Nuclear Weapons

Putting Arms Control at Risk: Trump’s Hasty Play with the Treaty on Open Skies

By Kamil Szubart*

The US decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) announced by President Donald J. Trump on May 22, 2020, and then followed by a notice submitted by the US Department of State to the depositaries and all other state-parties to the Treaty, seems to be a next step of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle an arms control architecture[1].

“A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.”

This time, President Trump has decided to demolish a framework for conventional arms control.

The pull-out of the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019, and the current resolution toward the OST, has simply led to the decrease of confidence between NATO allies, and it harms both US and European security interests undermining the sense of keeping and developing the arms control systems (both conventional and nuclear) at all. So far, 10 foreign ministers of the European state parties of the treaty have expressed regret over the US announcement[2].

By this step, the Trump Administration will give Russia a useful tool to deepen divisions within the NATO alliance and booster anti-American narrative throughout Europe, especially in Germany and France.

The decision will benefit the Kremlin much more than preventing Russian inspectors from making observation flights over the US territory and gleaning intelligence data on the US critical infrastructure reportedly. Finally, the sudden step of President Trump would likely have an impact on possible bilateral negotiations with Russia to extend the New START Treaty signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010, which expires in February 2021[3].

Understanding the Meaning of Conventional Arms Control

The OST has remained a crucial pillar of the conventional arms control system founded at the end of the Cold War era.

Alongside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document (V.D.), politically binding agreement with its last updated in 2011, the OST has belonged to stand-alone confidence, and security-building measures (CSBMs) developed in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE[4].

Signed on March 24, 1992, and in force since Jan. 1, 2002, the accord permits each of state-parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others’ territories to collect data on military forces, facilities and activities, especially drills and troops’ movements[5].

Each aircraft be equipped with sensors that enable them to observe and identify significant pieces of military equipment, such as main battle tanks, pieces of artillery, jet fighters, combat helicopters or armored fighting vehicles. Through the 1990s and in early 2000s, 34 countries from the OSCE (the Treaty’s initial 27 signatories) have joined and ratified the OST while Kyrgyzstan (a 35th) has signed but not ratified it so far[6].

According to the Treaty, observation flights can be carried out over the others’ entire territories, and no area can be declared off-limits by the state-party[7]. In practice, tensions between the OST state-parties have led to a partial suspension of the Treaty’s provisions.

“The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.”

Since 2010, the Russian Federation has excluded the provision of the OST alongside its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to having recognized both separatist republics as independent states. In response, Georgia has, since 2012, formally suspended Russia’s right to observe its territory. In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit on the OST flights over Russia’s heavily armed Baltic exclave Kaliningrad. The Russians have justified the decision referring to a paragraph of the OST that allows for the legitimate refusal of access to an area bordering a non-signatory state. In 2017, the Trump Administration suddenly declared Russia’s violation of the OST, and it restricted Russian access to Hawaii and Alaska in retaliation[8].

All scheduled observation flights are based on passive and active quotas agreed by the all state-parties annually. A passive quota refers to a certain number of overflights and the geographic size of host-state determines it[9]. Larger state-parties such as the US, Russia sharing its quotas with Belarus—42 quotas a year for the US and Russia each—or Ukraine (12 quotas) hold a higher number of quotas than Portugal or Denmark (Portugal have two and Denmark, six 6).

An active quota is the number of flights it may conduct over other OST countries. The OST does not require state-parties to use all quotas every year. However, the allocation of flights cannot be transferred for the next year. The first flights within the OST regime were carried out in August 2002, and since that time, more than 1,500 air observations have been conducted (including 77 US flights over Russia’s territory).[10]

The Treaty regulates all aspects related to the observation flights, including the time of each flight (which must be completed within 96 hours after arrival at the point of entry), the necessity to submit advance notices (72 hours before the scheduled flight), specific points of entry and exit and refueling airfields, flight plans, information on inspectors, and more.

The OST indicates if each observing party may use its observation aircraft or if it must use planes supplied by the host country. Some state-parties to reduce costs have not owned observation aircraft and exploited aircraft of allies, such as the NATO member countries conducting joined observation flights over Russia and other non-NATO countries[11].  

The Treaty Is not a Primary Intel Asset

Using the Treaty as an intelligence-gathering could have been useful during the Cold War era, but not now.

Although Russia has decided to place within its both aircraft (Tu-214 and Tu-154) used in the OST missions, new digital systems possess a more excellent range and an advanced processing capability, and the imagery could be similar to that available on the commercial market of satellite imagery.

However, under the provision of the Treaty, all new sensors and aircraft must be certified and approved by all states-parties gathered in a decision-making body of the OST: the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). Subsequently, a copy of all data gleaned during each OST flight must be supplied to the overflown state party. Moreover, all state parties receive a mission report from each single observation mission and have the right to purchase the data gleaned by the observing state party.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the information the OST countries, including Russia, collected under the provision of the Treaty is only a value in addition to other means of intelligence gathering, especially satellite imagery. States, including some state-parties, with capabilities in imagery intelligence, can typically obtain better imagery and collect it without informing or passing to review collected data to the other party.

The Priceless Values of Détente

A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.

The Treaty undoubtedly helps to increase transparency and communication between its members. It symbolizes cooperation between distrustful countries or politico-military alliances, and in that respect, is a model for behavior. The OST is also a risk-reduction mechanism to ease tensions between the state-parties. Finally, inspectors on both sides get to know one another during the field implementation of the Treaty, leading to more interaction and more exceptional communication at the inspection level.

Although the Treaty has been in force for 18 years, the idea to set up a framework for each other’s reconnaissance flights over the territories of the US and the Soviet Union sparked in the peak of the Cold War. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed an agreement between both countries to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.

Unfortunately, the US proposal was rejected by the Kremlin, claiming the initiative would be used for espionage. The idea was not abandoned definitely, and President George H.W. Bush resurrected it in 1989. The negotiations between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were launched in 1990, parallel to simultaneous talks on the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990[12].

Both conventional and nuclear arms control systems were born at the end of the Cold War and mirror that era. However, significant progress has not been achieved since that time. Although the 2010 New START Treaty should be considered a small step forward, in the meantime, the systems have been demolished by technology, such as satellite imagery, as well as Russia’s pivot in its foreign and security policy (and that seems to be heading for a confrontation with the West under Putin).

In 2007, Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. Subsequently, in March 2015, Russia abandoned its place in the Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a main decision-making body of the CFE Treaty[13]. The Trump Administration also has taken steps to disassemble of the architecture of arms control worldwide, first with the shutdown of the INF Treaty, and now tinkering with the OST.

Risks Over Benefits

The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.

First, Russia will use the abandonment as a diplomatic weapon to give saliency to the US as a country that has destroyed foundations of the international arms control systems and the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security. Moscow will feature Washington as an untrustworthy and unpredictable partner for cooperation, especially regarding politico-military dimensions. It is also sending a contradictory signal concerning the extension of the New START that expires in 2021, giving Russia a reliable card in this diplomatic play.

Secondly, the exit from the OST will leave the US at a disadvantage position among European allies from NATO, so the US should be prepared for heavy criticism coming from Berlin and Paris and a dozen of other European capitals. The US decision will be seen among European NATO partners as one more instance where the Trump Administration ignores the views and interests of its allies.

Thirdly, it is evident that Russia will use the US decision to put more substantial pressure on the US allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, by arousing insecurity concerning an American military engagement in Europe and its allied credibility.

The goal of Moscow would be to deepen divides within NATO, especially between allies on NATO’s eastern flank and the others. Concurrently, Russia would offer an alternative to the US exit from the OST by proposing Europeans its initiatives either to replace the OST or to renew conventional arms control and cooperative security in Europe without the US. Russian propositions in this matter would surely be taken into consideration by governments of a couple of European allies.

However, there is a positive sign of the Trump Administration’s decision. It will not be the necessary for the US taxpayer to invest in replacing the more than 50-years-old Boeing OC-135B aircraft that US observers and their allies use for combined OTS flights[14].

But in other aspects, the US will lose. There is still a chance to revoke the decision because it will come into force in six months. However, the clock is ticking.

*Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at the Institute for Security Policy and Law (formerly INSCT), via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He worked as a security and defense analyst for think tanks in Poland and abroad, where he was responsible for German security and defense policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic terrorism threats in German-native-speaking countries, and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and conventional arms control. He completed international courses on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document in the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s current workplace.

[1] https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-regret-us-plan-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/

[3] https://www.state.gov/new-start/

[4] https://www.osce.org/arms-control

[5] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/what-is-the-open-skies-treaty-intl/index.html

[6] The 34 state-parties (plus Kyrgyzstan) to the OST are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark (including Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[7] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[8] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/

[9] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[10] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/05/21/donald-trump-abandons-the-open-skies-treaty

[11] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[12] https://armscontrolcenter.org/treaty-open-skies/

[13] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/

[14] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/04/dod-wont-offer-contract-for-new-open-skies-plane-until-treaty-future-clear/

Professor Corri Zoli Talks Iran & Economic Warfare on WAER

SU National Security Expert: “Economic Warfare” With Iran, Others Might Achieve Results

(WAER | July 17, 2019) With the Iran Nuclear deal hanging by a thread, a Syracuse University national security expert says Iran is using it as a tool to push back against the US, Britain, and other allies to gain a stronger foothold in the region. Corri Zoli is a law professor and Director of Research for the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at SU.

“You have the Middle East/North Africa region going through this enormous transformation right now. Iran is trying to get leverage, trying to be an agent of change in that transformation.”

“They can create enough of a division such that the EU will continue to back their nuclear deal and keep giving them support. They can continue to try and beef up their economic standing, and still do their proxy war meddling in the region. Then they can ultimately achieve their ‘Persian Crescent,’ the idea that they will try to dominate the Middle East.”

Zoli says the nuclear pact is full of structural and policy limitations that allow Iran to push the limits. She says playing nice just doesn’t work with a pro-conflict actor like Iran that has repeatedly tried to destabilize the region. Zoli says the sanctions are a form of diplomacy, even if it seems to be ramping up tensions.

“It’s highly coercive. It’s highly hard power. But as an alternative to actual military intervention, it’s a very strong and powerful tool and the US is uniquely positioned to use it because we have one of the strongest economies in the world.”

Zoli says the Trump administration’s economic sanctions are strategic, if not unpredictable, and could reap results that evaded the Obama administration’s softer touch.

“The accommodationist strategy can be extremely risky. The more economic warfare strategy…not the soft power, but the hard power approach, can be more effective. Political respect is a wonderful thing, a very idealist conception. But many of these nations said ‘prove it.’ Then you’re in the realm of pragmatics. Unless you play in that realm, it’s very hard to get the policy outcomes that you want.”

ECONOMIC WARFARE AS A LARGER STRATEGY

Professor Zoli says the Trump Administration’s use of what she calls “economic warfare” with Iran and others seems to be part of a larger and perhaps effective approach to pressure countries into action.

“You’ve got all the hard power of economics, which is even more pernicious than war. You can really destroy whole economies. In a war, you can hurt certain areas of a country, but you usually don’t grenade the entire economy. Whereas with economic warfare, you truly can.”

Zoli acknowledges this runs the risk of ramping up tensions with Iran, which is being targeted for violating the nuclear deal. She says, however, that political polarization and personalities seem to distract from what might result in positive policy outcomes.

“You have the Middle East/North Africa region going through this enormous transformation right now. Iran is trying to get leverage, trying to be an agent of change in that transformation. The gulf monarchies, with the US as an ally and others, are trying to block that power move.”

Zoli says we’re seeing much the same strategy playing out with North Korea and its nuclear program.

“Where is the economic pressure on North Korea? China. There you’ve got the economic warfare web. The Trump Administratiion and his advisors know that North Korea is essentially a client state of China. Anything it decides to do or not do is going to be based on some kind of prior relationship with China.”

Zoli knows allies might be a bit disgruntled, but NATO’s European states are contributing more to their own defense for the first time in history.

Read the article on WAER.

 

Robert B. Murrett Talks Korea War Games with Stars & Stripes

US, S. Korea officially call off annual military exercises amid nuclear talks with N. Korea

(Stars & Stripes | March 2, 2019) The United States and South Korea canceled key war games in favor of low-profile drills, the allies said Sunday, in a major concession to North Korea days after its nuclear summit with President Donald Trump collapsed without agreement.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels.”

The springtime exercises known as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, along with their autumn counterpart Ulchi Freedom Guardian, have long been the lynchpin of the alliance between Seoul and Washington.

The drills, which include computer simulations and live-fire bombing runs, also have been a touchstone for tensions as the North considers them a rehearsal for an invasion.

The decision to cancel Key Resolve and Foal Eagle had been widely expected after Trump reiterated his own antipathy for the drills, which he has called “very expensive” and “provocative” …

… Last year, the Pentagon said it saved about $14 million with the cancellation of Ulchi Freedom Guardian, which was comparable in size and scope to Foal Eagle and Key Resolve.

Retired Navy Vice Adm. Robert Murrett said small-scale training is insufficient to prepare commanders and troops from both countries to overcome language and other difficulties to fight together if needed.

“That’s a little bit of a Band-Aid, but it doesn’t substitute the larger scale engagement we need to have,” said Murrett, now a Syracuse University professor.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels,” he added.

Read the full article.

Corri Zoli Discusses North Korea Summit with WSYR

Speaking to WSYR’s Dave Allen on June 12, 2018, Director of Research Corri Zoli analyzes the summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean President Kim Jong-un and the fate of the verbal de-nuclearization agreement between the two leaders. While cautioning some skepticism, Zoli says Kim’s action’s before and after the summit offer some amount of hope that a lasting nuclear and peace deal can be reached and that the Western-educated dictator might be a “change agent” for the hermit nation.

Corri Zoli Speaks to CNYCentral About Planning the North Korea Summit

WSTM News Channel 5 | May 24, 2018

Transcript:

HOST: Let’s bring in some new perspective on this international news. Corri Zoli is an assistant professor at the Maxwell school at Syracuse University and a familiar face here on CBS 5.

Thanks for coming in. This is sort of an unconventional from the start, the way this plan for the summit was announced. Maybe it won’t happen, maybe it will. We’re hopeful it’ll happen, and then finally today … what do you make of today’s announcement.

ZOLI: I think that this is a great example of how negotiations are a language of power, so we’re seeing stuff on the surface … somehow this president of all people is impacted by insults … so what we think we’re seeing on the surface is not reflective of what’s actually going on here in terms of the power dynamics …

Fox News Interviews Robert B. Murrett on North Korea Summit

Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un expected to discuss denuclearization, economy during historic summit

(Fox News | May 8, 2018) Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un expected to discuss denuclearization, economy during historic summit

President Donald Trump says a date and location have been set for the U.S.-North Korea summit, though he has yet to give specifics.

“It’s important because of the potential opening it has; there is potential diplomatic progress.”

“We now have a date and we have a location. We’ll be announcing it soon,” Trump told reporters from the White House South Lawn in early May.

In the past, Trump said the meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un would take place sometime in May or early June. It will be the first-ever meeting between a U.S. president and a North Korean leader.

“It’s important because of the potential opening it has; there is potential diplomatic progress,” former Vice Adm. Robert B. Murrett, a professor of practice, public administration and international affairs at Syracuse University, told Fox News.

Murrett, who also serves as deputy director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at the college, specializes in national security, international relations, military and defense strategy.

“This is something we haven’t been able to do for many years,” he added.

Fox News asked Murrett to explain what the summit could mean for this nation’s future, and he answered three questions about the historic event that Americans should know.

Why is this meeting so significant?

Aside from the potential diplomatic benefits between the U.S. and North Korea, the summit could benefit other countries.

“It not just about the United States,” he said, explaining that the meeting could also be a win for “our partners in the east, such as South Korea and Japan, but also areas in the South Pacific region such as Australia.”

He added, “These talks have the ability to reduce security tensions in East Asia and present an opportunity for the U.S. to reinforce the strong links with South Korea, Japan and even China.”

What topics should we expect Kim and Trump to discuss?

Denuclearization will be at the forefront, Murrett said.

North Korea’s “nuclear weapons and ability to deliver them at long distances should be central,” said Murrett, who added that recent talks between North and South Korea “would suggest that it would remain a core issue.”

President Trump says meeting with the leader on North Korea has a chance to be a big event.

But Murrett also expects discussion of the Hermit Kingdom’s role in the global economy.

Despite various sanctions placed on the country, North Korea’s economy grew by 3.9 percent in 2016. But Murrett said diplomatic talks represent the “prospect of North Korea rejoining the family of the Asians” if only from an economic standpoint, potentially opening the door for the country to trade with more than just China.

“It would be in the interest of the people of North Korea,” Murrett added.

Does Trump deserve credit for the summit?

In short: Yes. In part.

While Trump does deserve credit for agreeing to meet with Kim, his decision to do so was likely sparked by “the window of opportunity that has existed because of ongoing pressure” on North Korea to better its relations with surrounding countries and beyond, Murrett said …

Read the full article here.

Corri Zoli Discusses North Korea Talks with CNY Central

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism Director of Research Corri Zoli spoke to Syracuse-area channels 3/5 on March 9, 2018, about the overtures between the United States and North Korea on the subject of nuclear weapons. Zoli called them “interesting developments” that we should approach with a “healthy dose of skepticism” given North Korea’s broken promises in the past …

Robert B. Murrett Speaks to Brazilian Media About Trump’s Visit to Asia

Com trunfos, China recebe americano

(Estadão Jornal Digital | Nov. 8, 2017)

… The President of the Republic of Korea today arrives in Beijing from South Korea. After saying that it was a “waste of time” to talk to North Korea last month, the American adopted a diplomatic tone and invited Pyongyang to “sit at the table” to discuss the nuclear issue. “I think we’re making a lot of progress, I think we’re showing great strength. I think they understand that we have unparalleled strength,” Trump told a news conference alongside South Korean President Moon Jae-in. “In the end, this will work.”

Deputy Director of the Institute of National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University, Robert Murrett evaluated the change in the president’s tone as an attempt to reduce tension in the region. The South Korean president was elected on a platform that advocates negotiation with Pyongyang and rejects any military confrontation. Trump’s bellicose rhetoric was not well received by the South Korean population, who would be directly hit in a possible war. Research by Pew Research has shown that two-thirds of South Korean respondents consider Trump to be “dangerous.”

Murrett recalled that the issue of North Korea will be at the center of Trump’s agenda in Beijing. “Any kind of action against North Korea has to include the Chinese.” …

To read the article in the original Portuguese, click here.

“Never Underestimate”: USA Today Speaks to Robert B. Murrett About Japan’s Military Posture

When it comes to North Korea, what is Japan’s military role?

(USA Today | Nov. 6, 2017) President Trump pressed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Monday to purchase more military hardware from the United States and take a more active role in its defense against North Korea.

“I would never underestimate the Japanese military.”

Trump had privately questioned why Japan didn’t shoot down the North Korean missiles launched over the northern island of Hokkaido in August and September, according to a report Saturday by Japan’s Kyodo News Agency. The report, citing diplomatic sources, said Trump wondered why a nation of “samurai warriors” wouldn’t take action.

At a news conference in Tokyo with Abe, Trump addressed the question, saying: “(Abe) will shoot them out of the sky when he completes the purchase of lots of additional military equipment from the United States. … And we make the best military equipment by far” …

… For more than 60 years Japan has operated the Self-Defense Forces, with some 250,000 air, naval and ground troops that experts say are among the best-trained and most well-equipped in the world.

“I would never underestimate the Japanese military,” said retired vice admiral Robert Murrett, deputy director of the Institute of National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University. “In terms of just sheer military proficiency — unit for unit, person for person, they’re the best military in Asia.”

Murrett said that North Korea is continuing to push Japan to toward a more assertive posture.

“From a policy approach, they’re getting more energetic and less deferential to their neighbors or to the umbrella provided by the United States,” he said …

To read the full article, click here.

 

“Deal Very Carefully”: Robert B. Murrett Weighs US Options Regarding North Korea with Politico

Trump’s tough talk does little to deter North Korea

(Re-published from POLITICO | Aug. 29, 2017) Short of launching a military attack that would carry enormous risks, President Donald Trump has few military options at his disposal to back up his rhetorical assault against North Korea — as some arms control experts and members of Congress fear the president’s tough talk has only increased tensions.

“It is very important to deal very carefully with North Korea. They are [a] less rational actor than other international players.”

Indeed, North Korea’s latest provocation, following a large-scale U.S. military exercise, was seen by many as evidence that Pyongyang has responded to the president’s more bellicose approach than President Barack Obama’s, as well as new international sanctions, by instead stepping up its missile development.

“It makes it a little difficult to continue to be talking about, ‘Oh, you better watch out, North Korea, we’re going to get you,’” said James Moore, a former assistant secretary of Commerce with experience in the region who is now a professor at Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business. “Our options are really very limited.”

The test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Monday was seen as especially provocative because it flew over Japanese territory before splashing down in the ocean, drawing widespread condemnation.

Trump — who earlier this month threatened “fire and fury” upon Pyongyang — on Tuesday issued a statement saying that “all options are on the table.” U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley said that ”enough is enough” as the world body planned to convene an emergency meeting to address the latest development in the crisis.

But it will prove exceedingly difficult at this stage for the Trump administration to compel North Korea to stand down by threats or military moves.

Retired Adm. Robert Murrett, a former director of naval intelligence, said there are a range of options at the military’s disposal — but none of them are likely to make much difference in the near term.

They include sending additional reinforcements to the region in the form of air, ground or naval forces. The United States and South Korea could also conduct additional military exercises like the one completed just as the North Koreans test-launched the latest missile, he said.

American and Japanese military forces were wrapping up the war games called Northern Viper on Hokkaido, the island in northern Japan that was overflown by the North Korean missile. About 2,000 U.S. Marines participated, according to the Defense Department.

Kelsey Davenport, the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, which supports negotiations with North Korea, said that the missile test over Japan is “not surprising” given the timing of both Trump’s recent comments and the military exercise.

“North Korea often responds to threats with threats and to provocations with provocations,” she said.

Murrett also expressed doubt that additional military steps by the United States and its allies would force a change in behavior on the part of Pyongyang resulting in stabilizing the situation.

“It is very important to deal very carefully with North Korea. They are [a] less rational actor than other international players,” said Murrett, who now teaches at Syracuse University.

Yet he stressed that backing down from regularly scheduled military exercises with South Korea and Japan, as some recommended as a way to ease some of the recent tension, is not the answer, either.

“Canceling such a long-planned exercise would have sent the wrong signals” to U.S. allies, he said, and have a “negative impact on our current and long-term readiness.”

Another military option being raised in news reports is for the United States to position “strategic” weapons on the Korean peninsula, such as nuclear-armed bombers. The Pentagon declined to address questions about whether it is contemplating such a move …

To read the whole story, click here.