Foreign Relations

Professor Robert Murrett Discusses Afghanistan Withdrawal with WAER

SU Professor Weighs In on President Biden’s Plan to Remove Troops from Afghanistan

(WAER | April 16, 2021) A Syracuse University International Affairs professor says there is reason for concern after the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan this fall.

President Joe Biden announced yesterday the United States will fully remove troops from Afghanistan starting September 11th, exactly 20 years after the conflict began. Maxwell School Professor Robert Murrett also served in the navy for over 30 years. He says the US’ biggest focus now will be monitoring the Taliban’s activity in the country.

“The continued territorial gains which are likely by the Taliban forces, the continued viability of the Afghanistan government and challenges with the Taliban make it to them: whether it’s some sort of shared governing model or one that’s not shared at all in the case of significant territorial gains by the Taliban.” said Murrett …

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Professor Corri Zoli: China Changes Tone as US Changes Administration

By Corri Zoli, Director of Research

A new tone on the part of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials is unmistakable. This was evident in the verbal scuffles in Anchorage, AK, over a week ago at the first diplomatic meeting between China and the new Biden Administration. There, human rights and forced labor violations were raised, including with respect to the Uighurs and other Muslim Turkic minorities in Xinxiang, one of the world’s leading cotton producers. 

“These specific reports, data collection, and outreach efforts are unifying international pressure from many angles to force China to address these severe human rights issues.”

What caught the Biden team off guard was senior CCP diplomat Yang Jiechi’s pointed criticisms of the US’s own record on human rights violations (referencing the Black Lives Matter movement, for instance) and its “long-arm jurisdiction” in foreign interventions across the globe, which had also created instability. A clearly more assertive China made international foreign policy observers around the world take notice when President Xi’s delegation told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that “they don’t have the qualification to say they speak to China from a position of strength.”

Beyond the United States, Chinese officials have recently asserted to other nations, international organizations, and now corporations (H&M, Nike, Converse, Under Armour, and others) that the “era of bullying” of China by foreign powers has come to an end. That includes, according to Chinese official statements, the use of sanctions against China (and President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has not yet removed the Trump-era tariffs and sanctions). 

Both Biden’s and former president Donald J. Trump’s secretaries of state (Mike Pompeo, officially on his last day in office) have publicly accused China of carrying out a genocide against the Uighur and other minority groups, and Canada and the Netherlands have agreed. A block of 30 countries, including the European Union, which has not imposed sanctions since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown—as well as the UK, US, and Canada—have recently imposed new sanctions on China with those allegations in mind.

In addition to the EU and US coordinated response, today, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Working Group on Business and Human Rights used their mandate to express their own deep concerns that the Chinese government was violating what they see as emerging obligations to follow the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. What appears to have prompted their announcement is increasingly reliable accounts of Uighur treatment (in part from BBC, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Human Rights Watch reporting) and results from the UN Human Rights Working Group’s own investigation into the abuses of Uighurs, which have “tainted” China’s cotton supply chains. 

The UN Working Group has reached out to many private businesses in and outside of China who are part of these supply chains involving Xinxiang, as well as 13 other governments that may be implicated in these alleged abuses (and to ensure businesses in their territory respect all human rights throughout their operations). These specific reports, data collection, and outreach efforts are unifying international pressure from many angles to force China to address these severe human rights issues. UN Secretary General António Guterres is currently holding “serious negotiations” with China to gain unfettered access to the Xinjiang region to verify reports of Uighur treatment and persecution.

In response, Chinese officials have called for its own consumer base to boycott Western brands, especially those that have criticized the Chinese government in light of its use of forced labor, detention, reeducation camps, and other reports of crimes against the Uighurs. 

China also has flooded social media with information campaigns to control the narrative and highlight other nation’s human rights’ abuses (including slavery), while trying to persuade their domestic population. Chinese “netizens” and the Chinese Communist Youth League, for instance, also have fought back, telling Western firms that major Chinese e-retailers will remove all of their products from online stores, noting on H&M’s official Weibo account, for instance: “Are you ready [to] completely disappear in China?” and “Countdown to the beginning of withdrawing from the China market,” as reported by Human Rights Watch.

Professor Mark Nevitt: Secretary Pompeo’s Surprising Defense of International Law

Secretary Pompeo’s Surprising Defense of International Law, Allies, and the Law of the Sea Convention

By Mark P. Nevitt

(Just Security | July 15, 2020) On Monday, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a strongly worded, highly legalistic statement lambasting excessive Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea.

I welcome Pompeo’s statement as a substantive legal matter. It is long overdue. Nevertheless, it showcased the United States’ current schizophrenic approach to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its international allies in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere, and international law more generally. The United States should seek to reaffirm and reinforce its commitment to international law through UNCLOS Senate ratification. While doing so is by no means a magic bullet, it would serve as an important signal of the U.S. commitment to a rules-based order in the South China Sea and beyond.

To recap: for years, China has been making excessive claims in the region, pointing to a so-called historic “Nine-Dash Line” as the legal basis for these claims. This envelops an enormous swath of the South China Sea, encroaching on other nations’ maritime boundaries. And China is following through on its excessive claims: it has shown a willingness to employ aggressive tactics — including flexing military muscle — against other coastal states in Southeast Asia. It also has been building massive structures on contested “low tide elevations” and “rocks” in the area. These formerly uninhabited formations barely rise above sea level. They don’t qualify as “islands” under international law and, therefore, don’t create a critically important exclusive economic zone around them. But that has not stopped China from building and asserting one …

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Putting Arms Control at Risk: Trump’s Hasty Play with the Treaty on Open Skies

By Kamil Szubart*

The US decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) announced by President Donald J. Trump on May 22, 2020, and then followed by a notice submitted by the US Department of State to the depositaries and all other state-parties to the Treaty, seems to be a next step of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle an arms control architecture[1].

“A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.”

This time, President Trump has decided to demolish a framework for conventional arms control.

The pull-out of the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019, and the current resolution toward the OST, has simply led to the decrease of confidence between NATO allies, and it harms both US and European security interests undermining the sense of keeping and developing the arms control systems (both conventional and nuclear) at all. So far, 10 foreign ministers of the European state parties of the treaty have expressed regret over the US announcement[2].

By this step, the Trump Administration will give Russia a useful tool to deepen divisions within the NATO alliance and booster anti-American narrative throughout Europe, especially in Germany and France.

The decision will benefit the Kremlin much more than preventing Russian inspectors from making observation flights over the US territory and gleaning intelligence data on the US critical infrastructure reportedly. Finally, the sudden step of President Trump would likely have an impact on possible bilateral negotiations with Russia to extend the New START Treaty signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010, which expires in February 2021[3].

Understanding the Meaning of Conventional Arms Control

The OST has remained a crucial pillar of the conventional arms control system founded at the end of the Cold War era.

Alongside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document (V.D.), politically binding agreement with its last updated in 2011, the OST has belonged to stand-alone confidence, and security-building measures (CSBMs) developed in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE[4].

Signed on March 24, 1992, and in force since Jan. 1, 2002, the accord permits each of state-parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others’ territories to collect data on military forces, facilities and activities, especially drills and troops’ movements[5].

Each aircraft be equipped with sensors that enable them to observe and identify significant pieces of military equipment, such as main battle tanks, pieces of artillery, jet fighters, combat helicopters or armored fighting vehicles. Through the 1990s and in early 2000s, 34 countries from the OSCE (the Treaty’s initial 27 signatories) have joined and ratified the OST while Kyrgyzstan (a 35th) has signed but not ratified it so far[6].

According to the Treaty, observation flights can be carried out over the others’ entire territories, and no area can be declared off-limits by the state-party[7]. In practice, tensions between the OST state-parties have led to a partial suspension of the Treaty’s provisions.

“The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.”

Since 2010, the Russian Federation has excluded the provision of the OST alongside its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to having recognized both separatist republics as independent states. In response, Georgia has, since 2012, formally suspended Russia’s right to observe its territory. In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit on the OST flights over Russia’s heavily armed Baltic exclave Kaliningrad. The Russians have justified the decision referring to a paragraph of the OST that allows for the legitimate refusal of access to an area bordering a non-signatory state. In 2017, the Trump Administration suddenly declared Russia’s violation of the OST, and it restricted Russian access to Hawaii and Alaska in retaliation[8].

All scheduled observation flights are based on passive and active quotas agreed by the all state-parties annually. A passive quota refers to a certain number of overflights and the geographic size of host-state determines it[9]. Larger state-parties such as the US, Russia sharing its quotas with Belarus—42 quotas a year for the US and Russia each—or Ukraine (12 quotas) hold a higher number of quotas than Portugal or Denmark (Portugal have two and Denmark, six 6).

An active quota is the number of flights it may conduct over other OST countries. The OST does not require state-parties to use all quotas every year. However, the allocation of flights cannot be transferred for the next year. The first flights within the OST regime were carried out in August 2002, and since that time, more than 1,500 air observations have been conducted (including 77 US flights over Russia’s territory).[10]

The Treaty regulates all aspects related to the observation flights, including the time of each flight (which must be completed within 96 hours after arrival at the point of entry), the necessity to submit advance notices (72 hours before the scheduled flight), specific points of entry and exit and refueling airfields, flight plans, information on inspectors, and more.

The OST indicates if each observing party may use its observation aircraft or if it must use planes supplied by the host country. Some state-parties to reduce costs have not owned observation aircraft and exploited aircraft of allies, such as the NATO member countries conducting joined observation flights over Russia and other non-NATO countries[11].  

The Treaty Is not a Primary Intel Asset

Using the Treaty as an intelligence-gathering could have been useful during the Cold War era, but not now.

Although Russia has decided to place within its both aircraft (Tu-214 and Tu-154) used in the OST missions, new digital systems possess a more excellent range and an advanced processing capability, and the imagery could be similar to that available on the commercial market of satellite imagery.

However, under the provision of the Treaty, all new sensors and aircraft must be certified and approved by all states-parties gathered in a decision-making body of the OST: the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). Subsequently, a copy of all data gleaned during each OST flight must be supplied to the overflown state party. Moreover, all state parties receive a mission report from each single observation mission and have the right to purchase the data gleaned by the observing state party.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the information the OST countries, including Russia, collected under the provision of the Treaty is only a value in addition to other means of intelligence gathering, especially satellite imagery. States, including some state-parties, with capabilities in imagery intelligence, can typically obtain better imagery and collect it without informing or passing to review collected data to the other party.

The Priceless Values of Détente

A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.

The Treaty undoubtedly helps to increase transparency and communication between its members. It symbolizes cooperation between distrustful countries or politico-military alliances, and in that respect, is a model for behavior. The OST is also a risk-reduction mechanism to ease tensions between the state-parties. Finally, inspectors on both sides get to know one another during the field implementation of the Treaty, leading to more interaction and more exceptional communication at the inspection level.

Although the Treaty has been in force for 18 years, the idea to set up a framework for each other’s reconnaissance flights over the territories of the US and the Soviet Union sparked in the peak of the Cold War. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed an agreement between both countries to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.

Unfortunately, the US proposal was rejected by the Kremlin, claiming the initiative would be used for espionage. The idea was not abandoned definitely, and President George H.W. Bush resurrected it in 1989. The negotiations between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were launched in 1990, parallel to simultaneous talks on the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990[12].

Both conventional and nuclear arms control systems were born at the end of the Cold War and mirror that era. However, significant progress has not been achieved since that time. Although the 2010 New START Treaty should be considered a small step forward, in the meantime, the systems have been demolished by technology, such as satellite imagery, as well as Russia’s pivot in its foreign and security policy (and that seems to be heading for a confrontation with the West under Putin).

In 2007, Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. Subsequently, in March 2015, Russia abandoned its place in the Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a main decision-making body of the CFE Treaty[13]. The Trump Administration also has taken steps to disassemble of the architecture of arms control worldwide, first with the shutdown of the INF Treaty, and now tinkering with the OST.

Risks Over Benefits

The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.

First, Russia will use the abandonment as a diplomatic weapon to give saliency to the US as a country that has destroyed foundations of the international arms control systems and the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security. Moscow will feature Washington as an untrustworthy and unpredictable partner for cooperation, especially regarding politico-military dimensions. It is also sending a contradictory signal concerning the extension of the New START that expires in 2021, giving Russia a reliable card in this diplomatic play.

Secondly, the exit from the OST will leave the US at a disadvantage position among European allies from NATO, so the US should be prepared for heavy criticism coming from Berlin and Paris and a dozen of other European capitals. The US decision will be seen among European NATO partners as one more instance where the Trump Administration ignores the views and interests of its allies.

Thirdly, it is evident that Russia will use the US decision to put more substantial pressure on the US allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, by arousing insecurity concerning an American military engagement in Europe and its allied credibility.

The goal of Moscow would be to deepen divides within NATO, especially between allies on NATO’s eastern flank and the others. Concurrently, Russia would offer an alternative to the US exit from the OST by proposing Europeans its initiatives either to replace the OST or to renew conventional arms control and cooperative security in Europe without the US. Russian propositions in this matter would surely be taken into consideration by governments of a couple of European allies.

However, there is a positive sign of the Trump Administration’s decision. It will not be the necessary for the US taxpayer to invest in replacing the more than 50-years-old Boeing OC-135B aircraft that US observers and their allies use for combined OTS flights[14].

But in other aspects, the US will lose. There is still a chance to revoke the decision because it will come into force in six months. However, the clock is ticking.

*Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at the Institute for Security Policy and Law (formerly INSCT), via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He worked as a security and defense analyst for think tanks in Poland and abroad, where he was responsible for German security and defense policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic terrorism threats in German-native-speaking countries, and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and conventional arms control. He completed international courses on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document in the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s current workplace.

[1] https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-regret-us-plan-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/

[3] https://www.state.gov/new-start/

[4] https://www.osce.org/arms-control

[5] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/what-is-the-open-skies-treaty-intl/index.html

[6] The 34 state-parties (plus Kyrgyzstan) to the OST are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark (including Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[7] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[8] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/

[9] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[10] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/05/21/donald-trump-abandons-the-open-skies-treaty

[11] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[12] https://armscontrolcenter.org/treaty-open-skies/

[13] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/

[14] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/04/dod-wont-offer-contract-for-new-open-skies-plane-until-treaty-future-clear/

China & US Must Cooperate to Lead World Out of Coronavirus Danger

By James B. Steinberg

(Nikkei Asian Review | May 9, 2020) The international response to the COVID pandemic is a watershed moment in the evolution of the international order. At time when the value of global interdependence and international cooperation is already under assault from politicians and popular movements around the world, national leaders and international institutions face a fundamental test: can they turn back the growing tide of inward-looking, zero-sum policies to meet this critical challenge?

It would seem self-evident that the transnational nature of the threat, both to health and to prosperity, should trigger actions emphasizing international cooperation. Yet to an alarming degree, the response has been the opposite. For too many countries, the instinct has been to pull up the drawbridges and point fingers, seeking national solutions at the expense of international collaboration.

From the earliest days, China turned down offers of help from international organizations and foreign experts; refused to freely share complete information; and petulantly blocked Taiwan from World Health Organization emergency meetings.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, similarly, proposed banning travel, halting immigration and cutting off funds for the WHO, more focused on deflecting political fallout than developing an effective response … MORE

James B. Steinberg is University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs, and Law and an SPL faculty affiliate.

World War III Alarmism: It’s Time to Press for Sober, Rational, & Contextual Analysis of the Iran Situation

By Corri Zoli

Let’s begin with the obvious to self-aware observers of the region: “Iran’s so-called retaliation was not smart, to say the least. It was theater for its gullible constituents, and the US seems willing to let it slide.” So said Hassan Hassan about Iran’s ballistic missile attacks on Iraqi bases (Ain Assad and Erbil), which house US forces.

“To state this point as clearly as possible: we are not on the verge of World War III with Iran, despite social media trends.”

Hassan directs the Non-State Actors Program at the nonpartisan Center for Global Policy, focused on improving Mideast governance and US foreign policy. As if on cue, however, Iran’s state media is reporting “heavy US military casualties.”

Hassan is not the only one piercing the veil of alarmism (largely coming from US observers), confusion and ignorance, and disinformation (coming from Iran).

Ali Vaez, Director of the Iran Project at the CrisisGroup, explains Iran’s need for “face-saving measures” and symbolic revenge. Likewise, Illan Goldenberg at the Center for New American Security (CNAS), decodes Iran’s strategy: “This is our response, don’t hit us back. Regional players stay out or suffer the consequences. This may not be escalation just the response they felt they needed to make. Again, everyone CHILL.”

Pentagon officials, as Jake Tapper reported, explain that “Iran deliberately chose targets that would not result in the loss of US life,” emphasizing “[d]eliberate targets, minimum damage, maximum warning/effect.” Even Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif is eager to announce the attacks as “concluded,” even while he justifies this newest round of missile attacks once again on Iraq (after the Dec. 27, 2019, Kirkuk airbase and December 31 embassy attack) as “self-defense.”

“Facing complex conflict dynamics also means we must be open to unexpected or countervailing developments.”

To state this point as clearly as possible: we are not on the verge of World War III with Iran, despite social media trends.

Quite the opposite, the US government has set limits—first economically, now militarily with the Soleimani strike—on Iranian regional escalation dynamics at least since 2017, which caused a bipartisan Congress to reissue sanctions. Historically and in recent years, Iranian asymmetric warfare—with Soleimani at the helm—has hurt stability in the region. It has also become increasingly brazen—targeting Saudi refineries, downing US and Israeli drones, attacking vessels in the Gulf of Oman, and going after civilians in Syria.

Reasonable people can disagree over whether the best US-Iranian foreign policy approach today is limit setting to reestablish deterrence, as per the Trump Administration, or appeasement, engagement, and integration into the geopolitical community, for the previous Obama Administration.

Every public policy—particularly in the demanding domains of international security and foreign affairs—has strengths and weaknesses. What is not fair or good faith analysis, however, is to ratchet up global public fears about impending war as a way to win support for one’s “side.” That confuses policy with politics, without doing the hard, nonpartisan analytical work of contextual analyses, producing facts and evidence, and trying to include multiple—often contradictory—perspectives.

Such an approach reveals a lack of genuine concern about the people facing conflict dynamics first-hand in the Middle East, those who already face extensive human rights violations and are currently protesting such conditions, caused most often by their own leadership and unaccountable forms of governance.

Just last month Iran faced what The New York Times called its “worst unrest in 40 Years,” with anti-government protests across 21 cities—not to mention across the region—followed by the typical “brutal crackdown,” with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps help, resulting in more than 1,500 protesters killed.

For deeper analysis of how Iran and Soleimani’s approach to covert asymmetric warfare destabilized and stalled progress in governance across the Middle East, there are plenty sources for thoughtful, contextual analysis. Hassan’s Guardian essay explains the blow in the defeat of Soleimani to Iranian regional hegemony, domination, and military imperialism. Such an ambitious project was already facing grassroots challenge in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria from cross-community protests. Moreover, Kim Ghattas notes that Soleimani was not only a problem for the US, but “haunted the Arab world,” so that his death has been greeted with often quiet “elation.”

Facing complex conflict dynamics also means we must be open to unexpected or countervailing developments.

Some analysts see the post-Soleimani moment as a win for the region, whether for a stronger Iraq, or a weakened Quds Force. Even non-Trump supporters—such as political risk analyst, Ian Bremmer—note that while there is no “end” to the US-Iran conflict, no “mission accomplished” yet, “for everyone who thought killing Soleimani was going to lead to war, no; it established red-lines and deterrence,” and, more importantly, potentially opened “ a real window” for diplomacy. Ultimately, Bremmer sees the Iran choice as a big “win” and a “big opportunity going forward.”

While it is a bit early to tell, scholars at their best have a public duty to pursue the truth wherever it leads—which may result in inconvenient facts and discoveries—but that ultimately helps to advance society in some way. As a cross-culturally focused law and security scholar, I believe that truth-seeking must include multiple and diverse perspectives, particularly needed to get a complete picture of “wicked problems” or complex social phenomenon, like conflicts.

Yet, the public should also ask hard questions about information accountability today, particularly as information technologies disrupt traditional news reporting standards and methods: why ratchet up ordinary Americans’ fears? Who is responsible and what is their motive for spreading such fear? Is it just to get “clicks” or are we purposely misunderstanding a situation that involves the most serious issues as war, peace, life, and death?

I won’t answer those questions in this analysis, but we all need to insist that public—especially expert commentary and journalism—elevates the discussion and that analysts base their claims in facts, evidence, and informed inquiry, particularly when understanding is such a priority in cases of active conflict.

 

The Soleimani Airstrike: An End to His Signature Middle East Strategy?

By Corri Zoli

Less well-known than Al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden or ISIS’s Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi, the covert Iranian commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani had widespread strategic influence throughout the Middle East. He was responsible for standing up and activating a clandestine infrastructure of organized armed groups from Hezbollah to Hamas and for ongoing instability and insurgency in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and elsewhere. It is for this reason that several terrorism scholars and expert observers—myself included—have identified the Soleimani airstrike as far more significant than that of Osama bin Laden or Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

“Critics of this action will fixate once again on the Trump Administration’s strategy, positing the US as responsible for Mideast conflict and crisis. Some of these critics ignore Soleimani’s two decades of militant infrastructure-building.”

While the repercussions of his death for Mideast dynamics are still unknown, even in these polarized times, the defeat of Soleimani should warrant a clear-eyed recognition that his two decades of orchestrating a covert signature strategy for Mideast insurgency and instability has come to an end.

First, the facts as currently known. On Jan. 3, 2020, Soleimani—head of the elite, external clandestine Quds Force, a division of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—was targeted and killed by a US drone airstrike, authorized by President Donald J. Trump. The strike happened as Soleimani and four Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) members—including Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) Commander Jamal Jafaar Mohammed Ali Āl Ebrahim (Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis)—exited their aircraft at Baghdad International airport.

The five has just arrived from Lebanon or Syria, signaling coordination between Iran’s IRGC and the Iraqi-state supported umbrella PMF, often called the new Iraqi Republican Guard. PMF includes more than 40 largely Shia militia and terrorist groups, including Iran-supported KH, the Khazali Network, and Badr Brigades.

While some commentators have pointed to a post-US strike escalation of tensions, the drone strike that killed Soleimani and company was in fact a response to KH’s provocative 31 Dec., 2019, attacks on the US embassy in Baghdad—a breach of international law—and its 27 Dec., 2019, attack on the Iraqi K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk, which hosts US Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) personnel. During that attack, KH rockets—more than 30—killed a US civilian contractor and injured four US and two Iraqi military personnel. It is for these immediate precursor reasons that the Department of Defense has characterized the Soleimani strike as “defensive.”

Forgotten in recent news, however, were a series of highly provocative attacks since 2017 by IRGC across the region. Last year alone, these include the May 2019 Gulf of Oman oil tanker attacks damaged six commercial ships, including two Saudi Aramco oil tankers; the May 2019 Saudi pipeline attack and the Sept. 14, 2019, unprecedented drone hit on Saudi Aramco’s two major oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais; and the June 20, 2019, attack on a US RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone for which Trump intended to respond but reversed his decision, instead requesting a United Nations Security Council closed-door meeting on Iranian regional escalation. This pattern is why former US military commanders in the region, such as Gen. David Petraeus, have framed the Soleimani strike as a need to reestablish “deterrence.”

From a broader strategic perspective, for those unfamiliar with the region, the killing of Soleimani uncovers plenty of questions about the region’s politics and conflicts: Why in the world would Iran sponsor an irregular militia to attack a sovereign embassy, which Iraq as the host nation is required to protect? Why would Iran support the targeting of a neighbor’s military airbase, particularly when the world’s most powerful military force is on base? Broadening the aperture, why would Iran—with Soleimani as its operational mastermind—ally with Russia to support Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, since 2012, in the Syrian Civil War with brutal atrocities against his own people? Moreover, why would Iran seek to destabilize Yemen—supporting the Houthi insurgency—at Saudi Arabia’s doorstep, thus drawing the Gulf Arab states into the fray?

Welcome to the dynamics of proxy warfare and Soleimani’s signature strategy in the Middle East. At its core, Soleimani aimed to blend the power of the state (Iran, and its political power) with the dynamic activism of violent extremist and militant groups, much like the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Middle East expert Ali Soufan observed. That strategy alone—where nonstate groups can draw on the power of a state—warrants a more disruptive response which utilizes all instruments of national power, including economics and kinetics.

Still one of the best strategic profiles of Soleimani is Dexter Filkins’s 2013 New Yorker essay, “The Shadow Commander” in which Filkins explains how Soleimani was shaped by the 1980s Iran-Iraq War (with its use of chemical weapons) and then tasked as early as 1998 to advance the 1979 Iranian Revolution and reshape the Middle East into the Shia Crescent zone of influence. As part of this vision, Soleimani went on—all at the same time—to help direct and fund Assad’s war in Syria, Hezbollah’s control of Lebanon, and the ongoing insurgencies against US and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (since 2001).

Soleimani’s endgame was to reshape the Mideast into a zone of Iranian influence, thus, advancing the Iranian revolutionary flame ever forward. While this goal is by no means unique to Soleimani—Iran’s Supreme Leaders share this core aspiration—what was unique to the general was his powerful execution of this goal by building a vast covert organizational infrastructure of dozens of Iran-backed militant and terrorist organizations. These proxies and special groups have been increasing at rapid rates due to fighting against US coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Syria and against Islamic State.

In light of Soleimani’s long-term signature strategy, it is not surprising to see successive US administrations designate these proxy and covert forces as terrorist organizations. On April 8, 2019, Soleimani’s IRGC and Quds Force were both designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, augmenting earlier Obama-era Treasury designations in 2007 and 2010. Likewise, in July 2009 under executive orders 13438 and 13224—covering those who threaten stabilization efforts in Iraq—the Obama Administration designated Kata’ib Hezbollah a terrorist organization, the only Iraqi Shiite militia so designated by the US. Soleimani himself was a “specially designated national” (SDN) since 1999, again in 2010 under EO 13382, with additional sanctions after his foiled plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in the United States.

Such tactics also were used at home. In early December the world witnessed an Iran “convulsed” by what The New York Times called its “worst unrest in 40 Years,” with anti-government protests across 21 cities. These protests were followed by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s “brutal crackdown”—with IRGC involvement—resulting in more than 1,500 protesters killed. Iranians were protesting rising fuel prices, the result of economic mismanagement and EU and US sanctions issued in response to IRGC provocations. These included the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which passed overwhelmingly by both houses in 2017 (including sanctions against Russia and North Korea).

There’s no doubt Soleimani will be replaced, but his successor will have very large strategic shoes to fill. Reports indicate that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has regrouped and will replace the head of its agile, covert militant network with Quds Force deputy Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani.

Governments in and beyond the region are collectively holding their breath, hoping that violence will not escalate. Some—such as Russia, Iran’s ally in Syria—criticized the US action and, in turn, praised Soleimani for having “faithfully served and defended the national interests of Iran.” Any realistic account must address the conflicting, multiperspectives in the region. In addition to celebrations among communities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, journalist Kim Ghattas notes that Soleimani was not only a problem for the US, he “haunted the Arab world,” so his death has been greeted with often-quiet “elation.” While Iraq’s parliament will ask for the removal of US forces, some see the post-Soleimani moment as a win for a stronger Iraq. No doubt, US military servicemembers, directly targeted by the IRGC especially in Iraq, offer important insights.

Critics of this action will fixate once again on the Trump Administration’s strategy, positing the US as responsible for Mideast conflict and crisis. Some of these critics ignore Soleimani’s two decades of militant infrastructure-building or the audacity of Kata’ib Hezbollah to target its neighbor’s embassy and airbase. They also forget that KH Commander Muhandis—killed along with Soleimani—was the alleged mastermind of the US and French embassy bombings in Kuwait in 1983, as well as the assassination attempt on Kuwait’s emir in 1985. Such forces have been hard at work for a long time.

While we do not know what happens next, with Soleimani’s demise, Iran and its proxies have lost their strategic architect.

Corri Zoli’s Expertise in Demand as Media Make Sense of Iran Crisis

Corri Zoli, Director of Research for the Institute for Security Policy and Law, helped local media make sense of the Jan. 3, 2019, assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the subsequent Iran Crisis, and what this US military action means for the security of an already volatile Middle East region.

SU Professor: “Something Had to be Done” to Stop Gen. Soleimani’s Influence in Middle East Conflicts

WAER | Jan. 6, 2020

“Something had to be done. Former General David Petraeus was in the news the other day saying, listen, we had to reestablish deterrence somehow because the moves were getting more and more audacious. Closer and closer to US civilian populations, closer and closer to armed forces.”

Read more

SU Counterterrorism expert: Soleimani death may be more significant than Osama bin Laden

CNYCentral | Jan. 3, 2020

… Zoli says Soleimani had even greater military reach throughout the region. He was a man, Zoli says, who helped support unrest in Yemen, Syria and was a key figure behind insurgencies against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“The IEDs were as a tactical strategy in the field was pioneered by Soleimani. So many American service members think of him as responsible for these,” Zoli said.

She says Soleimani was covert but calls him an operational mastermind who built an enormous infrastructure of terrorist groups throughout the Middle East …

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What Led to Airstrike That Killed Iranian Military Commander?

Spectrum News | Jan. 3 2020

“I think everyone is holding their breath in the Middle East right now, there’s significant concern that there will be increased conflict, escalation, dynamics that will involve retaliation,” said Zoli. “There’s no doubt that the US is preparing for that.”

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SPL, CSIS Host Panel on the Future of US-Iran Relations

On Nov. 19, 2019, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, the Syracuse University Institute for Security Policy and Law (SPL) convened a panel of distinguished experts on US foreign policy to discuss the question of US-Iran relations. 

Titled, “Learning from the Past to Inform the Future of US-Iran Relations: On the 40th Anniversary of the Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, What Lies Ahead?” the panelists were:

  • Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State and US Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the UN, India, and Russia
  • Thomas L. Ahern Jr., former intelligence officer and CIA Station Chief in Tehran
  • Osamah Khalil, Associate Professor of History, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

The conversation—moderated by the SPL Director the Hon. James E. Baker—was timed to address the latest developments in US-Iranian relations and to mark a significant anniversary.

Referring to current events, the panel addressed President Donald J. Trump’s decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Nuclear Deal”); the attacks in May and June 2019 on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz; the Sept. 14, 2019, attack on two Saudi oil fields (widely attributed to the Iranian government); and the continuing humanitarian crisis in the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen.

November 2019 also marked the 40th anniversary of the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran (Nov. 4, 1979). The embassy seizure began a 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981 with a diplomatic resolution brokered by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as the Algiers Accords.

The insightful commentary from these experts, as well as a fruitful back-and-forth with the audience of foreign policy professionals and Syracuse alumni, explored the lessons that we can learn from the past in order to inform the future of this critical bilateral relationship.

Watch: Robert B. Murrett Interviews Ambassador Ryan Crocker

At the Rumsfeld Foundation seventh annual Graduate Fellowship Conference in Washington, DC, on Sept. 19-20, 2019, Vice Admiral Robert Murrett, Professor of Practice at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and Deputy Director of the Syracuse University Institute for Security Policy and Law, conducted an engaging interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Diplomat in Residence at Princeton University.

From his service as former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon, Amb. Crocker offered his advice for rising leaders from his wide-ranging experience, as well as remarked on broader diplomatic and security issues of the day.