Russia

Professor Robert Murrett Talks to Fox News About Russia’s Arctic Build-Up

Putin so upset over Biden’s killer comments he moved 28,000 Russian troops to Ukraine border, report

(Fox News | April 8, 2021) Vladimir Putin was reportedly so angered when President Joe Biden called him a “killer” in his first sit-down interview after taking office, the Russian president left his quarantine, got a COVID vaccination and moved 28,000 Russian troops to the border with Ukraine.

“It was really a shock. And it changed his behavior a lot,” argues Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at Norway’s International Peace Research Institute in Oslo.

Russian Bear bombers went into action, forcing NATO to scramble 10 jets to intercept the Russian warplanes flying over the North Atlantic Ocean last week, a rare show of force near the Arctic. On Monday, Putin quietly changed Russia’s constitution to allow him to stay in power until 2036. He would be 83 years old …

… Vice Admiral Robert Murrett is the deputy director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University and served as the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for four years overseeing the Pentagon’s top secret spy satellites until 2010. He says Russia is developing a series of weapons that are very concerning to the U.S. military.

“The Arctic is a terrific shortcut, whether you’re in an aircraft, whether you’re underneath the surface of the ocean and also for intercontinental ballistic missile, this goes back to the Cold War,” said Murrett, who has spent his career watching Russian military movements.

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed 4 B-1 bombers to an Arctic base in Norway for the first time, another sign that Putin is getting the response he wants: attention and a diversion from his domestic opponents.

Read the full story.

Experts worry Russia is seeking a ‘new Cold War’

(Fox News | April 8, 2021) FOX News’ Jennifer Griffin reports Russia is expanding its military bases in the Arctic on ‘Special Report’ …

Watch the clip.

Professor Mark Nevitt: How Will the Presidential Candidates Approach Arctic Policy?

Biden versus Trump: How a new president will affect the Arctic

(High North News | Oct. 30, 2020) With the US election just days away, anxiety is mounting about whether Republican incumbent Donald Trump or Democratic nominee Joe Biden will come away victorious. The stakes have never been higher for the Arctic, say environmental scholars and regional experts …

… Mark Nevitt, an associate professor at the Syracuse University College of Law, agrees that a Biden administration would handle the issue of climate change more effectively.

“It is critically important. We need to work with the leading climate scientists to understand the pace of climate change, permafrost melting, and its impact on local and Indigenous communities”, he says in an email to High North News.

“From a climate science perspective, a future President Biden will emphasize placing resources into better understanding the Arctic’s changing climate. Much like Obama. He has an ambitious, $2 trillion dollar “Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution & Environmental Justice” that is the most-forward looking climate plan of any presidential nominee in history. The Arctic is heavily mentioned and discussed in this context,” he says …

Read the full article.

 

Putting Arms Control at Risk: Trump’s Hasty Play with the Treaty on Open Skies

By Kamil Szubart*

The US decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) announced by President Donald J. Trump on May 22, 2020, and then followed by a notice submitted by the US Department of State to the depositaries and all other state-parties to the Treaty, seems to be a next step of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle an arms control architecture[1].

“A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.”

This time, President Trump has decided to demolish a framework for conventional arms control.

The pull-out of the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019, and the current resolution toward the OST, has simply led to the decrease of confidence between NATO allies, and it harms both US and European security interests undermining the sense of keeping and developing the arms control systems (both conventional and nuclear) at all. So far, 10 foreign ministers of the European state parties of the treaty have expressed regret over the US announcement[2].

By this step, the Trump Administration will give Russia a useful tool to deepen divisions within the NATO alliance and booster anti-American narrative throughout Europe, especially in Germany and France.

The decision will benefit the Kremlin much more than preventing Russian inspectors from making observation flights over the US territory and gleaning intelligence data on the US critical infrastructure reportedly. Finally, the sudden step of President Trump would likely have an impact on possible bilateral negotiations with Russia to extend the New START Treaty signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010, which expires in February 2021[3].

Understanding the Meaning of Conventional Arms Control

The OST has remained a crucial pillar of the conventional arms control system founded at the end of the Cold War era.

Alongside the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document (V.D.), politically binding agreement with its last updated in 2011, the OST has belonged to stand-alone confidence, and security-building measures (CSBMs) developed in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE[4].

Signed on March 24, 1992, and in force since Jan. 1, 2002, the accord permits each of state-parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others’ territories to collect data on military forces, facilities and activities, especially drills and troops’ movements[5].

Each aircraft be equipped with sensors that enable them to observe and identify significant pieces of military equipment, such as main battle tanks, pieces of artillery, jet fighters, combat helicopters or armored fighting vehicles. Through the 1990s and in early 2000s, 34 countries from the OSCE (the Treaty’s initial 27 signatories) have joined and ratified the OST while Kyrgyzstan (a 35th) has signed but not ratified it so far[6].

According to the Treaty, observation flights can be carried out over the others’ entire territories, and no area can be declared off-limits by the state-party[7]. In practice, tensions between the OST state-parties have led to a partial suspension of the Treaty’s provisions.

“The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.”

Since 2010, the Russian Federation has excluded the provision of the OST alongside its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to having recognized both separatist republics as independent states. In response, Georgia has, since 2012, formally suspended Russia’s right to observe its territory. In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit on the OST flights over Russia’s heavily armed Baltic exclave Kaliningrad. The Russians have justified the decision referring to a paragraph of the OST that allows for the legitimate refusal of access to an area bordering a non-signatory state. In 2017, the Trump Administration suddenly declared Russia’s violation of the OST, and it restricted Russian access to Hawaii and Alaska in retaliation[8].

All scheduled observation flights are based on passive and active quotas agreed by the all state-parties annually. A passive quota refers to a certain number of overflights and the geographic size of host-state determines it[9]. Larger state-parties such as the US, Russia sharing its quotas with Belarus—42 quotas a year for the US and Russia each—or Ukraine (12 quotas) hold a higher number of quotas than Portugal or Denmark (Portugal have two and Denmark, six 6).

An active quota is the number of flights it may conduct over other OST countries. The OST does not require state-parties to use all quotas every year. However, the allocation of flights cannot be transferred for the next year. The first flights within the OST regime were carried out in August 2002, and since that time, more than 1,500 air observations have been conducted (including 77 US flights over Russia’s territory).[10]

The Treaty regulates all aspects related to the observation flights, including the time of each flight (which must be completed within 96 hours after arrival at the point of entry), the necessity to submit advance notices (72 hours before the scheduled flight), specific points of entry and exit and refueling airfields, flight plans, information on inspectors, and more.

The OST indicates if each observing party may use its observation aircraft or if it must use planes supplied by the host country. Some state-parties to reduce costs have not owned observation aircraft and exploited aircraft of allies, such as the NATO member countries conducting joined observation flights over Russia and other non-NATO countries[11].  

The Treaty Is not a Primary Intel Asset

Using the Treaty as an intelligence-gathering could have been useful during the Cold War era, but not now.

Although Russia has decided to place within its both aircraft (Tu-214 and Tu-154) used in the OST missions, new digital systems possess a more excellent range and an advanced processing capability, and the imagery could be similar to that available on the commercial market of satellite imagery.

However, under the provision of the Treaty, all new sensors and aircraft must be certified and approved by all states-parties gathered in a decision-making body of the OST: the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). Subsequently, a copy of all data gleaned during each OST flight must be supplied to the overflown state party. Moreover, all state parties receive a mission report from each single observation mission and have the right to purchase the data gleaned by the observing state party.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the information the OST countries, including Russia, collected under the provision of the Treaty is only a value in addition to other means of intelligence gathering, especially satellite imagery. States, including some state-parties, with capabilities in imagery intelligence, can typically obtain better imagery and collect it without informing or passing to review collected data to the other party.

The Priceless Values of Détente

A cornerstone of the OST is trust-building-values and predictability among all 34 state-parties.

The Treaty undoubtedly helps to increase transparency and communication between its members. It symbolizes cooperation between distrustful countries or politico-military alliances, and in that respect, is a model for behavior. The OST is also a risk-reduction mechanism to ease tensions between the state-parties. Finally, inspectors on both sides get to know one another during the field implementation of the Treaty, leading to more interaction and more exceptional communication at the inspection level.

Although the Treaty has been in force for 18 years, the idea to set up a framework for each other’s reconnaissance flights over the territories of the US and the Soviet Union sparked in the peak of the Cold War. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed an agreement between both countries to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.

Unfortunately, the US proposal was rejected by the Kremlin, claiming the initiative would be used for espionage. The idea was not abandoned definitely, and President George H.W. Bush resurrected it in 1989. The negotiations between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were launched in 1990, parallel to simultaneous talks on the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990[12].

Both conventional and nuclear arms control systems were born at the end of the Cold War and mirror that era. However, significant progress has not been achieved since that time. Although the 2010 New START Treaty should be considered a small step forward, in the meantime, the systems have been demolished by technology, such as satellite imagery, as well as Russia’s pivot in its foreign and security policy (and that seems to be heading for a confrontation with the West under Putin).

In 2007, Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. Subsequently, in March 2015, Russia abandoned its place in the Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a main decision-making body of the CFE Treaty[13]. The Trump Administration also has taken steps to disassemble of the architecture of arms control worldwide, first with the shutdown of the INF Treaty, and now tinkering with the OST.

Risks Over Benefits

The decision to abandon the OST will be costly to the US, and the “deal-making” President Trump should be held accountable.

First, Russia will use the abandonment as a diplomatic weapon to give saliency to the US as a country that has destroyed foundations of the international arms control systems and the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security. Moscow will feature Washington as an untrustworthy and unpredictable partner for cooperation, especially regarding politico-military dimensions. It is also sending a contradictory signal concerning the extension of the New START that expires in 2021, giving Russia a reliable card in this diplomatic play.

Secondly, the exit from the OST will leave the US at a disadvantage position among European allies from NATO, so the US should be prepared for heavy criticism coming from Berlin and Paris and a dozen of other European capitals. The US decision will be seen among European NATO partners as one more instance where the Trump Administration ignores the views and interests of its allies.

Thirdly, it is evident that Russia will use the US decision to put more substantial pressure on the US allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, by arousing insecurity concerning an American military engagement in Europe and its allied credibility.

The goal of Moscow would be to deepen divides within NATO, especially between allies on NATO’s eastern flank and the others. Concurrently, Russia would offer an alternative to the US exit from the OST by proposing Europeans its initiatives either to replace the OST or to renew conventional arms control and cooperative security in Europe without the US. Russian propositions in this matter would surely be taken into consideration by governments of a couple of European allies.

However, there is a positive sign of the Trump Administration’s decision. It will not be the necessary for the US taxpayer to invest in replacing the more than 50-years-old Boeing OC-135B aircraft that US observers and their allies use for combined OTS flights[14].

But in other aspects, the US will lose. There is still a chance to revoke the decision because it will come into force in six months. However, the clock is ticking.

*Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at the Institute for Security Policy and Law (formerly INSCT), via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He worked as a security and defense analyst for think tanks in Poland and abroad, where he was responsible for German security and defense policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic terrorism threats in German-native-speaking countries, and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and conventional arms control. He completed international courses on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document in the Bundeswehr Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s current workplace.

[1] https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-regret-us-plan-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/

[3] https://www.state.gov/new-start/

[4] https://www.osce.org/arms-control

[5] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/what-is-the-open-skies-treaty-intl/index.html

[6] The 34 state-parties (plus Kyrgyzstan) to the OST are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark (including Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[7] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[8] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/

[9] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[10] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/05/21/donald-trump-abandons-the-open-skies-treaty

[11] https://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

[12] https://armscontrolcenter.org/treaty-open-skies/

[13] https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/

[14] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/04/dod-wont-offer-contract-for-new-open-skies-plane-until-treaty-future-clear/

What’s Next After the Mueller Report? William C. Banks Speaks to WAER

National Security Expert at SU Speaks About What’s Next After the Mueller Report

(WAER | April 19, 2019) WAER’s Chris Bolt spoke with Professor Emeritus William Banks on some of the legal and historical aspects of the report and what it means going forward.

One of most significant things about the report William Banks says, might be what’s not there. President Trump was never directly interviewed about any of the allegations.

“One of the aspects of his presidency is to treat it more like a business and a personal fiefdom, as though he was a king or autocrat.”

“His responses to the written questions were that he simply didn’t recall, most of the time when the questions probe his state of mind. Had they obtained oral testimonial from the president would be far more difficult to walk away from direct answer to the question about his state of mind.”

Intent would have to be established for prosecutors to be able to bring any charges for obstruction of justice against the president. But that doesn’t mean the investigation didn’t have legal ramifications … he notes two dozen indictments of others came out of it. Still, no direct questioning of President Trump leaves a hole in any possible criminal case.

He found in the report less redaction that he thought by Attorney General William Barr. Most things blacked out had to do with grand jury materials, things relevant to ongoing congressional investigations, and identification of ancillary witnesses. What does concern him, is the lack of objectivity from the Attorney General’s office.

“The willingness of the justice department to go behind the scenes to allow them to prepare their rebuttal today speaks more of an effort to support the administration than it does to simply speak for the rule of law for the United States. So I think this is a very unfortunate aspect of investigation and one that somewhat unique in our history.”

Of course you can’t escape the political aspects of the investigation and the report. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, who’s a presidential candidate, called it an embarrassing display of propaganda. She said in a release that the nation can’t trust a hand-picked attorney general and that congress should see the full, un-redacted report to really find the truth.

Area Congress members John Katko and Anthony Brindisi had different reactions to the release of the report, both speaking at a public event in Oswego. Katko told Syracuse.com he had no problem with Barr’s press conference and then releasing the report. He’s more concerned with what’s in it and how we reduce Russian influence in elections. Brindisi wants to see a full, un-redacted version before drawing conclusions, though he also does not want the investigation to overshadow other issues that need attention. Professor Banks meanwhile believes the prospect of Congress starting impeachment proceedings is not in the cards.

“I think the democrats recognize if they start an inquiry in the house, they may or may not have sufficient votes to impeach there. If they did, they would certainly not have votes to convict to the senate. It would be a way like the Clinton inquiry many years ago, a lot of effort for vey little outcome, any positive outcomes.”

While the President might not face that challenge, Banks says the whole process draws into question just how Mr. Trump views the office.

“One of the aspects of his presidency is to treat it more like a business and a personal fiefdom, as though he was a king or autocrat, rather than a democratically elected leader of a country who shares authority with the congress and the court in between nation government and states. So in many respects, I think the president has treated the office of presidency in a way as no other president has before as though he was above the law. That’s the most dramatic challenge to our constitutional system that I can imagine.”

And he adds things are far from over. There are still ongoing grand jury investigations; congress will have its own investigations and hearings; and Banks expects you should get used to hearing about the report and all manner of reactions to it on the campaign trail.

“I think certainly through the 2020 election, this is not going to be done. And then whatever the result the election produces, certainly the president and perhaps the shape and contour of the congress on the partisan, aside democrats from republicans. Then maybe on the November, 2020, this will all go away, but I doubt that it will before then.”

Listen to the segment.

No Evidence of Collusion? William C. Banks Discusses Senator Burr’s Comments with Bloomberg Law

Senate Intel Leaders Split Over Russia Collusion

(Bloomberg Law | Feb. 13, 2019) Syracuse University Law School Professor William Banks discusses comments made by Richard Burr, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Intelligence committee that the investigation had found no evidence of collusion, Senator Mark Warner, the top democrat on the committee disagreed saying the investigation is still ongoing and the committee still had to interview key witnesses. He speaks with Bloomberg’s June Grasso.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2019-02-13/senate-intel-leaders-split-over-russia-collusion-radio

“Going About His Business:” Bloomberg Discusses the Mueller Probe’s Effect on the Midterms with William C. Banks

William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University Law School, discusses the latest progress in the Mueller Probe, and how the probe, which began in the spring of 2017, could impact the midterm elections.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2018-10-16/affirmative-action-not-on-trial-in-harvard-case-podcast

Banks’ segment begins at 8m 25s. 

William C. Banks Discusses Giuliani’s “Truth” Comments on Bloomberg Law

Giuliani “Truth” Comments Put Trump Interview in Doubt

(Bloomberg Law | Aug. 20, 2018) William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University Law School, discusses recent comments by President Trump’s lead attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who is casting new doubt on an interview between the President and special counsel Robert Mueller. Plus, Kevin Whitelaw, Bloomberg News deputy managing editor, discusses the bank and tax fraud trial of Paul Manafort, which is now in its third day as jurors deliberate on the eighteen counts being brought against President Trump’s former campaign chairman. They speak with Bloomberg’s Peter Barnes and June Grasso.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2018-08-20/giuliani-truth-comments-put-trump-interview-in-doubt-audio

In Hot Water: Bloomberg Speaks to William C. Banks About President Trump’s Latest Legal Issues

(Bloomberg Law | Aug. 10, 2018) William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University Law School, discusses the latest in the negotiations between President Trump’s legal team and Robert Mueller over a sit-down meeting between the President and the special counsel. He speaks with Bloomberg’s June Grasso on Bloomberg Radio’s “Politics, Policy, Power and Law.”

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2018-08-14/trump-lawyers-send-counteroffer-to-mueller-audio

The High North at the 2018 NATO Summit: A Missing Puzzle Piece?

By Kamil Szubart

On July 11-12, 2018, NATO’s head of states and governments met in Brussels to discuss the current security threats to NATO member states. The Brussels Summit was the third meeting, after NATO summits in Newport and Warsaw, leading to a security adaptation of the NATO Alliance to new strategic challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area after the 2014 Russian aggression against Ukraine.

“Despite that China has systematically increased its attention to the High North, Russia will remain the main military competitor for the Nordic states and entire NATO in the region in the nearly future.”

At the 2018 NATO Summit, politicians discussed fair burden-sharing demanded by US President Donald J. Trump, and they have agreed to reshape the NATO command structure by establishing two new operational commands—in the United States at Norfolk, VA, and in Germany at Ulm—to secure military movements across the Atlantic and within Europe. They also boosted cooperation between the European Union and NATO, confirmed NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, launched a new training mission in Iraq, and balanced the Alliance present on both NATO’s eastern and south flanks.

All of these points were placed in the Brussels Summit Declaration, a 79-point document highlighting all decisions approved at the Summit. Unfortunately, not too much attention was given to NATO’s northern flank. NATO leaders kept up its 360° approach that applies to all geographical directions, including NATO’s northern flank. They also confirmed fruitful cooperation with Finland and Sweden. Both countries were invited for the Summit by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and looked forward to strengthening this cooperation (Article 52 of the Declaration).

But nothing was mentioned of the Arctic region, commonly known as the High North, which is a vital area for three European NATO members—Norway, Denmark, and Iceland—as well as for Canada and the United States, which are members of the Arctic Council. (The Arctic Council is composed of eight members: Canada, Denmark (representing Greenland and Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Russia, and the US.)

Despite the fact that the High North is seeing currently peaceful cooperation, the growth of importance of the region and military capabilities of Russia could change this harmony. Therefore, Russian military presence in the High North demands a coherent response from the entire Alliance. Touching on this issue would help the Nordic partners, Canada, and the US strengthen security and prevent a prospective conflict in the region.

Russia’s Increased Presence in the High North

Europeans—ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of violence in Donbas—have observed the rise of Russian assertiveness and hostile activities against NATO alongside its eastern and northern flanks (including the High North). Russia has systematically increased its presence in the High North, focusing on the dispute on the Arctic continental shelf about natural resources and securing maritime routes and arming the region.

Russia’s militarization of the High North had accelerated dramatically since 2014 when the Russian Ministry of Defense established the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command based near Murmansk in the Kola Bay, which plans and commands military operations in the Arctic. On Nov. 30, 2016, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), replacing a 2013 document. Authors of the FPC have highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic to Russia and its foreign and security policy and indicated that the area could witness the increase of international competition shortly. The FPC also completes the Russian military and naval doctrines emphasizing the necessity to increase Russia’s military presence in the High North.

Russia has systematically increased military expenditures to strengthen both conventional and nuclear forces, which could be used in a prospective conflict along its northern coast and on Arctic islands. The Russian Ministry of Defense has particularly developed strategic submarines with Bulava missiles (putting into service Yasen-class submarines); strategic bombers (the TU-160); and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) measures compose of S-300 and S-400 missile systems to secure Russian military facilities in the region.

Alongside strengthening both conventional and nuclear capabilities in the region, Russia has regularly conducted military exercises of its Arctic troops, subordinating to both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Military Oblasts. Morever, Russia has built and equipped four Arctic brigade combat teams (BCT), roughly 16,000 troops combined.

What Next for NATO, Scandanavia, and the High North? Some Recommendations

Despite that China has systematically increased its attention to the High North, Russia will remain the main military competitor for the Nordic states and entire NATO in the region in the nearly future.

On the eve of potential conflict in the Arctic, Russia will not respect the neutrality of Sweden and Finland due to their strong ties with the West and its politico-military institutions. It is highly possible that potential conflict on the Arctic would happen in northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Therefore, it is necessary that NATO influence Sweden and Finland to join the Alliance in the nearly future. Denmark and Norway should also support the narrowing of ties between NATO and NORDEFCO and cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Conversely, NATO should remain a cornerstone of Denmark’s and Norway’s security and defense policy regarding the High North. Both countries need to strengthen the capacity of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces and their contribution into NATO’s collective defense, such as the enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland (eFP) or the tailored Forward Presence in Romania (tFP). Moreover, both countries need to invest more in their military expenditures (Norway currently spends 1.61% of its GDP on defense; Denmark only 1.21%.)

By involving in the enhanced Forward presence (eFP) in the Baltic States and Poland, Norway and Denmark will become credible allies to other NATO member states, and this strategy will help both countries pursue their national interests regarding the High North.

Neither Denmark nor Norway unilaterally should pursue a response to growing Russian assertiveness in the High North; instead, they should fully implement the deterrence and defense strategy (2D) and the NATO’s 360° approach. Therefore, the Alliance must keep its strategic engagement in all NATO’s flanks, including the High North. However, at the same time there is a need to continue dialogue with Russia in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Leadership from the United States is essential for Denmark and Norway to implement NATO’s enhanced northern presence, and both countries should keep and develop strategic ties with the United States.

Furthermore, to conduct effective operations in the High North, the Alliance urgently needs to adopt an Arctic strategy and ensure a common approach to the region’s security challenges. Although NATO decided to deploy four battle groups to NATO’s eastern flank and increase its military presence in Romania and Bulgaria, NATO’s potential to deter Russia remains insufficient. Regarding that, the Alliance must rapidly boost its military presence on its northern flank and have troops ready to be deployed to the High North, such as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Maintaining the ability to a swiftly deploy the VJTF and the NRF troops to the region is crucial to improving NATO’s capacity to deter Russia effectively. Therefore, both the VJTF and the NRF troops must practice conducting operations in adverse weather conditions and severe environments, something that is part of the upcoming military exercises called Trident Juncture 2018 in Norway (October and November 2018).

Finally, all NATO decisions strengthening the NATO’s military presence in the High North must ensure military transparency throughout the 2011 Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.

INSCT Research and Practice Associate Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at INSCT, via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He works as an analyst for the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznan, Poland, where he is responsible for German foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic threats in German-native-speaking countries and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and the UN. Currently, he is working on a doctoral dissertation examining US-German relations in the field of international security since 9/11.

“Probability of a Possibility”: William C. Banks Explains the FISA Warrant Process to NBC News

Why Team Trump is wrong about Carter Page, the dossier and that secret warrant

(NBC News | July 23, 2018) Mueller’s Russia probe wasn’t launched because of Carter Page, and the dossier compiled by an ex-spy was only part of the evidence cited to get a warrant.

President Donald Trump and his allies are claiming that the partial contents of a secret national security FISA warrant, released Saturday, vindicate their claim that special counsel Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation was improperly launched on the basis of a speculative opposition research document paid for by Democrats.

The Trump camp says the probe has its roots in the “Trump dossier” compiled by former British spy Christopher Steele, which alleges collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia.

“So we now find out that it was indeed the unverified and Fake Dirty Dossier, that was paid for by Crooked Hillary Clinton and the DNC, that was knowingly & falsely submitted to FISA and which was responsible for starting the totally conflicted and discredited Mueller Witch Hunt!” the president wrote in a tweet Monday morning.

Trump also continues to suggest that the electronic surveillance of his one-time campaign aide, Carter Page, which was authorized by the FISA warrant, launched the Russia probe.

Both of these assertions are false.

Here is why …

National security experts who have reviewed the document say that even the parts that aren’t blacked out contain more than enough information to provide a judge reason to rule that the FBI had probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of Russia.

Probable cause is much lower than the reasonable doubt the standard required to convict someone of a crime. “It’s the probability of a possibility,” said William Banks, director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University College of Law. Page had already appeared on the FBI’s radar as a target of Russian intelligence recruitment in a separate spy case. He has acknowledged that he traveled to Moscow and met with Russian officials during the 2016 campaign. It would have been malpractice for the FBI, confronted with allegations that Page was helping the Russians, not to investigate, Figliuzzi says …

The FBI disclosed to the court that Steele was paid by people seeking to discredit Trump. But the FBI viewed Steele as credible.

“They dealt with the Steele stuff in an extensive footnote with bolded language,” Banks said. The note didn’t disclose that the dossier was paid for by Democrats because the document didn’t use any names or identities. It called Trump “Candidate 1” even after he was elected president. But the note did say that the dossier appeared to be funded by people seeking to discredit Trump.

In addition, Steele was seen not as a partisan operative, but as a credible source, according to the warrant. The document doesn’t say this, but Steele had helped the FBI for years, including providing crucial information in the U.S. investigation of corruption in international soccer.

Read the complete article.