give various agencies and elected officials tools to regulate the national security development of AI, as does the Constitution. Policymakers should become familiar with these tools, examine their strengths and shortcomings, and become involved in efforts to modify and improve the AI governance architecture. As with other “ungovernable” areas, like nonproliferation, where there are also myriad actors and challenges, we can design an effective governance architecture if we are purposeful about doing so. This paper considers one of the most important potential tools in this effort, the Defense Production Act (DPA); however, it would be a more effective tool if updated and used to its full effect.

AI development depends on hardware, data, talent, algorithms, and computational capacity.1 Thus, any law that can (1) help ensure an adequate supply of these assets and in appropriate form; and (2) prioritize the use of these assets to achieve national security policy objectives is an important national security tool. That is not to say the DPA’s full authority should be used at this time. Extraordinary tools, such as the DPA’s allocation authority, might more appropriately be used at a moment of emergency, for example, in time of conflict or should another nation achieve an AI breakout creating decisive security advantage.

Thus, at this time, the most important function a debate about the use of the DPA for AI purposes can serve is to shape and condition expectations and understandings about the role such authorities should, or could, play, as well as to identify essential legislative gaps so that we do not learn of these gaps (and are not hesitant to use the authority we have) when the authority is needed. However, in less dramatic manner, the DPA’s other authorities might well be used, or more fully used at this time to shore up America’s AI supply line, as illustrated with the examples below.

While obscure to the public, the DPA got a burst of national attention in early 2020 when the coronavirus pandemic began overwhelming U.S. hospitals, first in New York City and then elsewhere. In the absence of federal leadership, in March 2020 national security specialists familiar with the DPA urged its full use to mobilize the nation’s capacity to provide medical equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE) to address COVID-19.

In April 2020, as the spreading virus was depleting national supplies of ventilators and PPE for health workers, President Donald Trump generated headlines by invoking the DPA, ostensibly to compel businesses to manufacture such equipment. A second order authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to “use any and all authority available” under the DPA to acquire N95 respirator masks from 3M. By mid-July, however, CNN noted that “the Trump administration has made only sparing use of its authorities [under DPA], leaving front-line workers in dire need of supplies like masks, gowns and gloves.”2

The Trump Administration did eventually use the DPA during the second half of 2020 to prioritize contracts (eighteen times to channel raw materials to the manufacture of vaccines and therapeutics) and to incentivize the production of medical supplies like testing swabs; however, the DPA was never used to full effect, nor in a strategic and transparent manner.

In contrast, as a candidate for the White House, President Biden promised full use of the DPA to put the United States on a “war time” footing to meet COVID supply chain challenges. Since assuming office, the Biden Administration has used the DPA, and other laws, to address bottlenecks in the supply chain for components needed for vaccine manufacture and to prioritize supply contracts to allow Merck to assist in making Johnson & Johnson vaccines. In addition, the Biden Administration has used Title III financing authorities to incentivize the building of factories and supply lines for COVID tests and rubber plants for medical gloves.

What is significant here, is not just that the Biden Administration used the DPA to provide vaccine capacity to plug supply chain gaps, it did so after the president-elect and then president conditioned industry for its use in this manner and directed the federal government to lean into the law. It also made “friendly” use of the DPA, identifying needs in consultation and partnership with industry, with a focus on the result rather than the means. These are lessons worth noting in the AI context going forward. With COVID, as with AI, the legal policy question is not whether and how to use the DPA to accomplish a task but how to use the full range of available law effectively, purposefully to meet the nation’s needs, and in a manner consistent with our values. With COVID, it turned out, the DPA was one of several laws that could be used to harness America’s industrial capacity to address the pandemic.

The government’s handling of the pandemic is a topic for another day. The point here is that the mere mention of the DPA’s potential clout reinforced the view, in some people’s eyes at least, that the law is a vehicle to “nationalize” industry, a “commandeering” authority, which empowers the government to take over and run the nation’s defense industries. This fed into an already existing narrative about government regulation and opposition from the Chamber of Commerce.

In fact, as this paper shows, the DPA contains many different authorities, some narrow and others potentially broad in scope. It is important for policymakers to understand that the DPA is not limited to military equipment and actions, and its powers are not solely addressed to, or limited to, “commandeering.” Rather, the law establishes a national mobilization capacity to bring the industrial might of the U.S. to bear on broader national security challenges, including technology challenges and public health challenges. Thus, the DPA is both a potential macro tool and a micro tool. Its application to artificial intelligence can be substantial.


  1. Ben Buchanan, “The AI Triad and What It Means for National Security Strategy” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2020), https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-AI-Triad-Report.pdf
  2. Priscilla Alvarez, Curt Devine, Drew Griffin, and Kristen Holmes, “Trump administration’s delayed use of 1950s law leads to critical supplies shortages,” CNN, July 14, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/13/politics/delayed-use-defense-production-act-ppe-shortages/index.html

Professor Robert Murrett Discusses Afghanistan Withdrawal with WAER

SU Professor Weighs In on President Biden’s Plan to Remove Troops from Afghanistan

(WAER | April 16, 2021) A Syracuse University International Affairs professor says there is reason for concern after the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan this fall.

President Joe Biden announced yesterday the United States will fully remove troops from Afghanistan starting September 11th, exactly 20 years after the conflict began. Maxwell School Professor Robert Murrett also served in the navy for over 30 years. He says the US’ biggest focus now will be monitoring the Taliban’s activity in the country.

“The continued territorial gains which are likely by the Taliban forces, the continued viability of the Afghanistan government and challenges with the Taliban make it to them: whether it’s some sort of shared governing model or one that’s not shared at all in the case of significant territorial gains by the Taliban.” said Murrett …

Read the full story.

Military Times Speaks to Professor Robert Murrett About China’s Navy

China’s navy has more ships than the US. Does that matter?

(Military Times | April 9, 2021) Exactly if and when the increasing antagonism between United States and China will boil over into full-on conflict remains anybody’s guess.

But for now, one thing is as clear as the aqua-blue waters that lap up on the shores of China’s man-made islands in the South China Sea: Beijing’s naval fleet is larger than that of the U.S. Navy.

Citing the Office of Naval Intelligence, a Congressional Research Service report from March notes that the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, was slated to have 360 battle force ships by the end of 2020, dwarfing the U.S. fleet of 297 ships.

Such numbers are hard to pinpoint because the PLAN doesn’t release public reports on its future shipbuilding efforts like the U.S. Navy does …

… When it comes to fleet size, Robert Murrett notes that China’s fleet largely remains in its backyard, while a good number of the U.S. force is underway around the world, making a number-to-number assessment incomplete.

There’s also a tendency to view any maritime conflict between the United States and China as a two-party affair, which sidelines the significant role America’s allies in the region would likely play, Murrett said.

Japan, Australia and South Korea all sport robust navies in the region, and the United States is increasingly working to bring India into the fold as that country deals with its own Beijing-related rivalries.

“We just take for granted the incredible network of allies we have around the world,” Murrett said. “The view from Beijing in terms of maritime partners is pretty bleak. They don’t have any that are worth mentioning” …

Read the full story.

 

 

 

Professor Robert Murrett Talks to Fox News About Russia’s Arctic Build-Up

Putin so upset over Biden’s killer comments he moved 28,000 Russian troops to Ukraine border, report

(Fox News | April 8, 2021) Vladimir Putin was reportedly so angered when President Joe Biden called him a “killer” in his first sit-down interview after taking office, the Russian president left his quarantine, got a COVID vaccination and moved 28,000 Russian troops to the border with Ukraine.

“It was really a shock. And it changed his behavior a lot,” argues Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at Norway’s International Peace Research Institute in Oslo.

Russian Bear bombers went into action, forcing NATO to scramble 10 jets to intercept the Russian warplanes flying over the North Atlantic Ocean last week, a rare show of force near the Arctic. On Monday, Putin quietly changed Russia’s constitution to allow him to stay in power until 2036. He would be 83 years old …

… Vice Admiral Robert Murrett is the deputy director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University and served as the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for four years overseeing the Pentagon’s top secret spy satellites until 2010. He says Russia is developing a series of weapons that are very concerning to the U.S. military.

“The Arctic is a terrific shortcut, whether you’re in an aircraft, whether you’re underneath the surface of the ocean and also for intercontinental ballistic missile, this goes back to the Cold War,” said Murrett, who has spent his career watching Russian military movements.

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed 4 B-1 bombers to an Arctic base in Norway for the first time, another sign that Putin is getting the response he wants: attention and a diversion from his domestic opponents.

Read the full story.


Experts worry Russia is seeking a ‘new Cold War’

(Fox News | April 8, 2021) FOX News’ Jennifer Griffin reports Russia is expanding its military bases in the Arctic on ‘Special Report’ …

Watch the clip.

Professor Robert Murrett: China Has a Large and Growing Navy—What is the Rest of the Story?

By Robert B. Murrett, Deputy Director, Institute for Security Policy and Law

(Military Times | March 22, 2021) There is a good deal of interest these days in the growth of the Chinese navy, known officially as the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Most of the discussion tends to focus on the steady and significant increase in the inventory of PLAN ships and submarines, as well as the gradual expansion of the operational reach of these ships.

However, the other dimensions of seapower that constitute the real effectiveness of any navy are not always sufficiently considered. In the case of China, an assessment of strategy, operational proficiency, regional and global naval power, and leadership deserve additional emphasis.

The PLAN “order of battle” — the total number of ships, submarines, naval aircraft and supporting infrastructure continue to make gains, which will likely continue in future years. With this as a baseline, the strategic, operational and tactical proficiency of the Chinese navy has also made progress in parallel, with varied results. At the strategic level, the Chinese navy has attempted to strike a balance between regional focus on the western Pacific and adjoining waters, and other, sustained operations in distant waters.

While it is accurate that the Chinese navy has expanded the scope of their operations over the past decade, they do not have sustained global presence and reach. Concentrating maritime power in areas such as the East China Sea and South China Sea has certain advantages, although the cumulative impact of years of at-sea time and tough challenges in the world’s oceans is an important barometer of capability. The PLAN will achieve the proficiency associated with extended maritime employment in time, but a strategy which allows both a regional and global deployment posture has yet to be fully realized.

As China’s strategic naval posture is dealt with, operational-level skills associated with complex warfare challenges are a second important standard. Integrated anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air operations are fundamental and can only be gained by hard experience. These warfare basics should be viewed in the context of operational-level integrated joint and combined command, control and communications, and a sober assessment of Chinese capability and experience in this area cannot be overemphasized …

Read the full article.

 

Professor Mark Nevitt: How Will the Presidential Candidates Approach Arctic Policy?

Biden versus Trump: How a new president will affect the Arctic

(High North News | Oct. 30, 2020) With the US election just days away, anxiety is mounting about whether Republican incumbent Donald Trump or Democratic nominee Joe Biden will come away victorious. The stakes have never been higher for the Arctic, say environmental scholars and regional experts …

… Mark Nevitt, an associate professor at the Syracuse University College of Law, agrees that a Biden administration would handle the issue of climate change more effectively.

“It is critically important. We need to work with the leading climate scientists to understand the pace of climate change, permafrost melting, and its impact on local and Indigenous communities”, he says in an email to High North News.

“From a climate science perspective, a future President Biden will emphasize placing resources into better understanding the Arctic’s changing climate. Much like Obama. He has an ambitious, $2 trillion dollar “Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution & Environmental Justice” that is the most-forward looking climate plan of any presidential nominee in history. The Arctic is heavily mentioned and discussed in this context,” he says …

Read the full article.

 

Hon. James E. Baker in the NYT: Invoke the DPA During the Coronavirus Surge

Virus Surge Brings Calls for Trump to Invoke Defense Production Act

(The New York Times | July 22, 2020) Experts, medical workers and elected officials are reviving their call for the Trump administration to ramp up its use of the Defense Production Act to secure critical medical supplies.

In March, as the coronavirus pandemic took hold in the United States and pressure from cities and states grew, President Trump used the act to press General Motors to begin production of ventilators. But four months later, frustrated by what they describe as a lack of federal leadership in the face of continued shortages, critics say the Trump administration is not wielding the act to the extent that it can and should.

“What the federal government—the president or secretaries possessing delegated authority—have not done yet is use the D.P.A. to create a permanent, sustainable, redundant, domestic supply chain for all things pandemic: testing, swabs, N95 masks, etc.,” said Jamie Baker, a former legal adviser to the National Security Council and a professor of national security law at Syracuse University …

Mr. Baker, the national security law professor, said he worried that the federal government’s struggle to supply swabs and protective gear might portend difficulties in widely distributing a vaccine.

“Whatever vaccine is produced, it’s going to involve a vial and a needle,” he said. “If we cannot figure out how to produce enough swabs or tests, will we figure out how to produce enough vaccine or treatments?”

Read the full article:

Putting Arms Control at Risk: Trump’s Hasty Play with the Treaty on Open Skies

By Kamil Szubart*

The US decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) announced by President Donald J. Trump on May 22, 2020, and then followed by a notice submitted by the US Department of State to the depositaries and all other state-parties to the Treaty, seems to be a next step of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle an arms control architecture[1].

“A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.”

This time, President Trump has decided to demolish a framework for conventional arms control.

The pull-out of the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019, and the current resolution toward the OST, has simply led to the decrease of confidence between NATO allies, and it harms both US and European security interests undermining the sense of keeping and developing the arms control systems (both conventional and nuclear) at all. So far, 10 foreign ministers of the European state parties of the treaty have expressed regret over the US announcement[2].

By this step, the Trump Administration will give Russia a useful tool to deepen divisions within the NATO alliance and booster anti-American narrative throughout Europe, especially in Germany and France.

The decision will benefit the Kremlin much more than preventing Russian inspectors from making observation flights over the US territory and gleaning intelligence data on the US critical infrastructure reportedly. Finally, the sudden step of President Trump would likely have an impact on possible bilateral negotiations with Russia to extend the New START Treaty signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010, which expires in February 2021[3].

Understanding the Meaning of Conventional Arms Control

The OST has remained a crucial pillar of the conventional arms control system founded at the end of the Cold War era.

Alongside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document (V.D.), politically binding agreement with its last updated in 2011, the OST has belonged to stand-alone confidence, and security-building measures (CSBMs) developed in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE[4].

Signed on March 24, 1992, and in force since Jan. 1, 2002, the accord permits each of state-parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others’ territories to collect data on military forces, facilities and activities, especially drills and troops’ movements[5].

Each aircraft be equipped with sensors that enable them to observe and identify significant pieces of military equipment, such as main battle tanks, pieces of artillery, jet fighters, combat helicopters or armored fighting vehicles. Through the 1990s and in early 2000s, 34 countries from the OSCE (the Treaty’s initial 27 signatories) have joined and ratified the OST while Kyrgyzstan (a 35th) has signed but not ratified it so far[6].

According to the Treaty, observation flights can be carried out over the others’ entire territories, and no area can be declared off-limits by the state-party[7]. In practice, tensions between the OST state-parties have led to a partial suspension of the Treaty’s provisions.

“The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.”

Since 2010, the Russian Federation has excluded the provision of the OST alongside its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to having recognized both separatist republics as independent states. In response, Georgia has, since 2012, formally suspended Russia’s right to observe its territory. In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit on the OST flights over Russia’s heavily armed Baltic exclave Kaliningrad. The Russians have justified the decision referring to a paragraph of the OST that allows for the legitimate refusal of access to an area bordering a non-signatory state. In 2017, the Trump Administration suddenly declared Russia’s violation of the OST, and it restricted Russian access to Hawaii and Alaska in retaliation[8].

All scheduled observation flights are based on passive and active quotas agreed by the all state-parties annually. A passive quota refers to a certain number of overflights and the geographic size of host-state determines it[9]. Larger state-parties such as the US, Russia sharing its quotas with Belarus—42 quotas a year for the US and Russia each—or Ukraine (12 quotas) hold a higher number of quotas than Portugal or Denmark (Portugal have two and Denmark, six 6).

An active quota is the number of flights it may conduct over other OST countries. The OST does not require state-parties to use all quotas every year. However, the allocation of flights cannot be transferred for the next year. The first flights within the OST regime were carried out in August 2002, and since that time, more than 1,500 air observations have been conducted (including 77 US flights over Russia’s territory).[10]

The Treaty regulates all aspects related to the observation flights, including the time of each flight (which must be completed within 96 hours after arrival at the point of entry), the necessity to submit advance notices (72 hours before the scheduled flight), specific points of entry and exit and refueling airfields, flight plans, information on inspectors, and more.

The OST indicates if each observing party may use its observation aircraft or if it must use planes supplied by the host country. Some state-parties to reduce costs have not owned observation aircraft and exploited aircraft of allies, such as the NATO member countries conducting joined observation flights over Russia and other non-NATO countries[11].  

The Treaty Is not a Primary Intel Asset

Using the Treaty as an intelligence-gathering could have been useful during the Cold War era, but not now.

Although Russia has decided to place within its both aircraft (Tu-214 and Tu-154) used in the OST missions, new digital systems possess a more excellent range and an advanced processing capability, and the imagery could be similar to that available on the commercial market of satellite imagery.

However, under the provision of the Treaty, all new sensors and aircraft must be certified and approved by all states-parties gathered in a decision-making body of the OST: the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). Subsequently, a copy of all data gleaned during each OST flight must be supplied to the overflown state party. Moreover, all state parties receive a mission report from each single observation mission and have the right to purchase the data gleaned by the observing state party.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the information the OST countries, including Russia, collected under the provision of the Treaty is only a value in addition to other means of intelligence gathering, especially satellite imagery. States, including some state-parties, with capabilities in imagery intelligence, can typically obtain better imagery and collect it without informing or passing to review collected data to the other party.

The Priceless Values of Détente

A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.

The Treaty undoubtedly helps to increase transparency and communication between its members. It symbolizes cooperation between distrustful countries or politico-military alliances, and in that respect, is a model for behavior. The OST is also a risk-reduction mechanism to ease tensions between the state-parties. Finally, inspectors on both sides get to know one another during the field implementation of the Treaty, leading to more interaction and more exceptional communication at the inspection level.

Although the Treaty has been in force for 18 years, the idea to set up a framework for each other’s reconnaissance flights over the territories of the US and the Soviet Union sparked in the peak of the Cold War. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed an agreement between both countries to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.

Unfortunately, the US proposal was rejected by the Kremlin, claiming the initiative would be used for espionage. The idea was not abandoned definitely, and President George H.W. Bush resurrected it in 1989. The negotiations between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were launched in 1990, parallel to simultaneous talks on the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990[12].

Both conventional and nuclear arms control systems were born at the end of the Cold War and mirror that era. However, significant progress has not been achieved since that time. Although the 2010 New START Treaty should be considered a small step forward, in the meantime, the systems have been demolished by technology, such as satellite imagery, as well as Russia’s pivot in its foreign and security policy (and that seems to be heading for a confrontation with the West under Putin).

In 2007, Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. Subsequently, in March 2015, Russia abandoned its place in the Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a main decision-making body of the CFE Treaty[13]. The Trump Administration also has taken steps to disassemble of the architecture of arms control worldwide, first with the shutdown of the INF Treaty, and now tinkering with the OST.

Risks Over Benefits

The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.

First, Russia will use the abandonment as a diplomatic weapon to give saliency to the US as a country that has destroyed foundations of the international arms control systems and the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security. Moscow will feature Washington as an untrustworthy and unpredictable partner for cooperation, especially regarding politico-military dimensions. It is also sending a contradictory signal concerning the extension of the New START that expires in 2021, giving Russia a reliable card in this diplomatic play.

Secondly, the exit from the OST will leave the US at a disadvantage position among European allies from NATO, so the US should be prepared for heavy criticism coming from Berlin and Paris and a dozen of other European capitals. The US decision will be seen among European NATO partners as one more instance where the Trump Administration ignores the views and interests of its allies.

Thirdly, it is evident that Russia will use the US decision to put more substantial pressure on the US allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, by arousing insecurity concerning an American military engagement in Europe and its allied credibility.

The goal of Moscow would be to deepen divides within NATO, especially between allies on NATO’s eastern flank and the others. Concurrently, Russia would offer an alternative to the US exit from the OST by proposing Europeans its initiatives either to replace the OST or to renew conventional arms control and cooperative security in Europe without the US. Russian propositions in this matter would surely be taken into consideration by governments of a couple of European allies.

However, there is a positive sign of the Trump Administration’s decision. It will not be the necessary for the US taxpayer to invest in replacing the more than 50-years-old Boeing OC-135B aircraft that US observers and their allies use for combined OTS flights[14].

But in other aspects, the US will lose. There is still a chance to revoke the decision because it will come into force in six months. However, the clock is ticking.


*Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at the Institute for Security Policy and Law (formerly INSCT), via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He worked as a security and defense analyst for think tanks in Poland and abroad, where he was responsible for German security and defense policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic terrorism threats in German-native-speaking countries, and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and conventional arms control. He completed international courses on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document in the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s current workplace.


[1] https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-regret-us-plan-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/

[3] https://www.state.gov/new-start/

[4] https://www.osce.org/arms-control

[5] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/what-is-the-open-skies-treaty-intl/index.html

[6] The 34 state-parties (plus Kyrgyzstan) to the OST are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark (including Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[7] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[8] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/

[9] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[10] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/05/21/donald-trump-abandons-the-open-skies-treaty

[11] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[12] https://armscontrolcenter.org/treaty-open-skies/

[13] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/

[14] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/04/dod-wont-offer-contract-for-new-open-skies-plane-until-treaty-future-clear/